Decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil: Impacts on access to medicines by Nazareno, Regina Céli Scorpione
 i 
 
 
 
Decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance 
in Brazil: impacts on access to medicines 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by 
Regina Céli Scorpione Nazareno 
 
 
 
School of Social Science 
Brunel University 
 
 
September 2013 
 ii 
 
  
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank the Camara Legislativa do Distrito Federal for providing me with the 
sabbatical leave that made it possible for me to complete my PhD at Brunel University. I am 
especially indebted to my colleagues in the Assessoria Legislativa, and particularly those in the 
Unidade de Saúde, Educação, Cultura e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, who have been 
tremendously supportive, encouraging and helpful throughout this period of studies. 
 
I am truly grateful to all my interviewees and informants for their time and co-operation; the ideas 
they shared with me; and the many insights they have allowed me to draw. 
 
My heartfelt thanks go to my supervisor, Dr Barbara Prainsack, for the encouragement, guidance, 
patience and support she has provided me with over this period of studies. I feel truly fortunate to 
have had her as my supervisor. I will never forget the help and support Dr Jason Hughes gave me 
in the search for a new supervisor in 2012. I would also like to thank Dr Timothy Millewa for his 
guidance and supervision in the first stage of my work and Professor Christina Victor for her help 
at decisive moments in my time at Brunel. 
 
I am grateful to the whole of the Department of Sociology and Communications for providing me 
with the necessary support and help. I would particularly like to thank Amreen Malik and Ushma 
Gudka, who have been immensely supportive in many ways. 
 
My beloved parents and brothers, who have supported and encouraged me unconditionally in every 
aspect of my life, inspired and drove me on towards my objective. My deepest love and gratitude 
go to my husband Claudio, and my children Flavio and Gabriela, who have always been at my side 
providing patient support and restoring my spirits with laughter and tenderness. Their love has 
given me the motivation to complete this work. My husband Claudio was also a great office-mate 
during the long writing hours we shared in our tiny study in London. In addition to my family I 
owe many thanks to my friends in London and Brazil for their support, help and friendship. 
 
  
 iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores how decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance was introduced in 
Brazil. Decentralisation aimed to improve access to basic medicines. Nevertheless, the 
inconsistency in the availability of medicines in the Brazilian public health system (SUS - Unified 
Health System) justified the development of two seemingly contradictory, yet co-existing, 
approaches: decentralisation and recentralisation. 
 
The central question of my thesis was how the simultaneous processes of decentralisation and 
recentralisation, which took place between 1998 and 2011, have affected access to medicines 
distributed by SUS. My second aim was to explore how political and power dynamics impacted the 
implementation of decentralisation policies. I carried out semi-structured interviews with key actors 
in policy-making for pharmaceutical assistance; interviewees were selected from among the health 
secretaries and Ministry of Health officials that participated in interfederative boards of agreement. 
The Grounded Theory approach, as well as documentary analysis, informed my data collection and 
analysis.  
 
My findings suggest that decentralisation was important for improving the availability of 
medicines, although levels of improvement varied across the country. Decentralisation in itself was 
not sufficient to improve the availability of medicines largely due to the regional differences. 
Federative relationships involved in the decentralised management of pharmaceutical assistance are 
seen as important by health secretaries, but are considered laborious and time-consuming by 
Ministry of Health officials. Lack of compliance with agreements at state level was mentioned as 
one of the main barriers to further improving access to medicines. In this context of struggle, the 
Popular Pharmacy programme, controlled by the federal government, was created in 2004. The 
initiative, which can be regarded as a recentralisation process, rapidly improved the availability of 
basic medicines. There is no clear indication of which is the best approach for improving access to 
basic medicines in Brazil. Both decentralisation and centralisation worked well in some contexts 
but failed in others. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Access to essential medicines in developing countries is part of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG). It is considered a fundamental part of adequate health care, and is one of the explicit 
targets of the eight international development goals established in 2000 by the United Nations. 
They are to be achieved by the year of 2015.
 1
 The World Health Organization (WHO) regards the 
“equitable availability and affordability of essential drugs as a key indicator for health care quality 
and their availability is a pre-requisite to provide effective care” (WHO, 2002a). Concurrently, 
health system reforms in recent decades have often been premised upon the need to decentralise the 
management, funding and delivery of health services. A plethora of studies have argued the case 
for decentralisation as a means to support and develop health services that will better match the 
needs and preferences of citizens (Willis and Khan, 2009; Koranteng and Larbi, 2008; Bossert, 
Larrañaga and Ruiz Meir, 2000; De Vries, 2000). This pro-decentralisation move also reached the 
Brazilian health system. 
 
Brazil moved towards decentralisation as part of the re-democratisation process that started in the 
1980’s.2 The health sector was the first to be decentralised after some initiatives to promote 
political and fiscal decentralisation (Falleti, 2010:153). The turning point of the health sector in 
Brazil was the establishment of the Unified Health System (SUS - Sistema Único de Saúde) by the 
Constitution of 1988, which accentuated the country’s re-democratisation. Decentralisation is one 
of the pillars of the health system reform that distributed power and responsibilities to subnational 
levels. In essence, after the 1988 Constitution was enacted and SUS created, municipalities became 
responsible for health care provision, whereas states were expected to provide technical and 
                                                          
1
 To provide access to affordable essential medicines in developing countries is within the targets of the 8
th
 
goal. The goals are: 1) Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 2) Achieving universal primary education; 3) 
Promoting gender equality and empowering women; 4) Reducing child mortality rates; 5)Improving maternal 
health; 6)Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7) Ensuring environmental sustainability, and; 
8) Developing a global partnership for development. Source: United Nations, available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml [last accessed 06/08/2013]. 
2
 From 1964 to 1985 Brazil was under military rule. 
 2 
 
financial support. Lastly, the federal level controls the budget, and decides on national policies and 
priorities.
3
 
 
Following the decentralisation of the health care system, basic pharmaceutical assistance also went 
through a process of decentralisation from 1998 onwards. Pharmaceutical assistance is a term 
created in Brazil to designate health care activities involving pharmaceutical drugs (Marin et al., 
2003).
 4
  In this sense, the public delivery of medicines by SUS and its management is also part of 
pharmaceutical assistance.
5
 The main justifications for decentralising the provision of medicines 
were the then insufficient access to essential drugs and the need for a more effective use of local 
knowledge and resources to address local needs. According to the WHO definition, essential drugs 
or “essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population” 
(WHO, 2002b).
6
 Medicines for the treatment of diabetes and hypertension are examples of 
essential medicines. According to WHO guidelines, these drugs should be available in health 
systems continuously, in sufficient amounts and appropriate dosages to meet the needs with assured 
quality and affordable prices. 
 
Although the decentralisation of the responsibilities and management for the provision of basic 
medicines has been implemented across the country for some time already, it has not produced the 
expected impact in terms of improved access. In fact, there are some data on coverage of free 
provision of essential drugs (which I will discuss in the literature review, in Chapter Two) 
suggesting that the issue of access to medicines has not been solved. A fact that does support this 
hypothesis is the increasing number of court cases brought by users against SUS in attempts to 
obtain drugs, mainly high-cost medicines, but also for medicines of primary care which, in theory 
should always be available in public pharmacies (Marques and Dallari, 2007; Vieira and Zucchi, 
2007; Messender, Osorio-de-Castro and Luiza, 2005). These widespread court cases, which led to 
                                                          
3
 Brazil is a federation arranged in 27 states and 5570 municipalities. The three levels are autonomous and 
guided by the national constitution. 
4
 This work uses pharmaceutical drugs, drugs, medicines, medications and medicaments as synonyms.  
5
 Pharmaceutical assistance includes provision of all classes of medicines from those used for the most 
prevalent diseases to those involved in complex treatments such as cancer. This thesis is limited to basic 
pharmaceutical assistance, i.e. the activities involved in the provision of medicines used in primary care. 
6
 Essential medicines include not only drugs intended for primary care but can also include some medicines 
involved in treatments in secondary (medical specialists) and tertiary care (hospitals). In this work, however, 
essential medicines are limited to those used in primary care. Essential drugs, basic medicines, primary care 
drugs, and primary care medicines are used in this thesis as synonyms to designate the drugs used in primary 
care services. 
 3 
 
the term ‘judicialisation’ being coined, have contributed to the worsening of the public provision of 
medicines as significant resources are tied up in providing drugs to a limited number of patients. 
 
Another challenge to the adequacy of the decentralised model of drug provision came from the 
federal government. In what can be regarded as a move towards recentralisation, the Ministry of 
Health has been allocating considerable financial resources to a centralised programme for the 
distribution of basic medicines. In 2004, the Federal Government launched the Popular Pharmacy 
Programme, which emerged as an important initiative towards the expansion of access to 
medicines. The programme is an innovative federal policy that established a users’ co-payment 
scheme for the purchase of medicines in public and community pharmacies.
7
 It operates 
independently from and in parallel with the public distribution of medicines provided by the 
municipalities. According to the Ministry of Health it was introduced as a strategy for 
complementary access to drugs (Ministerio da Saude, 2005b). This programme expanded over the 
years, and is now widespread across the country. Since 2011, the Popular Pharmacy programme 
has also been distributing medicines to treat diabetes and hypertension, free of charge. Subnational 
actors
8
 did not participate in this initiative, which is managed and funded by the federal level. The 
way this programme entered the policy agenda and was implemented shows particular features that 
clearly suggest a change in the federative relations that command the basic pharmaceutical 
assistance policies. 
 
Another intriguing characteristic within the complex context of public pharmaceutical assistance in 
Brazil is the federal programme to fight STD/AIDS, which has brought remarkable advances in 
terms of access to medicines. This programme, considered an international model by many 
researchers, provides free medicines for all who need them. It has a special configuration that had 
not been used in the design and implementation of other initiatives within the pharmaceutical 
assistance in the country. The funding and purchasing are centralised and, in 2008, the expenses of 
the Ministry of Health with the purchase of antiretroviral drugs (ARV) to treat around 180,000 
patients, was about US$ 0.4 billion. That amount represented approximately 20% of total 
expenditure on medicines by the federal level in that year (Barbano, 2008). The resources invested 
to treat this relatively small group of patients (considering the total population of Brazil as being 
close to 197m), contrasts with the resources used to provide the whole list of basic medicines to 
                                                          
7
 Public pharmacies refer to SUS pharmacies, whereas community pharmacies are private businesses. 
8
 In my work the terms ‘subnational actors’ or ‘subnational level’ refer to state and municipal levels of 
government, in this case state and municipal health secretariats. 
 4 
 
primary care services. In 2007 the Ministry of Health spent US$179 million on basic medicines 
while US$400 million were spent to purchase ARV drugs (Vieira, 2009). One could argue that the 
individual cost of ARV medications is high, and this may explain why it necessitates such a large 
amount of money. Despite basic medicines being cheaper than ARV drugs, there are a large 
number of patients to be treated and low availability in the public sector indicates that the demand 
for basic medicines is not being met. In this context, the decision to invest more money in 
STD/AIDS than in basic medicines is in line with an explicit government priority.
9
 Comparing 
public delivery of essential medicines and the federal STD/AIDS programme, the differences in 
terms of access and coverage are remarkable. The STD/AIDS programme has succeeded in 
distributing ARVs, funded and purchased by the Ministry of Health, for all patients in need, 
whereas provision of essential medicines has not reached sufficient coverage. 
 
These different approaches to medicine provision could indicate that pharmaceutical assistance is 
still being developed and the content of the particular policy depends on the nature of the disease to 
be treated and the context in which the policy emerged. This thesis explores the relationship 
between decentralisation, recentralisation, and access to medicines in Brazil. Before introducing 
my central research problem and research questions, it is necessary to provide the context of my 
research, as well as the key themes guiding my investigation.  
 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The second section explores the context within which 
health system reform occurred in Brazil. The third discusses the decentralisation of the health 
sector. The fourth section gives an overview of the Brazilian health system and the interplay 
between the public and the private subsystems. The fifth section discusses the development of 
pharmaceutical assistance within SUS, and the two subsequent sections explain the research 
problems and the structure of the thesis, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The reasons for the distribution of ARV drugs having received significant attention and funds appear to be 
linked to the acute nature and the high degree of mortality of the disease. AIDS received much international 
attention and funding in the 1990s. The STD Department founded in 1986 was responsible for the 
management of these funds, the treatment guidelines, and the ARV purchase and distribution in the country. 
This strategy of centralised administration achieved many positive results, which in turn accredited the 
department for receiving increasing investments.  
 5 
 
1.2 Background to health system reform in Brazil 
The impetus for reforming the Brazilian health care system arose during a protracted period of 
military rule between 1964 and 1985. This period was marked by a political focus upon economic 
development at the expense of social welfare policies and a conscious inculcation of the private 
health sector  trends that helped to accentuate inequalities in access to health care and medicines 
(Labra, 2001; Horn, 1985). Public health programmes were limited to immunisation campaigns and 
epidemic controls overseen by the Ministry of Health (Souza, 2002a). At the same time, in terms of 
health care, the National Institute of Medical Assistance and Social Care (INAMPS – Instituto 
Nacional de Assistencia e Previdencia Social) was responsible for medical and hospital service 
provision under the direction of the Ministry of Social Security. Yet INAMPS was a centralised, 
contribution-based system restricted to workers in the formal job market (Lobato and Burlandy, 
2000). Those covered by this contributory system were concentrated mainly in urban centres in the 
south and southeast regions of Brazil. Consequently, large hospitals and private sector contractors 
in the health field were concentrated in these more developed and populated areas (Souza, 2002b). 
 
Indeed, state expenditure on health care was proportional to the total funds raised by contributions 
within each region. This matched national demand with health care provision but exacerbated 
geographical and social inequalities.
10
 People excluded from such provision could purchase private 
health care if they had the resources for it; if not, they had to rely on philanthropic hospitals and 
institutions. Even though the differences between regions have been decreasing over time, 
geographical and social inequalities in morbidity and mortality rates are still important in Brazil. 
For instance, in 2006, the infant mortality rate in the northeastern region was two times higher than 
that of the southern region (Victora et al., 2011). 
 
The sanitarista movement (a pro-public health movement) emerged in the mid-1970s within the 
context of wider calls for re-democratisation of the country and was dedicated to a democratic 
reform of the health sector. The sanitarista movement was a loosely organised coalition of social 
and political groups which included progressive health care professionals, scholars, trade unionists 
and popular social movements, and it forged broad links with opposition political parties. The 
movement, largely composed of and headed by health care professionals, aimed to tackle what was 
seen as an unequal and inefficient system of health care that focused on cure at the expense of 
                                                          
10
 In general, the southeast region is more economically developed whereas the north and northeast regions 
are less developed. 
 6 
 
prevention. The extent to which the movement reflected wider societal support is still a subject of 
considerable debate (Cohn, 2008; Weyland, 1995; Ministerio da Saude, 1986). The sanitarista 
movement, which had a clear reform proposal, had defined the strategy of gaining access to 
positions within public institutions in the health sector in order to support the reforms (Dowbor, 
2007). Despite ideological differences with the military regime which ruled the country, the 
movement’s health professionals worked in state institutions at all three federative levels. The 
movement’s state-centred strategy meant that, when the return democracy took place, many 
sanitarista activists would already be in position to become policy makers in order to secure the 
desired reforms.  
 
The health reforms which sought to place the state at the centre of public service delivery took 
place in an unfavourable political and historical context, however. Neo-liberal thought was 
underpinning health system reforms in some other Latin American countries; and there was a more 
general re-evaluation of state-centred welfare (Campos, 2007). The privatisation of public sector 
provision was evident in many countries. In this scenario, the foundation of SUS and its 
incorporation into Brazil’s Constitution in 1988 appear quite radical. Access to health care was 
framed as a constitutional right - a “duty of the state” and a “right of the citizen” (Brasil, 1988). 
The founding principles of SUS, thus, encompass universal access, equity and comprehensive care. 
Decentralisation, in this context, was believed to be a way of improving public health in Brazil, as I 
will discuss in the next section. 
 
 
1.3 Health reforms within the context of decentralisation in Brazil 
From the 1980s onwards Brazil implemented decentralisation policies that, along with 
constitutional and electoral reforms, aimed to transfer some responsibilities, resources and 
authority from higher to lower tiers of government (Falleti, 2010:150). Political decentralisation 
included the return to elected governors (between 1980 and 1982) and the recognition of municipal 
autonomy by the Constitution of 1988. The partial decentralisation of fiscal resources, increasing 
automatic transfers of revenues to states and municipalities, started in 1980 and was reinforced in 
1988 with the enactment of the Constitution. The last type of decentralisation policy implemented 
was administrative, and the first changes arising from this occurred in the health sector. Unlike 
other developing countries that embraced decentralisation of central government functions in the 
 7 
 
1980s but granted few revenue-raising power to local levels (Mills et al., 1990), Brazil’s 
decentralisation of health services was preceded by partial fiscal decentralisation (Falleti, 
2010:151).  
 
Before considering the reforms in detail it is useful to recall the political and economic 
environment within which the new policies were introduced. In overall terms, the health reform 
agenda in the 1990s often ran counter to the orthodoxies of political and economic reforms 
entrenched in the 1980s (in particular, the “opening” of the economy championed by neo-liberals) 
(Atkinson, 2002; Costa, 2002). Impediments to change included the remarkable scale of social and 
economic inequality in Brazil, the characteristics of Brazilian federalism and the impact of 
continuing arguments in favour of privatisation in the health sector (Levcovitz, Lima and Machado, 
2001). Neo-liberal reforms that began in the 1980s had stressed the need for structural adjustment 
in the economy, and in times of high inflation, an emphasis was placed on measures to stabilise the 
currency. The reforms also encompassed privatisation of state enterprises, the adoption of 
institutional reforms to reduce the size of the state and the introduction of a new framework for a 
more professional civil service, which required a public examination for civil servants to join the 
career. Although decentralisation was the only principle of SUS that did not conflict directly with 
these precepts in the 1990s, there was still tension in its creation.  
 
The sanitarista movement advocated decentralisation in order to bring health services closer to 
citizens' needs, to expand democratic space, social participation and the role of local governments 
(Campos, 2006). On the agenda of Brazilian health reforms, decentralisation has always been 
linked to broader issues such as the strategy of democratisation and incorporation of new social 
actors (popular or social participation) (Levcovitz, Lima and Machado, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
neo-liberal project of state reform advocated decentralisation as a strategy for modernising public 
administration and reducing the state's role in order to minimise the costs generated by the idea of 
universal health care.  
 
At this point is important to remark that the most prominent example of broad participation of 
various social sectors in policy-making process was the Eighth National Health Conference, held in 
1986, which promoted a wide-ranging discussion of SUS project proposed by the sanitarista 
movement. This Conference drafted SUS, which was made a reality subsequently to the 
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promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 (Fleury, 1997). The National Conferences and National 
Health Council are formal instances of participation and agreement (Guizardi et al., 2004).
11
 These 
are spaces where civil society is given the opportunity to participate in assessing and setting 
guidelines for health policies. The Health Council has the function of controlling and monitoring 
the implementation of policy, while the Health Conferences represent a public arena for democratic 
deliberation about guidelines and assumptions that should inform health policy-making in Brazil.  
 
As a result of this movement, the 1988 Federal Constitution, known as the Citizens’ Constitution, 
included health as a social right (Brasil, 1988). According to this constitutional principle, the state 
must provide the necessary conditions for the effective functioning of the health model proposed. 
Access to health care was, after all, a right of every Brazilian citizen. These principles were 
implemented in the creation of SUS, making the state responsible for maintaining a decentralised, 
universal and equitable health system. In 1991, the Health Organic act, in consonance with SUS’s 
constitutional principles of universality and comprehensiveness, included free access to medicines 
amongst the health rights. 
 
The decentralisation of the health system was a sine qua non for the accomplishment of the newly 
created SUS, and the reforms proposed demanded the development of complementary legislation. 
New regulations, rules, and administrative reforms were needed at all levels of government.  
 
Turning to the drive for decentralisation, from 1991 a series of operational directives from the 
Ministry of Health attempted, gradually, to transfer responsibilities for health services to the 
municipal level. The Basic Operational Standards (NOB), a type of ministerial order, was 
fundamental to the detailed division of responsibilities between the three levels of government.
12
 
The relationship between health stakeholders and the criteria and mechanisms for granting federal 
funds to subnational levels of government were the initial focus of these instruments. Within these 
norms, those related to funding and payment were of particular importance in the decentralisation 
process. Although the norms were introduced to implement decentralisation, it has, parenthetically, 
                                                          
11
 The hierarchy of those instances of agreement within SUS structure is summarised in Figure 1.1.  
12
 NOB means ‘Basic Operational Norm’ and NOAS are ‘Health Assistance Operational Norms’. Four 
regulatory norms setting the operational standards were issued between 1991 and 2001 - NOB 91, NOB 93, 
NOB 96 and NOAS 2001. 
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been argued that the NOBs were simultaneously a tool to strengthen the regulatory powers of the 
Ministry of Health (Levcovitz, Lima and Machado, 2001). 
 
Regarding funding, from its inception until 1998, SUS has worked through a complex and 
centralised payments system by which providers, both public and private, have received moneys on 
the basis of service provision. This payment system meant that the federal level made monthly 
payments according to the bills sent in by public (state or municipally owned) and private providers 
(Collins, Araujo and Barbosa, 2000). From this perspective, the central government’s goal was to 
control the health policy through federal administrative actions based on ‘authorized budget’ 
transfers that would not leave much scope for autonomy on the part of local governments 
(Trevisan, 2007). Similarly, there are claims that municipal autonomy is restricted because the 
transfer of funds is tied to specific actions and assistance programmes and that the federal 
government has used transfers to make wealthy states even wealthier (McCullaugh, 2009). 
Analysing the extensive use of orders at the federal level, Baptista (2007) argues that the Ministry 
of Health has adopted a centralising approach – financial and administrative tools make state and 
municipal governments subject to the system’s rules – without creating a more democratic and 
negotiated approach to the formulation of health policy. 
 
The complexity of SUS required incremental changes to implement mechanisms that would 
overcome potential conflicts and contradictions inherent to the distribution of responsibilities at 
subnational levels (Goulart, 2001). Thus, the decision-making structures of government were 
expanded to include social participation
13
 and to promote the building of alliances between 
stakeholders in order to incorporate the requirements brought by the decentralisation process. Key 
changes included the creation of Health Councils and Tripartite and Bipartite Intergovernmental 
Commissions (CIB and CIT, respectively) – bodies that would include representatives of the 
National Councils of State and Municipal Health Secretaries (CONASS and CONASEMS, 
respectively) in addition to the Ministry of Health representatives. In 1993 the government not only 
deepened the municipalisation process, but also implemented the interfederative boards of 
negotiations (Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission – CIT and Bipartite Intergovernmental 
Commissions – CIBs) in a favourable political environment resulting from the change in President 
of the Republic (Ministerio da Saude, 1993).  
                                                          
13
 Institutionalized popular participation is provided by the Health Councils and Health Conferences at the 
three levels.  
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The new federal health officials were clearly identified with the sanitarista movement, being more 
receptive to the proposed increase in municipalisation and decentralisation of the system. The 
institutional design planning and management of SUS remains in effect until today, featuring 
permanent forums of vertical and horizontal coordination. These bodies were cast as central to 
building relationships between stakeholders at federal, regional and municipal levels. These 
institutionalised forums introduced innovative features to Brazilian governance, enabling a greater 
number and variety of stakeholders to participate in the decision–making process. A clearer 
definition of each government level’s responsibilities in implementing health policy was also 
achieved (Miranda, 2007).  
 
Secondly, another change introduced as the implementation of decentralisation progressed was the 
automatic transfer of federal funds (on either fixed or variable per capita basis) to replace the 
payment for service provided. The automatic transfer of financial resources from federal to 
municipal funds created a direct relationship between the federal and municipal levels. These 
transfers were linked to greater autonomy for the municipal manager and the decentralisation of 
health resources to thousands of municipalities which, until then, had not received federal funds 
directly (Goulart, 2001; Levcovitz, Lima and Machado, 2001). In 1996, the NOB-96 detailed the 
conditions under which municipalities would assume responsibility for the health needs of their 
populations (Andrade, Pontes and Martins Junior, 2000). In order to acquire authority over local 
health services, municipalities had to undergo a process of accreditation against pre-determined 
criteria. Data provided by the Ministry of Health indicate that most of the progress towards 
decentralisation took place in 1998, but there was some variation as to what extent municipalisation 
was adopted and, even now, the process is still not complete (Aguiar, 2006).  
 
It was, however, in the field of primary health care that the changes resulting from the 
implementation of SUS were most evident (Aguiar, 2006). Three major primary health care 
programmes were implemented in the 1990s: the Primary Care Quota (PAB – Piso da Atenção 
Básica), the Community Health Agents Programme (PACS – Programa de Agentes Comunitários 
de Saúde) and the Family Health Programme (PSF – Programa Saúde da Família). Additionally, a 
coordination mechanism called the ‘Primary Care Pact’ (Pacto de Indicadores da Atenção Básica) 
was used to assess the progress of municipalities. 
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The Primary Care Quota introduced in 1998 is a per capita-based federal transfer to fund primary 
care services provided at the local level. It is assigned according to a formula based on resident 
population within each municipality. To receive these transfers, municipalities were required to 
engage in a process of voluntary accreditation. Municipal governments could apply for full 
management of basic care (primary care services only) or full management of the entire health 
system in the municipalities. The requirements for accreditation in full management of basic care 
include: the creation of a municipal health council (to provide popular participation) and a 
municipal health fund (to receive the moneys); the design of the municipal health plan, and the 
provision of evidence of technical, managerial and administrative capacity (Ministerio da Saude, 
1997).  
 
Nevertheless, even today the remit of municipalities is not standardised across the country. 
Currently there are three situations regarding the management of health in municipalities: 82% 
have joined the management pacts, 17% did not join the pact and hold only management of 
primary health care; and about 1% is accredited to the full management of the health system within 
the municipality.
 14
  
 
The Community Health Agents Programme, introduced in 1991, involved the employment of local 
workers under the supervision and management of a nurse.
15
 The programme used the existing 
local infrastructure of clinics to provide working space for the nurses and community health agents, 
but a large proportion of the work of the agents entails home visits (Ministerio da Saude, 1997). By 
1997, 30 million people were being served by the programme (Svitone et al., 2000). In 1997, the 
Ministry of Health merged the Community Health Agents programme into a broader programme – 
the Family Health Programme. Community Health Agents have remained central to service 
delivery, but the scheme has incorporated other health professionals, including general 
practitioners, nurses and nursing assistants. In some areas, dentists, dental hygienists, dental 
assistants and social workers have been included as well (Escorel et al., 2007). Each team works 
within a geographic jurisdiction and is responsible for monitoring the health status of the 
population living in that area, providing primary care services and making referrals to other levels 
                                                          
14
 Source: Sage website from the Ministry of Health http://189.28.128.178/sage/, accessed in 25/05/2013. 
15
 Each nurse oversees a maximum of 30 agents and each community health agent is assigned to a specific 
geographical area, providing service for up to 150 families or 750 individuals. 
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of care as required.
16
 The programme encompassed 96% of Brazilian municipalities by 2007, 
representing 50.7% of the population (about 96 million inhabitants) (Ministerio da Saude, 2009b). 
The initiative has already been linked to a reduced infant mortality rate in Brazil (Macinko, 
Guanais and Souza, 2006).  
 
More broadly, the Family Health Programme combines both centralised and decentralised features 
(Aguiar, 2006). On the one hand, municipalities can decide on many aspects of management but, 
on the other hand, they are subject to federal guidelines specifying the composition of the health 
teams, the number of people that each team is intended to serve, the responsibilities of each health 
care professional and the main health conditions that the programme is supposed to target. The 
rationale for such control is maintenance of national policy objectives and standards, and to avoid 
the potential capture of local systems by municipal agents for their own political gain.  
 
Advancing the decentralisation policy arrangements, in 1999 the federal government introduced the 
Pact of Indicators of Primary Care as a coordination mechanism. The process, led by the Ministry 
of Health, in partnership with state and municipal health secretariats, incorporated mechanisms for 
the monitoring and evaluation of health services based upon targets to be agreed between the three 
levels of SUS management (Ministerio da Saude, 2000a).
 17
 Under the pact, the three levels of 
government negotiate annual targets, based on health indicators, for each municipality. Based on 
the fulfilment of those targets, the federal government accredits states and municipalities for the 
autonomous management of health services (Ministerio da Saúde, 2003). The transfer of federal 
health funds for primary care could, in theory, be withheld if municipalities failed to regularly 
supply data on primary care indicators, or if they failed to establish mechanisms for popular 
participation in the municipal health council. Penalisation for non-compliance is often difficult or 
complicated to enforce, though. Penalisation would normally entail the withholding of federal 
funds, which could affect municipal health services in undesirable ways and undermine the 
rationale for health pacts in the first place. 
 
                                                          
16
 Each team should be responsible for between 600 and 1000 families (2400-4500 people). 
17
 These targets include, for instance, decreasing the incidence of malaria in the Amazon region to less than 
30% and improving the quality of care to the elderly living in institutions for long periods. 
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This trend of signing agreements on targets has been on the rise since 2006 when some of these 
rules and regulations were replaced by less hierarchical arrangements - the Pact for Health, an 
agreement in which managers at every level of government are committed to complying with 
health objectives and responsibilities (Ministerio da Saude, 2006). The Pact for Health approved by 
the CIT in January 2006 brought innovation to the process of entitlement for states and 
municipalities. The Pact aimed to establish joint responsibility in SUS more clearly, in which all 
managers are considered to be invested with full responsibilities, replacing the former accreditation 
process with a new system where they should observe the Statement of Commitment and 
Management (TCG). The TCG has the goals and objectives of the Pact for Health, the duties and 
responsibilities of each manager and the corresponding monitoring indicators. Another important 
element introduced by the Pact concerned the financial resources that changed from monthly 
payments linked to the service delivered, to ‘block funding’ corresponding to a certain amount of 
money to finance the services required to reach the targets agreed in the TCG. Financial incentives 
for the development of management and planning capabilities were also provided under this new 
paradigm of funding. 
 
Despite criticism related to the delays in care, long queues and shortage of drugs, opinion surveys 
on health have been showing a steady rise in the population’s satisfaction with the available 
services on the public health system. In 2010, the survey of the System of Indicators of Social 
Perception (SIPS) conducted by the think-tank Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA – 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) indicated that the services best evaluated by the 
population that uses SUS were the visits by the teams from the Family Health Programme (80.7% 
of respondents) followed by the distribution of free drugs (69.6%) (IPEA, 2011). Alternatively, 
according to IPEA, the most common problems mentioned were lack of doctors (58%), delay in 
treatment in the Basic Health Units (UBS – Unidades Básicas de Saúde) and hospitals (35%) and 
delay for consultation with medical specialist (33.8%). Taking these data into consideration, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that although decentralisation is still underway, improvements in 
health care, if any, are slow and it is difficult to assess their efficacy. 
 
At this point, after this brief discussion on how the public health system developed, it is vital to 
have a general overview of how the whole Brazilian health system is configured. In the next 
section, drawing on the work of Paim et al. (2011) and others, I will outline how SUS currently 
works and how it interacts with the private sector. 
 14 
 
 
 
1.4 The Brazilian health system  
The health system in Brazil developed as a complex network of public and private components 
with participation of complementary and/or competitive service providers and purchasers. 
According to Paim et al. (2011) the health system in Brazil can be separated into three subsystems: 
the public system, represented by SUS; the private health system, which includes for-profit and 
non-profit services; and private health insurance, which offers various types of health plans, 
insurance premiums and tax subsidies. 
 
1.4.1 Public Health system 
The public arm is organised on a hierarchical basis (federal, state and municipal) that nevertheless 
stresses the importance of significant decentralisation. At the municipal level, local authorities are 
responsible for health care delivery.
18
 The state and federal levels provide for technical and 
financial support within the context of central government’s control of the global budget, define 
national health policies and priorities and oversee intra-governmental relationships. The control of 
overall funding by the central government thus has implications for what, in terms of provision and 
access, can be achieved at municipal and state level. Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the instances 
and administration levels that compose SUS.  
  
                                                          
18
 In Brazil the municipal health secretariat is the local health authority. 
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Figure 1.1- SUS agreement forums and mechanisms for operation and coordination 
 
Although in the course of this work I will give detailed information regarding the structures and 
actors of the public health system it is useful to have a picture of the complex mechanisms that 
govern the operation of SUS. I depicted SUS operations in three sections: the executive bodies and 
corresponding representative boards (represented by the Ministry of Health, the state health 
secretariats and the municipal health secretariats, and their representative boards)
 19
; social 
participation (represented by the health councils and health conferences at the three levels) 
20
and 
the interfederative relations (represented by the bipartite and tripartite intergovernmental 
                                                          
19
 Representative boards are: CONASS - the National Council of State Health Secretaries; CONASEMS - 
National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries, and COSEMS – Municipal Council of Health Secretaries. 
20
 Social participation in SUS is provided by the National Health Council-CNS; State Health Councils-CES, 
and Municpal Health Councils-CMS. These councils in each government tier coordinate the corresponding 
Health Conference: National Health Conference-ConfNS; State Health Conference-ConfES, and ConfMS-
Municipal Health Conference. 
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commissions).
 21
 Figure 1.1 shows the three levels of the federation and the corresponding structure 
in each level for provision of services, social participation and the representative boards that 
participate in the interfederative forums of agreement. 
 
1.4.2 The private health-care and private health insurance subsystems  
Historically, limitations on health care provision by the public sector have led to the development 
of an important private sector consisting mainly of medical practices, specialist diagnostic and 
therapeutic clinics, private hospitals and health insurance companies. 
 
Interface with the public sector is related to the provision of services contracted-out by SUS to 
complete the supply of health care. SUS infrastructure is insufficient to meet the demand for public 
services. As a result, the private sector is financed by public and private sources. A major part of 
the private sector consists of private health plans and the health insurance market. Public and 
private corporations’ employees are the majority of the users of these private health plans where 
the insurance is co-financed by the employer and employee. An incongruent feature of the system 
is the fact that if you are a public employee or civil servant you are more likely to have private 
health insurance than relying on the public health system. In 2008, the proportion of the Brazilian 
population holding health insurance represented 21.4% (Ministerio da Saude, 2010). Again, the 
social and economic inequalities are reflected in the distribution of health insurance coverage. 
According to the Ministry of Health, the Southeast region concentrated the highest rate of 
population coverage by private health care plans (28.1%), with about 22.5 million beneficiaries, of 
whom 13.7 million were in São Paulo state alone. 
 
The network of services for diagnosis and therapeutic support is made up almost exclusively by 
for-profit private facilities. In 2002, the public sector had only 5% of the network facilities, 
whereas the private sector held 92%. Within this network, however, only 35% of facilities provided 
services to SUS, compared with 91% selling services for private health insurance. The fact that the 
health system is not merely dual, but largely based on the private network facilities, has 
implications for the operation of SUS. The private services prefer to sell their services to health 
                                                          
21
 The CIT-Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission has representatives of the Ministry of Health, CONASS 
and CONASEMS; and the CIB-Bipartite Intergovernmental Commissions take place in each state of the 
federation and bring together the municipal health secretaries and the state health secretary. 
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insurance corporations, except in procedures for which the amounts paid by SUS are greater than 
those paid by the private sector (Menicucci, 2009). Conversely, the provision of expensive and 
complex health treatments, even for the beneficiaries of private health insurance, falls mainly on 
the public system, which provides for transplantation procedures, cancer treatments, heart surgery 
and assistance in long-term haemodialysis. Regarding this pattern of user’s behaviour, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that SUS is contributing to widening the gap between SUS users and 
citizens with private health plans. Contrasting with SUS users who struggle to gain access to the 
health service, clients of private health plans have access to specialist clinics and diagnostic 
services. With these diagnoses in hand, indicating the necessity of a complex surgery, private 
health plan holders can bypass the long SUS queue for further diagnostic exams (magnetic 
resonance imaging, for instance). They will most probably have their expensive surgery before 
those that only have access to SUS services.  
 
These inequalities in access to treatments and services, inherent to SUS, also contribute to the 
issues surrounding access to medicines. In the next section I will discuss how policies related to 
pharmaceutical assistance have been developed within SUS. 
 
 
1.5 Development in pharmaceutical policy 
Against the backdrop of SUS and its current state of development, this section discusses the key 
policies, programmes and initiatives that shaped the pharmaceutical framework in Brazil with 
regard to supply of basic medicines. In doing so, I will explore six important initiatives within the 
development of basic pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil.  
 
1.5.1 Adoption of essential medicine list 
The use of essential medicine lists was one of the first strategies employed in the construction of 
pharmaceutical policy in Brazil. The first list was established by Presidential Decree in 1964, and 
was previous to the WHO initiative that launched the model of essential medicine lists as a strategy 
to organise provision in developing countries, in 1977 (Bermudez, 1995). From the perspective of 
the production process, in Brazil, the initiatives to stimulate the development of the pharmaceutical 
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industry also date back to the 1960s and 1970s. In order to stimulate the development of the base 
chemical industry, the federal government created the Industrial Development Board (Bermudez, 
1994). In 1971, these productive activities became part of the scope of the newly created Central of 
Medicines (CEME – Central de Medicamentos). 
 
In 1975, that initial list of essential medicines was improved, including more drugs, and was 
renamed National List of Essential Medicines (RENAME – Relação Nacional de Medicamentos 
Essenciais) (Ministério da Saúde, 2010). RENAME was drawn up by CEME staff and listed 305 
pharmaceutical substances covering 99% of the drugs needed by the population. The list was 
supposed to be periodically updated and was proposed to facilitate the rational use of medicines 
and to improve the procurement process. According to Castelo et al. (1991), the strategy of creating 
an essential drugs list allowed the government to procure medicines about 40% cheaper, both by 
buying in bulk and by buying generic brands.  
 
1.5.2 CEME 
In the 1970s the activities relating to medicines were centralised at the federal level. CEME, 
established by the military government, was in charge of writing the essential drugs list, its 
purchase and distribution. The main objectives were the provision of pharmaceutical products for 
the population with low purchasing power, and the incentive of scientific and technological 
research in the chemical-pharmaceutical field. Additionally, CEME was to foster and improve the 
pharmaceutical industry, with emphasis upon pharmaceutical input production by the State (Paula 
et al., 2009; Cosendey et al., 2000). CEME was linked directly to the Presidency of the Republic, 
being at the mercy of ideological and political interests that sometimes diverged from its goals. In 
fact, the provision of the priority medicines listed by CEME was frequently deficient (Cosendey et 
al., 2000). In 1974, CEME was transferred to the Ministry of Social Security as part of an 
organisational restructuring project of the federal government. The restructuring reduced CEME’s 
activities to drug distribution only. In 1975, the government transferred to the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade the promotion and coordination activities aimed at chemical and pharmaceutical 
technology development, which previously were CEME’s remit. 
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Despite the alleged strategic role of CEME in fostering the national pharmaceutical industry, those 
governmental changes and budgetary difficulties undermined the institution (Bermudez and Possas, 
1995). Over 26 years (1971-1997) CEME remained responsible for the main activities related to 
medicine and pharmaceutical services in the country. The economic difficulties that marked the 
Brazilian economy, the low prioritisation of health and a sluggish bureaucracy, resulted in a budget 
that was too low for CEME’s distribution programme. Thus, despite government efforts to improve 
the pharmaceutical services by implementing the list of priority medicines, supply of these drugs 
was precarious and deficient under CEME management (Bermudez, 1994). Examples that may 
confirm that deficiency are reported episodes of shortage of rifampicin for treating tuberculosis in 
primary health centres in variable periods of time (Castelo, Lopes Colombo and Holbrook, 1991).  
 
Arguably, CEME was regarded as an important government initiative translated into a policy to 
improve the access to essential medicines. Nevertheless, this project ideally conceived to 
strengthen the national pharmaceutical industry achieved no substantial results due to conflict of 
interests between public and private sectors, among other reasons. The private view prevailed with 
the hegemony of transnational corporations in the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, and CEME 
gradually lost power until being abolished in 1997 (Kornis, Braga and Zaire, 2008). 
 
1.5.3 Basic Pharmacy 
In 1987, when CEME was still responsible for distribution of medicines, the government created 
the Basic Pharmacy to address deficiencies in the provision of medicines (Cosendey et al., 2000). 
This initiative was designed to provide drugs for primary care. The operational strategy was the 
distribution of a fixed set of 48 medicines, many of them produced by public laboratories. The 
medicines, selected within RENAME, covered the treatment of common diseases. Later, other 
drugs for treatment of chronic conditions were added to a total of 60 medicines. Standard sets of 
medicines were distributed in amounts sufficient to provide three thousand people with essential 
medicines for a period of six months. Distribution of this single set of medicines to the whole 
country (not taking into account the epidemiological differences of each region, among other 
things), however, resulted in the lack of some drugs and excess of others. This in turn caused waste 
but also shortages of specific medicines. This lack of planning in the production and distribution of 
drugs, associated with the discontinuities in later years, had prevented the expected outcome of the 
initiative (Cosendey et al., 2000). 
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The abolishment of the pricing control of drugs by the federal government in 1992, and the 
consequent adjustment of prices by the pharmaceutical industry, generated a crisis evidenced by 
supply problems and significant increase in the sales price at that time (Bermudez and Possas, 
1995). The sales prices of some essential medicines were up to 20 times more expensive compared 
to prices set by UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and the WHO (Abbas and Bermudez, 
1993). Accordingly, an abrupt rise of 54% in the prices of medicines between 1989 and 1999 
(Serra, 1999; Bermudez and Possas, 1995), combined with the inefficiency and discontinuity in 
medicine distribution programmes, exacerbated access problems. The shortage in medicines 
affected, as expected, citizens with limited purchasing power and put additional pressure on the 
federal government (Cosendey, 2000). 
 
CEME’s closure in 1997 leveraged the process of reorganisation of pharmaceutical policy. New 
proposals were placed as a counterpoint to the centralised procurement and distribution of drugs 
charged by CEME (Gomes, 2003). The year that followed the deactivation of CEME marked a 
process of transition in which activities of procurement and distribution of drugs were fragmented 
among different organs of the Ministry of Health, going to the Executive Secretary of Ministry of 
Health, Secretariat of Health Surveillance, Department of Health Policy, and Department of Special 
Projects (Cosendey et al., 2000). 
 
1.5.4 The Basic Pharmacy Programme 
Concomitantly with CEME’s closure, in 1997, in order to increase the public pharmaceutical 
supply, the Ministry of Health created the Basic Pharmacy Programme (PFB – Programa 
Farmácia Básica). The programme was supposed to promote access to essential medicines for the 
population living in the poorest municipalities (Cosendey, 2000). This programme was structured 
along the lines of the Basic Pharmacy run in 1987 except for the size of the municipalities included, 
the medicines distributed, and the management, which was under Ministry of Health rule.
22
 Like 
the previous initiative, the programme used a standard module of 40 essential drugs, which covered 
prescribed drugs to outpatients of primary care services, and drugs were distributed to 
municipalities with up to 21,000 inhabitants. This selection included 4,199 Brazilian municipalities 
except for the states of Sao Paulo, Parana and Minas Gerais, which had already initiated a process 
                                                          
22
 The initiatives shared the same name except for the word ‘programme’. 
 21 
 
of pharmaceutical services reorganisation. As could be expected, this programme showed the same 
failures that the Basic Pharmacy had. A study of the implementation of this programme in five 
Brazilian states showed that the main criticism of local authorities was the inadequacy of the 
standard set of drugs distributed, which did not fit in with the differences in necessity according to 
the diseases’ prevalence in each region (Cosendey, 2000). The author argues that the Ministry of 
Health lost an opportunity to engage the state level in the design of this programme. She argues that 
participation of the state health secretaries in this process could represent an important step toward 
the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
 
1.5.5 National Medicine Policy 
The context of precarious access, worsened by the marked social differences and the distribution of 
medicines without taking into consideration regional needs, boosted the discussion of the need for 
pharmaceutical policies capable of ensuring equitable access. These discussions were led by the 
National Council of State Health Secretaries (CONASS – Conselho Nacional de Secretários 
Estaduais de Saúde) in workshops sponsored in 1997 and 1998, and by the National Health 
Council (CNS – Conselho Nacional de Saúde) (Ministério da Saúde, Conselho Nacional de Saúde, 
2005). 
 
It would be reasonable to suppose that the process of negotiation, social participation and pressure 
that drove the creation of SUS would participate in forging a pharmaceutical policy. There was not, 
however, the same momentum in 1998 when the National Medicines Policy (NMP – Política 
Nacional de Medicamentos) was launched, as was the case in the health reform movement in the 
1980’s. Changes related to pharmaceutical assistance that culminated in the NMP were incremental 
and spread over about ten years since the creation of SUS. Social participation had no significant 
role in the elaboration of the NMP launched in 1998. In fact, the first major forum that provided an 
opportunity for social participation in the field only took place in 2003 in the First National 
Conference on Medicines and Pharmaceutical Assistance. Although decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance was underway at that time, this theme appeared just three times in the 
Conference’s final report. More evident in that report was the need to merge fragmented 
programmes and the integration of pharmaceutical assistance into SUS activities (Ministério da 
Saúde, Conselho Nacional de Saúde, 2005). The report of the First Medicines and Pharmaceutical 
Assistance National Conference argued that the NMP had pulverised the cycle of the 
pharmaceutical assistance into dozens of specific programmes, scattered in different departments of 
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the Ministry of Health, impairing its control and monitoring (Ministério da Saúde, Conselho 
Nacional de Saúde, 2005). 
 
Other linked factors, such as disconnection of pharmaceutical assistance within SUS and the need 
to reorganise it, the lack of an updated standardised list of essential medicines, added to the 
precarious supply of drugs on an outpatient basis contributed to build an urgent case for the 
development of the NMP (Gomes et al., 2001). 
 
Within this perspective, the NMP was launched in 1998, drawing upon the principles and 
guidelines of SUS. This policy introduced what was called the reorientation of pharmaceutical care. 
NMP’s basic premise was the decentralisation of acquisition and distribution of essential drugs.23 
The federal administration, from that moment, was responsible for the transfer of funds and 
provision of technical cooperation. The implementation of this new arrangement started the process 
of decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
The NMP defined pharmaceutical assistance as a “group of drug-related activities designed to 
support the health demands of communities” (Ministerio da Saude, 2000b). Pharmaceutical 
assistance is a term created in Brazil to designate the health care activities involving drugs. 
According to Marin (2003), the definition of pharmaceutical assistance involves comprehensive, 
multi-professional and intersectoral activities connected to the management of services related to 
medicines in its various dimensions, with emphasis on the relationship with the patient, the 
community and health promotion. In this sense, the public delivery and management of medicines 
by SUS is also part of pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
                                                          
23
But the NMP has a broad scope that includes, briefly, the following guidelines: adoption of the essential 
medicines list (the RENAME) to inform the drugs to be prescribed, purchased, and delivered; sanitary 
regulation of medicines; promotion of rational use of medicines; the scientific and technological 
development; promoting the production of medicines; ensuring safety, efficacy and quality of medicines; and 
the development and training of human resources involved in pharmaceutical care (Ministério da Saúde, 
2001). 
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It is worth noting that the decentralisation provided in the NMP, in 1998, was limited to the 
management of the medicines for primary care. In reality, decentralisation only started in 2005 
when funds were transferred to subnational levels. 
 
1.5.6 Popular Pharmacy Programme 
In 2004, taking an additional measure in the process of implementing the access to medicines, the 
Federal Government put into operation the Brazilian Popular Pharmacy Programme (FP – 
Programa Farmácia Popular do Brasil), which emerged as one of the steps taken towards the 
expansion of access to medicines. The programme is considered an innovative policy that 
established the co-payment scheme for the purchase of medicines in public or community 
pharmacies (Ministerio da Saude, 2005b). The programme operates independently and in parallel to 
the provision of public medicines and is regarded as a strategy for complementary access to drugs. 
Pinto (2008), argues that the initiative can be regarded as federal interference in a decentralised 
system. Analysing the implementation of the programme, the author claims that the effectiveness 
of decentralised pharmaceutical assistance managed at local level is being questioned. The model 
of centralised management of basic medicines is returning, as it is considered more effective. 
Reinforcing his arguments, the author asserts that the implementation of the Programme gives the 
federal level the chance to keep activities and products standardised throughout the country, and 
provide gains from large-scale purchases. The Ministry of Health, in February 2011, went a step 
beyond increasing investments in the Popular Pharmacy programme in order to expand the free 
access to essential medicines (Ministerio da Saude, 2011). The drugs to treat diabetes and 
hypertension became available free of charge upon the presentation of a prescription at community 
pharmacies in the programme. It is worth stressing that co-ordination, management and financing 
are centralised at the federal level. 
 
In summary, the elements discussed here impacted on the Brazilian health system, changing public 
services from having restricted access and centralised management during the years of military rule 
to experiencing universal coverage and decentralisation resulting from the reforms introduced in 
the re-democratisation period. The implementation of decentralisation was incremental and 
incorporated elements to improve the role of subnational actors in the provision of health services. 
Following the move, the management of basic pharmaceutical assistance was also transferred to 
municipalities in 1998. Since then there have been multiple efforts by the three government tiers to 
improve the provision of medicines by the municipalities. The legal framework and financial 
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incentives were focused on strengthening the role of subnational actors in this process. This trend 
of decentralisation might be changing, however. The FP programme is a clear indication that the 
federal government is heading in the opposite direction. Having contextualised the pharmaceutical 
assistance within the Brazilian public health system, in the next section I will discuss my research 
questions in this investigation. 
 
 
1.6 Research problem and research questions 
This thesis explores the relationship between decentralisation, recentralisation, and access to 
medicines in Brazil. My central interest is in how the simultaneous processes of decentralisation 
and recentralisation have affected the access to medicines. To answer this question, and to explore 
how political and power dynamics influenced the provision of medicines, this research will 
investigate the following questions: 
1. How has the decentralisation of provision of basic medicines taken place? Who 
were the main actors in this process? What were the main rationales? 
2. How has the federative arrangement of the country affected the decentralisation of 
public provision of medicines in Brazil? 
3. How, and to what extent – if at all – has the public provision of medicines 
improved after decentralisation? 
4. What did the recentralisation of provision of medicines (represented by the Popular 
Pharmacy Programme) mean to the decentralised context of pharmaceutical assistance? 
 
Consequently, my research used two different kinds of sources, each informing and shaping the 
others. An initial “policy review” and interpretation of public domain policy documents, associated 
commentaries and academic publications (summarised in Chapter Two, the literature review) 
helped to identify key interviewees whose insights might be particularly illuminating about the 
dynamics and progress of the decentralisation of pharmaceutical services in Brazil. In addition, 
semi-structured interviews (see below) were conducted with key interviewees across the three tiers 
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of government (federal, state and municipal) who participate in the formal forums of agreement 
within the policy-making for pharmaceutical assistance provided in SUS. 
 
My thesis makes the following contributions to the existing literature: firstly, it contributes to the 
discussion about the limitations of decentralisation, more specifically regarding pharmaceutical 
assistance in federative states; secondly, it offers a new perspective on the understanding of the 
implications of adopting decentralised or centralised strategies for the provision of essential 
medicines; and thirdly, it helps to clarify the mechanisms which govern federative relations and 
their progress in relation to pharmaceutical assistance in SUS as a consequence of the 
decentralisation process.  
 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The study is divided into eight chapters, including this introduction. This first chapter discusses the 
political context within which Brazilian health reform happened. It also outlines the development 
of pharmaceutical policy under the decentralisation process, highlighting the unresolved issues 
regarding access to essential medicines.  
 
The second chapter presents a review of relevant literature and reflects on the definition of 
decentralisation regarding public administration, as well as current debates around decentralisation 
and centralisation of health policies. This chapter also gives a brief account of the political 
justification for adopting decentralisation policies, particularly in relation to health policies. The 
chapter then turns to the contemporary debates concerning the decentralisation-recentralisation 
policies in the field of pharmaceutical assistance within Brazil. That debate is followed by an 
overview of public provision of and access to essential medicines. The chapter finishes with a more 
general review of theoretical and analytical contributions concerning the policy process and 
“power”.  
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Chapter three describes the study’s design and methodology, providing a conceptual rationale for 
the approach taken to the research as well as a detailed description of the methods used. This 
chapter also details the source of data used and the collection method.  
 
Chapters four, five, six and seven primarily use the narratives presented by key actors involved in 
policy-making and decision in Brazil to explore their views and perceptions of the changes 
introduced by decentralisation in the public provision of essential medicines. Those views are 
discussed in conjunction with the related policy documents and legal framework for pharmaceutical 
assistance. Each of these four chapters aims to answer one of the research questions, as detailed 
next.  
Chapter four mainly uses the data I gathered in my interviews to explore how the decentralisation 
of provision of basic medicines has developed and who the main actors and rationales in this 
process were. The chapter is specially focused on decentralisation and centralisation of public 
provision of essential medicines. It presents views of how decentralisation happened, motivations 
and limitations of the process as well as regional differences in the implementation. The kind of 
bottom-up policy-making introduced by decentralisation is also discussed in conjunction with the 
legal and policy framework. 
 
Chapter five explores how the federative arrangement and consequent intergovernmental relations 
have affected the decentralisation of public provision of medicines. The chapter presents views on 
the developments and advances of intergovernmental relations in the process of decentralising 
pharmaceutical assistance. It also considers the process of negotiation which takes place in the 
forums of agreement, and how fulfilment of the agreements affects the development of 
pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
Chapter six discusses the changes in the public provision of medicines after decentralisation. The 
chapter analyses pharmaceutical assistance and access to medicines. The main points discussed are 
the consequences of decentralisation in the shaping of pharmaceutical assistance and the perceived 
impact on access. Limitations in assessing the impact on access to medicines and other barriers are 
also discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter seven explores the implications of the Popular Pharmacy programme for the decentralised 
context of pharmaceutical assistance. The chapter discusses the changes of the direction taken by 
the federal government in the decentralised provision of medicines. The characteristics and special 
features of the Popular Pharmacy Programme and its role within the public provision of essential 
medicines were also discussed. Drawing upon the analysis of my interviews as well as relevant 
policy documents I discuss how this programme entered the policy arena, its repercussions in 
federative relations, and its impacts on access to medicines.  
 
Chapter eight presents the conclusions, summarises the findings, and offers the closing remarks. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
DECENTRALISATION, POWER, AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
2.1. Introduction 
This thesis explores how the decentralisation of the provision of medicines developed in the last 
decade in Brazil, and its implications for access to medicines. In Chapter One I explained, briefly, 
the context in which health reforms and decentralisation of health services occurred, and how SUS 
- the Brazilian public health system - currently works. In this context, I explained the 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance and the key elements related to the operation of that 
area. In this Chapter I will provide an overview of a range of literature analysing decentralisation 
processes, policy-making, power and access to medicines in Brazil. 
 
Decentralisation, in broad terms, entails the shift of power from central government to 
organizations closer to the operation, provision and recipients of services. Rationales for 
decentralisation are often premised on a view that smaller organisations are, intrinsically, more 
responsive and accountable than larger organisations (Saltman, Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek, 
2007). In the context of health reforms in developing countries, decentralisation was viewed 
initially as an administrative reform which would improve efficiency and quality of services and 
later as a means of promoting democracy and accountability to the local population (Bossert, 
1998). A number of advantages have been identified to justify this transfer of power, particularly in 
developing countries (Rondinelli, 1980). Decentralisation is also receiving increased attention as a 
potential tool in the fight against poverty (Jutting et al., 2004; Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998). 
Efficacy of decentralisation as a tool for improving social standards, however, is argued not to be 
appropriate to those countries where mitigation is most needed. A review of the experience of 19 
countries suggests that the potential effects of decentralisation in poverty alleviation are dependent 
on the stage of the country’s development (Jutting et al., 2004). According to the authors, 
decentralisation most probably would increase poverty rather than reduce it in poor countries where 
the state lacks the capacity to fulfil its basic functions. In the case of Malawi, the authors argue that 
the depth of poverty
24
 is an obstacle to democratic participation, which is one of the aspects 
associated with poverty alleviation. Jutting et al. (2004:44) also argue that in Nepal, considering 
                                                          
24
 Metrics for depth of poverty indicate how far below the poverty line a poor person’s income falls 
(Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon, 2002). 
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the strong elite capture,
25
 the high level of corruption, and “considering the existing power 
distribution (feudalistic and elitist leadership in rural Nepal), decentralisation has the inherent 
danger of legitimising and perpetuating existing power structures and exploitation”. Other 
perceived disadvantages of decentralisation, such as increased disparities and undermined 
efficiency, have also been described in the literature (De Vries, 2000; Prud'homme, 1995). Some 
scholars claim that decentralisation does not improve equity, quality or efficiency of services and 
that it even has the opposite effect due to financial constraints and supply-side failures (Kristiansen 
and Santoso, 2006; Tang and Bloom, 2000). In the late 1980s, basic health services were devolved 
to the lowest level of government in China. Tang and Bloom (2000) showed that services provided 
by health centres in rural areas deteriorated after decentralisation. The authors argue that changes in 
financial management, rather than increasing funding for health centres, resulted in severe financial 
constraints. Additionally, dissatisfaction with changes introduced by decentralisation caused a 
significant exodus of highly trained personnel from rural areas. The shortage in personnel led to 
recruitment and employment of less qualified people, resulting in falls in efficiency and quality of 
services provided by health centres. Such controversies attest to the complex nature of the aim of 
decentralising functions and services, and of the evaluation of such attempts. This complexity and 
uncertainty informs the purpose and content of this chapter – a review of literature relevant to the 
research with a particular focus on the topics and perspectives most relevant to reforms of 
pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil.  
 
More specifically, in this chapter I employed a realist perspective in the view of Pawson et al. 
(2005) for the identification and categorisation of sources in the literature. The authors argue that 
large-scale policy reform in fields such as health and education rarely involves the formulation of 
wholly coherent and focused interventions designed to bring about clearly defined and measurable 
effects. Instead, systemic interventions are often grounded in a theory or hypothesis about the 
expected change that is held by some actors (rather than an uncontentious description of cause and 
effect). In a second respect, effects, whether intended or not, will often reflect the motivations and 
expectations of individuals and groups involved in the implementation of an intervention. 
Successes and failures of interventions are, in a certain respect, explained by personal choices and 
reasoning adopted by the actors involved. There is no reason to suppose that there will be 
coincidence in reasoning and personal choices among such actors, particularly if they operate 
within and across different tiers and institutions in the state apparatus. These differences in choices 
could hinder the implementation and explain, at least partly, some of the failures. Thirdly, 
interventions such as large-scale decentralisation do not occur in a ‘vacuum’ but, instead, 
                                                          
25
 Elite capture occurs when the management of resources is shifted from the group that was intended to 
manage the resources, to an elite (Wong, 2010). 
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necessarily reflect many other factors of an ‘open system’, such as the distribution of political 
power, resources and the impact of private sector activity. Finally, in a fourth related aspect, policy 
interventions may be regarded as changing the conditions in which they were originally introduced. 
Thus, the reception and consequences of the same policy over time are altered as a consequence of 
policy learning (Pawson et al., 2005: 23). In response to these observations this review of the 
literature reflects an initial collation and overview of relevant sources followed by their 
categorisation under topics judged most appropriate to the research reported in this thesis. The 
topics here elected are: decentralisation, power and access to medicines.  
 
In order to explore these three topics, I will organise this chapter in six sections. After this 
introductory section, the second section reflects on the definition of decentralisation with particular 
reference to public administration and, more specifically, to the provision of public health services. 
This section also focuses upon current debates about trends in decentralisation and recentralisation 
and, in so doing, gives a brief account of some experiments across Europe and Latin America. The 
third section turns to the political justifications, the rationale, for adopting decentralisation policies 
in general and, more specifically, in relation to health services (highlighting the differences 
between developed and developing countries). The chapter’s fourth section provides a more 
general review of theoretical and analytical contributions concerning the policy process and power. 
Before the conclusions, section five overviews the situation of access to medicines in Brazil. 
 
 
2.2 Decentralisation’s conceptual framework: definitions, key issues and debates  
Decentralisation is a highly complex process that has generated interest in a wide range of 
disciplines. There is extensive literature on this topic in various academic branches including 
politics, public administration, health services research, economics, management, sociology and 
organisational studies. This section focuses on the following aspects of decentralisation: 1) the 
definitions and difficulties entailed in the concept of decentralisation when it is applied across a 
wide range of contexts; 2) the complexity of assessing the impact of decentralisation policies and 
initiatives; 3) the political and financial dimensions of decentralisation, and 4) the outcomes of 
decentralisation. 
 
2.2.1 Definition and analytical frameworks 
Decentralisation is a difficult term to define and has been understood in multiple ways 
(Bankauskaite and Saltman, 2007; Pollitt, Birchall and Putman, 1998; Mills et al., 1990). Many 
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scholars agree that defining and measuring decentralisation is challenging (Saltman, Bankauskaite 
and Vrangbaek, 2007; Levaggi and Smith, 2005). Bankauskaite and Saltman (2007:2) state that 
“decentralization in practice represents many things to many people” referring to many variants of 
decentralisation that operate in Europe. The term encompasses political, fiscal and administrative 
dimensions and has been linked, traditionally, to the public administration field. The different ideas 
of what constitutes decentralisation are sometimes inconsistent and contradictory. Bankauskaite 
and Saltman (2007) argue that a particular divergence arises when definitions of decentralisation 
derived from public administration are applied to the health sector. Mills et al. (1990) concur and 
observe that the public administration literature tends only to mention the health sector 
superficially when discussing decentralisation and that, in turn, analyses of the health sector often 
neglect its relationship with broader areas of government administration. Moreover, still according 
to Bankauskaite and Saltman (2007), interpretation of the outcomes of decentralisation policies 
also often generates controversy. They argue that authors’ own biases may lead to a focus upon 
either positive or negative outcomes.  
 
Accordingly, efforts to define and delimit the idea of decentralisation have generated a large sub-
literature related to public administration, fiscal and political fields (Bossert, 1998; Mills et al., 
1990; Rondinelli, 1980). Definitions of decentralisation usually emphasise the transfer of power to 
planning, making decisions and managing public functions from the central level to lower levels in 
the government system (Saltman, 2003). Likewise, the topic has spurred the literature on analytical 
frameworks to examine the relationship between processes and types of decentralisation and actual 
outcomes or performance in the health sector. 
 
The best known framework for analysing decentralisation in the field of public administration is 
that of Rondinelli (1980) who proposes four forms of decentralisation according to the degree of 
authority devolved and the type of actors to whom the authority is transferred: deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution, and privatisation. This public administration approach was first introduced 
for evaluating broad processes of decentralisation in developing countries but was also applied to 
health systems in an influential work conducted by Mills et al.(1990). These four types are 
typically found within the administrative form of decentralisation. The types of decentralisation, in 
addition to reflecting the degree of power enjoyed by the local level, are also related to legal 
frameworks because policies are often based upon constitutional amendments or national laws 
(Mills et al., 1990). In short:  
Deconcentration: A shift in authority to regional or district offices within the 
structure of a government ministry. De-concentration is seen as the 
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least extensive form of decentralisation since it only involves the 
transfer of administrative authority (Mills et al., 1990). A district 
level office of the Ministry of Health is an example of de-
concentration in the health sector (Mills et al., 1990).  
Delegation: The transfer of services and responsibilities to semi-autonomous 
agencies. This is related to the transfer of managerial responsibilities 
for defined functions and in health systems has been employed, for 
example, in the management of teaching hospitals or to provide 
health services for insured workers (Mills et al., 1990). 
Devolution: A shift in authority to state, provincial or municipal governments. 
Devolution creates or strengthens sub-national levels of government 
with substantial independence from the central level and is related to 
a significant redefinition of a set of roles that may entail marked 
structural reforms (Mills et al., 1990). It is claimed that 
responsibilities for health when devolved to local government often 
entail issues of budgetary constraint, coordination and cooperation 
regarding the provision of specialised services (Mills et al., 1990).  
Privatisation or transfer to non-government organisation: Ownership is shifted 
to private entities, usually with a contract to define what is expected 
in exchange for public funding. For Bankauskaite and Saltman 
(2007), privatisation is “when tasks are transferred from public into 
private ownership”. This might also include the outsourcing of 
particular services. 
 
Although widely employed, this fourfold classification framework has not generated widespread 
consensus. There are, for example, disputes over whether de-concentration, devolution and 
privatisation should be considered legitimate forms of decentralisation (Falleti, 2010; Bankauskaite 
and Saltman, 2007). The usefulness of Rondinelli’s framework has been also challenged by 
Exworthy et al. (2010), who argue that it cannot be applied in cases where decentralisation extends 
to the level of individuals (patients or staff) due to an exclusive focus upon institutional actors in 
the context of decentralisation. As the researchers remark, the categories do not consider the 
specific objects of decentralisation and do not conceptualise or enable the measurement of the level 
of autonomy transferred to local governments.  
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Decentralisation has become the usual strategy adopted by health sectors in many countries across 
Europe in a restructuring process that has accelerated since the Second World War, producing an 
important strand of the literature specifically addressing the decentralisation of health systems 
(Saltman, Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek, 2007:2). In the last two decades many different 
approaches to the topic have appeared in the literature. Four of these analytical approaches that I 
consider useful to this thesis, arranged in chronological order, are outlined in Table 2.1. The table 
illustrates the diversity of aspects considered, which link in with the complexity of the process, 
showing that no single approach is capable of reflecting all aspects involved.  
 
Table 2.1 - Decentralisation in health systems frameworks 
Author Framework Reasoning 
Bossert, 1998 Decision space Defines decentralisation in terms of the set of functions 
and degrees of choice (narrow, moderate or wide) that 
are formally transferred to local officials. Evaluates 
incentives; local government characteristics; whether or 
not local officials innovate; and then assesses the impact 
of local choices on performance. 
Levaggi and Smith, 
2004 
Economic  Deals with transfer of financial and policy powers. 
Emphasises the role of information asymmetry in 
determining optimal governmental structure and the role 
of central governments in ensuring that public services 
accommodate any valued spillover effects (clinical 
training and research, public health, inequalities, 
information, macroeconomics factors). 
Saltman and 
Bankauskaite, 2006 
Functional  Analyses decentralisation in terms of three functional 
dimensions: political, administrative, and fiscal. 
Peckham, 2008; 
Exworthy, 2010 
Arrows  Focuses on the content of decentralisation (the ‘what’ 
issue) and identifies the scope of decentralisation (from 
‘where’ to ‘where’?). Examines the processes of 
centralisation/decentralisation as multiple processes that 
occur concurrently. 
 
The decision-space framework proposed by Bossert (1998) is a modification of the principal agent 
approach that was developed by economists. The principal agent approach was first used to analyse 
federal intergovernmental transfers but was also applied in health care to explore the relationship 
between provider and patient. The decision-space framework centres on the extent to which the 
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expansion of choice transferred in the decentralisation process can be seen to contribute to the 
achievement of the goals associated with decentralisation (Exworthy et al., 2010). The framework 
distinguishes between three main elements - the amount of choice transferred, the types of choices 
local officials make, and the impact of these choices upon performance (Bossert, 1998). In this 
framework the decision-space is applied across functional areas of the health system and is 
“quantified” into three categories (narrow, moderate or wide). The transferability of the approaches 
developed by both Bossert and Rondinelli is, however, arguable, because both focus on developing 
countries (Peckham et al., 2008). But the decision space model is also suitable for observing the 
dynamic nature of the distribution of authority between central and regional/local institutions. 
 
The framework proposed by Levaggi and Smith centres upon an economic perspective on two 
issues that they consider “common for all types of decentralisation: transfer of finance powers and 
transfer of police powers” (2005:224). An apparent strength of the model - a well-defined focus - 
might also be seen as a weakness because it is greatly concentrated on the financial dimension of 
decentralisation (excluding other important influences on authority and legitimacy). Despite the 
importance of financial factors involved, an economic framework alone is unlikely to provide 
sufficient insight into the complex task of assessing decentralisation in the context of the health 
field. 
 
Considering that a more targeted approach is needed, Saltman and Bankauskaite (2006) argue that 
approaches to decentralisation in the disciplinary fields of public administration and economics 
tend to be oriented to the public sector in general and do not consider particular forms of 
decentralisation specific to the health sector. For example, it is not uncommon for two or more 
organisational forms of decentralisation to co-exist in a particular health care system. To facilitate 
the analysis of such arrangements the authors propose a functional framework that takes into 
account three key dimensions - political, administrative and fiscal. A better understanding of the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of decentralisation and the possibility of assessing the 
strategies adopted are the main arguments used to support the functional model. Saltman and 
Bankauskaite concede that their approach, because it was developed with tax-funded health 
systems in mind, requires further elaboration in order to be applicable to countries with new private 
arrangements in the health sector.  
 
Pollitt et al. (1998:6), drawing on a number of contributors, state that “decentralisation involves the 
spreading out of formal authority from a smaller to a larger number of actors”. The authors thus 
equate “political” decentralisation with the devolution of authority to elected representatives. 
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According to DeVries (2000), the introduction of political decentralisation within a health care 
system can entail advantages and disadvantages for policymakers. The disadvantages, seen from an 
economic point of view, centre upon the potential inefficiency and duplication associated with a 
myriad of small service providers. 
 
In a fourth respect, the arrows framework (Exworthy et al., 2010; Peckham et al., 2008) has been 
proposed as a way to analyse decentralisation and recentralisation movements within the British 
National Health Service and to explore the possible links between decentralisation and 
performance. It is a two-dimensional framework designed to address the ‘what’ and ‘where’ of 
decentralisation. The horizontal axis is the hierarchy in which decentralisation takes place (ranging 
from global institutions to individuals). This axis explores and indicates the ‘from where’ and ‘to 
where’ dimensions through the use of directional arrows. The vertical axis considers ‘what’ is 
being moved between different levels within a hierarchy and gauges the impact of these transfers 
upon performance through the concepts of input, process and outcome. The depiction of 
performance is descriptive – the framework itself does not evaluate the quality of performance 
attributable to transfers.  
 
Each of the frameworks presented has some validity and provides some insight into key issues of 
decentralisation. Considering the complexity of decentralisation, the importance of context and the 
limitations presented by the different analytical frameworks, Peckham et al.(2005) observe that 
“there is limited applicability of any single framework that can be applied in all circumstances”. In 
sum, decentralisation studies have been dominated by multiple perspectives and, overall, the 
proposed frameworks or approaches of analysis were developed in parallel rather than building on 
each other. Two important questions thus remain unanswered. First, what are the most appropriate 
strategies, if any, to assess decentralisation in the context of health services? Second, how can we 
relate decentralisation to issues of performance? These are sound questions even if in this thesis I 
am not conducting policy analysis. These issues are closely related to my central question about 
how decentralisation has affected the public provision of medicines in Brazil, and I will return to 
this when discussing my research design approach in Chapter Three. 
 
2.2.2 Political and financial dimensions 
Beyond the issues of defining decentralisation and the difficulties in its measurement, the political 
and financial aspects involved also involve complexity and ambiguity. In these areas the 
predilections of the analyst are often considered a variable in itself (Bankauskaite and Saltman, 
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2007). Similarly, political perspectives are intrinsically linked to decentralisation because it often 
concerns the distribution and sharing of power. In more detail, Bankauskaite and Saltman (2007) 
perceive three factors that shape the political backdrop to decentralisation: institutional structure; 
social and cultural values; and governance mechanisms. Indeed, there appears to be a degree of 
agreement among many scholars that the different meanings, goals and evaluations associated with 
reforms are central to their understanding and evaluation (Falleti, 2010). Conversely, this emphasis 
on context is considered a disadvantage for Peckham et al. (2008). The latter argue that it is the 
contextualised nature of interpretive frameworks that hampers their applicability beyond specific 
environments. 
 
Although decentralisation has many disputed points around definitions, goals and outcomes, 
scholars agree on the importance of knowing the context, different meanings and aims that drive a 
particular reform if one seeks to understand how decentralisation happened, as I do. How these 
concepts informed my research design will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
2.2.3 Decentralisation outcomes in health 
The difficulty of having multiple frameworks, an important unresolved question, affects the 
outcomes of the changes in a health system as a result of decentralisation. Broadly, there is little 
agreement about the outcomes that decentralisation should produce and the evidence from the 
literature is mixed (Bustamante, 2010; Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2006). Bankauskaite and 
Saltman (2007) add that when the focus turns to the implementation of such decentralisation 
policies the results are even more inconsistent. For some authors, contrary to the supposed 
advantages, there is little evidence that decentralisation has led to improvements in equity, quality 
or efficiency in local services or to an increase in local funding (Pariyo et al., 2009; Tang and 
Bloom, 2000). In Uganda, a study of the devolution of powers to allocate resources and deliver 
services, including health, concluded that there was little impact on access to health care (Pariyo et 
al., 2009). After the decentralisation process in that country, the use of public health services 
increased, but the private for-profit sector still provided most of the formal health care. Moreover, 
the costs and travel entailed remained significant barriers to the use of health services by the 
poorest patients. The power to allocate resources alone was not sufficient to enhance equity and 
access to health services. Another study - concerned with the relationship between decentralisation 
and equity in health and health care in the largely decentralised Canadian health care system – 
suggests that income-related inequalities in health care utilisation are more influenced by 
differences between poorer and wealthier provinces than by the form and extent of decentralisation 
(Jimenez-Rubio, Smith and Van Doorslaer, 2008). The research, claim the authors, points to the 
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need for central government intervention to balance resources between provinces rather than 
further structural reform. This argument on the role of regional differences in decentralisation is of 
particular importance to inform my discussion in Chapter Four on how regional differences shaped 
the implementation of decentralisation in the Brazilian health system. 
 
Conversely, positive impacts of decentralisation have been cited, for example, in a child 
immunisation programme in developing countries and also in relation to achieving equitable per 
capita financial allocation between municipalities in Colombia and Chile (Khaleghian, 2004; 
Bossert et al., 2003). In this last regard, financial decentralisation that took place in these two 
countries was analysed using a decision space framework. Findings suggested that those policies 
had a positive effect on health resource allocation in terms of equity (Bossert et al., 2003). In 
Colombia, the study reports, a population-related formula for resource allocation appeared to be an 
effective mechanism for making expenditure more equitable. The scholars remark that a more 
balanced per capita allocation was obtained by the use of a horizontal equity fund that redistributed 
local revenues between municipalities in Chile. 
 
It is worth noting in this review that this form of decentralisation of resources was not, however, 
capable of balancing the regional differences in Brazil, as data from my interviews suggest. SUS 
uses this per capita criterion in funds allocation, but metropolitan areas or the more developed cities 
within a geographical area still attracting patients in search of more complex or emergency 
treatments. There is a saying in Brazil that ‘the best hospital (in less developed regions) is the 
ambulance’. It is common practice for mayors or local health authorities to send patients to be 
treated in hospitals in the state capital or other cities around the region. As the resource funding is 
based on per capita values, this is claimed to cause a financial imbalance and overcrowding 
because those cities have to treat more patients than they were prepared or received money for.
26
 
 
As the examples above illustrate, the empirical evidence is difficult to compare because the 
outcomes of decentralisation are influenced by the context of the reforms. Similar programmes will 
produce contradictory results depending on where and when they are implemented. In order to 
better grasp the understanding of the implications of decentralisation, a key issue that also needs to 
                                                          
26
 This issue of ‘migration’ of patients searching for health treatment is very often broadcast in the media. I 
would say that nobody in any region of the country would be surprised at hearing this kind of news. The 
financial burden caused by migration of patients is usually a point of contention, involving municipal, state 
and federal governments. An example of this situation is a recent case involving three states of the Northern 
and Midwestern regions. For more details see: http://casacivil.to.gov.br/noticia/2013/4/12/pacientes-de-
outros-estados-geram-onus-de-r-4-milhoes-ao-tocantins/ [retrieved 15/06/2013]. 
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be analysed involves the reasons used to justify decentralising or centralising measures. This point 
is addressed in the next section.  
 
 
2.3 General rationales for decentralisation 
Decentralisation has been one of the most recurrent themes in governmental reforms over the last 
two decades (Falleti, 2010; Boex and Simatupang, 2008; Atkinson and Haran, 2004; Bossert, 
Larrañaga and Ruiz Meir, 2000; Collins, Araujo and Barbosa, 2000). A broad range of rationales 
emerged from these changes, including efficiency in the provision of services; reducing costs and 
strengthening accountability; addressing local needs; bringing government close to the people and 
improving popular participation (Dubey, 2003; World Bank, 1997). The rationales can be separated 
into political and economic arguments. If we take into consideration the decentralisation of the 
health system in Brazil, both arguments were in place but used by different groups. From one side 
the claims of the sanitarista movement linked decentralisation with political arguments related to 
the re-democratisation of the country (Doimo and Rodrigues, 2008). On the other side, neo-liberal 
reforms brought a new rationality to public management, involving reduction of the role of the state 
which went to exercise regulatory functions withdrawing from direct provision of services. Within 
these views, financing was also separated from service delivery, which became the responsibility of 
subnational actors. 
 
The political arguments appeal to theories or claims that decentralisation improves democracy by 
bringing the government closer to the people (Falleti, 2010). In many countries the discussion of 
increased democracy is linked to the political move to decentralisation. Decentralisation is 
associated with the promotion of local democratic involvement and distribution of political power, 
which could reduce the potential for corruption. Within the arguments relating to economics, 
change is often justified with reference to the theory of fiscal federalism (Saltman, Bankauskaite 
and Vrangbaek, 2007). The tenets of this theory include a view that local government should, 
where possible, provide and fund the public goods and services consumed within their jurisdictions 
(Oates, 1999). Decentralised provision, it is argued, increases local economic welfare because 
services and public goods can be tailored to particular preferences and needs. Oates (1999) also 
refers to the Tiebout (1956) model wherein intergovernmental competition facilitates different local 
government taxation and expenditure policies that will encourage citizens to ‘vote with their feet’- 
a direct expression of political preferences that discourages inefficiency (Bardhan, 2002). 
Additionally, in a third, related, regard it is claimed that decentralised systems act as a de facto or 
de jure limit on central government interference with the supposed benefits and savings that accrue 
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from such competition. Similar arguments suggest that decentralisation improves the monitoring 
and supervision of local government because local politicians have more of an incentive to respond 
to local demands than national legislators. Moreover, it is claimed that local politicians can 
reasonably be assumed to be better informed about local preferences and needs (Aguiar, 2006).  
 
The degree to which these rationales are applicable to less economically developed countries has 
however been questioned (Bardhan, 2002; Prud'homme, 1995). Key differences between these 
countries and more developed economies could hamper the relevance of such reasoning in 
developing countries. These differences include: lower citizen mobility; less effective monitoring 
of public administration; weaker institutions of local democracy and mechanisms for political 
accountability; a greater case for the redistribution of resources to disadvantaged groups or regions; 
the impact of poverty on homogenised preferences; a non-linear relationship between taxation and 
service provision; plus asymmetric technical and administrative capacities between levels of 
government (Bardhan, 2002). Levaggi and Smith (2004) add that the optimal degree of 
decentralisation is likely to vary between different health system functions. Primary care and 
chronic care services are perhaps more suited to local discretion and would benefit more from 
decentralisation than secondary care services.
27
 Conversely, in order to enhance local coordination 
and efficiency it may be necessary to purchase or commission health services through just one 
agency. The authors note that the appropriate level of decentralisation in health care is a difficult 
policy judgement that will often involve a trade-off between conflicting objectives. These 
discussions about appropriate levels of decentralisation will be particularly useful in Chapter Seven 
when I analyse a centralised programme of provision of medicines which emerged within the 
decentralised model adopted in Brazil.  
 
In summary, the main political and economic rationales in relation to decentralisation have been 
reviewed briefly. Political arguments tend to equate decentralisation with distribution of power, 
enhanced democracy and citizenry. Economic arguments, reflecting fiscal federalist ideas and more 
general perspectives in theories of political economy suggest that decentralisation increases 
efficiency in the allocation of resources. Against the background of these general perspectives for 
decentralisation I will now focus more specifically on decentralisation in the health sector. For this 
                                                          
27
 Primary care is the first point of consultation for all patients within the health care system, being a patient's 
main source for regular medical care. Primary care is intended to provide a broad spectrum of preventive and 
curative care over a period of time and to coordinate all the care that the patient receives. 
Secondary care is an intermediate level of health care that includes diagnosis and treatment, performed in a 
hospital with specialized equipment and laboratory facilities. 
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discussion I will divide this section into two points: the objectives and rationales discourse, and 
scholars’ debates around decentralisation or recentralisation moves. 
 
2.3.1 Objectives and rationales for the decentralisation of health systems 
Rationales for decentralisation of health systems often echo more general arguments in and around 
public administration related to allocative efficiency, empowerment of local governments, 
accountability and equity. But, as Bremner (2011) observes, advocates of health sector 
decentralisation tend to present three additional objectives: improving technical efficiency; 
enhancing the quality of health services; and stimulating innovation in service delivery. In terms of 
greater technical efficiency, decentralisation is often justified with reference to fewer levels of 
bureaucracy, greater cost consciousness at local level and the market discipline that seems to arise 
from the separation of purchaser and provider functions. In a second regard, the author argues, 
increase in the quality of health services is assumed to result from the integration of health services, 
improved information systems and better access to health care services for vulnerable groups. And 
in a third respect, the posited improvement in the innovation of service delivery is linked to the 
experimentation and adaptation that will supposedly arise from the increased autonomy of local 
government and institutions. These three factors tend to be the focus of critical appraisals of 
decentralisation in health systems (Atkinson, 2007; Bankauskaite and Saltman, 2007:16). 
Bankauskaite and Saltman (2007:16) argue that improvement in technical efficiency may require 
certain contextual conditions like incentives for managers, and warn that market-type relations may 
lead to some negative outcomes. When it comes to innovation of service delivery, the authors argue 
that it could increase inequalities. At this point is important to remark that technical efficiency and 
innovation are in close relation to the themes I explored in my work. As I will discuss in Chapter 
Four and Five, my interviews suggest that the issues pointed out by Bankauskaite and Saltman are 
applicable to decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil. Before I give more details of 
the Brazilian case, it is important to discuss how associated debates have played out. 
 
2.3.2 Debates about decentralisation and recentralisation  
Decentralisation was initially cast as a solution to many problems faced by health systems – but 
complexity and issues around its implementation soon clouded the waters in this respect 
(Vrangbaek, 2007; Mosca, 2006). As a consequence, the appropriateness of these shifts of power 
between tiers of the state continues to generate significant debate (Peckham et al., 2008). In 
particular, the posited benefits of decentralisation – such as tailor-made policies, service delivery 
supported by greater knowledge of local circumstances provided by local actors and locative 
efficiency of public goods and services – have generated ongoing debates (De Vries, 2000). In the 
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view of De Vries (2000), tailor-made policies that are responsive to local needs have, for example, 
been implicated in enhanced geographical inequalities in access to services. Moreover, allocation 
of resources according to local preferences and needs is under dispute since it can result in 
inequalities, considering the variation in the delivery of services or public goods between 
municipalities. De Vries states that it has also been suggested that officials most able to accurately 
gauge and respond to local circumstances are more likely to work at a national rather than local 
level.  
 
In fact, De Vries (2000) argues that neither the arguments in favour of decentralisation, nor those in 
favour of centralisation, are convincing. The author argues that decentralisation and 
(re)centralisation “seem to be ongoing cycles in which trends and taking sides in the discussion 
succeed one another continuously” (De Vries, 2000:194). In terms of specific case studies Peckham 
et al. (2008:572), analysing the decentralisation of health services in the United Kingdom, argue 
that “policies are both centralist and decentralist at any time and at any level”. Similarly, health 
policy in the UK has been described “as a paradox of simultaneous centralisation and 
decentralisation” (Greer, 2011). Although the UK health system was decentralised after the 
creation, in 1998, of the devolved governments for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, there are 
increased demands therein for greater central control in the name of cost containment, access, and 
quality improvement. 
 
Similarly, the Spanish health system was transformed from a highly centralised regime to a 
democratic, highly decentralised structure. But it has been argued that decentralisation does not 
extend beyond the regional level and that some regional tiers have in fact assumed roles originally 
devolved to municipalities. Moreover, it has been suggested that in fact within some regions have 
recentralised powers originally devolved to the local level (Duran, 2011). This particular pattern of 
regional decentralisation is blamed for the often strained relationship between regional 
administrations and the medical profession, difficulties in coordination, financial problems and a 
failure to reduce per capita geographical inequalities in expenditure (Duran, 2011). Again, it is 
important to note that the same kinds of difficulties were found in the decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil, as I discuss in Chapter Four. Returning to the Spanish case, 
despite the difficulties indicated, Duran (2011) acknowledges that there is some consensus that 
decentralisation has stimulated investment in health care, advanced innovation in the delivery of 
health services and promoted initiatives shaped by local preferences. Such advantages attributed to 
decentralisation can be applicable to the Brazilian case, as I discuss in Chapter Six. 
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Norway provides another good example of the reversed approach to decentralisation of the health 
system compared to other European countries (Saltman, 2008). The Norwegian health system is 
characterised by a focus on equity, decentralised political governance and public ownership and 
control. But from 2002 the central government took responsibility for all public hospitals. Hospital 
management responsibilities were recentralised from 19 counties back to five regional health 
authorities. Driving forces toward these reforms have been the lack of “geographical equity” and a 
desire to end the “economic blame game” between local and central government.28 Reforms seek to 
resolve long waiting lists for elective treatment; lack of equity in supply of hospital services; and 
lack of financial responsibility and transparency (Saltman, Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek, 
2007:228). Magnussen (2011) argues that it was a response to the practice of hospitals in deficit 
requesting help from sub-regional counties (who had no discretion with regard to setting taxes) 
that, in turn, would seek assistance from the central government. But the distribution of specific 
funds to the five regional health authorities quickly became a political issue and it was not until 
2009 that agreement on related mechanisms for fund raising and redistribution was reached. Even 
after this reform, however, four of the five regional health authorities were in substantial deficits – 
a factor in sparking debates over structural reform (Magnussen, 2011).  
 
From the examples discussed here, it can be seen that scholars have identified significant tensions 
between the impetus towards decentralisation and recentralisation in health policies. Debates about 
the suitability, degree and functions to be decentralised vary markedly within and between health 
systems. The adequacy of decentralisation is under question in European countries that are, in some 
cases (including Norway’s), reversing the trend and beginning to recentralise some functions 
within their health systems (Saltman, Bankauskaite and Vrangbaek, 2007).  
 
As seen from the debates highlighted in this section, the decentralisation process distributes power 
to subnational levels, brings new actors to new political arenas and provides a formal opportunity 
for public participation in health policy-making process. To help unpack such complex and 
multilayered relations, the theoretical and analytical aspects related to these new arrangements and 
the relative power and influence of the stakeholders are reviewed in the next section.  
 
 
                                                          
28
 “Economic blame game” refers to the struggle between county councils and central government in which 
both levels tried to pin responsibilities on the other for the sector’s inability to attain goals such as reduced 
waiting time for elective patients, higher cost efficiency and cost control. 
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2.4 Theoretical and analytical aspects of power and policy change 
While the preceding sections encapsulated contributions in the literature on definitions of 
decentralisation; academic perspectives on decentralisation at a general level; and associated 
analyses that focus upon health services, at this point it is important to introduce some concepts 
related to power and policy change.  
 
2.4.1 Approaches to understanding the policy-making process 
Until recent decades the analysis of health policy tended to focus upon a restricted range of actors – 
‘the state’, politicians, bureaucrats and fairly clearly defined interest groups (Walt et al. 2008). In 
the last decade, health policy and the policy-making have changed to incorporate more players 
(Buse, Mays and Walt, 2005). Notably, public-private partnerships have become a feature of many 
health systems. Traditional distinctions between top-down and bottom-up policy formulation and 
implementation have become less clear-cut in many instances – we have seen the evolution of 
policy networks or even policy “communities” (Tantivess and Walt, 2008). Moreover, it has been 
suggested that it is often unrealistic to separate an appreciation of political calculation and 
strategies from understandings of how health policy evolves and is implemented. Buse et al. 
(2005:7) emphasise this point, stating that “the content is not separate from the politics of policy-
making”. Against this background, again adopting the ‘realist’ approach commended by Pawson et 
al. (2005), which I discussed in section 2.1, I examine some of the ideas and perspectives on how 
to explore power in the context of the policy-making process of most immediate relevance to the 
research described in this thesis.  
 
2.4.1.1. Stage theories 
Stage theories break the public policy process into functionally and temporally distinct stages. The 
stages usually encompass agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy 
evaluation. Discussion centres on the factors that influence processes within and between each 
stage (Walt et al., 2008; Sabatier, 2007:6; Lee, Estes and Rodriguez, 2003:135). From the late 
1980s onwards, the stages model began to encounter increasing criticism (Sabatier 2007:7). 
Criticism specifically targeted the assumption of linearity in the policy process; the delimitation of 
stages that are often not so clear-cut in reality; the absence of causal theory and the under-
estimation of organisational complexity in modern governance (Walt et al., 2008; Sabatier, 2007:7; 
Lee, Estes and Rodriguez, 2003:139). Some of the alternative approaches that attempt to engage 
with such complexity are discussed below.  
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2.4.1.2. Institutional approaches  
Institutional rational choice is a term that encompasses a variety of frameworks that centre attention 
on how institutional rules modify the behaviour of intentionally rational individuals motivated by 
forms of self-interest (Sabatier, 2007:8). In one variant, Institutional Analysis Development - most 
closely associated with Ostrom (1998) - stresses the role of self-interest but acknowledges that 
rational choice cannot be applied to all cases and contexts. Ostrom analysed how groups of people 
can exploit natural resources in a sustainable manner, even without government regulation. 
Regarding environmental protection initiatives, she proposed a polycentric approach where 
management decisions should be made close to the place where actions take place by the actors 
involved (Tucker, 2013). Ostrom’s approach is to rethink the institutional theories and problems of 
governance in light of lessons learned from public-choice. She attempts to replace the state-centred 
view with a pluralist and polycentric one, where power is seen as something that is widely 
distributed in society. Ostrom’s work challenges the monocentric vision and the existence of a 
unique centre of power and authority centred in ‘the state’ and shows that ‘seeing like a state’ is not 
inevitable when thinking about collective-action problems and solutions (Tucker, 2013). Ostrom’s 
work on governance contributed to the transition from public choice to the new institutionalism, 
which encompasses the logic of institutional diversity, social heterogeneity and value pluralism. 
Moreover, Ostrom recognises the importance of institutions in policy outcomes, but challenges 
centralisation and monocentrism as key principles of governance. The application of institutional 
approaches tends to be more convincing when the preferences of actors are clear and stable but is 
unable to explain where those preferences come from and why they change (John, 2003). 
 
2.4.1.3. Multiple-streams 
This model of policy-making, often associated with Kingdon’s model of agenda-setting (1984), 
focuses on the flow and timing of policy action and is useful in understanding the complexities and 
realities of policy-making. In this model three streams of actors and processes contribute to the 
policy formulation and implementation. These are the problem stream (or problem recognition with 
regard to potential policy interventions); the policy stream (concerned with formulating policy in 
relation to perceived problems) and the political stream (consisting of various elements such as 
public opinion, political parties, political debate, pressure group activities and government 
prioritisation of legislative issues) (Sabatier, 2007:66). Kingdon (1984:119) explains that for an 
issue to become a policy problem, people need to be convinced that something should be done – 
the issue has to enter the recognised problem stream if it is to receive the attention of government. 
The author argues that there are three mechanisms to draw government attention to problems. 
These are indicators (measurements used to assess the changing scale and import of problems); 
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events (disasters or personal experiences which focus attention on problems) and feedback 
(information on current performance that shows either a failure to meet objectives or unexpected 
consequences). And at critical times the problem, policy and political streams come together. “A 
problem is recognised, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political 
change makes the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe” Kingdon 
(1984:174). These streams move independently through the policy system according to their own 
logic, until a window of opportunity is opened and two or more streams coincide and “become” a 
policy issue. This streams model, unlike stage theories, does not picture the policy-making process 
as linear and based upon discrete stages. Instead, the policy process is seen to be shaped by the 
intersection of at least two independent streams at one time. The model also acknowledges the 
multiplicity and unpredictability of diverse policy actors.  
 
2.4.1.4. Punctuated-equilibrium framework 
This framework was originally developed to integrate the literature on policy incrementalism and 
agenda-setting.  
 
Incrementalism was proposed in 1959 by Lindblom as an alternative to ‘synoptic’ models of 
decision-making (Allison and San-Martin 2011; Atkinson 2011). According to the incrementalism 
concept “decision making is, and ought to take place through, a process of successive limited 
comparison”(Allison and San-Martin 2011:1).29 Agenda-setting is the process by which issues 
enter the policy agenda. Models of agenda-setting focus on the mechanisms that explain how an 
issue is chosen by policy makers from a large number of issues that all potentially worth attention 
of the government. According to Buse et al. (2005:67) there are two prominent models of agenda-
setting: Hall’s and Kingdon’s models. Hall’s model proposes that whether or not a particular issue 
will reach the government agenda depends on legitimacy, feasibility and support levels.
30
 
Kingdon’s model is explored in this section in the multiple streams framework (see below). 
 
                                                          
29
 There is a distinction between incrementalism as an approach to policy analysis on the one hand, and a 
pattern of policy change on the other (Allison and Saint-Martin 2011). In the case of the punctuated 
equilibrium framework, the policy analysis dimension was used.  
30
 Legitimacy is an attribute of a particular topic with which governments consider they should be concerned 
and in which they have a right or obligation to intervene. It refers to issues that are in the domain of 
government regulation. Feasibility is concerned with the potential for implementing the policy and depends 
on workforce and technological and financial resources. Support is related to the public support to the 
government regarding the subject of the policy (Buse et al.2005:68). 
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Punctuated-equilibrium framework is based on a view that the policy process is characterised by 
long periods of stability interspersed by brief periods of instability and major policy change. The 
model of policy change proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argues that a so-called 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ is underpinned by two forces - policy image (how issues are portrayed) 
and institutional policy venues (the institutional context of issues). The scholars argue that 
incremental policy change is often due to constraints on individual decision-makers. In broad terms 
these constraints include institutional cultures and accepted practice, the influence of powerful 
vested interests and bounded rationality
31
. Periods of stability are characterised by agreement 
around how issues are portrayed on the policy-making agenda. Modifications of some conditions, 
especially in society (such as public opinion and media attention) or government (such as 
significant electoral change) allow issues to emerge and, potentially, to bring about change in 
previously stable institutional arrangements (Parsons, 1995:204; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993:20). 
As Baumgartner and Jones (1993:20) put it: “Each time there is a surge of media interest in a given 
topic we can expect some degree of policy change”. 
 
2.4.1.5. Advocacy coalition frameworks 
Advocacy coalition frameworks synthesise elements from top-down and bottom-up perspectives 
within the policy implementation literature (Sabatier, 1997:292). The approach views the policy 
process as a competition between alliances of actors who advocate beliefs about policy problems 
and solutions. Sets of actors compete for influence over government agencies to advance their 
policy objectives (Sabatier, 1988). This framework fuses elements from top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. In bottom-up terms a variety of public and private actors are seen to participate with 
regard to aspects of policy formulation and implementation. And in top-down terms the framework 
addresses the reality of socio-economic conditions, legal systems and political processes in 
constraining behaviour. Significant policy change can thus often be linked to two circumstances - 
fundamental change in the external environment (such as a change of government) or significant 
change in ordinary conditions as a result of learning processes and interactions between advocacy 
coalitions within the specific policy communities. Kubler (2001), for example, uses the advocacy 
coalition approach to argue that a harm reduction policy adopted as a result of the arrival of the 
AIDS epidemic could be explained in part by a coalition of AIDS policy actors who succeeded in 
displacing a previously dominant coalition that advocated sexual abstinence.  
 
                                                          
31
 The term ‘bounded rationality’ was coined in 1956 by Herbert Simon and the idea is that human beings are 
limited in their capacity to process information. Individuals endeavour to be rational, having first simplified 
the choices available; consequently, the decision-maker chooses between reduced options (Simon, 1976). 
 47 
 
2.4.1.6. Policy networks 
The policy network concept arose from the idea that the government was not the only actor ‘in 
command’ of society, and that policy-making actually resulted from the interplay of various actors 
(Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000). The network framework emerged from organizational sociology and 
posits that the structure of coalitions across complex policy sectors determines the policy outcome 
(John, 2003). There may exist bargaining and negotiation at a variety of spatial levels such as those of 
central, regional and local state organisations together with the private sector. These levels may be 
dissected by a variety of institutional or informal linkages between major interest groups - a system of 
“policy networks”. There may, as has been intimated, be institutional or legal imbalances in power 
between groups, but the manner in which protagonists select and deploy resources and plan strategies 
is highly variable. A critical distinction thus exists between structurally imbued potential power and 
strategically realised effective power. There is no inherent reason why actors/groups should exhibit 
similar strategies or foresight in exploiting potential power. Indeed, there may be considerable scope 
for actors/groups to develop and exploit “informal” rules of negotiation and conflict and exchange 
resources with other interests to their own benefit. Hardy et al. (1990:143) produced a study of policy 
network related to the implementation of a community health policy, which suggests that “[a]n 
organisation which effectively deploys its resources will maximise its scope for decisional manoeuvre 
(or discretion) and be able to choose among various courses of action or inaction”. More specifically, 
Lewis (2005:170) characterises the health system as a network of interactions between people, 
organisations, structure and ideas. She proposes that a framework for analysing health policy 
should thus be based on the concepts of networks, ideas and power. She argues that each of these 
themes is essential to deal with a particular aspect of health policy. Networks reflect connections 
and relationships in the health policy process. Ideas are indicative of contested or uncontested 
foundational paradigms and the discourse around problems and solutions (such as the preventative 
model in health care). And power centres on the politics pertaining to the distribution of resources 
and influence.  
 
As explained by Rhodes (2006:425), “a policy network is one of a cluster of concepts focusing on 
government links with, and dependence on, other state and societal actors”. The policy network 
approach is diverse and widespread in social science disciplines. It ranges from social network 
analysis to policy network analysis, including network society approaches and cross-cultural 
analysis. Policy networks, for instance, were used to describe government policy-making on 
Australia, Canada, UK and USA (Rhodes, 2006). As Rhodes (2006) argues, the policy network 
approach in itself has a broad and diverse scope. In this section I just introduced some elements 
relevant to my subject, namely those related to the notion of negotiation of various actors at 
different levels and inherent imbalances in power involved in policy processes.  
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2.4.1.7. Policy triangle framework 
The policy triangle framework, developed specifically for health policy analysis, considers the 
content of policy, but also acknowledges the central role of the actors involved, as well as the 
context and the process (Walt and Gilson, 1994). This framework reflects how the interplay of 
these elements affects the policy-making process. ‘Content’ reflects the subjects and topics covered 
by a specific policy. “Process is concerned with the way in which policies are initiated, developed, 
implemented and evaluated. Actors – individuals, groups or organisations - are central to the 
framework” (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2005:9). Such groups, within and beyond formal institutional 
apparatus, may either seek to exercise power or simply influence the nature of policy. Finally, the 
‘context’ is related to the general factors in the economic, political and social spheres that may 
influence health policy. Those contextual factors are categorised by Leichter (1979:41) as: 
situational factors: temporary conditions - such as wars, flooding or the HIV/AIDS epidemic – that 
may influence policy; structural factors: the relatively stable characteristics of society that may 
include the political system, the economy and demographic structure, technological advances and 
national wealth; cultural factors: such as religion; gender roles; the position of ethnic minorities; 
linguistic differences; social hierarchies and the size, quality and organisation of a civil service; and 
environmental or exogenous factors: mainly associated with the international environment. Some 
health issues require cooperation between national and transnational organisations, and those 
interactions generate interdependence between states as a result of agreements and financial 
obligations. 
 
2.4.1.8. Interpretative policy analysis 
The emergence of interpretative approaches in social sciences, in the late 20
th
 century, has its roots 
on the broad intellectual movement contesting the dominance of positivist science and empiricist 
research enquiry. When it comes to doing interpretative policy analysis, there is a variety of 
methodological approaches “ranging from finding meaning behind a particular policy, to 
reconstructing the genealogy of a social institution, engaging in critical discourse analysis, 
sustaining a policy mediation effort, and to large scale action research on pressing social problems” 
(Wagenaar, 2011:241). 
 
Wagenaar (2011) offers a comprehensive review of the literature on interpretative policy analysis 
field. His book provides an insightful ordering of meaning, which cut across the myriad of 
interpretative approaches in the literature. Differences in ontological and epistemological 
 49 
 
assumptions informed the ordering adopted by Wagenaar in his book. The three types of meanings 
proposed are: hermeneutic, discursive, and dialogical. As he explains, they are not hardwired 
categories but rather represent the predominant interpretative framework applied by the analyst to 
capture meaning. Wagenaar affirms that in interpretative analysis, usually, the analyst employs one 
of the three approaches to explore meaning. Each of the three approaches revolves around different 
questions, and consequently generates different types of analysis leading to different conclusions. 
First, hermeneutic meaning considers the common intelligible context, which Wagenaar refers to as 
the background of common understanding. When s/he adopts this tradition the researcher interprets 
the actions of the individual taking into account the background of common understanding. The 
second type, the discursive meaning, relates to linguistic-practical frameworks that shape our 
comprehension of everyday practices as natural and self-evident or bizarre and illegitimate. The 
aim of the researcher, in this case, is to evidence from where these interpretations of practices 
emerged, and how it forces some individuals’ practices and permit others. The third type, dialogical 
meaning, relates to social and practical nature of meaning. Individual agents’ self-understanding 
(and understanding by others) is linked to social interactions in a ‘taken for granted’ world. In this 
tradition, the focus of the researcher is on how meaning is constructed as a result of social 
interactions in everyday situations.  
 
In short, the different approaches to understanding the policy-making process discussed in section 
4.1 consider how, to various extents, the political, economic and social factors may influence the 
way policies are developed and implemented. The combination of these factors provides the 
context within which health policy is constructed.  
 
2.4.2 Conceptualising power in the policy process 
The idea of power is central to understanding the influence of diverse actors in the policy process 
(Buse, Mays and Walt, 2005:10). Several theories help to understand the relationship between 
power and policy-making. Seminally, Lukes (1974:25) – in criticising the views of power proposed 
by American pluralists - outlined a three-dimensional view that incorporates the less visible 
dimensions of power and attendant relationships. As Buse et al. (2005:21-23) observe, Lukes 
conceives three types of power or, rather, three faces of power: 
Power as decision-making: this focuses on individuals and groups that 
participate in or influence directly policy decisions; 
Power as a non-decision making: this focuses on how powerful groups limit the 
scope of the policy agenda and thus prevent active and open 
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discussion of some issues. Crimson (1971), for example, sought to 
discover why air pollution remained a “non-issue” in many 
American cities. Findings tended to confirm the discursive 
circumscription described by Lukes;  
Power as thought control: this focuses on the ability to influence others by 
shaping their preferences. This may be accomplished through subtle 
means to change meanings and perceptions of reality.  
 
Foucault’s conception of power provides what is called ‘the fourth face of power’ (Digeser, 1992). 
The fourth face of power, unlike the other three faces discussed, is not restricted to coercive or 
repressive power to force individuals to do things. As Digeser’s seminal work on the fourth face of 
power showed, the Foucauldian notion of power is linked to a productive force: power produces 
subjects
32
. Besides producing reality, power is present in all social practices, and mediates all 
human relationships. 
 
Another important aspect in Foucault’s conception of power is disciplinary power, which is 
exercised, via dominating narratives, by the creation of norms of what is acceptable. Those who fail 
to follow the norms governing our self-understanding and political practices face social pressure to 
conform. Digeser argues that the general concept of disciplinary power is still relevant for policy 
enquiry even to those that do not agree with Foucault’s claims. Digeser (1992:980) summarises 
sharply the differences in the kind of enquiry entailed by each conception of power:  
Under the first face of power the central question is, "Who, if anyone, is exercising 
power?" Under the second face, "What issues have been mobilized off the agenda 
and by whom?" Under the radical conception, "Whose objective interests are 
being harmed?" Under the fourth face of power the critical issue is, "What kind of 
subject is being produced? 
 
But, for our purposes, the main disjuncture at a meta-theoretical level with regard to power is 
between pluralists who see power as fragmented and distributed to more or less equal degrees 
(according to the context and issue) and a variety of other perspectives that regard power as 
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 Digeser (1992:980) states that “[s]ubjects are understood [by Foucault, in the fourth face of power] as 
social constructions, whose formation can be historically described. Foucault's use of the term power is part 
of his description of this formation”. 
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concentrated among small elite groups (Hill, 2005:50). Drawing on the works of Buse et al. 
(2005:26-36), Hill (2005:25-62) and Parsons (1995:248-270) I outline the main perspectives:  
 
Pluralist perspectives  in extreme forms  argue that power is spread 
throughout society and that the state, in the interests of what is best 
for society, assumes a position of neutrality to decide between 
conflicting interests in relation to the development of policy. From 
this perspective health policy is shaped by disputes and debates by 
different interests that are resolved, on an ongoing basis, by an 
impartial state in the interest of the greater good.  Proponents of the 
pluralist approach thus usually consider interest groups as important 
conduits between the people and government (Walt, 1994:97). In 
this idealised model sensible policies would always take priority, 
although some interest groups do - in reality – subordinate the 
greatest good to their own interests. 
Public choice theory, conversely, sees the state as encompassing specific 
interest groups. These include elected politicians but also 
government departments, civil servants and trade unions. In order, 
for example, to keep themselves in power and ensure re-election, 
elected officials reward key constituencies with enhanced public 
expenditure, particular services or favourable regimes of regulation 
and taxation. Similarly, civil servants may exploit their importance 
to political decision makers and those who rely on provided services 
to ensconce and bolster their own position. 
Elite perspectives focus on the way in which power is concentrated. Theorists 
argue that the power to influence the policy process is often 
concentrated among privileged political, economic, social or 
professional groups. As a result, public policy may reflect the values 
and interests of these elites and not the interests of the broader 
public. Examples might include the influence wielded by the 
medical profession, the tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceutical 
industries. 
Marxist approaches focus on class conflict and economic power. In this model, 
power is distributed among classes according to ownership and/or 
control of the dominant means through which capital is accumulated 
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(such as the manufacturing and service sector). The state relies on 
taxation generated by such capital to provide public services, and 
most workers have no option but to rely on paid employment. 
Moreover, increasingly over time, private capital can relocate to 
anywhere in the world, affecting nations’ policy processes. 
Accordingly, those who own/control the means of accumulation 
exercise a disproportionate influence over economic parameters of 
policy, whether directly or indirectly. 
Corporatism focuses on the power of organised interests – such as the state, 
trade unions and associations that represent the private sector - but 
with reference to their cooperation rather than competition. Such 
interests may come together to influence policy in fields such as 
health insurance and regulation of the medical profession to the 
exclusion of less organised and less powerful groups (such as those 
who depend on public welfare or patients). 
Professional influence focuses on the power of professional elites who may 
prioritise their own interests over those in society for whose benefit 
they supposedly exist. According to Parsons (1995:263) “neo-elitist” 
perspectives have focused on these groups and have shown how they 
play a major role in the shaping and implementation of policy. For 
example, in a study of American health care, Alford (1977) argues 
that health professionals (doctors) and corporate rationalisers 
(managers, planners, administrators) exercise considerably more 
influence than the “repressed” interest of patients.  
 
2.4.3. Models to equate the exercise of power 
Although scholars have offered several concepts to frame the study of power, how do we recognise 
and trace the exercise of power? One early response is reflected in Easton’s (1965) model. This 
highlights the role of inputs, outputs, and the linkage between them (including a feedback loop) in 
the policy process. Inputs reflect the demands made by individuals or groups on decision makers 
and attendant levels of public support or opposition. Inputs feed into policy-making and may or 
may not, according to particular circumstances, help to shape outputs in the form of goods, 
services, legislation or taxation.  The feedback loop refers to the manner in which outputs help to 
shape future inputs. The model is, however, very general and does not make clear exactly how 
inputs become outputs – decision-making within the government is thus still viewed as a “black 
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box” (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2005:34). Buse et al. (2005:34, p39) then outline three contrasting 
approaches to the decision-making processes within the black box – the rational, incremental and 
mixed perspectives, which I will now discuss. 
 
2.4.3.1. Rational models 
Simon (1976:62-78) developed a ‘rational’ model of decision-making in his work on how 
organisations make decisions. The author argues that the model of rational choice involves 
selecting the policy option that is most conducive to the achievement of organisational goals. It is 
necessary to follow a logical sequence of six steps to achieve such goals. The steps, briefly, are - 1) 
identify the problem to be solved and separate it from other problems, if possible; 2) clarify and 
rank the goals, values and objectives of decision makers; 3) list all alternative strategies for 
achieving their goals; 4) undertake a comprehensive analysis of all the consequences of each of the 
alternatives; 5) compare each alternative and its set of consequences with the other options; and 6) 
choose that alternative which maximises their values and preferences. A more recent but less 
prescriptive variant of this approach is stakeholder analysis. This approach also seeks to gather 
knowledge about actors, their behaviour, intentions, interrelations, interests and influences on 
decision-making or the implementation processes (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000). Reed (1999) 
defines stake as “an interest for which a valid normative claim can be advanced”. Carrying out a 
stakeholder analysis helps to build an understanding of the decision-making process within a given 
context. This broad perspective may be particularly useful where authority is shared among actors 
and institutions or where different policies are closely intertwined (Weible, 2007).  
 
2.4.3.2. Incremental models 
Proposed by Charles Lindblom in 1959, in this model, decision-makers take incremental steps, 
introducing small changes that may challenge the status quo only in a marginal way. Lindblom 
explains that in this model a good policy will secure the agreement of the various interests at stake. 
According to Lindblom, this model better describes the actual process of decision-making and 
incremental steps also allow inadequate decisions to be amended before the next step. Incremental 
strategy is seen as a more democratic approach than the centrally coordinated approaches provided 
by the rationalists. Path dependency and the inherent inertia of the institutions (mainly those set up 
by the government) have been used to explicate incremental changes (Falleti, 2010). If on the one 
hand the incremental model provides a more realistic account of the decision-making process than 
the rationalist models, on the other hand critics of incrementalism argue that the model is not able 
to explain radical changes. The model has been criticised for not handling what drives the 
incremental steps. An incremental model is likely to be unfair because it favours those with more 
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power. This conservative decision-making approach discourages decisions to introduce changes 
that run counter to the status quo and that would benefit the most needy.  
 
2.4.3.3. Mixed-scanning model  
Mixed approaches were proposed to address the criticism and limitations of both rationalist and 
incrementalist models. The idea was to combine the idealism of the rational approach with the 
realism of incremental models. This combination would overcome the unrealistic requirements of 
rationalism and the conservative approach of incrementalism. Etizioni (1967) proposed a mixed-
scanning model of decision-making which combined a broad scan of the situation with a more 
detailed view of certain areas based on weather forecasting techniques. The author claimed that the 
mixed model was useful to the decision-making process and also provided a good description of 
the process in practice. Etizioni proposed a distinction between major and minor decisions. In his 
model major decisions required a broad analysis of the area without detailed examination of the 
policy options (as suggested by rationalists). Minor decisions (which follow up fundamental 
decisions) could have a more detailed review of the options. The broad overview would overcome 
the unrealistic expectation of rationalism by reducing the details required by major decisions, while 
helping to deal with the limitations of the conservative approach of incrementalism. 
 
Buse et al. (2012:43) states that the mixed-scanning approach is used in some countries by 
Ministries of Health to estimate the overall burden of diseases which will inform the prioritisation 
of specific disease programmes and the correspondent resource allocation. The mixed-scanning 
model is also associated with global health policy. In response to the growing burden of non-
communicable diseases the WHO carried out a broad scan and selected cancer, cardiovascular 
diseases, respiratory diseases and diabetes as top priorities. Specific strategies to address each of 
these diseases were then developed, assessing detailed options on diet, alcohol consumption, and 
tobacco control, inter alia. 
 
This section has shown researchers’ views on how to study the exercise of power and its influence 
on policy-making, its implementation and outcomes. I will now turn to the panorama of the access 
to medicines in Brazil, more specifically on essential medicines, which constitutes a crucial aspect 
of my thesis. This overview is important to set some parameters for the analysis of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance as well as helping in the interpretation of my findings. As would be 
expected, a comparison of access figures before and after decentralisation reforms would help to 
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elucidate which approach gives the best results. However, this proved to be unfeasible, considering 
the poor data available, as can be seen in the next section. 
 
 
2.5 Access to essential medicines in Brazil  
This section provides an account of the state of affairs regarding the public provision of essential 
medicines and access in Brazil. The access to basic medicines is an important part of my research 
questions. In order to investigate if decentralisation had positive effects on access or otherwise I 
discuss some aspects related to the availability of medicines in the public sector. I summarise the 
data combined with the resources allocated and public expenditure in medicines available in the 
literature. My aim with this section is to establish the panorama of public provision of basic 
medicines in Brazilian municipalities, and the main trends related to the management of that 
provision. The issue of access pervades all discussions throughout my work (but particularly 
chapters six and seven), so the overview provided by this section is crucial to inform my analysis. 
 
This assessment of public provision of medicines is composed of three subsections. A discussion of 
the availability of essential drugs and the difficulties in comparing different studies is presented in 
the first subsection. The following subsection focuses on public expenditure on medicines as well 
as policies and programmes involved. The last subsection then centres attention on the role of 
private expenditure on medicines, exploring the impact of such expenses on household income 
levels.  
 
2.5.1 Availability of essential medicines  
The right to access to essential medicines is supported by international treaties as part of the 
fulfilment of the right to the highest attainable standard of health (United Nations, 2007; United 
Nations, 2000; United Nations, 1966). Brazil has come a long way in the progressive fulfilment of 
these rights. As discussed in Chapter One, the milestones in this process of incorporating the 
delivery of medicines by the health system were: (i) the establishment of CEME (Central of 
Medicines) in the 1970s focused on public drug provision to the lowest-income population as well 
as putting in place public plants and laboratories to produce medicines; (ii) adoption of RENAME 
(National Essential Medicines List) to inform the priority medicines to be supplied to SUS users; 
(iii) the National Constitution of 1988 and subsequent legislation which enshrined the right to 
medicines and assigned the responsibility for provision of these products to the public health 
system, and; (iv) the NMP (National Medicines Policy) launched in 1998, based on a decentralised 
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management model, formulated primarily for the purpose of ensuring free provision of essential 
drugs through the public health system. Adding to these initiatives and policies to improve public 
availability of medicines is the public production of medicines (Oliveira, Labra and Bermudez, 
2006). Currently, expanding the access to medicine is a major goal of the Pharmaceutical 
Assistance Policy in Brazil within the NMP.  
 
Although access to health care, including access to medicines, is a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution in Brazil, this provision by SUS is not always as extensive as it should be. In this 
context, population and household surveys can provide knowledge about the evolution on access, 
about the implementation of important social programmes and hence about the ability of the 
government to deliver on a key obligation. Despite the national and international advances made in 
recent years with regard to access, the availability of essential drugs in public primary care units 
has repeatedly shown insufficient levels of coverage. As a consequence, the Brazilian population 
does not have access to medicine consistently (see for example OPAS, 2005:26). Adding to these 
indicators of poor availability is the increasing number of court cases demanding essential 
medicines via judicial orders around the country (Sant’Ana et al., 2011; Borges and Ugá, 2010; 
Ferraz, 2010; Pepe et al., 2010). 
 
An important landmark in the measurement of access was the WHO’s model for worldwide 
monitoring and evaluation of the country’s pharmaceutical situation. The model has three levels of 
evaluation (Paniz et al., 2010).
33
 The first and second level assessments were conducted in Brazil in 
2003 and 2004 respectively (OPAS, 2005). With regard to the second level, which is related to the 
objective of this section, a set of indicators to evaluate national drug policies was developed by the 
WHO, resulting in three categories of indicators: structural, process and outcome indicators 
(Brudon, Rainhorn and Reich, 1999). Outcome indicators in particular are intended to measure the 
results achieved and the changes that can be attributed to the implementation of the national 
medicines policy. These outcome indicators selected by the WHO are devised to assess the effects 
of implementing the policy on aspects related to access (availability and affordability of essential 
drugs), quality and rational use. Access to medicines has at least four dimensions - physical 
availability, affordability, geographic accessibility, and acceptability (or satisfaction) (Center for 
Pharmaceutical Management, 2003). My research explores two of the of the outcome indicators 
proposed by the WHO to assess the effects of changes introduced by decentralisation on the drug 
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 The first level concerns the organizational structure and process of the pharmaceutical sector. The second 
level uses indicators of access, quality and rational use of medicine in order to evaluate the National 
Medicine Policy. The third consists of studies that aim to describe specifically detailed aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector’s organization. 
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policy in Brazil: availability of essential drugs, free of charge, in the SUS public health facilities, 
and affordability mainly regarding user co-payment and household expenditures on medicines. 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts on proposed indicators, measures of access are not fully standardised 
worldwide, impairing comparison between countries. Measures used by developed and developing 
countries can vary (Kruk and Freedman, 2008). It is not always possible to compare even regions 
within the same country. As a consequence, there is no unique operational definition to medicine 
access, and that evaluation, according to Paniz et al.(2010), is “a subject under conceptual and 
methodological development”. The Brazilian case is no exception, as national publications relating 
to access, besides being scarce, employ different methodologies, hampering comparability. 
 
Access is frequently evaluated not considering consumption conditions, i.e. research does not 
distinguish free from out-of-pocket access (Bertoldi et al., 2009; Carvalho et al., 2005). These two 
consumption categories are very important elements in the analysis of pharmaceutical assistance 
policies, since affordability is an issue of concern regarding equality of access, which is a 
significant aspect considering the inequalities in Brazilian society. The comparison is also 
compromised as some studies evaluate availability of medicine only for specific health services 
(Pinto et al., 2010; Guerra Jr et al., 2004; Karnikowski et al., 2004; Santos and Nitrini, 2004) while 
in others availability is restricted to generic drugs (Miranda et al., 2009). Despite the 
methodological differences, population studies in Brazil report medicine availability ranging from 
55% (Karnikowski et al., 2004) to 96% (Bertoldi et al., 2009) regardless of the source of 
medication (free of charge or out of pocket). This is a wide range but what it really means to SUS 
users in terms of access is more complex to equate, as I explain next. 
 
Bearing in mind these difficulties in comparing data from different studies and their limitations, I 
summarised data from seventeen quantitative studies measuring medicine access in Brazil 
conducted between 1998 and 2009, and the analysis is presented next according to the 
corresponding geographical region where the data were collected.
 34
 The study design, sample and 
study level vary, as well as the region covered and the medicine access characterisation. Specific 
studies about medicine access for STD/AIDS, tuberculosis, Hansen’s disease, endemic disease 
control and high cost medicines were excluded because these are beyond the scope of my work. 
Among the selected studies, five are national, six are regional, and six municipal. The majority of 
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 Brazil has 27 states grouped within five geographical regions: North, Northeast, Midwest, Southeast and 
South. Other details retrieved from the selected papers are found in Appendix 2. 
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studies, twelve out of seventeen, used the methodology proposed by the WHO and the remaining 
five employed instruments developed by the researchers.  
 
As for the sample, only two are population-based studies; two evaluate the access within the 
population covered by the Basic Health Unit (UBS-Unidade Básica de Saúde); and the remaining 
thirteen investigate health services and health service users. In terms of evaluated medicines, six 
studies investigate all medicine types which should be dispensed by the health unit or health 
service investigated; five evaluate essential medicines; three included selected drugs within WHO 
global and regional core drugs; and the remaining three studies include only selected medicines 
prescribed for: i) hypertension and diabetes treatment; ii) hypertension, diabetes and mental health 
treatments; or iii) chronic diseases and palliative cancer treatment. Besides the variation in terms of 
medicines assessed within the studies, diabetes and hypertension drugs are included within each of 
the medicine groups investigated. The considerable variability of approaches and instruments 
among the studies analysed corroborates the idea that the area is still in the methodological 
development stage. At least in Brazil it is more evident. Next I divide the studies into two 
categories: broader coverage (national and regional studies) and limited coverage (studies in states 
or municipalities within the five Brazilian geographical regions).  
 
2.5.1.1 Studies with broader geographical coverage 
The studies included in this category collected data from 1999 to 2007. Regardless of the study 
design and the instruments used, the works suggest a general improvement in public availability of 
essential medicines as time progressed. In 1999 the proportion of medicines available in public 
health services over five states of the federation was 52.8% out of 40 essential medicines 
investigated (Cosendey, 2000). This figure is similar to that estimated by Karnikowski et al. 
(2004). According to the authors, in 2002, the public availability of 61 essential drugs (included in 
the RENAME-National Essential Medicines List) was 55.4% in eleven metropolitan areas 
distributed in the five geographical regions of Brazil. The following year, research designed to 
investigate the use of medicines by the Brazilian population found that 87% of the participants had 
succeeded in obtaining all the prescribed medicines (Carvalho et al., 2005).
 35
 Among the 13% who 
failed to obtain their medication 55% of the interviewees claimed that lack of money was the cause 
of the failure, emphasizing the importance of the free distribution of medicines. A national 
household survey conducted in 2004 coordinated by PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) 
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 This cross-sectional study used data collected in 2003 from the Brazilian World Health Survey using an 
instrument designed by the WHO to evaluate health systems performance of the member countries adapted to 
Brazil. 
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and the Ministry of Health found, on average, 73% of availability of essential medicines in public 
health units, and 89% of availability in the private pharmacy network (OPAS, 2005:26). These 
figures show the better position of the private sector, but also suggest that even in private 
establishments patients had difficulty finding essential medicines. It is worth observing that, 
according to the study, only 65.7% of the prescribed drugs were in effect dispensed, and on average 
84.1 days of drug shortage were observed among the public health units investigated. 
Comparability of these last two investigations, however, is impaired. Although both are national, 
population-based household surveys had data collected in consecutive years (2003 and 2004) they 
investigated different medicines and used different sources of medicines to estimate access. 
Carvalho (2005), for instance, did not evaluate the public availability of essential drugs. Therefore, 
each work has conceptual variations which affect conclusions about access level achieved. 
 
The remaining two studies within this category investigated selected medicines for treatment of 
chronic diseases. The first, a household survey conducted in 2005 in 41 cities in Southern and 
Northeastern Brazil, whose sample included people living in the coverage areas for primary health 
care clinics, showed that access to continuous-use medicines was 81% in non-elderly adults and 
87% in the elderly (Paniz et al., 2008). The second was a study conducted in 2007 to examine the 
availability of medicines for hypertension and diabetes dispensed by the FPB (Popular Pharmacy 
Programme) in public and private-managed units (Pinto et al., 2010). The work found around 
100% availability for drugs to treat both diseases in the private sector. However, the same research 
showed poor availability in public health units. Availability fell to 23.3% for diabetes drugs and 
around 87% for hypertension.
36
  
 
A report by the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU – Controladoria Geral da União) 37, 
which collected data from 10% of Brazilian municipalities from 2004 to 2006 shows that 24% of 
the municipalities investigated failed in the public delivery of medicines (Vieira, 2008). The most 
frequent problems were: inventory tracking missing or deficient (81%); inadequate storage (47%); 
share of state resources missing or in disagreement (28 %); expired products (22%); share of 
municipality resource missing or in disagreement (20%); and failure to follow rules of acquisition 
(19%). These findings suggest a close relationship between the establishment of efficient 
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 The implications of the PFP programme for the public delivery of essential medicines is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
37
 The Office of the Comptroller General is the agency of the Federal Government in charge of assisting the 
President of the Republic in matters which, within all areas of the Executive Branch, are related to defending 
public assets and enhancing management transparency through internal control activities, public audits, 
corrective and disciplinary measures, corruption prevention and combat. 
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programming and control of inventory with availability of medicines. Vieira (2008) argues that the 
first two management factors listed by the CGU report are the most important and would affect the 
efficiency of the pharmaceutical assistance programme more than the proper allocation of 
resources. The literature discussed in the section related to decentralisation factors cannot be 
dissociated from the context. Thus, assigning weighting factors based on their frequency alone 
might result in misleading conclusions. The failures most frequently reported are usually linked to 
low availability of medicines, but it is arguable to claim that one factor is more important than the 
other in causing the problem. 
 
As gathered data suggest, there is currently insufficient evidence of improvement or not in public 
provision of medicines at the national level. Next I will show studies conducted in states or 
municipalities clustered according to region. 
 
2.5.1.2 Studies with limited geographical coverage 
North and Northeast  
The only existing data for these regions are part of national studies already discussed (Emmerick, 
Luiza and Pepe, 2009; OPAS, 2005; Cosendey, 2000). Regarding the northern states of Acre, Para 
and Amazonas, the studies report respectively 63%, 69% and 83% of prescribed drugs dispensed 
(Emmerick, Luiza and Pepe, 2009; Cosendey, 2000). Only for the states of Pernambuco and 
Sergipe, in the northeastern region, is there information available about access to medicines. A 
surprisingly high figure of 96% prescribed drugs being dispensed is described for Pernambuco, 
whereas Sergipe achieved only 55% (Emmerick, Luiza and Pepe, 2009; Cosendey, 2000). 
Although one could argue that Pernambuco has the best public provision of medicines within the 
northern and northeastern region and Amazonas in the northern region, these are only snapshots, 
having thus limited value and not supporting conclusive remarks.
38
 
 
Midwest 
Specifically for the Federal District, a study conducted in 2006 found that about 50% of patients 
did not receive at least one of the prescribed drugs (Siqueira and Gaulard, 2009). Shortage in 
medicine supply in the public health unit was reported, by 75.8% of the interviewees, as the most 
frequent reason for the failure in providing the full prescription. A propos of the ability of the 
health units to supply prescribed drugs, the percentage of medications dispensed in pharmacies of 
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 These studies collect data once in each place using a small sample. These studies give results that can be 
both positive and negative and do not reflect the availability of drugs in the region during most of the year. 
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public health units was approximately 63%. Comparing with the 61.2% of drugs prescribed 
actually being dispensed, as obtained by Naves (2005) in 2001, this suggests that no significant 
improvement in the public delivery of medicines was made in the Federal District in the period 
analysed. In this particular case there are two consecutive studies in the same state which, to a 
certain extent, indicates that availability of drugs did not change between 2001 and 2006.  
 
Data on access regarding Goiás state showed unpredicted results, considering the expectation of 
steady implementation of pharmaceutical assistance programmes by the government, suggesting 
inconsistency in the drug provision programmes. In 1999, a study which undertook analysis of the 
implementation of the Basic Pharmacy Programme found, within the essential medicines covered 
by the programme, 100% of the prescribed drugs were dispensed (Cosendey, 2000). Five years 
later, in 2004, Emmerick et al. (2009) found that no more than 74% of prescribed drugs were 
actually dispensed. 
 
Thus, in two states of this region available data show no evidence of improvement in access. 
 
Southeast 
Despite being the most populated and economically developed region in Brazil, Southeastern states 
also presented low levels of access to essential medicines in the few published studies for that 
region. A study which collected data from the public and private sector between 2000 and 2001 
within two regions in Minas Gerais state reported 81% of availability of 21 indexed essential drugs 
in private pharmacies, whereas only 47% were available in public health units (Guerra Jr et al., 
2004). Two other municipal studies conducted in 1998 and 2002 within the Southeastern region 
reported around 60% of essential drugs prescribed being dispensed in public health units (Chaves et 
al., 2005; Santos and Nitrini, 2004). More recently, a study conducted in 2006 in the municipality 
of Praia Grande in Sao Paulo state reported that the complete list of drugs prescribed for antenatal 
care was available in just 15% of the health services examined (Vieira, Lorandi and Bousquat, 
2008). 
 
Hence, data for the southeastern region show poor levels of availability of medicines in public 
services, and the values show discrepancy in relation to the national household survey conducted 
by PAHO and the Ministry of Health in 2004 (OPAS, 2005). Poor availability of medicines in this 
region, which in theory has the best infrastructure and economic resources in the country, could be 
interpreted as a failure in the decentralised model as it was implemented (Guerra Jr et al., 2004).  
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South 
The most recent data about access to medicine in Brazil come from works conducted in the 
Southern region. A multi-centre study in six low and middle-income countries which included 
Brazil evaluated the public availability of 32 drugs used to treat chronic diseases (Mendis et al., 
2007). This study was conducted in 2005 in Rio Grande do Sul state in 20 public and 20 private 
health units and reported 30% public availability of drugs. Bertoldi et al. (2009) conducted a 
household survey in 2003 with subjects living in the Family Health Programme coverage area in 
Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul state. The study reports general availability of 
medicines of 96.4%. Although access in general was high, of all medicines used by patients, only 
51% were obtained free of charge from SUS, whereas 41.5% were paid for out-of-pocket. The 
same study revealed that drugs used to treat chronic diseases had a higher public supply of 63%. 
Additionally, if only drugs to treat hypertension and diabetes were considered, the free supply 
covered about 80% of the drugs. This survey shows that almost half of the subjects who failed to 
use a needed medicine did not even search for them in SUS. A belief that the medicines would not 
be available in public facilities was given as one of the reasons for not searching. Considering the 
failures in the public provision of drugs already discussed, this low expectation regarding access to 
medicines in public facilities could be interpreted as a reflection of years of shortages in the 
availability of free medicines in Brazil. 
 
The more recent accounts of public availability of medicines came from two other studies. The first 
is a multi-centre, longitudinal study which interviewed patients monthly in public health units from 
2006 to 2008 (Dal Pizzol et al., 2010). The study was carried out in eight municipalities in three 
states, and reported that 76% of all medicines prescribed were available free of charge. Higher 
public availability of 88% was reported if only essential medicines were considered. The second 
study collected data in six cities in the Southern region in 2008 and 2009 in public and private 
health units and pharmacies. The results compare well with previous studies, although they show a 
slightly lower overall availability of essential medicines of 69% in the public sector (Bertoldi et al., 
2010).  
 
In summary, from the two groups of studies discussed here, one can conclude that access to 
medicines in Brazil improved. This conclusion, however, does not withstand closer analysis, 
especially with regard to public supply. Studies discussed here have shown that figures can vary 
substantially according to the region, and comparisons are fragile due to methodological 
inconsistency.  From the literature gathered here it is reasonable to state that the big picture of 
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access to essential medicines is already to be done. The other side of this issue on access 
improvement is how much effort and resources the public sector is investing to improve the current 
situation. Pharmaceutical assistance programmes implemented by SUS are the main form of access 
to medicines, especially for lower-income population. The National Household Sample Survey in 
2008 reported that among the population belonging to the bottom income deciles 48% of 
prescription drugs were obtained free of charge, whereas in the upper income levels this source 
represented only 10% (IBGE, 2010). The social importance of free provision of medicines 
especially amongst people from the lowest income strata was further strengthened by the results of 
a recent regional study, which showed the poorest decile of the population living in Porto Alegre 
relied on free medicines for 80% of their needs, compared with just 20% among those in the richest 
decile (Bertoldi et al., 2011). The following subsection will further explore other factors that 
influence the public provision of medicines.  
 
2.5.2 Public expenditure on medicines  
As introduced in the previous subsection, availability of medicines in the public sector still does not 
meet the challenge of supplying essential medicines to patients in need. This lack of access can 
result in failure to follow the recommended treatment, particularly amongst people in the lower 
socio-economic strata (Carvalho et al., 2005). Public policies targeted to make essential medicine 
free of charge more widely available have been implemented over the last decade. The 
intensification in the efforts to provide access to medicine was indicated with the publication of the 
National Medicines Policy (NMP) in 1998 (Brasil, 2000). As a development of the NMP, several 
programmes were launched to guarantee access to medicine for the population. This led to 
increases in government spending on medicine, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total 
health expenditure. The total spending on health (public and private expenditure)
 39
 in 2003 was 
7.6% of the Brazilian gross domestic product, within which only 45.3% came from the public 
sector and the rest came from private expenditure. These figures are not compatible with the 
supposedly universal health system that Brazil has ‘on paper’, but in fact are comparable to those 
observed in other low- and middle-income countries where most pharmaceutical expenditure is 
privately financed (Lu et al., 2011). 
 
Between 2002 and 2007 significant growth in government expenditure on medicine was observed. 
In 2007 spending on drugs was 3.2 times higher, in absolute terms, than in 2002, accompanied by a 
rise from 5.4% to 10.7% in the proportion of expenditure on medicines related to the total 
                                                          
39
 Private expenditure in this thesis refers to spending by citizens and families, as opposed to public 
expenditure, which refers to government spending. 
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government health expenditure over the same period (Vieira, 2009). The Ministry of Health’s 
significant increase in total spending on drugs could be explained by the launch of the NMP in 
1998, whose implementation either created or expanded programmes, aimed to guarantee the 
population’s access to medicines as mentioned previously. As a result, a rapid growth in resource 
allocation for initiatives involving drug supply was achieved. The steady evolution of the share of 
expenditure on drugs in the National Health Fund (FNS)
40
 total spending, as shown in figure 2.1, 
provides evidence of the importance attained by the programmes for provision of medicines 
throughout the years analysed. 
 
 
Figure 2.1- Percentage of the budget of the National Health Fund allocated to purchase of medicines 
Sources: 2002 to 2007:Vieira (2009); 2008 and 2009: Ministério da Saúde/Secretaria de Ciência, Tecnologia e Insumos 
Estratégicos (SCTIE); to 2010: Brasil.CONASS (2010:14). 
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 The National Health Fund (FNS) is the financial manager at the federal level of the resources of SUS. 
5.39 
6.8 
9.04 
9.33 
10.93 
10.7 
13.1 
11.1 
12.5 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
%
 
 65 
 
 
The preceding chart shows that the relative amount of the FNS allocated to drug purchase more 
than doubled in the last decade. Moreover, according to Vieira (2009), spending on primary care 
drugs increased, in absolute terms, by 75% between 2002 and 2007. However, as Figure 2.2 shows, 
the proportion spent on primary care drugs as a share of the total expenditure indicates an opposite 
trend. The percentage of the Fund assigned to the acquisition of primary care drugs was reduced 
from 12.57% in 2002 to 6.84% in 2007. A more detailed analysis of the data and context indicates 
that antiretroviral and exceptional circumstance drugs had a greater participation in the increased 
spending on drugs between 2002 and 2007. The fact that these drugs are under patent protection is 
indicated as a possible explanation for the large increase in spending. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2- Percentage of the National Health Fund budget allocated to purchase of primary care 
drugs 
Source: Vieira (2009) and Siga Brasil System-Federal Senate41 
 
The financing of public medicines delivery is fragmented into specific programmes resulting in 
complex mechanisms of resource allocation, which complicates the monitoring and analysis of 
public expenditure on drugs (Machado, 2007). It is worth noting that public pharmaceutical 
programmes are co-financed by the three SUS management levels: Federal (represented by the 
Ministry of Health), State, and Municipalities. The allocation of federal funds to finance the 
purchase of medicines is accomplished through a specific budgetary item named ‘Bloco de 
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 Data available at : http://www12.senado.gov.br/orcamento/tematicosaude [last accessed in 17/06/2013] 
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Financiamento da Assistencia Farmaceutica’ (or Pharmaceutical Assistance Funding Block), which 
has three components:
42
 basic, strategic, and specialised component of pharmaceutical assistance. 
The Ministry of Health shares responsibility for the funding of basic and specialised components, 
along with the states and municipalities, and has exclusive responsibility for funding the strategic 
component. The following table shows the federal spending on drugs, according to two studies that 
have disputed views.  
 
Table 2.2. Federal medicines purchase spending in 2009 and 2010 
 
Year 
Expenditure on medicines as share of 
total health expenditure (%) 
Vieira 2009 Aurea et al. 2010 
2002 5.39 - 
2003 6.80 - 
2004 9.04 - 
2005 9.33 7.8
43
 
2006 10.93 5.9 
2007 10.7 5.9 
2008 - 5.48 
Source: Elaborated by the author using data from Vieira (2009) and Aurea et al. (2010). 
 
Although Vieira (2009) and Figure 2.1 suggest growth on drug spending, that analysis was 
challenged by the study conducted by Aurea et al. (2010) depicted in Table 2.2. This work 
                                                          
42
 Pharmaceutical Assistance Funding Block, which consists of three components: (i) Basic Component of 
Pharmaceutical Care funds the purchase of primary care drugs. Contributions for the funding are shared 
between Federal (50%), State (25%) and Municipal (25%); (ii) Strategic Component of Pharmaceutical Care 
funds the cost of drugs for the treatment of tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria, leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, and 
other endemic diseases of national or regional level, antiretroviral programme of STD/AIDS, blood 
components, immunobiologicals, drugs for giving up smoking, food and nutrition programmes and; (iii) 
Specialized Component funds high-cost medicines for diseases whose therapeutic approaches are established 
in Therapeutic Clinical Protocols and Guidelines (PCDT) which establish the medications available and who 
is responsible for their funding (state or federal level). 
43
  A plausible explanation for this peak presented by the author could be a large amount of ARV drugs that 
the federal government purchased in 2005 compared to previous years, aiming to maintain adequate drug 
stocks during future price negotiations (Nunn et al., 2007). 
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combined two national databases (SIASG
44
 and SIOPS
45
) in order to analyse the spending of each 
of the three government levels. According to the authors, comparing the figures from 2005 to 2008, 
direct drug expenditure by the Ministry of Health was stable and even lower than in 2005 as shown 
in Table 2.2. The authors argued that studies using budget information, as Vieira (2009) did, could 
include other related expenditures than exclusively drug purchase, for example flight tickets or 
other daily allowances, payments to individuals (wages) or corporations depicting higher figures 
than the actual amount of money spent on medicines. In fact, when comparing 2005 and 2007, even 
Vieira (2009), who claims an increase in expenditure, shows an increment of only 1.4% in 
medicine expenditure. The next graph helps to understand why these expenditures are difficult to 
assess. 
 
 
                                                          
44
 The purchase of drugs by the federal government is done through tenders and/or covenants. Purchases 
made through tenders are recorded in the Integrated General Services Administration (SIASG), which was 
one of the databases considered. 
45
 To account for public spending on pharmaceutical assistance, the expenditure of states, Federal District 
and municipalities taken from the Information System on Public Health Budgets (SIOPS) was included. 
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Figure 2.3 - Brazilian federal spending on medicines: direct purchase and federal funding transfers to 
states and municipalities, from 2005 to 2008. 
Source: Aurea et al. 2010, elaborated by the author 
 
As Figure 2.3 indicates, the share of federal spending with direct purchase of medicines decreased 
in the period, while overall the federal funding transfers to states and municipalities for health have 
grown. However, federal funding transfers to subnational levels only showed growth from 2005 to 
2006, and since then have remained stable. The drop in participation in the federal government’s 
purchases of drugs could be explained by the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance, which 
led to the distribution of responsibilities and consequently to an increase in federal transfers to 
states and municipalities. The increase in transfers of funds was a development from the 
arrangement that distributed, to state and municipalities, powers and responsibilities in the 
acquisition and management of distribution of drugs. As I will further explore in Chapter Four, 
although the National Medicines Policy since 1998 foresaw the decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance, it was only from 2005 with the enactment of the Statutory Order GM/MS n.1105/2005 
that the process of decentralisation was actually initiated, leading to a consistent increase in the 
relative share of states and municipalities in the total public spending on drugs. Although 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance was supposed to increase federal transfers, Figure 2.4 
shows that the federal share varied little in the period analysed. 
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Figure 2.4-Share of public expenditure on medicines (%) according to the government level, Brazil 2005 to 
2008 
Source: Author using data from Aurea et al. (2010)  
 
The increase in drug expenditure has been significant greater than the increase in health expenses. 
Vieira and Mendes (2007) considered the evolution of public expenditure on drugs over the period 
2002 to 2006 and described a 124% increase in federal spending on drugs, while in the same period 
the increase in overall public spending on health was only 9.6%. A more detailed analysis showed 
that the main reason for the rise came from expenditure in the programme for provision of costly 
drugs
46
 which presented an increase of 159%. In other words, the expenditure was 2.6 times higher 
in 2006 (increased from R$
47
 516 million in 2002 to R$ 1.3 billion in 2006), whereas growth in 
resource allocation to basic medicines was 62% comparing 2002 to 2006 - from R$ 176 million to 
R$285.6 million. 
 
An analysis of the value disbursed by each of the three government levels in direct payment for 
medicines in 2009 showed a striking distribution if compared with previous years, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.4. The state level had the highest share of direct spending to buy drugs (47%) followed by 
the federal and municipal levels (about 26% each) (Vieira and Zucchi, 2011). This could be 
explained in at least two ways. First, states are concentrating purchases, and pharmaceutical 
                                                          
46
 Programa de Medicamentos de Dispensacao Excepcional or Componente Especializado, as it was named 
from 2009 (Brasil. Ministerio da Saude, 2009)  
47
 R$-Brazilian Real; currency; National currency units deflated using 2003 values currency calculated using 
the General Price Index DI elaborated by the Getulio Vargas Foundation.  
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assistance was centralised at the state level instead of municipal management, as would be 
expected with decentralisation. The second likely explanation is that the drugs whose purchase is 
under state responsibility saw their costs substantially increased, which led to a rise in drug 
spending. States are responsible for the purchase of medicines that are part of the specialized 
component (formerly high cost) and can also centralise the purchase of drugs from basic 
pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
Unfortunately, Vieira and Zucchi (2011) did not collect data from the state of Parana. As I will 
explore in Chapter Six, this state implemented a consortium for drugs, which centralised 
purchasing at the state level; this consortium receives transfers related to the federal and municipal 
shares in the financing of basic medicines. Moreover, the authors observed an inverse relationship 
between per capita spending on medicines and municipal population. The mean per capita 
spending in municipalities with population below 5,001 residents was 3.9 times greater than in 
municipalities with a population above 500,000 residents. Differences in negotiating power and in 
the scale of purchases were indicated as a possible explanation for the difference in the per capita 
spending among different categories of municipalities. Another possible explanation not explored 
by the authors discussed in this review concerns the inefficiencies in the procurement process in 
small municipalities due to constraints on administrative resources. 
 
At this point, it is important to remark on the distinction between free access and general 
availability in the Brazilian context. On the one hand, free access means that patients can obtain 
their medicines free of charge. Public provision is a responsibility of SUS as stated by law. On the 
other hand, general availability refers to all means to obtain the medicines regardless of the source, 
i.e. medicines can be obtained free of charge or paid out-of-pocket.  
 
Although the preceding studies focused on drug spending, trying to correlate expenditure with 
implementation of health policies, the increase in public spending on medicines does not 
necessarily mean that it will be translated into increase in access. These two variables are not 
straightforwardly associated. In order to understand other factors that influence access, in the next 
subsection I will explore academic works dealing with private expenditure on medicines and what 
this represents for low-income patients. 
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2.5.3 Private expenditure on medicines 
Among all health care expenses, purchase of medicines and payment of health insurance are the 
main household expenditures in Brazil. Medicines account for the largest share among the poorest 
members of the population (Silveira, Osório and Piola, 2002). National data on families’ health 
expenditure in Brazil can be obtained through two types of household surveys, PNAD
48
 and POF
49
, 
both conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística). Studies using data from these databases indicate that the share of 
expenditures in health has been modified, mainly among people of the poorest income deciles. The 
following figure shows how these expenditures vary according to income level, as reported by 
Diniz et al. (2007). 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - Monthly health expenditure as share of family total expenditure according to income deciles (%) 
Source: Author, using and amending data from Diniz et al. (2007). 
 
Figure 2.5 shows that, overall, while in 1987-1988 health accounted for 5.3% of total household 
expenses, the percentage increased to 6.5% in 1995-1996, and fell again to 5.1% in 2002-2003. 
                                                          
48
 PNAD- Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Municipio or National Household Sample Survey held annually 
across the country and which, in certain years, applies a supplement dedicated to health as occurred in 1998 
and 2008. 
49
 POF – Pesquisa de Orcamentos Familiares or Household Budget Survey held every five years in specific 
metropolitan areas. 
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This trend for increased participation of health care expenditure between 1987-1988 and 1995-1996 
and the subsequent drop in 2002-2003 took place in all income deciles. In the period between the 
first and second POF, the share of health spending has increased proportionally more for the 
poorest than for the richest population. However, data from 2002-2003 show that the share of 
health spending was reduced for all income deciles except for the richest. That is, for families in 
the lowest income bracket, the share of health spending in the household budget decreased from 
7.6% to 3.2%, while for the top earners it decreased from 6.0% to 5.3% between 1995-1996 and 
2002-2003. Diniz et al (2007) argue that the decrease in the relative share of health spending within 
total household expenditure observed in 2002-2003 could be attributed to a higher coverage by 
SUS, especially among the poorer segments of the population, as well as to the medicine provision 
policies implemented. 
 
The information provided by POF and PNAD is not strictly comparable, not only due to differences 
in territorial coverage, but also to the instruments used. Silveira et al. (2002), however, argue that 
with regard to health spending, both surveys could be used in a comparative perspective since the 
overall picture outlined by the two surveys would be similar if certain measures were taken to 
match the data.
50
 Combined data from POF-1995-1996 and PNAD-1998 revealed that spending on 
health accounted for 7% of the total disbursement of families every month. According to the study, 
this spending ranked fourth, coming after housing costs (29%), food (23%) and transportation 
(14%). Breaking down health spending, drugs accounted for 37% of these expenditures overall. 
Expenditures in the poorest deciles are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the richest 
deciles. According to POF 2008-2009 data, expenses with medicines by families in the upper 
income deciles accounted for more than nine times the expense of the poorest families. Although 
the families in the bottom income deciles spend much less on medicines (in absolute terms 
compared to wealthier families), they commit proportionately more income to the acquisition of 
medicines. I used data collected by IBGE to produce Figure 2.6 in order to show the profile of 
spending on medicine according to family income level across time. Comparing the share of drug 
spending in total household monthly expenses, the poorest households (those earning up to two 
minimum wages per month), as can be seen in Figure 2.6, represented 4.2% of its total expenditure 
monthly in 2009, whereas in the richest families this was only 1.9%.  
 
                                                          
50
 The idea of reconciling data from different surveys in order to allow comparability was also embraced by 
Diniz et al. (2007) regarding POF data from three different periods which show variations in methodology 
and coverage. 
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Figure 2.6- Expenditure on medicine as a share (%) of family monthly expenditure according to family 
income level in minimum wages 
Source: Author using data from IBGE /PNAD 1988, 1996, 2002, 2009  
 
The uneven pattern of household spending on drugs, sorted by income level, has not changed 
substantially over recent years. As shown in Figure 2.7, data from POFs of 1987-1988, 1995-1996 
and 2002-2003 present a tendency to maintain and even increase the difference in drug spending 
between the richest and the poorest families (Campolina et. al., 2007). While among the poorest the 
first category of health expenses is medicines, in the richest strata spending on private health 
insurance rose progressively. Still, drug expenditure represented a significant share of spending in 
all income deciles, and only among the 10 % richest strata was the share of health expenditures 
spent on health insurance higher than the fraction spent on medicines. 
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Figure 2.7 - Expenditure on medicine as a share (%) of total health expenditure by families, according 
to income decile distribution 
Source: Author using data extracted from Diniz et al. (2007).  
 
Regarding the expenditure on medicines, in recent years a range of studies has been dedicated to 
the subject. Barros and Bertoldi (2008), as already mentioned in the previous subsection, 
investigated a population living in the area covered by the PSF programme in the Porto Alegre 
metropolitan area, southern Brazil. The study was conducted in 2003 and reported that 10.5% of 
the total family income was spent on health and, within that, more than half (5.8 %) was spent on 
medicines. In other words, 55.2% of the total amount that families spent on health was on 
medicines. The share of health expenditure is higher than reported by national household surveys 
(see Figure 2.6) even if the poorest income level is considered. The results are remarkable 
considering that the population investigated lives in an area assisted by the Family Health 
Programme (PSF). Although 37.5% of the studied households came from the poorest deciles within 
the region, they lived in areas covered by the very PSF programme that was supposed to provide 
access to health care as well as to medicines.  
 
Another cross-sectional population-based study carried out in 2009 in Southern Brazil in the capital 
of Santa Catarina state corroborates the findings that out-of-pocket payment for medicines are still 
having an impact on household budgets (Boing, Bertoldi and Peres, 2011). The study has reported 
71 
66 
63 
57 57 
47 
43 
34 
29 
21 
51 
77 
68 
59 
53 
45 
42 
37 
33 
21 
65 
58 
68 
55 
52 
48 
45 
39 
32 
27 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1988 1996 2003 
 75 
 
that more than 15% of family income was committed to purchasing medicines among the richest, 
compared to 9.6% in the poorest group. Around 29% of the adults studied bought medicines which 
are part of the Municipal List of Essential Medicines, and around 10% had to purchase medicines 
not obtained through SUS. Again, even if methodological differences make the results not directly 
comparable with the other studies discussed here, the data gathered suggest that the bottom income 
deciles still pay for medicines that should be available free of charge. In support of this suggestion, 
Bertoldi et al. (2010) reported that around 25.5% of the medicines obtained by the bottom income 
decile of the population are paid for entirely out-of-pocket. The situation remains in certain aspects 
unchanged if compared with 1998. According to data from PNAD, in 1998, among the poorest 
deciles of Brazilian households, the majority of health expenses went to purchasing medicines of 
regular use. In this share of the population, 22% of average family income was committed to 
purchasing medications for regular use (Silveira, Osório and Piola, 2002).
 51
  
 
That same pattern of medicines being the main source of expenditure among the poorest, and 
having its share reduced as wealth increased, has also been portrayed by other studies with some 
degree of variation within the proportions of expenditure (Barros and Bertoldi, 2008; Diniz, Eirado 
and Piola, 2007; Silveira, Osório and Piola, 2002). Another study that aimed to compare the 
proportion of medicine paid out-of-pocket with the proportion paid by SUS showed that the former 
represented 1.3% of the total income of the bottom decile families and 2.5% of income from the 
well-off families in the top decile (Bertoldi et al., 2011). The amount of money paid out-of-pocket 
accounted for 26% of all health expenditures among the poorest decile families. On the other hand 
the research reported that SUS paid for 78% of the medicines used by the population in these 
socioeconomic strata. The relative proportion of medicines obtained free of charge according to the 
socioeconomic deciles analysed by the authors showed an inverse correlation: the higher the 
socioeconomic status, the lower is the contribution of medicines provided free of charge. In order 
to summarise the data about private expending on medicines, some of the key figures discussed are 
presented below in table 2.3. 
 
 
                                                          
51
 This percentage refers to the families that had health expenses within the poorest population deciles. 
However, it is worth noting that, according to PNAD 1998, among the 10% poorest only 22% of people were 
in families who had undergone health spending, while among the 10% richest this proportion was 89%. 
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Table 2.3– Percentage of private expenditure on health and medicines according to data from National 
Household Surveys 
 
Parameter 
National Household Surveys 
1988 1996 2003 2009 
% health expenditure 
related to total income  
5.3% (Diniz, Eirado 
and Piola, 2007) 
7%(Silveira, Osório 
and Piola, 2002) 
6.5%(Diniz, Eirado 
and Piola, 2007) 
 
5.1%(Diniz, Eirado 
and Piola, 2007) 
 
% medicines 
expenditure related to 
health expenditure 
 37% (Silveira, 
Osório and Piola, 
2002) 
41% (Menezes 
2006) 
 
% medicines 
expenditure related to 
total income 
2.32% (IBGE 1988) 2.65% (IBGE 1996)  2.8%(IBGE, 2010) 
 
This section has highlighted the inconsistency in the assessment of the availability of essential 
medicines. Currently, there are no data to support conclusions on availability of essential medicines 
around the country, but data suggest that the level is still unsatisfactory. The literature has shown 
that, compared to other countries with similar health systems, public spending on medicines is not 
compatible with the systems of universal coverage that SUS is legally, and even constitutionally, 
bound to provide. This discussion on access finishes the literature review devised for this thesis. 
 
In the following section I offer my conclusions on this review. Before we explore the main 
conclusions, let me highlight briefly how the points reviewed here connect to my research process. 
In the previous sections I explored a broad range of themes related to decentralisation, policy 
analysis and power. Although I have discussed a variety of frameworks that could potentially be 
used to analyse decentralisation processes, I did not follow any one approach consistently. Instead, 
I chose elements from each of them that I felt could inform my research. Decentralisation 
frameworks, health reforms dynamics and issues of implementation helped to understand some 
aspects that influenced the decentralisation of Brazilian pharmaceutical assistance, and contributed 
to refining my research questions. Moreover, the observation that there is no single approach 
suitable to analyse all dimensions of decentralisation highlighted the complexity of the subject, and 
uncovered many critical aspects that influenced my data collection and analysis. The importance of 
the agreement forums within the Brazilian federative arrangement was one of the aspects revealed 
by the literature review that influenced my choice of actors to interview. With regard to the 
interviews, being aware of aspects concerning concepts of power and its models was essential for 
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conducting and designing the interview guide. In this respect, power relations and its dynamics 
informed my approach to data analysis. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
As the different perspectives from academics in the field reviewed here have shown, 
decentralisation in health systems is a global, multidimensional phenomenon. Decentralisation is 
also highly dependent on each country’s context regarding the governmental institutional structure, 
the legal framework and the intra-country negotiations arrangements. In the view of researchers, 
decentralisation is related to where power and responsibilities lie in the health system, i.e. where 
the decisions are made. As Saltman et al. (2007:10) put it, decentralisation is “…the transfer of 
authority and power from higher to lower levels of government or from national to sub-national 
levels”. Power is distributed in a search for greater efficiency, equity and effectiveness, and 
although positive outcomes are claimed to be achieved by some authors, such as Bossert (2003) 
and Jutting et al.(2004), negative results of decentralisation are pointed out by others, such as 
Prud’homme (1995). These perceived advantages and disadvantages have given rise to debates 
about decentralisation and reversions to centralisation. As the scholars’ standpoints reviewed here 
have suggested, decentralisation is a complex process that encompasses political, economic and 
fiscal dimensions, each of them with different, and at times conflicting, objectives and 
consequences. Decentralisation results are difficult to measure and no single or universal analytical 
framework is capable of reflecting all the dimensions involved. Moreover, there is no definitive 
evidence on the results of decentralisation. It is difficult to distinguish whether a change is in 
consequence of decentralisation or of other factors. The multidimensional feature of 
decentralisation and the limitations in analytical frameworks, along with the aspects that each 
framework can assess, were important elements that helped inform my decision of where and how I 
could investigate to answer my research questions. 
 
A brief overview of the vast body of literature concerning issues of power, especially related to 
policy process, was reviewed in this chapter, providing important elements to inform my research 
design and support my analysis. The literature reviewed has shown that understanding the 
dimensions of power and how it can be exercised is crucial to interpreting the influence of the 
diverse actors and their motivations in policy changes introduced by decentralisation.  
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Integrating the literature on decentralisation discussed in this chapter with the health reforms that 
have occurred in Brazil and in decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance explored in Chapter 
One, contributed to drawing a broader view of the context within which decentralisation has 
occurred, as well as the theory and concepts involved. In sum, as acknowledged by Regmi et al. 
(2010), the literature on decentralisation, though large, has paid comparatively little attention to the 
impact of decentralisation on the management and delivery of health services. Even less emphasis, 
perhaps not surprisingly, has been placed on the effects of decentralisation on pharmaceutical 
assistance in Brazil. The most apposite research in this last respect has tended not to link 
decentralisation to the issue of access to medicines in a thorough manner. Typically, for example, 
the study conducted by Barreto and Guimarães (2010), which evaluated the decentralised 
management of pharmaceutical services in municipalities, did not address access but, instead, 
focused on the evaluation of management and, more specifically, on organizational and operational 
aspects of service delivery. Moreover, other studies that I have analysed, such as Chaves et al. 
(2005), have evaluated access to medicines but have not related the topic to decentralisation 
policies. 
 
Adequate availability of medicines free of charge is still an issue, and the data available do not 
support consistent progress in levels of access around the country. Overall, expenditure on 
medicine has increased, although the evidence here discussed suggest that growth is concentrated 
on high cost drugs and not on essential medicines for primary care. Expenditure on medicine 
swallows up a significant amount of the household income among the poorest income levels. 
Literature assessing access to medicines in Brazil, although scarce, confirms the relevance of my 
research to exploring how public provision of medicines is managed under the decentralised model, 
and if it has had an impact on access. Hence, these perceptions are encouraging justifications of the 
novelty of the research proposed by my thesis. Some scholars here reviewed, such as De Vries 
(2000) and Prud’homme (1995), reported an increase in inequalities as a result of decentralisation; 
hence, regional differences in terms of availability of medicines experienced in Brazil could be 
related to the decentralised management adopted. The lack of definitive evidence in the results and 
the difficulties in measuring decentralisation speak of the complexity of trying to assign the role of 
decentralisation in the context of the public provision of medicines in Brazil. These observations 
from academics, discussed in this review, have helped to shape my approach to the design and 
conduct of the research reported in this thesis. I will explore these ideas and limitations in more 
detail in the next chapter when discussing the methodology and the research design of my study on 
decentralisation and its impact on access to essential medicines. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter placed my investigation in the academic and policy context but also alluded 
to some of the methodological issues and uncertainties encompassed by the complex and 
multifaceted question of how decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance affected access. 
Addressing these considerations, this chapter introduces the research methodology used for this 
study. I will provide a conceptual rationale for the approach taken to the research and a detailed 
description of the methods used. A brief discussion of the epistemological foundations of the 
research design, premised upon pragmatic critical realism insights based on the views of McEvoy 
and Richards (2003), is followed by an explanation of the data collection strategy. The subsequent 
section explains the rationale for a particular focus upon decentralisation policy as it has been 
applied to primary care medicines (for example, Type 2 diabetes and hypertension) in Brazil. The 
discussion then focuses on the approaches taken to sampling and data sources, the development of 
research instruments, piloting of the research and the techniques used to analyse the accrued data. 
Before I discuss my research methodology, I will give an overview of my professional experience 
and how it has influenced my research. 
 
I worked for 15 years in the Department of Health of the Federal District, at the blood bank of the 
capital of the country. In those years I represented this public institution on various committees and 
local and regional meetings. These activities have allowed me to observe the relationships between 
health institutions within the Federal District, and between the federal and local level respectively. 
Many of these meetings dealt with problems and failures in implementing policies and compliance 
with regulations. Blood banks are heavily regulated from the point of view of health surveillance 
due to the nature of their activities (collection and blood transfusion) linked to the restoration of 
health, but if regulation is poorly implemented it can cause damage to health (such as blood 
transfusion contaminated with Hepatitis C due to a failure in the implementation of screening 
procedures). In another health related job that allowed me to participate directly in policy-making; I 
was involved with the development of policies and regulations pertaining to in vitro diagnostic tests 
at ANVISA (National Agency of Sanitary Surveillance). In this role I also represented the federal 
government at national meetings and within MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South). Finally, 
an additional professional experience that has proven useful for my understanding of the 
complexities inherent in my topic of research has been my work as a consultant in the regional 
parliament on matters relating to health (since 2006). In this role I have come into direct contact 
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with the failures that occur in SUS pharmaceutical assistance. Because my role is to support the 
drafting of local bills, and also provide advice on matters related to public health in the Federal 
District I became interested in the provision of essential medicines at the local level. As a 
consequence I became conscious of the intricate relationships between the tiers of government in 
the implementation of health policies, and realized that there is an excessive volume of policy 
documents and regulations to which I needed to pay attention in order to understand the field.  
 
 
3.2 Conceptual foundations and the research design 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that broad reforms such as decentralisation in health care are 
often driven by a variety of ideological and practical objectives and typically have unpredictable 
outcomes for which criteria of measurement and evaluation are difficult to anticipate on an a priori 
basis (Pawson et al., 2005). In terms of the epistemological foundations of my research design, an 
empiricist focus upon clarifying how simultaneous processes of decentralisation and 
recentralisation have affected access to essential medicines would have been problematic in two 
respects. First, the multi-sectoral and multi-actor nature of the decentralisation initiatives meant 
that I needed a methodology that allowed me to consider the situated interpretations and 
motivations of relevant stakeholders. This involved fluid perspectives and understandings that 
might shape and reshape understandings of reality with regard to policy inputs, processes and 
outcomes.  
 
Second, since the interpretation and interpolation of stakeholders’ views becomes central to the 
research enterprise, it becomes very difficult to completely write out the judgement and selectivity 
exercised by the researcher. In trying to generate and explain a picture of reality, the basis of the 
planned research gravitated towards a pragmatic critical realism (McEvoy and Richards, 2003; 
Yeung, 1997). This approach – often associated with the philosophical insights of Bashkar (1998) 
and Harré (1970) – is premised upon three ideas relevant to my research. First, as McEvoy and 
Richards (2003)
52
 observe, pragmatic critical realism does not shy away from interpretivist 
approaches in understanding the rationales and actions of informants. This is not to dismiss the 
reality of existing legal and administrative structures and processes but is, instead, an 
                                                          
52
 As very well summarised by Yeung (1997:52), critical realism, the hallmark of the Bhaskarian version of 
scientific realism in the social sciences, is “a scientific philosophy that celebrates the existence of reality 
independent of human consciousness (realist ontology), ascribes causal powers to human reasons and social 
structures (realist ontology), rejects relativism in social and scientific discourses (realist epistemology) and 
reorientates the social sciences towards its emancipatory goals (realist epistemology)”. 
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acknowledgement that the phenomena under study can often be interpreted, challenged and reacted 
to in a multiplicity of ways by key actors. In a second related respect, pragmatic critical realism 
will acknowledge the multiple fields, domains or levels of perception and behaviour that can 
operate simultaneously (sometimes in unison and sometimes discordantly). For instance, 
enthusiastic proponents of decentralisation at the federal, state and municipal levels may evince 
similar ideologies and objectives, but their distinct parameters of action and experiences might 
influence their interpretation and evaluation of specific initiatives. A third premise associated with 
the approach is associated with this reality: the fields, domains or levels are not necessarily sealed 
off from one another. They may be susceptible to challenge, interpolation and blurring by actors 
therein – and this is particularly the case in relation to lobbying by interest groups (McEvoy and 
Richards 2003: 412-413). These three epistemological foundations pointed to the need for a 
research design that allows ‘triangulation’ of methods. A design was needed that would give 
research participants a voice of their own and define the role of the researcher as somebody who 
interprets and orders ideas in the light of research objectives and insights from relevant academic 
literature. In this respect, triangulation and multimethod research have been proposed as a way to 
enhance validity of research findings (Bryman, 2012:635). Triangulation is often used in qualitative 
research as a way of achieving a multi-faceted portrayal of the context within which the topic is 
studied (Hollar, 2008). These two features, enhancing validity and a comprehensive portrayal of the 
context, made triangulation of much interest in my research design. 
 
Combined approaches are not without their critics. One criticism is that different research methods 
are rooted in wider epistemological and ontological perspectives that may not be compatible with 
each other. Morgan (1998) argues that differences between qualitative and quantitative methods in 
the nature of the knowledge produced and the means to generate knowledge make the information 
and knowledge created by each method incomparable in many situations. Although Morgan (1998) 
also argues that the tenability of combining qualitative and quantitative methods in a research 
design is not determined at this conceptual level – such viability instead depends upon the nature of 
the proposed research and the internal logic of the research design. This point of view, called a 
“technical” approach by Bryman and Beevan (2005:323), informed my approach to the research 
design. Specifically, a mixed methods approach would facilitate description, triangulation and 
interpretation from different perspectives but, as acknowledged by Creswell (2009), would also 
necessitate a clear idea of the juxtaposition and purpose of each element of the investigation. 
 
Taking these considerations on board, data collection and analysis in this thesis are informed by 
principles of the Grounded Theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 2009) observing the alternative 
perspective proposed by Charmaz (2006). In this respect, the research described here centred on 
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three sets of activity, each informing and shaping the other. An (i) initial ‘policy review’ and 
interpretation of public domain policy documents, associated commentaries and academic 
publications (summarised in Chapter Two of this thesis) helped to inform; (ii) the identification of 
key informant interviewees whose insights might be particularly illuminating in exploring how 
political and power dynamics have influenced the provision of medicines in Brazil. This review 
also served to illuminate (iii) sources of quantitative data with regard to the dynamics and progress 
of the decentralisation of pharmaceutical services in Brazil. 
 
In order to make clear the role of each element within the research design, Figure 3.1 represents, in 
a model, the interactions and influences of each element in my research process.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Research process 
Source: author 
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The three sets of activities are shown in Figure 3.1. The figure illustrates the work flow of my PhD 
research. The central and right sides of the figure represent the literature review – the first step in 
the research process. The ‘policy review’ comprises the analysis of elements involved in the 
policy-making, legal framework and implementation of decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance. As indicated, the identification of actors and the dynamics of power inherent to 
decentralised settings emerged from the analysis of concepts, theories, and models concerning 
power and decentralisation conducted in the literature review, and this informed my research 
design, the second step carried out, which is represented on the left hand side of the figure. The 
dynamics of decentralisation and responsibilities of each level of the federation regarding the 
provision of medicines pointed to the role and weight of Ministry of Health officials, state and 
municipal health secretaries. The identification of those actors led to the choice of elite interviews 
as the preferred method to help answer my research questions. The Grounded Theory approach 
informed my data collection and analysis, which constituted the third step in my research, is also 
represented on the left hand side of the figure.  
 
In the following section I will detail some aspects of Grounded Theory that help to explain the 
adequacy of this approach to the purposes of my thesis. 
 
 
3.3 Overview of the Grounded Theory Method 
Glaser and Strauss’s (2009) influential book The discovery of Grounded Theory, was notable as a 
response to the predominantly quantitative research paradigms when it was first published in the 
late 1960s, and an answer to criticism about the scientific rigor and value of qualitative research. In 
their book Glaser and Strauss proposed an approach to systematic qualitative analysis and offered 
practical guidelines. They argued that qualitative research employing the proposed systematic 
approach would generate theory, contrasting it with positivism, which aims to test a hypothesis 
from an existing theory. Soon Grounded Theory became one of the most popular research methods 
used in qualitative research among social scientists. While Glaser and Strauss form the first 
generation of grounded theorists (Birks and Mills, 2010:3), those who interpreted Glaser and 
Strauss’ methods, the second-generation grounded theorists, include scholars such as Kathy 
Charmaz, Leonard Schatzman, Barbara Bowers, Juliet Corbin and Adele E. Clarke. After the 
methodological split between Glaser and Strauss in 1992 they assumed different perspectives on 
Grounded Theory. The split followed the publication of Strauss and Corbin’s text Basics of 
qualitative research: grounded theory procedures and techniques (1990) which was strongly 
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contested by Glaser as not being Grounded Theory but proposing a new method (Walker and 
Myrick, 2006). Differences in epistemological perspectives resulted in three main categories of 
Grounded Theory: Classic (or Glaserian) Grounded Theory, Straussian Grounded Theory, and 
feminist or constructivist Grounded Theory. 
 
Charmaz’ approach, a variant of constructivist Grounded Theory, was influenced by feminist and 
constructivist methodological work, reflected in the focus on the place of the author in the text, 
their relationship with participants, and the importance of writing in constructing a final text that 
remains grounded in the data (Birks and Mills, 2010). The process of writing, according to 
Charmaz, is involved in the development of the theory. This process allows for insights and ideas 
about the data to emerge. Writing and rewriting constitute essential parts of the analytical process 
involved in Grounded Theory. Charmaz (2006:9) argues that “the flexibility and legitimacy of 
Grounded Theory continues to appeal to qualitative researches with varied theoretical and 
substantive interests”. As Charmaz remarks, basic Grounded Theory guidelines describe the steps 
of the research process, which can be adapted to serve in different studies. Grounded Theory 
methods include key strategies for conducting data collection and analysis. Data collection usually 
consists of interviews but can also include other sources of data such as existing research literature 
and quantitative data, whereas data analysis includes coding, comparisons between data, theoretical 
sampling and memo writing. Theoretical sampling is a form of purposive sampling where 
participants are selected according to criteria specified by the researcher and based on initial 
findings. Considering these aspects, especially data collection using interviews and the possibility 
of using purposive sampling, my methodological approach was informed by Grounded Theory. The 
Grounded Theory research approach, however, is not without controversy and has limitations like 
any other research methodology. Some argue that the Grounded Theory method is very time-
consuming due to the coding process and memo writing as part of the analysis. This same 
characteristic, however, is considered an advantage of the method as coding “keeps your project 
going”, in the words of Kathy Charmaz.53 To others, Grounded Theory is very subjective as it relies 
heavily on the researcher’s abilities. Many studies make use of the term Grounded Theory 
inappropriately (Egan, 2002), and Bryant (2002) points out that the flexibility of the method can be 
used to provide a justification for studies lacking in methodological strength.  
 
 
                                                          
53
 BSA Med Soc 2012- University of Leicester-UK- Professor Kathy Charmaz presented “The power and 
potential of Grounded Theory”. Available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY1h3387txo. [Accessed 
20 June 2013]. 
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3.4 Rationale for the focus on medicines to treat hypertension and type 2 diabetes  
As the preceding chapters indicate, decentralisation of pharmaceutical services has encompassed 
myriad administrative bodies, several layers of administration and governance and a broad range of 
medicines. My research thus had to focus on selected technologies that were of implicit or explicit 
interest to large sections of the Brazilian population and had significant implications for funding 
decisions - in terms of demand, cost and use. In this regard, my own professional experience in the 
sphere of Brazilian public health and knowledge of attendant epidemiological and policy sources 
pointed to two particularly apposite conditions – hypertension and type 2 diabetes. The medicines 
to treat both conditions are classified as essential medicines. 
 
There are sound reasons for choosing to understand changes in the provision of these particular 
medicines. According to the Ministry of Health, Brazil has 33 million people with hypertension. 
This prevalence increases with age and the condition is associated with cardiovascular, brain, 
coronary, renal and peripheral vascular complications. It is estimated that 40% of strokes and about 
25% of heart attacks occurring in hypertensive patients could be prevented with appropriate 
antihypertensive therapy. Diabetes mellitus is a challenge for health systems around the world, and 
in 2010, Brazil was among the five countries with the largest number of people with diabetes 
(International Diabetes Federation cited in (Diabetes UK, 2010)). The consequences of diabetes in 
human, social and economic terms are severe. The condition can lead to cardiovascular disease, 
necessitate dialysis for chronic renal failure and result in surgery to amputate lower limbs. In global 
terms, four million deaths per year across the world are directly attributable to the disease or 
associated complications (accounting for 9% of all deaths). Diabetes, like hypertension, thus has 
major cost implications for health systems. The availability and accessibility of drugs to treat both 
conditions are necessarily focus of concern to for a large swathe of the patient population and, thus, 
to health policy makers and politicians. Indeed, in 2008 the National Household Survey (PNAD- 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio) showed that 14% of the Brazilian population had 
reported hypertension and 3.6% had indicated that they suffered from diabetes. Diabetes and 
hypertension are also the leading cause of hospitalisation in the public health system within Brazil. 
One study, for example, of the economic impact of diabetes in the country, encompassing 37 
million hospitalisations between 1999 and 2001, estimated that 2.2% of the Ministry of Health’s 
annual budget was devoted to acute and out-patient hospital care for diabetes (Rosa and Schmidt, 
2008). Therefore, to focus on the provision of these medicines could represent a very reasonable 
parameter for my research to track changes resulting from decentralisation.  
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3.5 Sampling and data sources 
This focus upon hypertension and diabetes, coupled with the rationale for qualitative interviews 
described above, necessarily influenced my study’s approach to sampling. In particular, the fluid 
and porous population of interest does not allow the delineation of a stable sampling frame and true 
randomisation in the choice of potential informants (O'Leary, 2009: 166). The default sampling 
technique thus pointed to study recruitment based upon purposive selection, snowball sampling, 
theoretical sampling and opportunistic or pragmatic engagement of informants
54
 (Bowling, 
2009:409; Bryman and Teevan, 2005:227-233). More specifically, purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques were particularly relevant for this study, given that my focus was upon policy-
making elites as identified by Tansey (2007) and Erasmus and Gilson (2008). The idea of elites is 
not, of course, unproblematic (Harvey, 2011). Some scholars, for example, suggest a hierarchy of 
status within apparently homogenous elite groups (‘ultra elites’). Others classify groups according 
to professional competence and skills - professional elites sit at the pinnacle of such hierarchies. 
Smith (2006) and Harvey (2010), however, reject the idea of job titles or professional positions as 
straightforward indicators of elite status. Indeed, those who hold strategically important positions 
within influential social networks could legitimately claim elite status beyond that of more visible 
figureheads and leaders within organisations or policy domains (Harvey, 2011; Harvey, 2010). 
 
As acknowledged by Goldstein (2002), potential problems with sampling bias or the impact of non-
response from key informants – a non-random error rather than a problem with approaches to 
measurement – were thus not automatically obviated by a focus upon interviewing elites 
(Goldstein, 2002). Moreover, time constraints, crowded agendas and caution might limit the 
cooperation of this type of informant - coupled with a relatively small sample size – potentially 
raising the possibility of highlighting skewed perspectives. Moreover, such failures could 
compensate for random errors in the form of misconceptions, distortions or simple lies on the part 
of participants. As Goldstein (2002) notes, however, elite interviews may have an advantage over 
broader sampling strategies. Participants, if they are forthcoming, may not only provide credible 
                                                          
54
 Convenience sampling: subjects are sampled according to accessibility. The sampling is based on the 
facility of recruiting, availability or likelihood to respond. Some sort of convenience sampling might occur 
mixed within the other two forms of sampling described below. 
Snowball sampling: is considered a variation of convenience sampling by Bryman and Teevan (2005:227) 
since there is no sampling frame. Researcher makes contact with a small group of potential respondents 
relevant to the subject. These initial respondents are asked to suggest others whom they know are in the 
target group and this process is repeated successively.  
Theoretical sampling: is an essential part of Grounded Theory. The researcher simultaneously collects and 
analyses data, decides what data and where to collect it next, and develops a theory as it emerges. The 
process is carried out until a theoretical saturation point is reached, that is when no new analytical insights 
emerge. The objective is the advancement of ideas rather than boosting sample size. 
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testimony but can also identify other, perhaps less obvious, informants and could be in a better 
position to buttress their views with official documentation or other evidence. In addition, these 
additional informants and new sources of evidence may in themselves triangulate and verify the 
statements and interpretations of the elite informants. I took these considerations into account when 
dealing with my sample, and checked continuously against policy documents, databases and 
probing another interviewee when I encountered unusual views or information. As Prainsack and 
Wahlberg (2013:339) remind us, elite participants “are often guarded and weary of how what they 
say will be received in ‘the public’.” They argue that elite groups are cautious about outsiders, in 
this case the researcher, who could disclose to the public the disordered and discontinuous 
character of the policy-making as it actually occurs. That exposure would thwart the elite’s efforts 
of being seen as “formulating rational and coherent policies” (Prainsack and Wahlberge, 
2013:348). 
 
3.5.1. Identifying key sources 
The review of policy documents, knowledge gained in my professional experience and personal 
contacts were used to inform the selection of potential participants. The sample was designed on 
the basis of maximum possible variation – a reflection of the fact that “no matter the goal, good 
research practice demands that one use multiple sources” (Goldstein, 2002:699). Actors across the 
three levels of government that were considered for this research included Municipal Health 
Secretaries, State Health Secretaries, and officials from the Department of Pharmaceutical 
Assistance and from the Department of Interfederative Relations of the Ministry of Health. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the Ministry of Health plays the prime role in health policy-making in 
Brazil. The federal level of administration controls the largest proportion of funding in the health 
field and sets attendant regulations for the use of these resources. Officials from the Department of 
Pharmaceutical Assistance, specifically those directly involved with the implementation of 
decentralisation policies, were identified as suitable interviewees. Health Secretaries at the state 
level were also approached on the basis of their fundamental role in the coordination of 
pharmaceutical assistance at a regional level. The target sample also reflected the municipal level 
of administration’s essential role with regard to access to medicines - this is the level at which 
drugs are made available to patients through many publicly managed facilities. Consideration was 
also given to the geographical variations discussed in the previous chapter. Senior personnel at 
municipal and state level within each of the five Brazilian geographical regions were selected in 
order to address this requirement.  
 
Accordingly, three sources of data were used in this research: i) semi-structured interviews; ii) 
national databases; and iii) literature and policy documents. Primary data were obtained from semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders in the domain of pharmaceutical assistance policy, 
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particularly those involved directly in the decentralisation/recentralisation processes across the 
three tiers of government. In subsequent sections in this chapter I will describe the interview 
procedure in more detail. 
 
Academic literature, policy documents and statistical databases related to access to basic medicines 
in Brazil, reviewed in Chapters One and Two helped, first, to anchor and orientate the foci of the 
investigation with regard to access to medicine. Second, this review helped to contextualise and 
corroborate findings derived from interviews. The main aspects identified and addressed in the 
analysis of documentation which helped to design my sample were:  
 Responsibilities in the pharmaceutical assistance cycle regarding essential medicines, 
within each governmental tier as prescribed by legislation; 
 Initiatives at each governmental level that aimed to improve access to medicine;  
 Decentralisation and recentralisation initiatives within the pharmaceutical assistance policy 
regarding basic medicines and, where possible, diabetes type 2 and hypertension drugs. 
 
 
3.6 Developing the interview guide 
Qualitative interviews have been a common research method in the social sciences since the 
pioneering work on the urban experience by the Chicago School in the 1930s and 1940s (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2008:9). Qualitative interviews can be unstructured, semi-structured or employ a 
mixture of both approaches. The strategy in unstructured interviewing is to adopt a conversational 
style. In such cases, the interviewer usually has a brief list of themes or key words rather than a set 
of fully written questions – the emphasis is upon flexibility and fluidity in the interview in order 
not to constrain the interviewee or ignore potentially relevant insights. These face-to-face in-depth 
interviews “aim to delve deep beneath the surface of superficial responses to obtain the true 
meaning that individuals assign to events, and the complexities of their attitudes, behaviours and 
experiences” (Bowling, 2009:407). When more specific information is required, however, a semi-
structured interview format may be more appropriate. In this format the researcher employs an 
interview guide with a list of questions or specific topics to be covered. There is still scope for 
flexibility in the reformulation of questions, follow-up questions and freedom of expression on the 
part of the interviewee, but it is assumed that all issues addressed by the schedule will be covered 
(Silverman, 2010:136). Semi–structured interviews allow respondents to reflect and organize their 
answers, which in turn potentially increases the validity of the responses (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002). Qualitative interviews can also be conceptually “active” in that they might allow 
interviewees to confirm, develop or refute initial formulations and ideas with regard to the research 
on an ongoing basis (Silverman 2010: 136). 
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As with any other research method, qualitative interviews have advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages over quantitative methods, such as structured self-completion questionnaires, include 
the potential to obtain more detailed and nuanced information and scope for the researcher to 
address more complex and fluid issues. Potential disadvantages include the relatively time-
consuming and resource-intensive nature of interviews compared, for example, to Internet-based 
questionnaire surveys. This can have implications for sample sizes in interview research and thus 
may raise questions about the degree to which data can be said to represent the wider population of 
interest (Bowling, 2009:408). Kvale and Brinkmann (2008: 105), however, observe that interviews 
alone are seldom used to test quantifiable hypotheses. They are more often oriented to 
understanding the inner rationales, emotions, attitudes or social behaviour of interviewees. 
Moreover, in many cases interview research will be concerned with advancing the understanding of 
complex phenomena rather than simply gathering descriptive data (Bowling, 2009:410). Against 
this background, my development of the interview instruments followed the guide proposed by 
Bryman and Teevan (2005) and data analysis strategy was informed by Grounded Theory as 
propounded by Charmaz (2008: 82). Regarding the interviews, in the subsequent subsections I will 
explain how I designed my interview guide and discuss how I prepared myself to conduct the 
interviews. 
 
3.6.1 Preparing the interview guide and piloting 
The interview guide was prepared in accordance with the guidance produced by Bryman and 
Teevan (2005: 187) and was developed with specific reference to themes identified in the literature 
review around power, decentralisation and pharmaceutical assistance policy. The interview guide 
was essentially the same for the four different categories of interviewees (CONASS - National 
Council of State Health Secretaries members, CONASEMS - National Council of Municipal 
Health Secretaries members, Ministry of Health officials and National Health Council 
representatives).
55
 The wording was, however, sufficiently flexible to allow for different emphases 
to be raised in the discussions.  
 
Upon these bases, the interview guide was piloted with the cooperation of two municipal Health 
Secretaries to refine the wording and sequence of the questions. The pilot phase was also helpful in 
establishing the likely length of interviews. As a result of the piloting, the guide was revised 
slightly (the interview guide is in Appendix 3). 
 
                                                          
55
 Refer to Chapter One for details on these forums. 
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3.6.2 Preparing to enter the field 
Kvale and Brinkman (2008: 166-167) emphasise the importance of the interviewer as an agent or 
“variable” within interview enquiry. The authors compare the interviewer to an able craftsman who 
– to a greater or lesser extent – has a grasp of interview techniques and reflects characteristics that 
enable him or her to be a successful interviewer
56
. This set of desirable characteristics is further 
extended by Bryman and Teevan (2005: 187) to encompass several aspects such as: 
knowledgeable, structuring, clear, gentle, sensitive, steering, critical, remembering, interpreting, 
balanced, and ethically sensitive. 
 
The interviews should, if possible and with the interviewee’s permission, be audio-recorded in 
order to facilitate detailed analysis. Recording the interview will also allow the researcher to focus 
on the conversation without worrying about taking detailed notes. Additionally, some notes should 
be made during the interview and immediately afterwards. As remarked by Bryman and Teevan 
(Bryman and Teevan, 2005) this guards against equipment failure and poor recording quality and 
can aid analysis (Bryman and Teevan, 2005: 191). Conducting my interviews I was also aware of 
possible anxiety about being recorded on the part of the interviewee. The authors state that if the 
researcher judges that information has been withheld the recording device should be turned off at 
the end of the interview (or at relevant junctures) so that interviewees can be encouraged to speak 
more freely.  
 
Recording and transcribing interviews has further advantages. As Bryman and Teevan (2005: 191) 
observe, this facilitates scrutiny of data by other researchers; helps to counter potential accusations 
of bias in the analysis and leaves the data open to further analysis by the original investigator or 
others. Transcribing interviews, however, is time-consuming – it may take five to six hours to 
carefully transcribe an hour of recording (Bryman and Teevan, 2005: 191). Transcription can of 
course be out-sourced where resources allow, but this delays “immersion” in the data by the analyst 
and places judgements on grammar, punctuation and layout in the hands of a third party. 
 
 
                                                          
56
 The extent of spontaneous, rich, specific, and relevant answers from the interviewee; the extent of short 
interviewer questions and longer interviewee answers; the degree to which the interviewer follows up and 
clarifies the meanings of the relevant aspects of the answers; to a large extent, the interview being interpreted 
throughout the interview; the interviewer attempting to verify his or her interpretations of the subject's 
answers over the course of the interview; the interview being "self-reported," a self-reliant story that hardly 
requires additional explanations. 
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3.7 Data collection procedures  
Data collection was based on semi-structured interviews that were conducted with key respondents 
across the three tiers of government (federal, state and municipal). Twenty interviews were 
conducted, and some informal talks with Ministry of Health officials occurred in October and 
November 2011 in Brasilia, Brazil. On average, the interviews lasted 40 minutes (ranging from 15 
to 85 minutes). The interviews were concentrated within a short period due to time and resource 
constraints. I planned and pre-arranged the interviews to take place in Brasília in a period covering 
a national meeting (Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission-CIT meeting) attended by municipal 
and state health secretaries from all Brazilian regions. I also interviewed health secretaries in the 
days preceding the CIT meeting when they had preparatory meetings involving both CONASS and 
CONASEMS. Ministry of Health officials and National Health Council (CNS) representatives 
work in Brasília and were interviewed over the days after the CIT meeting. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. On top of the transcriptions (in Portuguese), I also translated into English 
the parts that correspond to quoted extracts I used in my reporting. This added even more time to 
the transcription task. 
 
3.7.1 Interviewees 
I conducted twenty interviews distributed as follows: 
a) State Health Secretaries (5); 
b) Municipal Health Secretaries (9); 
c) Ministry of Health Officials (4): 
a. Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance: 
i. Current director; 
ii. Previous director; 
iii. Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance Coordinator. 
b. Department of Federative Relations: 
i. Current director 
d) National Health Council representatives (2): 
a. Rural workers union representative; 
b. Intersectional Medicines Policy and Pharmaceutical Assistance Commission 
Coordinator. 
 
It is relevant to justify the choice for interviewing CONASS and CONASEMS representatives; this 
was because eighteen out of twenty interviewees were currently or formerly health secretaries, 
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either municipal or state. The exception was a Ministry of Health official, and a rural union 
representative of the National Health Council. Moreover, all state secretaries interviewed were 
former municipal health secretaries. State secretaries interviewed were representatives of 
CONASS, and the municipal secretaries were representatives of CONASEMS. The distribution of 
the health secretaries interviewed according to their region is shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
Table 3.1 Health secretaries interviewed according to region. 
Region 
North Northeast Midwest Southeast South 
Amapa 
State Health 
Secretary 
 
Ceara 
State Health 
Secretary 
 
 Sao Paulo 
Municipal Health 
Secretary (3) 
 
Parana 
State Health 
Secretary 
Municipal 
Health Secretary 
Amazonas 
Municipal Health 
Secretary 
Bahia 
State Health 
Secretary 
Municipal Health 
Secretary 
 Minas Gerais 
Municipal Health 
Secretary (2) 
 
Santa Catarina 
Municipal 
Health Secretary 
 Sergipe 
State Health 
Secretary 
   
 
Regarding the viability of the achieved sample, it covers four of the five geographical regions of 
Brazil. I intended to cover all five regions, and actually pre-arranged interviews, but unfortunately 
due to unforeseen circumstances I was unable to interview any health secretary from the 
Midwestern region. While this was not the ideal situation in terms of responses from the five 
regions, I live in Brasilia, which is located in the Midwest, and I worked in the Federal District 
Health Secretariat until 2006. Therefore, although I was unable to interview the health secretary in 
Brasília, I did talk to two Federal District Health Secretariat officials to check if my knowledge of 
the pharmaceutical assistance situation was still valid. 
 
Although not all 27 federative state members were interviewed, the members who participated are 
part of CONASS or CONASEMS. They take part in the CIT meetings, which are the final forum in 
the process of negotiation within the Pharmaceutical Assistance Policy in Brazil. Moreover, some 
of them are very experienced and have been working in the area for 15 to 20 years or more. Some 
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took part in the movimento sanitarista, which played an essential role in the origins of SUS. 
Concerning the Ministry of Health officials, by interviewing both the previous and the current 
director of the department of pharmaceutical assistance there was an overview of policy-making 
and implementation over the last 10 years. I believe that these qualifications speak for the expertise 
of the interviewees regarding the public provision of medicines, and therefore corroborate my 
choice of elite interviews as an adequate tool for my investigation.  
 
 
3.8 Data analysis 
Coding and comparing data 
For this work I transcribed each interview and saved the work in separate files. I wrote memos after 
each transcription to keep track of thoughts and ideas regarding the data analysis. Transcripts were 
coded in at least three sequential ‘rounds’ observing Charmaz’s (2006:43-71) guidelines on coding. 
The essential role of coding is well explained by Charmaz ( 2006:46) as being ‘the pivotal link 
between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data’.I worked through 
each of the transcripts, coding incident to incident. Codes devised varied from those very close to 
the interviewees’ accounts to other more conceptual ones. I have provided a worked example of 
coding in Table 3.2. In the example given, initial codes identified different processes (verbs ending 
in ‘ing’) related to intergovernmental relationships. This included a group of codes that captured 
my respondents’ experiences with intergovernmental pacts that governed decentralisation process. 
Because accomplishment with these pacts seemed central to the implementation of decentralisation, 
and because it was talked about often, “disruption of pacts” became a focused code. By comparing 
codes against codes, and data against data, I was able to distinguish the category “disruption of 
pacts” from other focused codes, such as “roles and responsibilities: coordination, interdependence 
and autonomy” and to understand the relationship between them. In the example, using this 
constant comparative method I created a theoretical code: “interference of federative relationships 
in the implementation of decentralised policy”.  
 
Codes and later categories were grouped under four main themes built from major theoretical 
codes: decentralisation and centralisation of public provision of medicines; federative relationships 
in decentralised setting; basic pharmaceutical assistance and access; and popular pharmacy 
programme. I organised the codes and categories under each theme in four main tables. More 
representative codes/categories’ quotes were saved and assigned a position number that allowed 
data to be retrieved within each interview transcript. Each of these four themes originated a chapter 
(Chapters Four to Seven). The findings from interviews were compared to the reviewed literature, 
relevant policy documents and legislation, which helped and supported the formation of 
conclusions. 
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Table 3.2 – Coding process 
 
 
3.9 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations are an essential aspect of research involving human participants (Creswell, 
2009: 87; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008: 61-63). In my investigation, I sought to consider in 
particular ethical concerns as summarised by Kvale and Brinkman (2008: 63) related to research 
using interviews.  
 
Raw data Initial coding Focused coding Theoretical coding 
Q. Was there anyone against 
decentralising pharmaceutical 
assistance? 
The central question in Bahia 
was not only the agreement 
process itself.  
The issue was to ensure that 
what was agreed would be 
fulfilled, i.e., compliance with 
the covenants made in the 
political arena of the CIB 
[interstate forum]. 
 It was a source of tension 
between managers, but there 
was also negotiation and 
consensus.  
However, some agreements 
were not respected, and the 
state justified the breach of 
covenants as budgetary or 
financial difficulties.  
The state, instead of 
exercising technical 
cooperation to support the 
municipalities in the 
management of 
Pharmaceutical Assistance, to 
help municipalities to 
strengthen management 
capacity, and the 
implementation of 
pharmaceutical assistance 
policy, the state did the 
reverse. So, by failing to 
empower municipalities it was 
as if the state had boycotted 
what had been agreed. 
(Interviewee 4, 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
Identifying what was 
beyond negotiation 
 
Pointing out the difficulties 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognising the potential of 
interstate forums: tensions 
and consensus 
Pointing out the state level 
failures in fulfil agreements. 
 
 
 
Explaining the failures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exposing  disappointment 
with the state level 
administration 
 
 
 
Disruption of pacts: 
failures and lack of 
accountability 
 
 
Interference of federative 
relationships on the 
implementation of a 
decentralised policy 
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In addition to being aware of and ready to address ethical concerns that could be involved in the 
research process, before beginning the interviews, ethical approval was sought and obtained by 
submission of a completed pro forma to the Department of Sociology and Communications at 
Brunel University (acting on behalf of Brunel University Research Ethics Committee). As 
prescribed by Creswell (2009: 89), each interviewee was asked to read and sign an informed 
consent form that stipulated their rights in the research process. This form provided information 
about the purpose of the research, assured participants that participation was voluntary, indicated 
that they could withdraw from the research at any point and stressed confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
All respondents gave their informed consent in writing (I retain the signed documents). 
Confidentiality was protected by anonymising the data, so that participants cannot be identified.  
 
It should be noted as well that all my interviewees were administrators or policy makers who have 
experience with being interviewed and are not considered a particularly vulnerable population in 
any respect. 
 
 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter described the research design and methods used in the investigation. It outlined the 
rationale for the fieldwork design and considered the issues of sampling, instrument development, 
data collection, and analysis. In sum, I designed and conducted my investigation on how 
decentralisation affected the provision of medicines mainly based on the strategy devised by Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2008) and Charmaz (2006). The themes explored in the literature review related to 
analytical frameworks used to evaluate decentralisation as well as the concepts, theories and 
models involved in research into power dynamics in policy changes were essential to my research 
design. The literature review shed light on important aspects which I considered to devise my 
research design, basically, how and where I should investigate to answer my questions but also 
who would participate in the process and the interest/power involved. I focused my work on elite 
groups – state or municipal health secretaries and Ministry of Health administrators – to study how 
decentralisation has come to be organised and implemented.  
 
The research findings are presented in the next four chapters. Chapter Four explores how the 
decentralisation of provision of basic medicines has developed and who the main actors and 
rationales were in this process. Chapter Five explores how the federative arrangement and the 
consequent intergovernmental relations have affected the decentralisation of public provision of 
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medicines. Chapter Six discusses the changes in the public provision of medicines after 
decentralisation. Chapter Seven explores the implications of the Popular Pharmacy programme for 
the decentralised context of pharmaceutical assistance. Chapter Eight presents the conclusions, 
summarises the findings, and offers the closing remarks. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DECENTRALISATION AND RECENTRALISATION OF PUBLIC PROVISION OF 
BASIC MEDICINES 
4.1 Introduction 
In Brazil, the two most prevalent forms of medicine provision are (1) free supply, and (2) out-of-
pocket direct payment by users. As in many other countries, the Brazilian health system is 
constituted of a complex network of services, which mix public and private providers (Paim et al., 
2011). Users of the private system, that is, those who have private health plans, buy drugs in 
pharmacies and pay out of pocket. They could use SUS pharmacies to obtain their prescription, but 
the chronic lack of availability of medicines in SUS push users of the private system to community 
pharmacies. SUS users, instead, receive medications free, but when prescribed drugs are not 
available in SUS pharmacies these patients also have to purchase them (and pay out-of-pocket) in 
community pharmacies. The latter group often has insufficient funds to buy medicines whose cost 
has a significant burden in the household budget of the poorest families.
57
 Not surprisingly, Brazil’s 
asymmetrical income distribution has led to unequal access to medical and pharmaceutical care 
(IBGE, 2000). Even if in recent years a decline in Brazil’s social inequality was observed (Barros 
et al., 2006), the country has one of the highest levels of income disparity in the world, as 
evidenced by the 2010 Census (Silva 2011). As an indication of social improvement, in 2011, the 
National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) showed a decrease in the Gini index
58
 from 0.518 in 
2009 to 0.501 in 2011(IBGE 2013). Despite these developments in social indicators, the lack of 
access to medicines remains one of the main challenges to the public health system in Brazil 
(Portela 2010).  
 
SUS’ failure in providing sufficient medicines to users, among other factors, could be ascribed to 
the late development of public pharmaceutical assistance. There was a ten-year gap between the 
establishment of the National Health System (SUS) in 1988, and the inclusion of pharmaceutical 
assistance on the federal government’s agenda. It was in 1998 that, in line with health reform, the 
National Medicines Policy (NMP) decentralised the management of the basic pharmaceutical 
                                                          
57
 In the poorest households, the share of drug spending in total household monthly expenses represented 
4.2%. For more details see Chapter two, section 2.5.3- Private expenditure on medicines. 
58
 The Gini coefficient or index measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution (for 
example levels of income). A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality (for example, where 
everyone has an exactly equal income). A Gini coefficient of one expresses maximal inequality among values 
(for example where only one person has all the income). Source: US Census Bureau. Current Population 
Survey (CPS) - Definitions and Explanations; available at http://www.census.gov/cps/about/cpsdef.html [last 
accessed 20/07/2013] 
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assistance to municipalities or states. Decentralisation was the strategy chosen to solve the shortage 
of basic medicines experienced by municipalities. The process of decentralisation re-distributed 
power, funds and responsibilities, which in turn enabled local authorities to match the provision of 
medicines to their specific needs. In January 1999, a ministerial ordinance has made states and 
municipalities responsible for the purchase and distribution of basic medication (Ministerio da 
Saude, 2000b). Funding to purchase medication for primary care, however, was sent to 
municipalities only from 2005, when decentralised supply actually started. 
 
Funding for the NMP, like all other health care activities, is shared between the three levels of the 
federation. The Ministry of Health plays a major part in the co-funding of the health system, being 
responsible for half of the resources. It means that the implementation of policies by sub-national 
levels is heavily dependent on funding from the federal government. According to Arretche and 
Marques (2007), this system of redistributive transfers of resources allowed the widespread 
provision of basic health services by municipalities, but did not mitigate regional differences in the 
standard of health services, which still occur.  
 
Responding to the failure in provision of medicines, the budget of the Ministry of Health regarding 
pharmaceutical assistance has increased considerably in recent years. The federal government’s 
drug expenditure increased 144% between 2003 and 2007. Additionally, the expenses with 
medicines in relation to the total federal investment in health rose from 5.4% to 11% between 2002 
and 2004 (Vieira and Mendes, 2007). Despite this steady growth in federal government 
expenditures, a national household survey conducted in 2008 revealed that in the poorest 
households about 76% of the total spending on health was spent on drugs (IBGE, 2010). This is an 
important issue, as the lack of access to free of charge medicines means high expenses for the 
poorest individuals, jeopardizing their basic needs. The high cost of medicines also leads to failure 
in following the recommended treatment, which, in a vicious cycle, hinders their health recovery. 
In 1999, it was estimated that 40% of the Brazilian population could not afford to purchase drugs at 
community pharmacies, and the only alternative was to obtain their prescribed drugs free of charge 
from pharmacies in the governmental primary care network (Callegari, 2000). This high proportion 
of the population relying exclusively on SUS to obtain their prescribed medicines emphasizes the 
importance of public provision in Brazil.  
 
Decentralisation, as one of the pillars of SUS, has been much studied and debated in Brazil, 
focusing mainly on its positive aspects and its need for implementation. However, there are no 
extensive studies on the difficulties entailed in decentralisation, especially with regard to the 
 99 
 
national medicines policy, pharmaceutical assistance and access to medicines. In this chapter, I will 
shed some light on this discussion, analysing how decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance 
developed, who the main actors are, and the rationales that guided the process. The chapter has six 
sections, in addition to this introduction. The first section discusses the roles and motivations of 
sub-national actors in the decentralisation process. The changes introduced by the National 
Medicines Policy in the basic pharmaceutical assistance are discussed in the second section. The 
third section analyses how decentralisation was conducted. The regional differences that shaped 
decentralisation are discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses sub-national 
experiences enabled by decentralisation. Lastly, before reaching conclusions, the limits of 
decentralisation or centralisation perceived by the interviewees are the subject of analysis in the 
sixth section. 
 
 
4.2 Call for changes in basic pharmaceutical assistance: the main actors and the 
motivations 
In the centralised model of pharmaceutical assistance managed by the Ministry of Health, all 
municipalities used to receive the same set of medicines, independent of the epidemiological 
profile of the region. A country as large as Brazil shows a wide variation in disease incidence and 
prevalence when comparing regions from north to south. As expected, this dissimilarity is 
translated into differences in needs for medicines. Acquisition of medicines tuned both by local 
necessities in terms of quantity, and by epidemiological characteristics, was amongst the main 
motivations for health secretaries to push for decentralisation. In general, interviewees highlighted 
the unsuccessful strategy to supply medicines adopted by the Ministry of Health. The amount of 
medication sent was not calculated in accordance with the demand from each municipality, leading 
to a lack of some drugs and wastage of others. The inadequacy of the model is summed up by this 
participant: 
When provision of medicines was centralised at the federal government, drugs often did 
not arrive on time in the municipality. These medicines were distributed uniformly 
throughout the country, without regard to regional differences. What Amazonas needs, 
Minas Gerais does not use… but for many years we have received these same drugs, which 
in many cases remained on the shelf until the expiry date and we had to throw them away 
(Interviewee 6;5.1).
 59
 
                                                          
59
 Amazonas (North region) and Minas Gerais (Southeast region) are states of the federation. Amazonas is 
less urbanised and has a lower ageing index (16.6%) when compared to the Southeast region (40.8%). The 
ageing index is the number of over-60-year-old inhabitants divided per 100 under 15-year-old inhabitants in a 
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Difficulties in logistics to distribute the drugs around an extensive country such as Brazil were 
another intrinsic characteristic that is believed to have contributed to the failure of the centralised 
model of drug provision. The interviewees argued that as the acquisition was centralised, problems 
in the procurement process and delays in the distribution had the potential to affect a wide range of 
municipalities or even the whole country. The coordination of the whole process of planning the 
purchase, conducting a national procurement process, and delivering the medicines on time and in 
appropriate amounts to each region, had multiple critical points which affected the provision of 
medicines.  
 
After experiencing frequent failures in the supply of essential medicines, municipalities considered 
that the autonomy to decide when and which drugs to buy could be the solution to access issues. 
And, in fact, in my interviews with sub-national actors, it became apparent that their narratives 
reinforce the idea that the support given to the implementation of the decentralised model was 
based on the expectations that this sort of problem could be overcome. 
 
The National Council of Municipal and State Health Secretaries, CONASEMS and CONASS 
respectively, in which health secretaries of all Brazilian regions participate, were instrumental to 
bring together the voices of dissatisfaction with the existing lack of consistency within the policy of 
drug provision. The health secretaries claimed that, although they were responsible for local 
primary care, they did not manage a crucial element within the process: the provision of essential 
medicines. They argued that failures in medicine provision were preventing the fulfilment of 
patients’ needs and putting local authorities in a bad position within the community. Some of the 
municipal authorities interviewed used a common expression that illustrated their urgent need to 
solve the shortage of medicines, which could be summarised as: Citizens knock at the municipal 
health secretary’s door, not at the Ministry’s door, when asking for medicines. They live in the 
municipality, not in the state or in the Union (Interview 1; 13.1). 
 
The decentralisation of primary care brought the issue of drug shortages to the agenda of the state 
and municipal health secretaries. My interviewees suggest that provision of basic medicines gained 
                                                                                                                                                                                
specific area. The infant mortality rate in 2004, in the North, was 25.5 compared to 14.9 in the Southeast 
region. Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of babies under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a 
specific area in a year (REDE Interagencial de informacoes para a Saude-Ripsa, 2008). These demographics 
are translated into differences in epidemiology and therefore differences in medicines needed to treat the 
most prevalent diseases in each region. 
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importance for municipal health secretaries when decentralisation of primary care took place in the 
1990’s. At this point, municipalities became responsible for health care delivery, which is 
intrinsically linked to medicine provision, given that medication is part of almost all health 
treatments. This need increased the awareness of health secretaries, especially at municipal level, of 
the importance of having control over the purchase and distribution of medicines. At the same time, 
the Ministry of Health also resented the difficulties in running the centralised process of drug 
provision, as illustrated in this quotation: 
It was a mix of the dissatisfaction voiced by CONASEMS and CONASS that the drugs did 
not arrive, but was also dissatisfaction on the part of the Ministry of Health, because we 
were running things here without being able to plan, purchase and deliver the drugs on 
time. Imagine making a bid for the supplier to deliver all over Brazil. In some cases it was 
impossible. It was an inefficient policy. This centralised process could not deliver the drugs 
in the way we needed. So, there was dissatisfaction and criticism in the municipality and in 
the state, and internal dissatisfaction [among Ministry of Health officials at the federal 
level]. The outcome was: how much is spent on that? X is spent, so take that X and transfer 
[it] to the municipality and state and they will manage the supply locally (Interview 13; 
5.1). 
 
From this quotation we can see that while the push for decentralisation might have been led by 
state and municipal health secretaries, their demands for change found strong echoes within the 
Ministry of Health. Another aspect that we can explore in this quotation is the association of 
decentralisation with funding. To the Ministry of Health, to decentralise meant simply to distribute 
money, as that interviewee stated. I shall return shortly to what decentralisation meant to federal 
and subnational levels, in section 4.7. 
 
Although subnational actors called for changes in the management of basic medicine provision, the 
interviewees, in general, portrayed decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance as an 
expected development within the decentralisation of primary care. In their accounts, the 
distribution of responsibilities to municipalities was portrayed as an incremental development of 
the health system. For state and municipal health secretaries the provision of basic medicines 
should be managed at the local level, as primary care was. This view was plainly and simply 
expressed by this state health secretary: 
I really think that the right strategy was to decentralise the pharmaceutical assistance 
(Interviewee 2; 2.1). 
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The changes brought about by the pharmaceutical assistance policy are also seen as a natural 
consequence of the decentralisation process undertaken by the health reform that created SUS. 
Interviewees generally felt that as decentralisation is a pillar of SUS, the competencies to manage 
the basic pharmaceutical assistance would, certainly, be decentralised and it was only a matter of 
time. When asked about the motivation to decentralise pharmaceutical assistance, one state health 
secretary replied: 
In fact, decentralisation is one of the guiding principles of the system’s organisation and 
results in a motto, not only for the pharmaceutical assistance but for all areas of SUS. (...) 
The decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance followed the process of primary care 
decentralisation and municipal accountability [for primary care]; those are things that are 
intertwined. I understand that it is not possible to think of organizing [at municipal level] 
primary care without organizing pharmaceutical assistance. I see the decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance as a consequence of primary care decentralisation (Interview 6; 
4.1). 
 
My interviewees suggested that, as the decentralisation of health services was already in place as a 
result of the implementation of SUS, the distribution of power and responsibilities for 
pharmaceutical assistance was an expected development of these wider reforms that started in 
1988. When asked what led to the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance, one state 
health secretary, a member of CONASS and CIT, argued: 
I think, first, it was to complete the autonomy of the municipality. It does not make sense to 
keep pharmaceutical assistance centralised when the rest of the health policy was 
decentralised, and even municipalised. In addition, of course it was [decentralised] to 
promote greater access. And so, municipalities had more participation in the negotiations 
about health policy. I think it happened in the pharmaceutical assistance as well as in 
other areas. One of the pillars of SUS is exactly decentralisation (Interviewee 2; 8.1). 
 
From this quotation we can see the association of decentralisation with a wider municipal 
autonomy. As illustrated by the quotation, it was expected that decentralisation would bring 
improvement to the access to essential medicines and, hence, to primary care, which was already 
under municipal rule. The next section will explore one of the most important pieces of regulation 
involved in the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
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4.3 National Medicines Policy introduced important changes in the basic pharmaceutical 
assistance  
The necessity of reorganising and integrating pharmaceutical assistance into SUS activities, added 
to the precarious supply of basic medicines, contributed decisively to the development of a new 
framework in 1998: the National Medicines Policy. The new policy provided the bases for the 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance, enacting the changes demanded by subnational 
actors. The NMP was approved by the Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission (CIT) and the 
National Health Council (CNS) and was later complemented by the National Pharmaceutical 
Assistance Policy (NPAP) (Ministerio da Saude, 2001).
 60
 The development of this national policy 
is seen by interviewees as a significant measure which placed pharmaceutical assistance in a better 
position within the SUS policy hierarchy.  
 
Implementation of the NMP started at the beginning of 1999. It was a bold initiative that 
introduced a set of guidelines to cover a broad scope of principles and actions, which included 
decentralisation and effective adoption of RENAME
61
 as the mandatory guideline for medicines to 
be distributed by SUS, promoting their rational use. The new policy adopted a systemic and 
multidisciplinary perspective on Pharmaceutical Assistance, which was to be followed by all 
regions. The purposes and guidelines established by the NMP, whose scope goes beyond the 
acquisition and delivery of medicines, required significant work and involved close partnership 
between government levels.
 62
 I will return to these governmental relations entailed in decentralised 
pharmaceutical assistance in Chapter Five. 
 
The directive of the NMP that is linked directly to the present study involves the reorganisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance, which redefined the tasks and powers of the three levels of 
management. The main criticisms of and complaints about the centralised management of medicine 
provision were acknowledged by the federal government when the policy was presented. 
Concerning this initiative, the federal government prioritised the decentralisation of the acquisition 
and distribution of drugs. This meant that the purchase and distribution of basic pharmaceutical 
                                                          
60
 The context and actors involved in the creation of NMP and NPAP was discussed in Chapter One, section 
1.4. 
61
 RENAME is the Relação Nacional de Medicamentos Essenciais or National List of Essential Medicines  
62
 The NMP established eight guidelines: adoption of the National List of Essential Medicines – RENAME; 
sanitary regulation of medicines; reorientation of pharmaceutical assistance and promotion of rational use of 
medicines; scientific and technological development fostering the production of medicines; and development 
and training of human resources. 
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components by the Ministry of Health would be replaced by regular and automatic transfers of 
federal resources, in the form of a supplementary incentive named Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance 
Incentive (IAFB – Incentivo à Assistência Farmacêutica Básica). Municipalities, coordinated at the 
state level, should use these funds to purchase medicines required for primary health care. 
According to the NMP, the state would receive technical cooperation from the federal level to 
coordinate the process, thus ensuring that medicines were bought in accordance with the 
epidemiological situation of each municipality. The state level coordination was also aimed to 
ensure municipalities would use appropriate prescribing and dispensing routines. According to the 
NMP, pharmaceutical assistance would encompass activities of selection, programming, 
acquisition, storage and distribution, quality control and use - prescription and dispensation - 
favouring permanent availability of medicines according to the needs of the population, with the 
identification of needs based on epidemiological criteria. In order to fulfil their new 
responsibilities, the municipalities needed to train and qualify human resources and invest in 
pharmacies’ infrastructure and storage facilities. 
 
Although the policy provided scope for profound changes, including initiatives beyond the 
acquisition and distribution of drugs, the incentive provided at first could only be used to purchase 
drugs for primary care. This mismatch between more comprehensive municipal tasks and the lack 
of funding to enable all these specific goals limited the implementation of that policy, as will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
 
My interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the fact that pharmaceutical assistance had 
reached a higher status on the SUS agenda, evolving from being a federal programme, which 
distributed standardised sets of basic medicines to municipalities, to becoming a national policy 
whose scope goes beyond the simple dispensation of drugs.
 63
 In the following quote, the 
interviewee recognises that the field has room for improvement, while emphasising the importance 
of having a policy to lead the development of pharmaceutical assistance within SUS: 
It was a great achievement, the level of organisation that pharmaceutical assistance has 
today, of course it has a lot to improve with respect to high-cost medications, for example, 
but that is another story…but getting [the management of] the basic pharmaceutical 
assistance [after decentralisation], this was a process that empowered the municipalities 
and invested the sector with a pharmaceutical assistance policy. It is no longer just a 
programme to dispense medicines. It has received another connotation, which provides 
                                                          
63
 Before the decentralisation of the pharmaceutical assistance the distribution of basic medicines was made 
by the federal Basic Pharmacy Programme. 
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completeness of attention and enables access to drugs as an important tool towards 
comprehensive [health] care (Interviewee 4; 13.1). 
 
This interviewee, a state health secretary, reported advances in organisational aspects of the 
decentralisation process. From his quote we can also see the association of decentralisation and the 
NMP with the empowerment of municipalities. The idea was that the redistribution of power 
entailed in the decentralisation would allow municipalities to organise the pharmaceutical 
assistance focused on the provision of medication to treat people living in the area. It meant that 
municipal managers could choose which medicines to buy, the quantity needed, and how to 
dispense them. The advances in the field, however, proved that more than just changing national 
policies toward municipalities would be necessary for the management of the comprehensive cycle 
of tasks involved in pharmaceutical assistance.
 64
 In fact, the NMP was enacted in 1998, but in 
practice the management of drug provision by municipalities only occurred after 2004
65
. So, 
immediately after the NMP came out, no changes in terms of medicine provision could be observed 
by SUS users. 
 
This delay in implementing the actions provided in the NMP is better understood if we consider the 
global health context. The World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines on national 
pharmaceutical policy, which informed the design of the NMP, were first published in 1988. 
Although these guidelines included concerns with essential medicines and access, it was only in 
2004 that the WHO established a new strategy based on key objectives for improving access to 
essential medicines and strengthening the national medicines policy (WHO, 2004). So, even though 
there were internal motivations for the entry of pharmaceutical assistance in SUS agenda, the move 
followed the timing established by the WHO. Although the interviewees argued about the 
importance of municipal and state demands to trigger the process of decentralisation of provision, 
the circumstances suggest that changes took place in accordance with the international context. 
After this note on the wider context related to the introduction of the NMP, the next section will 
explore how the negotiations for decentralisation developed. 
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 The Pharmaceutical Assistance Cycle consists of drug selection, procurement, storage, distribution and 
dispensing, monitoring, evaluation and supervision of pharmaceutical activities. 
65
 A detailed view of the timeline of actions regarding the distribution of power and responsibilities to state 
and municipal level is shown in Appendix 2. In 2005 decentralisation began for the acquisition of 55 drugs 
for different health programmes. However, the purchase of medicines for diabetes and hypertension was still 
centralised in the Ministry of Health. 
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4.4 Decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance: a negotiated process 
Although decentralisation of the management of pharmaceutical assistance has been provided in 
the NMP since 1998, it was only from 2005 that this process really began to take shape at the 
municipal level. The circumstances explaining this delay between the enactment of the NMP and 
its implementation are illustrated by a municipal health secretary in this quote: 
So, I think that, actually, the legal framework of SUS was much more advanced than the 
concrete foundations to implement what was already provided in the legal framework. 
Thus, much of what actually is in the 1988 Constitution and the 8080 Act [SUS Organic 
Act enacted in 1990], took five, ten, twenty years to start to be part of the political agenda 
of SUS. There was a gap between what was placed in the legal framework and the actual 
conditions we had to make it happen. So, those things started to appear on the political 
agenda only when the actors, and the country, had the energy to do it. So I believe that 
Pharmaceutical Assistance had this same trajectory ... There was a time when it was 
politically possible to build the National Pharmaceutical Assistance Policy, discuss the 
tripartite funding, the components in the organisation of Pharmaceutical Assistance: basic, 
strategic and specialised. All of these ended up being in tune with the broader policy 
discussion of the SUS (interviewee 8; 3.1). 
 
The aspects evoked by the interviewee in order to explain how decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance entered the political agenda shed light on an important characteristic related to SUS legal 
framework. This assessment that the legal framework was very advanced compared to what could 
actually be done is not only a shared vision among my interviewees but also among scholars in this 
field. This mismatch could lead the actors to not question the slow development of the various 
areas of SUS. In my view, the actors showed a certain degree of complacency because what was 
expected in terms of care and access is so far beyond what it is possible to achieve that they knew 
in advance that the target would be missed. From another perspective, the legal framework created 
high expectations in relation to SUS performance, which were not frequently met, leading to a 
general perception of failure. SUS, in theory, should provide universal access to any level of health 
treatment and medicines, which is certainly not true. 
 
Decentralisation of the management of pharmaceutical assistance is portrayed by most of my 
interviewees as a gradual and negotiated process. The narratives suggest that the negotiations 
involved the three government levels and were coordinated by the federal level. Additionally, the 
changes in pharmaceutical assistance were preceded by other decentralised experiments that took 
place in health care. In certain aspects these experiments conferred legitimacy on the municipal 
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health secretaries to demand for more power to manage medicine provision, as articulated by this 
interviewee:  
The decentralisation of 2005 did not occur unilaterally. Within SUS this is not allowed. So, 
there was an evaluation of states and municipalities, which was also shared by the 
Ministry of Health, that the drugs for basic pharmaceutical assistance did not always 
reach their destination. There were millions of pills [to be purchased], in a logistics system 
that did not work, procurements that did not work. So the municipalities did not buy 
[drugs], they kept waiting [for purchases by the Ministry of Health] and when they got [the 
drugs] the amount was exaggerated. So the planning was deficient. Thus, it was agreed, we 
agreed, to decentralise (...) that was not a unilateral process; it had to reach a consensus. 
This agreement had to arrive at a consensus. So it happens that way. Is the subject mature 
enough to experience another type of arrangement? (Interviewee 13; 3.1) 
 
This concept of level of maturity voiced by the above interviewee encapsulates the incremental 
nature of the process of changes brought about by decentralisation. A recurrent argument expressed 
by many interviewees relates to the very nature of SUS and its agreement process. Empowered by 
the municipalisation of health care, municipal health secretaries pushed for more autonomy. They 
wanted to manage the provision of medicine within the municipal health system. They asked for 
autonomy to decide which medicines to buy and for funds to make these purchases. Following the 
steps of the policy-making process implemented by SUS, municipal demands reached the state 
level forums of negotiation (COSEMS and CIB).
 66
 These municipal demands found echoes within 
the Ministry of Health. Overall, the interviewees share the view that the process culminated in an 
agreement, and decentralisation was presented as the solution to the inefficiencies of the centralised 
model. The regional differences and the continental dimensions of the country were used to explain 
the inappropriate catalogue of drugs provided by the federal government and the difficulties in 
distribution.  
 
One Ministry of Health official, however, expressed a dissonant view about the idea that 
decentralisation could be an adequate response to the provision issues and also disagreed that the 
process of change was as smooth as portrayed. This interviewee expressed doubts about the 
suitability of transferring responsibilities to small municipalities to manage the supply of 
medicines. Also, the interviewee suggested that the changes introduced by the decentralisation 
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 COSEMS- Council of Municipal Health Secretaries. Each state has a COSEMS which brings together all 
municipal health secretaries within the state. COSEMS participates in the CIB- Bipartite Intergovernmental 
Commission (state and municipalities). 
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process did not always happen in tune with the timing of the municipality. This informant argued 
that some municipalities were practically forced to take responsibility for tasks that they were not 
prepared to carry out. In these cases, state health secretaries did not give municipalities the option 
of having the provision of medicines managed at the state level. This interviewee argues that even 
today these municipalities still do not have the administrative capacity and infrastructure to provide 
access to basic medicines in their jurisdiction, as summed up in the following quotation: 
So I think that decentralisation was a little forced and perhaps even today, some 
municipalities are not prepared to assume this responsibility (Interviewee 19; 1.2). 
 
This theme of municipalities being unprepared to take over the management of pharmaceutical 
assistance, although not so clearly expressed as in this quotation, is present in a significant number 
of the interviews conducted. At this point it is necessary to explore further what it means to be 
‘unprepared’, according to the views voiced throughout the interviews. 
 
On some occasions, being prepared was related to being organised and having sufficient and 
qualified human resources as well as infrastructure. In this case, interviewees from subnational tiers 
argued that adequate federal funding, technical support and political will could solve the issue of 
unpreparedness, creating a favourable environment for the implementation of decentralised 
functions. Another line of reasoning relates the lack of prepare to limitations inherent to small 
municipalities
67
. This line argues that the limited administrative structure, characteristic of small 
municipalities, makes it difficult to carry out decentralised tasks. The alternatives, as pointed out by 
proponents, were to rely on the state level for technical support and also to substitute the federal 
level in the purchase and distribution of essential medicines, as was the case in the previous 
centralised model. This optional arrangement was made explicit in the NMP. Decentralisation was 
not compulsory, so municipalities could, in theory, choose to receive medicines bought by the state 
level instead of being funded directly to purchase those drugs. In some states that was the option 
taken by many municipalities, as for example in São Paulo and Paraná, matters to which I shall 
return in section 4.6. But, as we will discuss in the following section, some municipalities did not 
have the alternative of opting out of decentralisation and had to take on the provision of basic 
medicines even without suitable infrastructure or resources. 
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 In Brazil 70% of the 5,565 municipalities have fewer than 20,000 inhabitants in comparison with some that 
have several million. Source: IBGE Censo Demografico 2010, available 
at:http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/imprensa/ppts/0000000402.pdf [last accessed 
20/07/2013]. 
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4.5 Regional differences shaping the implementation process 
As one might expect, the implementation of decentralisation in the public provision of medicines 
did not follow the same pace throughout the country, and some informants even consider that 
decentralisation is not yet complete. Among the elements that participated in policy-making, the 
concept of decentralisation is seen by interviewees as something that could take on distinctive 
features, depending on the available infrastructure and context of the municipalities or states 
involved. These differences include, for example, having human resources to manage the 
procurement processes and public laboratories to produce essential medicines in the state. 
 
Arretche and Marques (2007) are among the scholars who argue that the main focus of the federal 
government has been the promotion of decentralisation in itself, and that less effort has been placed 
in initiatives to reduce inequalities. Corroborating this argument, studies conducted to evaluate the 
implementation of decentralisation of health care in two geographical areas in Brazil argued that 
decentralisation in itself does not ensure changes in the standards of municipal health systems 
(Vieira-da-Silva et al., 2007; Atkinson and Haran, 2004). Decentralisation in the management of 
basic pharmaceutical assistance did not happen to the same extent in all Brazilian states and 
municipalities. Although regional differences were a motivation for decentralisation, these same 
differences proved to be a limitation to the process. According to my interviews, the lack of 
infrastructure in small municipalities was a significant barrier that prevented some of the proposed 
changes from being implemented. These structural differences displayed by some regions resulted 
in differences in the level of decentralisation implemented. According to interviewees and policy 
documents some municipalities have chosen to exercise full control while others delegated the task 
of buying drugs to the state level. Within the more developed states in terms of health care facilities 
and administrative infrastructure, the state level of the management held the responsibility for 
purchasing and distributing essential medicines. Thus, in states that took the responsibility and 
centralised the procurement of essential drugs, the small municipalities had their lack of structure 
covered and could benefit from the distribution of power in terms of the decisions about what and 
how much to buy. However, in some circumstances, as we mentioned before, municipalities did not 
have the option to delegate and ended up with responsibility for the whole management. 
Municipalities located in less developed states, especially those with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, 
struggled to meet the new responsibilities brought about by decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance, without state level support. Some municipal health secretaries reported a precarious 
situation, in small municipalities, where they did not receive any support at the state level. As they 
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explained, this lack of support was not exclusively related to pharmaceutical assistance but affected 
the whole municipal health system.  
 
With regard to the level of decentralisation implemented, until today there are basically two types 
or stages of decentralisation, depending on where the responsibilities and power are concentrated: 
municipal (complete decentralisation) or state (partial decentralisation). Regarding complete 
decentralisation, the municipal level receives the federal and state counterpart of the funds for basic 
pharmaceutical assistance – the IAFB - and is in charge of the whole process from planning to 
dispensing, including public tender. In partial decentralisation, federal and municipal funding 
counterparts are sent to the state which is responsible for planning – together with the 
municipalities - purchasing and distributing the medicines within the state. 
 
These differences in administrative capacity combined with the existence, or not, of state level 
support worsen the disparities in pharmaceutical assistance offered by municipalities. Whereas in 
some regions some sophisticated forms of management for the public provision of medicines were 
put in place, like the consortium in Paraná state, other municipal managers do not even know that 
they have received funds to purchase medicines, as illustrated by this quotation: 
I think that decentralisation was an important process, but it was traumatic for some of the 
municipalities. Some states, like São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Ceará centralised the 
acquisition because they have public pharmaceutical laboratories to produce those 
medicines. The municipalities within these states, I believe, have suffered less (...) Other 
states do not support the municipalities in the purchase, and the transfer [of federal funds] 
goes directly into the municipal fund, in this case what we observe is that they get [the 
money] and they do not even know it is for pharmaceutical assistance. So we had some 
managers that came here [to the Ministry of Health in Brasilia] unaware that they have 
financial resources for basic pharmacy, or for any budget block [of financing in health 
care]. The money is deposited in that city and they did not know what they have to do with 
that resource. So, it is important to decentralise, but I think it has to be analysed better to 
avoid these inequities that may be happening (Interviewee 19; 1.3). 
 
In agreement with this discussion about inequalities among regions which affect decentralisation, 
CONASEMS emphasizes that the process of decentralisation has received funding that is 
incompatible with the responsibilities distributed to municipalities (CONASEMS, 2010). It further 
argues that there was a reduction in the state health secretariats’ responsibilities in the healthcare 
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field. The reduction in the assistance role combined with the lack of clarity about the new rules to 
the state level is perceived by subnational actors as negative aspects of the decentralisation. This 
assessment that the state level saw its role reduced after decentralisation, and that municipalities 
were burdened, is a widespread complaint in Brazil. This matter of the state level role in 
pharmaceutical assistance will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. CONASEMS argues 
that the organisation of health care is based primarily on the provision of services and not on the 
needs of the population, which increases regional inequalities and difficulties in accessing the most 
vulnerable populations. Thus, the provision of services may be regarded as being directly linked to 
infrastructure, which is normally better in the more developed regions. In general, less developed 
regions do not have adequate infrastructure and frequently concentrate the most vulnerable 
population. This assessment is applicable to pharmaceutical assistance as well. Although it 
indicates that decentralisation may increase regional differences, from a different perspective, the 
policy-making process may be influenced by subnational successful experiences, as will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
 
4.6 Bottom-up policy-making: subnational experiences informing national policies and 
initiatives  
Although the distribution of responsibilities posed many challenges, the participation of 
subnational actors in the decision-making process provided by decentralisation is highly valued by 
the interviewees. The most valued characteristic pointed by the participants belonging to state and 
local levels was what can be called bottom-up policy-making. These features were: freedom of 
choice of drugs most appropriate to local needs; federative forums of agreement; and the legal 
requirement to reach a consensus on the stances of agreement at the state and national levels (CIB 
and CIT). 
 
Decentralisation and the consequent bottom-up policy-making enabled subnational initiatives to 
emerge in order to solve the usual problems in pharmaceutical assistance. This is one of the 
intrinsic values ascribed to decentralisation: to allow ideas generated at the municipal level to be 
used to solve national problems.  
 
When participants were asked what they could identify as a subnational innovative initiative that 
could only have arisen in a decentralised context, they pointed out three significant innovative 
approaches from four different states of the country. The examples came from Paraná, São Paulo, 
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Bahia and Sergipe, states which have quite remarkable differences in terms of health infrastructure, 
economic development index, and demography.
68
 
 
4.6.1. The Paraná Consortium 
The first innovation the interviewees ascribed to decentralisation came from Paraná, which was the 
first state to organise a medicines consortium. The initiative, according to two interviewees from 
Paraná, was put in place by the state health secretary in 1999. The Paraná Consortium is mentioned 
with enthusiasm as achieving consistent positive results over the years. I could confirm in a CIT 
meeting I was observing
69
 that Paraná is presented as an example of state where access to essential 
medicines has been solved and the consortium is believed to be the main reason for this 
achievement. The consortium centralises the purchase of medicines and manages the financial 
resources, but the selection and planning are still a municipal responsibility. 
 
Although municipal health secretaries valued the results achieved with this initiative, the autonomy 
to manage the basic pharmaceutical assistance has brought challenges, as one interviewee from 
Paraná state explained. Subnational levels had to find strategies to optimize the use of financial 
resources. The main concern was the management capacity of small municipalities, and the modest 
amounts of medicines to be purchased by small municipalities (about 80% of the municipalities in 
Paraná have less than 20,000 inhabitants). The strategy proposed by the state health secretariat was 
to create a consortium that centralised the purchase of medicines, whereas each municipality 
selected the medicines and their respective quantities. In 2011, about 97% of the municipalities of 
the state were part of the consortium which was cited by ten out of the 20 respondents as an 
example of a successful administrative strategy. Among the issues solved, it was pointed out that 
the consortium provided efficient management of medicines’ procurement and rational use of 
financial resources, allowing wider access to medicines.
 70
 In line with this perception, Ferraes and 
Cordoni Junior (2007) remark that acquisition of medicines by the consortium costs on average 
29.7% less than the prices set by federal standards. It is remarkable to find a subnational initiative 
which seems to be more cost-effective than a national procurement procedure. Against the 
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 Sergipe: poverty incidence 47.80%; Gini index 0.50; Bahia: poverty incidence 43.47%; Gini index 0.49; 
Parana: poverty incidence 39%; Gini index 0.47. Source: IBGE; Map of Poverty and Inequality – Brazilian 
Municipalities 2003; available at 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/estadosat/temas.php?sigla=ac&tema=mapapobreza2003 [last accessed 20/07/2013] 
69
 CIT meeting on 26th October 2011 in Brasilia. 
70
 10 out of 20 interviewees talked about the consortium as a strategy to overcome decentralisation 
limitations; four of them used the Parana Consortium as a successful example. 
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economic odds, which according to the economies of scale would predict better prices in a national 
purchase, decentralisation in this case proved the contrary.  
 
According to the interviewees, the consortium was responsible for raising the awareness of 
municipalities in Paraná about the need for investment in human resources to organise 
pharmaceutical assistance and to face the challenges of selecting and planning for purchase of 
medicines. The interviewees’ perception is that, as the issues of purchasing were solved by the 
consortium, municipal health secretaries had the opportunity and the motivation to tackle other 
aspects involved in the provision of medicines. Consistency in the distribution of basic medicines 
provided by the consortium unburdened municipal health secretaries to focus on hiring and training 
human resources to select and distribute medicines according to local needs. The importance of this 
pioneering initiative is summed up by this participant: 
It is pioneering in Brazil; Paraná was one of the first states of the federation to work in the 
form of consortia of municipalities.... It was the first involving medicines. Of course, 
throughout these 12 years it has been improved. And it has advanced, has expanded the list 
of medicines and systematically has increased the participation of the municipalities. .... 
All this was set within the CIB
71
 and what we have today is a strategy that has been very 
well resolved by the municipalities in relation to primary care medicines. The price… 
according to the bank of prices [database] of the Ministry of Health, for more than 10 years 
the consortium is the public institution that buys drugs cheaper.... It organized the 
purchase, so the municipalities were aware that they needed to have professionals, 
especially pharmacists, to organise the programming, and the planning (Interviewee 3; 
1.6). 
 
Along with the emphasis that the interviewee places on the positive aspects of the consortium the 
narrative also suggests that pharmaceutical assistance in Paraná reached a superior standard when 
compared to the Brazilian situation. The management of basic pharmaceutical assistance at state 
level, according to the interviewee, resulted in many financial and operational benefits. Aided by 
the consortium, municipalities invested efforts in expanding the list of drugs and pharmaceutical 
services delivered because they had money and professionals available. 
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 CIB is the Bipartite Intergovernmental Commission 
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4.6.2. MEDCASA in São Paulo and Remédio em Casa in Bahia
72
 
The second innovative approach developed to improve access was the delivery of medicines by 
post directly to the patient’s address. Currently two states use this strategy to provide medicines: 
Bahia has the programme MEDCASA and São Paulo has Remédio em Casa, which was 
implemented in the state capital and in other cities within the state.  
 
The Remédio em Casa programme was put into practice by the Municipal Health Secretariat of the 
city of São Paulo. The programme delivers medicines to treat patients with chronic diseases for the 
period of 90 days. Patients should be clinically stable, and being assisted by SUS to qualify for the 
programme. Remédio em Casa was implemented in 2005 initially with medications for diabetes 
and hypertension and was gradually expanded to cover other chronic conditions such as 
dyslipidemia and hypothyroidism.  
 
MEDCASA was an initiative launched in 2008 by the state health secretary of Bahia, to pay off an 
important financial debt the state had with the municipalities. The debt, as explained by one of the 
interviewees, was the contribution due from the state for pharmaceutical assistance that had not 
been sent to municipalities for years in a row. Two respondents from Bahia pointed out COSEMS’ 
constant pressure as an important backing to the success of the municipalities’ requests. The way 
Bahia chose to pay off the debt was to send drugs to treat diabetes and hypertension, by mail, to 
patients in treatment in the municipalities. My interviewee associates MEDCASA with 
improvement in pharmaceutical assistance, because the programme combines the distribution of 
medicines with health care, as patients should be in treatment at a municipal health unit to be 
eligible to receive home delivery of medicines. 
 
4.6.3. Sergipe’s experience in regulating access 
The third innovative approach came from Sergipe, which in the 2000’s, was the first to enact laws 
to regulate the operation of SUS at the state level with regard to the coverage of services and drugs. 
Sergipe was also the first to establish contracts to regulate the responsibilities of the state and 
municipalities. Among the tools created by Sergipe for managing SUS, the Standard of Coverage 
stands out, which contains: a list of services and medicines to be offered; the Guidelines for 
construction of the Health Map, which seeks to map and distribute the supply services throughout 
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 MEDCASA merges the words medicines and home (MED+CASA), and Remédio em Casa means 
‘medicines at home’. 
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the territory; and the Public Action Contract, which defines what should be the responsibility of 
each governmental entity within state jurisdiction in the provision of health. 
  
Those instruments implemented in Sergipe were introduced at the national level later on in 2011, 
with the enactment of Decree 7508 (Brasil, 2011). This is an example of how innovation and 
experimentation at state level have led to new policy measures that had broad national application, 
as illustrated in the next quotation: 
Historically in my state we’ve had a very interesting advance. The state of Sergipe 
experienced the changes which are now being discussed with Decree 7508 for Brazil. In 
Sergipe, we already have a contractual relationship between the state and municipalities 
defining the responsibilities of each one. We've also set a standard of coverage, and a 
standard of inputs, be they medicines, health products or devices. This greatly facilitates 
the relationship with the municipalities (Interviewee 5; 1.2). 
 
Although the new legal framework is portrayed by the interviewee as an advance in pharmaceutical 
care, this innovation can also be regarded as a response to restrain the tendency to turn drug 
dispensing into a judicial issue, which occurs in Brazil and is known as ‘judicialisation’. It refers to 
a phenomenon in which patients take the government to court to gain access to health services and 
resources (in this particular case the term refers to lawsuits for access to medicines). In fact, the 
national decree that the interviewee refers to actually limits the provision of medicines to those 
listed in RENAME and/or in SUS Therapeutic Protocols. This was justified by the need to contain 
the financial impacts of supplying the high-cost drugs that are mostly involved in lawsuits. I will 
return to the judicialisation issue later on. 
 
These three examples indicate the emergence of subnational alternatives to overcome issues raised 
by decentralisation in Brazil. They are in accordance with the idea that decentralised governments 
are more favourable to policy innovations and experimentation, as remarked by Oates (1999) and 
Osborne (1993:253). However, the innovative consortium strategy created in Paraná, in my view, is 
more likely to be a result of the autonomy intrinsic to federal states than of the decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance. Assigning responsibilities relating to the governance of medicine 
provision to states and municipalities could, in a way, push the states to search for alternatives. 
Considering the circumstances, the innovative initiative of the Consortium was probably not the 
result of the decentralisation of pharmaceutical services per se, but, more likely, of the political and 
fiscal decentralisation that happened before the administrative decentralisation of health. The fact 
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that the Consortium was created in 1999, i.e. at a time prior to the effective implementation of 
decentralised basic pharmaceutical assistance, helps to explain my view. The same argument is 
supported by the fact that São Paulo, Paraná and Minas Gerais were precursors for the Basic 
Pharmacy Programme implemented by the federal government in 2004.
73
 This reiterates the fact 
that certain states of the federation possessed, before decentralisation of pharmaceutical services 
took place, sufficient infrastructure, resources and administrative capacity to implement strategies 
for the supply of drugs that later would serve as a model for other national initiatives. Nonetheless, 
it should also be remarked that judicialisation played an important role in shaping the legal 
framework. 
 
Judicialisation may be regarded as a process that has been used and adapted to respond to different 
situations concerning both patients and SUS. Court cases that are supposed to be used in extreme 
cases have become a usual approach to obtain drugs, as this municipal health secretary from Santa 
Catarina state explains:  
Today, with the ease of judicialisation I've seen a judicialisation process even to [buy] 
shampoo (Interviewee 7; 5.1). 
 
Initially, the drugs that were part of those lawsuits were primarily for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 
After 1999, there was a decrease in cases that required these drugs, and others emerged such as 
hepatitis C, hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis and diabetes (Borges and Ugá, 2009). Although 
these lawsuits are well known and have been reported widely by the press, there is no nationwide 
survey depicting number of court cases or proportion of access provided via court cases. Despite 
the difficulty in measuring the total costs of the lawsuits, it can be observed that expenditure on 
paying claims ordered by courts has increased significantly since 2003. Ministry of Health 
expenses with court cases demanding medicines went from R$170 000, in 2003, to R$ 250 million 
in 2011(Advocacia Geral da União, 2011). It is worth noting that the judiciary, as well as the health 
system, is also decentralised, so that the lawsuits are divided between the Federal Court and the 
Courts of each State, making it difficult to draw a national picture. However, a report by the legal 
consulting area of the Ministry of Health showed that about R$ 950 million was spent on the 
lawsuits in 2010 by the federal government and eight of the 27 states.
74
 This represented about 14% 
of total expenditure by the Ministry of Health on medicines to address all SUS users. 
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 Basic Pharmacy Programme was the federal initiative which distributed standardised sets of basic 
medicines to municipalities before decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance. 
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 Spending on lawsuits by 19 out of 27 states and all municipalities are not included in this sum. 
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As in other aspects of pharmaceutical assistance that I have already discussed, the role of medical 
doctors is important to understand the phenomenon of judicialisation. Lima (2009:54) has shown 
that doctors have been the first to direct patients’ search for medicines through the courts. The 
author interviewed patients in Manaus and these patients reported that the doctor told them that if 
they could not find the prescribed medication in SUS facilities then they should use the judicial 
process. This behaviour illustrates how these professionals influence the implementation and 
performance of SUS pharmaceutical assistance. Taking this in conjunction with the prescription of 
drugs that are not part of the RENAME list, as reported by my interviewees, resulted in important 
factors that undermined the implementation of pharmaceutical assistance. Although this is an issue 
that has a profound financial impact on the whole health system, influencing the availability of 
medicines, as far as I am concerned these behaviours have not been discussed by the health 
secretaries. The next section will discuss what interviewees have explicitly reported as important 
factors that limited decentralisation.  
 
 
4.7 Partial decentralisation, complete decentralisation and centralisation: what are the 
limits perceived by the interviewees? 
Overall decentralisation is portrayed by the interviewees as a negotiated and gradual process which 
has not yet reached its full potential. In general, among the municipal and state health secretaries 
interviewed, the view is that basic pharmaceutical assistance decentralisation is a one-way process, 
i.e. the policy initiatives, and their financing strategy, are directed to distribute more power from 
the federal level to subnational levels, mainly municipalities. On the one hand, even when 
interviewees representing state and municipalities are directly asked and prompted with examples 
of centralised initiatives in the field – the Popular Pharmacy Programme, for instance - they tend to 
argue that it is not a move towards centralisation, given that municipalities still hold the same 
responsibilities and funding to provide basic medicines. On the other hand, Ministry of Health 
officials can more openly discuss the centralising aspects of these initiatives and, moreover, justify 
them. These findings regarding different views between subnational and federal actors are in close 
agreement with some of the conclusions of Exworthy et al. (2010), who investigated the inter-
relationship between decentralisation and performance in the local health economy in the NHS in 
the UK. The authors argued that “decentralisation and centralisation usually exist together and 
policy attention on decentralisation can mask the centralisation taking place” (Exworthy et al., 
2010: 8). 
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One Ministry of Health official that played a key role in the decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance argued that the process was focused on the transfer of federal funds to subnational tiers 
to finance the purchase of medicines. At the beginning of the process, from 2004 to 2006, as this 
interviewee explained, the focal point was: who has the money to purchase the drugs? At that time, 
when Ministry of Health officials referred to decentralisation, they meant distribution of funds to 
buy medicines. The NMP, however, had made it clear that decentralisation encompassed the 
management of pharmaceutical assistance beyond the purchase of drugs. Elaborating the idea of a 
restricted concept of decentralisation adopted at that time, this interviewee describes that, at the 
beginning, municipal health secretaries kept buying the same list of medicines they used to receive 
from federal level, as summed up in this quotation: 
But at first the discussion on decentralisation was: who buys [the medicines], who has the 
money in hand to buy. In reality in our view [the Ministry of Health’s perspective], 
decentralisation should include the management as a whole. In other words, whoever is 
taking the important decisions at the local level related to the health system should also be 
able to make the decisions about which drugs were important, and how to accommodate 
local demands of medicines, and should, of course, have the money to do it. But the process 
was not so simple, so that even today it has not been totally solved yet (...) but when I was 
the director, decentralisation was closely tied to the concept of who has the money to 
manage the purchase of medicines. In fact, the list of medicines was not him [sic, the 
municipal health secretary] who had defined or decided on (Interviewee 18; 1.1). 
 
Alongside this observation that decentralisation was seen just as distribution of funds, this 
quotation also gives an idea about the gap between what was provided by the legal framework and 
what the municipalities actually could perform. The quotation presents a nuanced portrait of the 
municipal circumstances after decentralisation. If on the one hand their demands for autonomy 
were met, on the other hand, decentralisation has brought out the need to have the capacity and 
structure to manage pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
But what are the actual difficulties in buying medicines? The motivation presented by 
municipalities to choose partial decentralisation was the gains of economy of scale and the 
bureaucratic difficulties inherent to the public procurements procedure, which requires highly 
skilled human resources. Awareness about the potential savings is widespread among the 
interviewees, both subnational health secretaries and Ministry of Health officials. Economies of 
scale in this case relate to better prices and consequently to the economy obtained by centralised 
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procurement by virtue of the larger amount of medicines purchased. The following quotation, from 
a municipal health secretary, illustrates this perception clearly: 
Municipalities that have centralised purchasing at the state level [i.e. partial 
decentralisation] have economies of scale. It is too complicated for a small municipality to 
buy small quantities of drugs; it will end up paying higher prices. The state will buy for a 
large number of municipalities and will get a better price. But when the state fails to buy 
certain drugs, especially hypertension, the municipality experiences shortages. The 
federal, state and municipal funding counterparts are committed in this process headed by 
the state [level]. If the purchase does not work well, these funding sources are no longer 
used to supply the population (Interviewee 10;1.4). 
 
This quotation also highlights the disadvantage most frequently cited by my informants: 
inconsistency in the distribution of medicines. Decentralisation that reached just the state level 
sometimes produces the same problems that motivated the decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance in the first place. With this partial decentralisation, shortages were downsized from 
being a nationwide problem, when purchases were centralised in the federal government, to a 
regional scale. However, for municipal managers and patients, both approaches, in the case of 
failure, have the same consequences: shortage at the local level. 
 
Regardless of the type of arrangement adopted, the regulatory framework mandates that the supply 
of basic medicines must be sorted out by means of a federative agreement between federal, state 
and municipal level, approved in the tripartite forum. Thus, in theory when the state fails to deliver 
medicines sanctions could be applied. But, in reality, some municipal health secretaries reported 
that when this agreement is breached there are no consequences for the state. Failure in fulfilling 
agreements and repercussions on access is a matter to which I shall return in Chapter Five.  
 
Considering regional differences, it is worth noting that state administrative capacity and 
infrastructure, mainly regarding the public production of essential medicines by state laboratories, 
played an important role in the steps taken and in the extent of decentralisation experienced. 
Additionally, those features formed the context within which pharmaceutical assistance advanced. 
More developed states were able to accommodate and compensate the lack of managerial capacity 
and low volume of purchases in small municipalities. States from economically developed regions 
such as São Paulo and Paraná, for example, have centralised acquisition of medicines. In São 
Paulo, the Dose Certa programme was created by the state health secretary to manage the 
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acquisition and distribution of essential medicines for municipalities with fewer than 250,000 
inhabitants.
75
 
 
The programme is managed by FURP, the Foundation for Popular Medicines, the official 
pharmaceutical laboratory of São Paulo state, which is part of the São Paulo Health Secretariat. 
FURP is the largest public drug manufacturer in Brazil and one of the largest in Latin America. 
Although it could be expected that having such a public manufacturer would solve the main issues 
of medicine availability and costs, it is not currently the case. Some municipalities in São Paulo 
which opted for state management, are discontented with the sort of medicines distributed and their 
prices, and are now trying to opt out, as illustrated in this quotation: 
Today many of the 598 municipalities that are part of 'Dose Certa' have already realised 
that it’s much more advantageous to opt out because the list [of drugs] is outdated, so now 
you have basically two standards of pharmaceutical assistance [within the state]. One in 
larger municipalities [that are not part of the Dose Certa Programme], which update their 
list and buy freely because they get the management at the Municipal Health Secretary (…) 
[and] we have a second standard of assistance in smaller and medium-sized municipalities, 
where it is not possible to use better medicines. But the worst is that several of these 
products which are produced by the FURP, when they are distributed the invoice shows 
that the drug is more expensive than the same drug bought directly by a small municipality 
with all the inconvenience of buying small quantities (Interviewee 1; 2.7). 
 
This quotation illustrates an inconvenience of decentralisation, which is often counted as an 
important disadvantage that arises from the distribution of power and resources: the inability to 
standardise the implementation of a given programme. From this quotation we can also see the 
discontentment of municipalities with state management of pharmaceutical assistance associated 
with inefficiencies of the public sector. The situation evidenced that distribution of medicines that 
involves the state level is problematic, even in São Paulo with its governmental pharmaceutical 
laboratory to produce medicines. This dissatisfaction, the interviewee suggests, can lead 
municipalities to demand complete control over pharmaceutical assistance. 
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 Dose Certa means ‘Right Dose’. It is the programme created by the state health secretariat in São Paulo to 
manage the acquisition and distribution of essential medicines to municipalities with fewer than 250,000 
inhabitants. In Brazil only 2% of the municipalities have more than 250,000 inhabitants, and 54% have fewer 
than 10,000 inhabitants. São Paulo city is the biggest city in the country with 10,990 million inhabitants, but 
the smallest municipality with only 834 inhabitants is also in São Paulo state. 
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This perception of changeability in the level or extent of decentralisation has at least two 
perspectives. Firstly, municipal and state actors could use this to move forward or backward when 
it comes to responsibility for the complete management cycle. Secondly, the Ministry of Health 
interviewees suggest that this movement forward or backward in the extent of decentralisation 
could be used as an alternative to overcome operational and financing difficulties. 
 
Overall, decentralisation is considered one of the pillars of the organisation of SUS and is 
passionately defended by its proponents. For the Ministry of Health, however, decentralisation or 
centralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance is a changeable state that depends on the results 
achieved, as articulated by this Ministry of Health official: 
So, I think this process needs to have coherence. Decentralisation or centralisation must be 
in balance: what are the advantages and the disadvantages? In both processes, the 
Ministry of Health was right. It was right when decentralised and again it was right when, 
in 2009, it re-centralised the acquisition of some medication.
76
 As Brazil is such a large 
and diverse country, we need always to evaluate whether it is good or not and if it should 
remain as it is. We also have to analyse if this arrangement [decentralised or centralised] is 
still appropriate. So, I think today we have to have that perspective, don’t we? This 
movement of centralisation of some processes is to make savings, to gain scale 
(Interviewee 13; 2.3). 
 
Even if the centralised initiative exemplified in the preceding quotation does not refer to the basic 
pharmaceutical assistance which is the focus of my work, the example of cutting costs is used as 
striking evidence of the advantages of centralised bids. The justification of economies of scale is 
used once more to build the case for centralised initiatives. Certainly, the optimal level of 
delivering public goods and services varies with the tasks, as noted by De Vries (2000). Certain 
policies require technologies and involve economies of scale. Decentralised arrangements are more 
appropriate when there are fewer economies of scale involved (Tomaney et al., 2011). When 
discussing the dangers of decentralisation, Prud’homme (1995:9) is categorical that “even the most 
decided decentralist acknowledges that services with economies of scale should not be 
decentralised.” I am going to explore the argument that the funds saved could have provided more 
medicines and improved access, as defended by the federal government, in Chapter Seven which 
explores the Popular Pharmacy Programme. 
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 The interviewee is talking about the re-centralisation of planning, purchase and distribution of high-cost 
drugs, not essential drugs. Later on, the interviewee talked about the significant economy of scale as a result 
of this first centralised bid. Compared to the prices paid in the decentralised period, the first centralised bid 
cut around £80 million. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
As suggested by my interviewees, the decision of the Ministry of Health to decentralise the 
management of basic pharmaceutical assistance was a result of municipal and state health 
secretaries’ demands for change. The process was precipitated by the various difficulties faced by 
the Ministry of Health in managing centrally a nationwide programme of basic medicine provision. 
 
According to the respondents, the rationale underpinning decentralisation relied on the potential of 
local government to improve the access to medicines. Municipal and state health secretaries 
expected that a re-distribution of power (and resources) to buy medicines according to local needs 
could solve the provision shortages, and the lack of suitability of the medicines distributed by the 
federal government. 
 
The process of decentralisation was portrayed as a consequence of primary care decentralisation. 
After the health reform introduced in 1988, municipalities were in charge of health care delivery 
and they expected that the management of the provision of basic medicines should be decentralised 
to complete their autonomy. My interviewees suggested that decentralisation was a gradual and 
negotiated process that involved the three government tiers, and was coordinated by the Ministry of 
Health. 
 
The NMP, which provided the legal framework for decentralisation, is seen by the interviewees as 
an important turning point that allowed medicines to reach a higher position on SUS agenda. The 
NMP provided a comprehensive policy which included activities beyond the distribution of 
medicines, and was designed to improve SUS pharmaceutical assistance. 
 
As my interviewees suggested, regional differences in terms of structure and management 
capability shaped the implementation of decentralisation. In general, these differences resulted in 
variations in the level of decentralisation adopted: complete (when the municipality has control 
over the provision of medicines) or partial (when the state manages the funds and purchases the 
medicines chosen by municipalities). In one option, developed states that have better infrastructure 
and management capability took upon themselves the tasks related to the purchase and distribution 
of medicines. This, in turn, corrected the lack of scale and poor administrative capability of small 
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municipalities to manage the provision of medicines. On the other hand, some states left 
municipalities with the responsibility for the whole cycle involved in the provision of drugs. 
Decentralisation in this case has caused serious difficulties, especially to small municipalities in 
less developed regions. These different panoramas raise questions about the lowest suitable degree 
to which a specific policy should be decentralised. 
 
After this discussion on how decentralisation developed, the next chapter analyses the 
particularities and the development that occurred in federative relationships as a result of the health 
reforms that affected the pharmaceutical assistance field.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FEDERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS AND BASIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSISTANCE IN 
BRAZIL 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the decentralisation of the provision of basic medicines was a 
negotiated process between the three levels of government. Hence, federative relationships and 
forums of agreement provided in the legal framework were involved in this process. To discuss the 
influence of these relationships on the provision of medicines, first it is necessary to consider, in a 
broad sense, how federalism and decentralisation have developed in Brazil, and how power was 
divided between the central and non-central government.  
 
Brazil has a consensus democracy model.
77
 This “model is characterised by inclusiveness, bargain, 
and compromise; for this reason consensus democracy could also be termed negotiation 
democracy” (Lijphart, 2012:3). This model promotes broad participation and policies implemented 
should reflect the agreement achieved.  
 
Moreover, Brazil has been governed by a federal constitution since 1890. Miranda (2003:213) 
remarks that unlike the United States, in Brazil the federation did not arise from independent 
entities but emerged from the national unity existing at the time of the proclamation of the republic 
in 1889. While federalism in the United States, for example, originated from aggregation, in Brazil, 
it is rooted in segregation: the unitary state was divided into several member states.
78
 As a 
consequence, the power of the Union  through public investment, budget allocations and large 
national projects  became the main element in the construction and consolidation of the 
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 Lijphart (2012:4) identifies ten variables which determine whether a country is either a “consensus 
democracy”, a “majoritarian democracy”, or somewhere in between. The institutional design of a fully 
consensual democracy would allow executive power-sharing to take place through the application of 
proportional representation to the executive office/branch; it would be a presidential rather than a 
parliamentary system; the legislature would be bicameral rather than unicameral; the system would allow for 
multiparty governance; there would be proportional representation in the legislature; interest group 
corporatism; a federal intergovernmental arrangement with relatively autonomous regions at the more local 
levels; constitutionally enshrined checks and balances; a judicial review process; and centralised bank 
independence. 
78
 Federation by segregation, or centrifugal, originates from a unitary state, which splits. There is thus the 
segregation (division) of the central power with the new units. However, larger portion of this power remains 
with the central government, which restricts the autonomy of member states. In contrast, in federation by 
aggregation (created as a result of centripetal forces), the state originates from the union of sovereign entities, 
who renounce a portion of sovereignty to the formation of the federation. It is the example of the United 
States federation, which resulted from the union of thirteen colonies. 
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federation. The author argues that the predominant participation of the Union led to an unequal 
correlation of power between union and other federal entities preventing the federation from acting 
as a tool for equitable distribution of resources. The persistence of those distortions may be linked 
to regional inequalities that continue to this day. Although since 1890 the country has gone through 
important political changes, the characteristic of centralised power in the Union remained.
79
 In 
agreement with this analysis, the Brazilian political scientist Marta Arretche (2012) argues that the 
process of building the Brazilian federation reinforced the centralisation of political authority.  
 
Federalism tends to be adopted by large countries or societies that have heterogeneity in the 
territorial, ethnic, linguistic, socioeconomic, cultural or political fields (Lijphart, 2012:183). Two of 
these characteristics could be assigned to Brazil without dispute: the size of the country and 
socioeconomic heterogeneity. The purpose of the federation is to maintain social stability in the 
presence of these heterogeneities. An essential aspect of the federation is linked to its capacity for 
promoting partnerships among federal entities in order to address conflicts. In this sense, 
federalism is intrinsically linked to covenants, as pointed out by Elazar (1987:5):  
The term federal is derived from the Latin ‘foedus’ which, like the Hebrew term ‘brit’, 
means covenant. In essence, a federal arrangement is one of partnership, established and 
regulated by a covenant, whose internal relationships reflect the special kind of sharing 
which must prevail among the partners, namely one that both recognizes the integrity of 
each partner and seeks to foster a special kind of unity among them. 
 
In the Brazilian case, despite the heterogeneity mentioned, several aspects such as language are 
shared between the federative constituents contributing to maintain the unity. The balance of power 
however, is skewed to the centre, as this chapter will discuss. 
 
As is well known, in federalism, power and competencies are shared between central and 
subnational levels, and all intermediate tiers of government have their competencies 
constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, this system of government imposes a certain level of constraint 
on central government initiatives. In that way, the federal level cannot invade the competencies of 
the subnational levels. As mentioned, in Brazil, the legal framework of these relations was set by 
the Federal Constitution of 1988, which established the federal system as an immutable clause, and 
also significant to this discussion, introduced the figure of municipalities as autonomous entities. 
                                                          
79
 In 1890 came the proclamation of the republic which ended the Brazilian imperial period. Since 1891 
Brazil had had four other constitutions before the 1988 Constitution, which is currently in force. 
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The arrangement adopted with three autonomous political entities – the union, states and 
municipalities
80
  has had, as immediate consequence, the need for redistribution of competencies 
for the provision of public services between the three spheres of the federation (Guerreiro and 
Branco, 2011). Indeed, understanding the dynamics of these federal relations is a necessary path to 
the understanding of the decentralisation process in Brazil. Given its impact on the division of 
responsibilities and resources between levels of government, these negotiations play an important 
role in the functioning of government programmes. 
 
With regard to my thesis, pharmaceutical assistance is directly affected by federative relations. In 
this chapter I will focus on how aspects of the federative pact influence the health system, 
particularly the management of basic pharmaceutical assistance. This chapter is organised in six 
sections. Following this introduction, the second section analyses the reforms in the 1990’s and 
how these affected the health system. The third section introduces the roles and responsibilities of 
the federative units regarding the health system, and their implications for coordination and 
autonomy. The fourth section explores the federative relationships concerning the management of 
the health system, especially basic pharmaceutical assistance. Closing the chapter is a discussion of 
how disruption of pacts and the lack of accountability affect the provision of medicines, followed 
by the conclusions. 
 
 
5.2 Cardoso’s reforms and the emergence of fiscal and health decentralisation  
To understand current governmental relations concerning pharmaceutical assistance policies we 
need to go back in time to significant events regarding fiscal and health decentralisation that 
impacted the way the pharmaceutical field is managed. Fiscal conflicts between federal and state 
level are a persistent issue in Brazil and were particularly important in the 1990’s (Samuels 
2004:120). In order to reduce the fiscal and economic crisis in the mid 1990’s President Cardoso 
(1995-2002) went through efforts to restructure Brazil’s intergovernmental fiscal system, reducing 
the state’s fiscal autonomy. President Cardoso was elected in 1995 on the back of the ‘Real Plan’, a 
package of economic measures that helped to stabilise the economy and control inflation, and 
which introduced the Real, the new currency. This economic plan was implemented when Cardoso 
was the Minister of Finance, in 1994. Dickovick (2003:6) argues that the success of the Real Plan 
                                                          
80
 The three levels of government - federal, state and municipal - have elections for the executive and 
legislative branches; have substantial administrative autonomy; have authority to legislate in different public 
activities, as well as capacity for tax collection and expenditure of their own. In Brazil, municipalities are 
federal entities and have administrative, political and financial autonomy, being empowered to collect, 
monitor and expend revenue from resources. 
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allowed Cardoso to change subnational autonomy by tightening ministerial control over 
expenditure. Dickovick (2003:9) shows the correlation between the reforms of the 1990’s and 
political proximity to President Cardoso. The author argues that close ties between the President 
and Ministers led to important fiscal and administrative changes, notably in education and health. 
In Ministries controlled by the president’s political party new expenditure rules were developed. 
These rules linked the transfer of funds to an increase in provision of services, mostly at the local 
level, so that the state level was being bypassed.  
 
Reforms in health, with the establishment of the National Health System-SUS, created links with 
municipalities and transferred funds and responsibilities directly to municipalities. These transfers 
of funds increased in accordance with the level of services provided by municipalities. This central-
local linkage helped municipal government to develop health provision capacity and allowed 
federal government to bypass the state level for substantial portions of the health budget. Dickovick 
(2007:15) argues that this empowerment of municipalities in Cardoso’s government contributed to 
restraining the state level power
81
. The 1988 Constitution reduced the possibility of major fiscal 
centralisation by the federal level, so the Cardoso government used expenditure municipalisation to 
control public spending at subnational levels and curb the strengthening of the state level within the 
federation. The direct fund-to-fund transfer from federal to municipal level decreased the power of 
the state, but it also removed the municipality’s discretion over health spending because the funds 
transferred were earmarked. This weakening in state level leverage, along with the direct linkage 
between central and local levels will be important to explain other developments in the provision of 
basic medicines. Within those changes, the next section will discuss how the new roles and 
responsibilities were echoed in the pharmaceutical assistance field. 
 
 
5.3 Roles and responsibilities: coordination, interdependence and autonomy 
The competencies, roles and responsibilities of each level of government in SUS were defined by 
the 1988 Constitution and the 8080/1990 Organic Health Act. However, it took several years for 
the roles and responsibilities of each of the three levels to be made completely clear and put into 
practice. Coordination and interdependence have complex boundaries in Brazil because few 
exclusive competencies exist at any level. Health financing responsibilities are shared between all 
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 Other factors that contributed to undercut states were the new fiscal responsibility law, which limited the 
spending of states and municipalities to the taxes collected, and the privatisation of state-owned banks. 
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three government levels. Municipalities are responsible for health care delivery and are 
autonomous entities, so federal and state level do not have jurisdiction over them. 
 
The three levels of government, with shared competencies and power, which resulted from the 
1988 Constitution, required the deployment of institutional mechanisms for intergovernmental 
articulation. These mechanisms were necessary to connect obligations with resources. This meant 
that the distribution of responsibilities and powers that resulted from decentralisation introduced 
the need for negotiation previous to the implementation of policy and health programmes. 
Subnational autonomy meant that those actors had to be persuaded and encouraged, and more 
importantly, had to agree to follow the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health.  
 
Although state and municipal levels participate in important ways in the development of many 
aspects of health policy guidelines (operation, management, financing) through different 
intergovernmental forums (such as CIT, CIB, CONASS, CONSEMS, CNS, and Health 
Conferences about which I will give more details later in this section), individual states and 
municipalities have no political authority over the basic parameters of health policy within their 
jurisdictions. The setting of these parameters is a federative matter (Chapman Osterkatz, 2011). 
This includes the minimum health care activities that must be delivered, such as a pre-set number 
of antenatal consultations or compliance with a compulsory vaccination scheme. Individual states 
or municipalities also have no political authority to restrict the private health service within their 
jurisdiction. Despite this, sub-national governments may choose how they will fulfil their 
obligations established under national law. While sub-national units have to comply with spending 
requirements for health, they are not constitutionally bound to follow the programmes developed 
by the Ministry of Health. In order to avoid non-engagement, since the mid-nineties the central 
government has largely used incentives and conditionality to encourage subnational cooperation 
(Dourado and Elias, 2011).
 
The development of such mechanisms went a long way to support the 
implementation of decentralisation. At the start, Ministry of Health ordinances and earmarked 
funds encouraged the adoption of decentralised initiatives by subnational actors. These mechanisms 
were eventually substituted by intergovernmental pacts. 
 
The process of negotiation is designed to conclude in an intergovernmental pact, which translates 
into a signed contract with all the clauses negotiated between the governmental agents. These 
instruments of agreement were an innovative feature introduced in health management after the 
enactment of the 1988 Constitution (Guerreiro and Branco, 2011). The method encompasses 
continuous negotiation in order to reach an agreement regarding intergovernmental conflicts, which 
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is particularly relevant within federative arrangements, where each governmental level has 
autonomy. Guerreiro and Branco (2011) argue that the approach to the agreement that emerged in 
the framework of public health management has its origins linked to the restructuring process of 
Brazilian public administration. These reforms, in tune with the neoliberal winds at that time, 
preached a reduction in the size of the State and a reorientation of its functions. The federal level, 
in the course of these reforms, started to be in charge of coordination, stimulation and financing 
instead of performing public policies, i.e. the subnational level became responsible for the delivery 
of public services. Thus, decentralisation required the strengthening of coordination mechanisms 
since it interfered with the existent balance between autonomy and interdependence of 
governments (Abrucio, 2005). This balance was particularly affected in the case of pharmaceutical 
assistance, as I will discuss. 
 
Among the aspects that facilitated the adoption of intergovernmental pacts in the health sector, 
political and administrative decentralisation and the forums of agreement and decision provided 
within the structure of the SUS stand out (Guerreiro and Branco, 2011).
 82
 The forums of federative 
articulation in the SUS included in the federal legislation are: the National Health Council (CNS); 
Bipartite Intergovernmental Commission (CIB); Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission (CIT); 
National Council of Municipal Health Secretaries (CONASEMS); National Council of State Health 
Secretaries (CONASS) and the Council of Municipal Health Secretaries (COSEMS).
 83
 
Nonetheless, some of the features of SUS that prompted the adoption of the strategy of pacts are 
also identified as factors that hindered their implementation. The main difficulties and 
contradictions that have reduced the efficacy of these pacts, as pointed out by D'Avila et al. (2002), 
are: decentralisation itself and the need for co-operation among federal entities; intergovernmental 
relations marked by conflict and competition for resources; excessive centralisation and 
institutional fragmentation; fragile regulatory capacity; and negligible social participation. Many of 
the difficulties pointed out by the author in 2002 are still valid today, as some of the interviewees’ 
accounts explored later on in this chapter will illustrate. 
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 In Chapter One, Figure 1.1 shows the SUS forums and mechanisms for operation and coordination. 
83
 The CIT is a space for articulation, discussion, and agreement of the demands from federal, state and 
municipal managers, being formed by the three instances of SUS: The Union, represented by the Ministry of 
Health, states, represented by the National Council of State Health Secretariats (CONASS) and the 
municipalities represented by the National Council of Municipal Health Secretariats (CONASEMS). The 
CIB works similarly with representatives of municipal and state level. The main functions of CIT and CIB 
are related to operational aspects, financial and administrative management of the SUS, as well as network 
and health services integration among the federative entities. 
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Dickovick (2007:20), in line with D'Avila et al. (2002), argues that decentralisation – of political, 
fiscal and/or administrative authority – from the central government to local governments can 
weaken the intermediate levels (the state level in the Brazilian case), thus undermining federalism. 
The process of health reform decentralised responsibilities and resources to the state level, but 
mostly to municipalities. It is also true with regard to the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, decentralisation has the potential to adapt policies to local conditions 
and to increase the participation of the population; but it can also lead to inefficiencies due to loss 
of scale and scope, fragmentation of services and the difficulty of coordination of actions. As in the 
health sector in general, an important challenge posed by decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance is the need to enhance effective state coordination of the municipalities. 
 
Although the management of basic pharmaceutical assistance is a local responsibility, 
municipalities are supposed to have technical assistance and financial support from state and 
federal levels to perform their duties. Nonetheless, in cases where, for instance, the state level does 
not fulfil its responsibility, neither the municipality nor the federal government have jurisdictional 
control to enforce compliance. Regarding basic pharmaceutical assistance, some of the problems 
produced by this autonomy are exposed by the interviewees, as is illustrated in the two quotations 
that follow. The interviewee associated the weak performance of the state in fulfilling its 
responsibilities with the judicialisation issues:
84
  
So, in states such as São Paulo, which has an important judicialisation demand, the state 
got involved [with judicialisation issues] and stopped supporting the municipalities in the 
structuring, planning, and technical support for basic pharmaceutical assistance. But it is 
happening in many states. (Interviewee 19, 12.1) 
(…) the municipalities, especially small and medium-sized ones, need too much technical 
and financial cooperation from state governments, and the state level in São Paulo has 
abandoned that approach. Rather, the structure of the state [health] secretariat today was 
dismantled. So fragmentation is very strong (Interviewee 1; 33.1). 
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 Judicialisation is a phenomenon experienced in Brazil, occurring when patients take the government to 
court for access to health services and resources (in this particular case the term refers to lawsuits for access 
to medicines). See Chapter Four for more details. 
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These two quotes also suggest that the state level is committed to other activities linked to 
judicialisation and this has left municipalities vulnerable. São Paulo is an influential state situated 
in the most developed region of Brazil, and for this reason it would be expected to have the best 
conditions for delivering public services. So if the municipalities have a struggle in terms of 
coordination and technical cooperation to manage the provision of medicines even in São Paulo, 
then it is plausible to think that the small municipalities in less developed areas around the country 
will have the same difficulties. 
 
When I compared, within the accounts I gathered, the views and perspectives of state and 
municipal health secretariats it becomes apparent that the state level has other priorities in terms of 
pharmaceutical assistance than to assist municipalities with the provision of medicines. 
Decentralisation of the provision of basic medicines to municipalities certainly plays an important 
role in explaining this change in priorities. The state level, however, still has responsibilities and its 
role in co-funding, technical assistance and cooperation is not disputed, as voiced in the following 
quotation: 
When we decentralised and brought to the municipalities the responsibility for basic 
pharmacy, with the exception of those states that have centralised purchasing [partial 
decentralisation], a lot of the role of the state was lost. It has neglected much of its role of 
supporting municipalities. (...)In 2009 TCU made a big audit in ten states and three 
municipalities on basic pharmacy.
85
 The report points out that the state has lost its role of 
providing technical support for municipalities. The report says that state and Union are 
not doing anything in relation to pharmaceutical assistance policy. I think it's an 
overstatement. But the state neglected its supporting role and it is more in control of 
resource transfers, and forgets its role in helping the municipality in planning and 
structuring. (...) So I believe that in some states this process went too far away. 
Municipalities were [left] alone in the basic pharmaceutical assistance. The state got more 
involved with specialised components, high-cost drugs, and judicialisation (Interviewee 
19; 12.1).  
 
The interviewee brought to light an important report conducted by TCU in 2009 that resulted from 
an audit related to basic pharmaceutical assistance (TCU, 2011). The report showed important 
failures in the coordination and cooperation among federal entities. According to the audit that 
analysed ten states, the Ministry of Health should provide technical cooperation to states and 
                                                          
85
 TCU is the Court of Accounts of the Union 
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municipalities, to standardise patient care and quality of the service. However, according to the 
report, the federal level does not guide or advise municipalities in the process of acquisition and 
dispensing of medicines, just as it does not provide incentives or induce states to provide technical 
and financial cooperation for municipalities in activities related to basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
The TCU report also pointed out that the state governments do not perform their duties defined in 
the National Medicines Policy (NMP). The audit team argues that states neglected their role in 
assistance, coordination, provision of technical support in the process of acquisition of medicines, 
and did not support the organisation of consortiums. The state level, with respect to pharmaceutical 
assistance, is focused on providing high-cost medicines that are part of a particular category of 
drugs, termed the specialised component.
86
 TCU’s report was emphatic in stating that neither the 
federal nor state level has fulfilled their role. My interviewees, nonetheless, suggested that the main 
concern of municipalities was focused on failures at the state level. The explanation for this 
perspective could be associated with co-funding issues. As discussed, co-financing is an essential 
part of the health system, and failures at any government level in sending funds can cause 
interruption in the provision of medicines in municipalities. Interviewees reported many situations 
where the state level did not perform as expected in co-financing, but are categorical in stating that 
the federal level never fails to transfer funds.  
 
Although all interviewees mentioned the importance of the autonomy of federated entities and 
institutionalised forums of agreement within the SUS structure, there is an understanding at the 
Ministry of Health that this process of persuasion and agreement with the federated entities is very 
time-consuming. Autonomy is also seen as a barrier to the implementation of policies. The delay in 
negotiations with sub-national partners is contrasted with the speed observed in the private sector. 
Talking about the implementation of the Popular Pharmacy Programme (which is the subject of 
Chapter Seven) and the need to implement a database system to record information about patients 
treated at private pharmacies, the interviewee compared response times of public and private 
sectors: 
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 The specialized component of the pharmaceutical assistance is related to medicines that are part of the 
Clinical Protocols and Therapeutic Guidelines. They are organised in four groups. The state health 
Secretariats are involved in the following steps of the management: 
Group 1A: storage, distribution, and dispensing. 
Group 1B: purchase, storage, distribution, and dispensing. 
Group 2: co-funding, purchase, storage, distribution, and dispensing. 
Group 3: co-funding. 
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In the 30 days since President Dilma decided that hypertension and diabetes medicines 
would be distributed free of charge across the community [pharmacies] network, the 
pharmaceutical market has managed to get organised in 30 days to change the computer 
system [software], to adapt the prices, and to organise all the logistics. Yes, they have done 
all that in 30 days. For two and a half years I’ve been trying to [develop] a system to make 
that information on access to SUS public pharmacies network available (…) I've said this 
before, in 30 days the whole of Brazil was mobilised. On the other hand, we took two and a 
half years to get 170 health units, and are still begging for health secretariats to use the 
system [HORUS] 
87
... So it's very different [from the private sector]. Public [sector] 
feedback is very time-consuming (Interviewee 19; 11.2). 
 
The situation described by this interviewee suggested that failures and delays inherent in the 
negotiation process among the federal, state and municipal levels seem to lead the federal 
government to seek alternatives in order to shorten this process of negotiation. The autonomy of 
municipalities to follow federal programmes is also associated with delays and difficulties in 
implementing federal initiatives (in this case the interviewee refers to the database system that 
monitors pharmaceutical assistance, known as HORUS, proposed by the Ministry of Health). In the 
previous quotation, the Ministry of Health official emphasised the difficulties in engaging health 
secretariats, using the word ‘begging’. In contrast to this time-consuming negotiation with the 
public sector, the private sector was portrayed as responding swiftly to the federal level demands 
and, more importantly, without needing a negotiation or agreement process. The introduction of a 
new actor, the private sector partner, in the implementation of a particular policy illustrates how 
federative relationships in pharmaceutical assistance are currently being reshaped.  
 
 
5.4 Development of federative relationships in pharmaceutical assistance 
Despite the difficulties and delays intrinsic to negotiation processes, my interviewees considered 
federative relations to have improved with the changes implemented via health pacts and the 
inclusion of the forums of agreement in the policy process. 
 
SUS has been experiencing a continuous change in central-local relations over the last 20 years. In 
the 1990s and early 2000s the strategy adopted by the Ministry of Health with the implementation 
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 HORUS is software to manage pharmaceutical assistance implemented by the Ministry of Health; it allows 
the control and distribution of medicines by SUS.  
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of SUS, by publishing legal standards, was summarized in the familiar expression "carving out the 
SUS by decrees" coined by Goulart (2001).
 88
 Pasche et al. (2006) argue that although some of the 
Ministerial regulations, such as the NOBs
89
, had been agreed in intergovernmental forums, the term 
‘regulatory frenzy’ came to be used to describe the process of bureaucratisation implemented by 
the federal executive. In the late 1990s, the Ministry of Health published, on average, eight orders 
per day. Pasche et al. (2006) state that the normative approach adopted was drawn from the 
analysis that the main problem in SUS was low management capacity in the subnational tiers. 
Thus, the regulations were intended to limit the degree of control that local managers had over the 
federal resources allocated. 
 
As the decentralisation of health has progressed and states and municipalities have taken on more 
responsibilities and developed administrative capacity, the allocation of federal funds has also 
followed this trend. The rules that guided the transfer of federal funds to finance health services 
underwent gradual adjustment, changing from payment after service delivery to payment in 
advance based on agreed goals. The institutionalisation of results-based planning introduced by the 
Portaria 21/2005 (Ministerio da Saude, 2005a) and the Pacto pela Saúde
90
 (Ministerio da Saude, 
2006) and, most recently, by Decree 7508/2011 (Brasil, 2011), which strengthened the mechanisms 
of accountability, are important inflection points within the course of SUS development. In general, 
those policy changes towards agreements other than rigid normative rules (such as the NOBs) are 
acknowledged by the interviewees as positive and promising initiatives. Those changes are seen as 
an advance in central-local relations, as explained by this interviewee: 
SUS is undergoing a transition. There was a time when SUS was formatted by very rigid 
orders and regulations, but now this has evolved to a different paradigm regarding the 
relationship of accountability and also federal funding. Now, there is a commitment to 
goals that, together, the three entities [federal, states and municipalities] believe that it will 
be possible to achieve. These goals are to promote the health of the population. The prime 
example of this is when today the Ministry speaks of advanced global financing. So, what 
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 Although Goulart (2001) used the word ‘decree’, in fact the Ministry of Health uses ministerial orders. 
Thus, the more precise wording would be: ‘carving-out the SUS by ministerial orders’. I think the author 
chose the term ‘decree’ because in Brazil, in colloquial language, is common to use this word to refer to 
something that is seen to have been imposed. 
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 NOB - The organization and operation of SUS were guided by rules known as NOBs (Basic Operating 
Standards), developed throughout the 1990s and 2000 to regulate the system operation. However, the use of 
these standards has created dependency on the system of issuing ministerial orders. The NOBs favoured the 
transfer of earmarked financial resources and created a system of prior qualification of municipalities to 
receive federal funds, which increased health inequalities in the country. 
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 Pacto pela Saúde means ‘Pact for Health’.  
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once was paid only a posteriori, after undertaking the health procedures, now is to be paid 
in advance, on a global basis in accordance with the agreed targets. We'll have to try it. 
It's a different way of forming a relationship. We walk towards it, to move further forward 
(Interviewee 5; 12.1). 
 
From this quotation we can see the association of particular funding rules (payment after service 
delivery versus payment in advance) with the development of central-local relations. The 
negotiations to set goals and the payment in advance are taken as a signal of a change in these 
relations. Another valued characteristic refers to the institutionalised mechanisms to allocate 
resources that prevent political alliances from prevailing in the division of resources. The 
architecture of the forums of negotiation (COSEMS, CONASS, CIB and CIT) provides 
mechanisms which allow transparency in the allocation process. 
 
Funds allocation follows the same established rules applicable to each federal entity. However, if 
there are additional funds to be reallocated that escape this general rule the division follows another 
agreement route. As the allocation and use of funds have to be justified and negotiated, the scrutiny 
of peers precedes the effective allocation of resources. This municipal health secretary from São 
Paulo state summarised this mechanism in the following quotation: 
I would say that SUS today - this is very interesting - that despite all the political and 
partisan character, despite all the difficulties, [despite] the cronyism that is characteristic 
of Brazilian politics, despite all, that SUS has a republican character. In resources 
allocation, for example, we have R$40 million for elective surgery sent by the federal 
government to spend until the end of this year. Instead of deciding: I'll send it to São 
Bernardo because they are PT [the Workers Party, the party of the president of the 
republic], or to such-and-such a place which is PMDB [this party is included in the 
government coalition] because I have to please the mayor, what does the government do? 
The money is allocated to the state and then seven municipal secretariats and seven state 
secretariats in the bipartite commission [CIB] will decide. We [municipal secretaries] 
represent 645 municipalities and they [the state managers] represent themselves. We have 
the responsibility for deciding and agreeing on how this resource will be spent. To make 
this allocation I had a board meeting yesterday with two, and today with 64 members who 
are regional representatives of 64 regional management boards. In this game, there were 
more than 80 municipal secretariats involved in deciding how we will spend R$40 million. 
If a municipality is privileged the other municipalities will disagree and denounce it 
(Interviewee 1; 29.1). 
 136 
 
Thus, as clearly shown in the quotation, forums of negotiation play an important role in ensuring 
transparency in the distribution of federal funds within each state of the federation. The inclusion of 
representatives of municipalities neutralises possible partisan political influences on the process of 
reallocation of resources. Although the interviewee referred to health services, the same reasoning 
and forums of agreement are applicable to pharmaceutical assistance. However, these forums are 
not sufficient to ensure the state level’s accountability regarding pharmaceutical assistance, as will 
be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
5.5. How ideology and party politics may influence the continuity of health initiatives 
Although the role of ideology in the implementation of health policies in Brazil may be disputed, 
my interviewees considered that ideological divergences and party-political affiliations can have a 
negative impact. According to their accounts, the willingness of politicians, at the state level, to 
make it clear to their constituency that they run counter to the federal government usually results in 
a failed attempt by the Ministry of Health to implement certain national initiatives. According to 
one interviewee, the divergence between the government of São Paulo state and the federal 
government, which are from different political parties, pushed the state secretariat to lead the health 
policy in the opposite direction to the orientation of the federal government. This claim is well 
illustrated by the following quotation: 
If the state government was more cooperative, and fought less with the federal government, 
as is happening now in this second administration of the state government; if they had at 
least a little better alignment... Because here in São Paulo it was always like this: if the 
federal government wants this, then the state does not do that (Interviewee 1; 32.1). 
 
One example of this confrontational approach can be observed in the implementation of the Family 
Health Programme (PSF). In São Paulo the PSF was handed over to the OSS 
91
 (Social Health 
Organizations), making the features of the programme distinct from the PSF in other regions of the 
country (Chapman Osterkatz, 2011). Although the guidelines and directives are set by the federal 
government, there are considerable variations in local government´s willingness to follow them and 
to adopt the policy proposed. The motivation to implement national programmes may be related to 
                                                          
91
 The Social Health Organization (OSS) represents a partnership model adopted by the government of the 
State of São Paulo for the management of health facilities. State law regulates the partnership with charities, 
which have become categorized as Health and Social Organizations, being able to sign a Management 
Contract with the State Health Secretary, directed towards the management of hospitals and public health 
facilities within state territorial jurisdiction. 
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political partisanship. Sugiyama (2007:8) investigated the motivation for the diffusion of 
innovations in the health field across Brazil, using the PSF as a case study, and argued that 
“ideology and social networks can work together in mutually reinforcing ways to promote 
diffusion.”  
 
State health secretariats’ control over the implementation of decentralised initiatives for supply of 
medicines and sharing of power with the municipal level are other aspects mentioned by the 
interviewees. The next quotation illustrates how personal perspectives can influence the 
decentralisation process: 
So the municipalities had an important role in the decentralisation process. But the state 
manager ends up being a hostage of political forces to decentralise or centralise, to 
empower municipalities or not. Finally, depending on the current political forces, they can 
divide responsibilities and effectively implement the decentralisation or they can adopt 
another form to deal with the federative relationship (Interviewee 4; 5, 4). 
 
The view expressed above is in accordance with Sugiyama’s (2007:8) affirmation that ideology 
helps individuals to filter their policy choices. The interviewee associated the decision to 
implement decentralisation to state level political ties. This became apparent when the interviewee 
said that depending on the political forces the state could follow federal policy and effectively 
decentralise responsibilities to municipalities or not. The two previous quotations suggest that at 
the state level the political group plays an important role in explaining differences in the level of 
decentralisation
92
 implemented and the adherence to federal policies. In São Paulo, basic 
pharmaceutical assistance was partially decentralised, i.e. the state controls the provision of basic 
medicines, and only a few municipalities within the state have complete control over basic 
pharmaceutical assistance. Looking at partisan differences over the last ten years (2003-2013), 
since the first Workers’ Party presidential government, São Paulo state has been ruled by the 
opposition party to the federal government, which could explain the interviewee’s analysis of the 
dichotomy between federal and state government when it comes to health initiatives. 
 
In contrast, states where politically appointed officials are less frequent and influential do not 
experience this strong political influence of state level authority. The accounts of my interviewees 
suggested that less political interference will result in less political appointment of officials. This in 
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 In Chapter Four I refer to partial or complete decentralisation to differentiate what I termed “levels of 
decentralisation”. Partial refers to decentralisation from central to intermediate level, in this case state level; 
and complete when power and responsibilities are distributed to municipalities. 
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turn will give opportunity for continuity. If the officials are career civil servants they are more 
likely to remain in office for longer, in contrast to the high turnover of political appointees. In the 
next quotation, this state health secretary associates less political interference in policy 
implementation with better health outcomes: 
I think an important point in the state was continuity in policies for health. We had a 
continuity of people who are extremely committed, secretaries extremely committed to 
public health, regardless of ideology or party affiliation. We actually experienced this 
continuity and that advance is demonstrated by our health indicators: the reduction in 
infant mortality… (Interviewee 2; 15.1). 
 
Turnover in most ministries in Brazil, including the Ministry of Health, is quite high (Sugiyama, 
2007:102). Usually, after general elections ministerial change is accompanied by a cascade of 
changes in state and municipal health secretaries, who are also appointed rather than being career 
civil servants. The political appointments are not limited to the upper levels of management. This 
lack of continuity in professional teams affects the implementation of health policies, making the 
process slower, less cohesive and more difficult. The potential incremental gain that results from 
experience acquired after some time working in a programme is broadly offset by turnover. Each 
new health minister or secretary wants to make their own mark on management and employ people 
who share their goals and values. If on the one hand it is hard to prove or to provide evidence that 
lack of continuity negatively influences policy implementation and outcomes, on the other hand 
examples of states that have experienced fewer changes in their officials offer good examples of 
what could be achieved. 
 
The medicines consortium implemented by Paraná state, which is always cited as a successful 
initiative, is associated by the interviewees with a committed professional group of career officials.
 
93
 The fact that the initiative to create the consortium came from an established professional team, 
which currently still works at the state health secretariat, was pointed out as a crucial factor to 
explain the success achieved, as claimed by this interviewee: 
It [the consortium] was a pioneer initiative of Paraná. It was the result of the autonomy 
and the result of efforts made by the State Health Secretary who, at that time, believed in 
the success of this initiative. Especially because many leaders who worked in the team 
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 The innovation introduced by the Paraná consortium and details about its management is discussed in 
Chapter Four, section 4.5. 
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remained or returned, believing that consortiums were a better solution and more effective 
for the problems that were common to municipal managers (Interviewee 3; 2. 1). 
 
Discussing the circumstances in which this consortium initiative took place, two factors emerged 
from the interviews: professionalism and continuity. These factors help to understand the special 
features found in Paraná state which allowed the emergence of the consortium. Professionalism 
refers to the team’s training being focused on the area of health and also refers to the career 
officials or civil servants. It may seem incongruous that people occupying important positions do 
not have specialised training. But it occurs with some frequency in Brazil when it comes to 
politically appointed positions. 
 
The importance of professionalism and the continuity of the working group, despite party-political 
changes, were identified as factors that differentiate Paraná state, and were also associated with 
positive results achieved. This view is not only an inside observation but it is shared by Ministry of 
Health officials, as illustrated in this quotation: 
In Paraná it is different, pharmaceutical assistance works. First you have a team in the 
state that is very different from other states, a team of pharmacists who managed to 
maintain the continuity of the work in the state, regardless of changes of government 
(interviewee 19; 12.2). 
 
The political and partisan influence in the nomination of teams and leaders in health are part of the 
political culture of the country. Yet considering the potentially negative effect of this practice on 
policy implementation, to counteract this tradition is not a straightforward task. Even if the 
Ministry of Health wanted to act, it would not be feasible to set out ministerial orders to change the 
behaviour of subnational actors prohibiting this practice. A ministerial order, of course, does not 
have the same legal power as parliament norms. Even if it had, however, it could not be used for 
this purpose because this would constitute interference in the autonomy of states and 
municipalities. Moreover, the appointment of ministers and officers in the upper levels of 
management also follows party affiliation, so it would be incoherent to ban this practice just in the 
states and municipalities. 
 
Thus, as this section has highlighted, political autonomy combined with the power distributed by 
decentralisation led to the achievement of positive results, such as the consortium in Paraná. 
Moreover, this same arrangement also enabled federative entities to continue working under strong 
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partisan influences. The accounts of my interviewees suggested that the high turnover experienced 
in some parts of the country prevented the continuity of staff and might have caused programmes to 
be discontinued or not to progress. This situation resulted in teams not being committed to national 
programmes and could explain the failure, especially at state level, in fulfilling agreed tasks. This 
lack of commitment to the pacts signed is going to be explored in the next section. 
 
 
5.6  Disruption of pacts: failures and lack of accountability 
Like other health-related fields, inequalities are still an important issue in public provision of 
medicines. Moreover, the differences in terms of coverage level and access between regions are 
remarkable. As discussed, the budget for basic medicines is co-funded by the three government 
tiers, and although the role and responsibility of each level is explicitly stated in legislation, 
interviewees reported a systematic inconsistency in state level financial support. One might expect 
this failure to occur in less developed regions or states, but accounts of this type came from a 
municipal health secretary from São Paulo state, which is one of the wealthiest states of the 
federation. Certainly, the failure in contributing to financing has negative consequences for 
municipal planning and for provision of medicines. These failures at the state level in fulfilling its 
responsibilities and the consequences that follow are illustrated by this interviewee from São Paulo:  
I would say that the great difficulty that we have here, in São Paulo state, is the fact that 
the state government does not fulfil its part in the pact, and it is important to say that the 
Ministry [of Health] does not fail. The money is little, but it comes religiously! Now the 
state government is not doing its share in basic pharmaceutical assistance ..., either 
delivering the drugs or the funding ... (Interviewee 1; 38.1). 
 
In São Paulo, as discussed, pharmaceutical assistance was decentralised just down to the state level. 
Municipalities opted to leave the state level with the responsibility for the management of resources 
and procurement of basic medicines. The interviewee remarked that the federal level is sending its 
funding share to the state but the state keeps the money and does not distribute the medicines to 
municipalities.
 94
 This interviewee explained that these issues are constantly part of the agenda and 
they represent a significant proportion of the discussions that take place at the CIB in this state.  
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 This municipal secretary of health showed me a spreadsheet depicting the two-year delay in transfers of 
funds due by the state level. 
 141 
 
My interviewees suggest that the impact of these failures on federative relations is an object of 
concern at the federal level. According to one Ministry of Health official, the debate in the 
agreement forums has been much concentrated on negotiations about transfers of resources and the 
frequent failures of the state level in fulfilling their responsibilities. When talking about the 
municipal health secretariats’ meetings which precede the CIB meetings, this official argued that: 
I visited all COSEMES [forums] in these last two and half years.... Many states and 
municipalities are discussing whether the state will transfer the funds, if the state is not 
transferring regularly, if it is behind schedule. That's all they discuss there (Interviewee 
19; 12.1) 
 
Funding is a real issue for municipal managers and consequently it should be part of the negotiation 
agenda in CIB and CIT. Basically, in these forums the three tiers will negotiate tasks, 
responsibilities, and discuss whether the funds proposed (usually by the federal level) are sufficient 
to finance the tasks agreed. The accounts of my interviewees, however, suggested that other themes 
did not get the chance to be discussed, such as the issue of pharmaceutical assistance per se. 
Discussions about the insufficiency of funds and the lack of accountability of the state level in 
fulfilling their responsibilities, in contrast, were (and are) recurrent themes dominating the agenda 
in CIB forums. Of course, without medicines there is no pharmaceutical assistance, and the debate 
about issues of lack of sufficient funding or resources is essential. My interviewees suggested, 
however, that the inconsistency in transferring funds is preventing other subjects from entering the 
agenda and consequently preventing the potential evolution of public policies and of the decision-
making process at the local level. 
 
Although annual overall expenditure on health represents 8.4% of GDP in Brazil and is close to the 
world average of 8.5%, according to the WHO, the chronic underfunding situation of SUS is well 
known (Ocké-Reis and Marmor, 2010; Santos, 2007). Moreover, in Brazil, only 45% of health 
expenditure is in the public sector, with the other 55% being spent on private care. The share of 
public spending on health is 3.7% of GDP while the international average is 5.5%. Public health 
spending in Brazil is much lower compared to countries that have universal health systems. These 
countries spend on average 6 to7% of GDP (Ocké-Reis and Marmor, 2010). The discussion about 
public health system financing is a constant item on the agenda of national political debates. States 
and municipalities are constitutionally bound to spend 12% and 15% of gross revenue on health, 
respectively. The federal government, on the contrary, has no specific percentage to fulfil. 
However, in terms of basic pharmaceutical assistance, complaints and faults mentioned by 
interviewees more often than not refer to the state level. According to my interviewees, 
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municipalities, which by constitutional duty should contribute proportionally with more resources 
to health, also have to pay the states’ share when these agents fail. 
 
Data from my interviews also indicated that these issues between state and municipalities could 
lead to an unexpected outcome. This failure of the state level in fulfilling their responsibilities on 
the provision of medicines or on their share of the co-funding provided a fruitful opportunity for 
the municipal level to exercise power and to influence the development of a solution. One 
interesting example came from Bahia, where the state level had a debt with the municipalities 
related to co-funding of pharmaceutical assistance. According to my interviewees, in 2007, after 
years of complaints headed by municipal secretariats represented by the COSEMS, the health state 
secretary proposed an additional programme to distribute diabetes and hypertension medicines to 
municipalities to be implemented with state funding and planning. The MEDCASA programme was 
designed to enhance the provision of medicines in municipalities as a compensation for years of 
state lack of compliance with its share in the co-funding of pharmaceutical assistance. 
95
The way 
the process occurred and the main actors who participated in the construction of this alternative are 
described in the next quote, according to the viewpoint of a municipal health secretary in Bahia: 
The process began in 2007, improving the regularisation of the distribution of drugs by the 
state. Before 2007 there was a debt of more than R$ 30 million of transfers from the state 
to the municipalities [with regard to] Pharmaceutical Assistance. In this context the state 
proposal to create the MEDCASA programme came up as a way to pay the debt. This was 
a way to decentralise and to regularise the counterpart. I'm giving credit to COSEMS, 
which fought for these transfers and to SESAB [the Bahia Health State Secretariat
 
] for 
understanding that it was its duty to recognise the liability of counterparts due 
(Interviewee 10; 3.1). 
 
In the MEDCASA programme, the above account suggests that autonomy and interdependence of 
federative entities, and SUS forms of institutionalised agreement, came together to develop a 
negotiated solution which resulted in better access to basic medicines for people living in the 
region. This example suggests that forms of negotiation can effectively be used to neutralise or 
reverse negative situations, and I would say in a certain way to enforce liability. 
 
Despite the broader claim, in the literature, that the performance of the decentralised provision of 
medicines is mainly affected by a lack of definition of roles and responsibilities of the subnational 
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 The MEDCASA programme is discussed in Chapter Four. 
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actors involved, in my interviewees accounts the lack of accountability was a major issue, as 
expressed in the following quote: 
I think the fulfilment of these responsibilities, rather than the definition, although in some 
cases the definition of responsibilities could be renegotiated, but those agreed should have 
been completed ... Moreover it is a problem which is not unique to pharmaceutical 
assistance, it exists in all areas: the low level of accountability and lack of consequences 
which arise from not fulfilling what was agreed. Everyone signed a management pact in 
2006 and pharmaceutical assistance was one of the items. This pact was renewed in 2009 
and updated in 2010. ... Whoever acts in accordance with the pact is OK, but what happens 
to those who do not comply? Nothing happens (Interviewee 1; 34.2). 
 
This interviewee linked the lack of mechanisms to enforce federative entities to comply with the 
pacts with the perpetuation of practices that weaken the performance of municipalities. In the 
ministerial rules the only penalty provided for cases of mismanagement is the suspension of 
transfer of funds, which can occur due to the non-application of municipal or state counterparts or 
because of irregularities pointed out by audit and control institutions.
 96
 But, although control 
bodies had pointed out numerous irregularities in the use of the resources of Basic Pharmaceutical 
Assistance, as well as the fact that municipalities and states do not make their share in the co-
funding available, the transfer of funds by the Ministry of Health was never suspended (TCU, 
2011). In the case of no co-funding contribution from the state, TCU (the national auditing 
tribunal) argues that there is no penalty for the state, which could encourage the omission of 
responsibilities. According to the audit office’s report this fact allows years to pass without some 
states making the transfer of funds related to pharmaceutical assistance. In my research, this 
practice was corroborated by interviewees’ accounts from São Paulo, Bahia and Amazonas. 
 
Another aspect that arose from my interviews was related to the provision of technical assistance to 
enable the municipalities to develop better capabilities to perform their responsibilities in planning 
and delivering basic pharmaceutical assistance. Besides the issue of accountability, the state's role 
in the coordination and technical cooperation with the municipalities is also the subject of 
discussion among municipal health secretariats, as exemplified in this quotation: 
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 The institutions that have direct relation to SUS activities are: TCU - Court of Accounts of the Union (the 
Brazilian federal accountability office); CGU - The Office of the Comptroller General (the agency of the 
Federal Government in charge of assisting the President of the Republic in matters related to defending 
public assets and enhancing management transparency through internal control activities, public audits); and 
DENASUS - National Department of Audits of SUS (in charge of specialised supervision and audit activities 
within SUS). 
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The central question in Bahia was not only the agreement process itself. The issue was to 
ensure that what was agreed would be fulfilled, i.e., compliance with the covenants made 
in the political arena of the CIB [interstate forum]. It was a source of tension between 
managers, but there was also negotiation and consensus. However, some agreements were 
not respected, and the state justified the breach of covenants as budgetary or financial 
difficulties. The state, instead of exercising technical cooperation to support the 
municipalities in the management of Pharmaceutical Assistance, to help municipalities to 
strengthen management capacity, and the implementation of pharmaceutical assistance 
policy, the state did the reverse. So, by failing to empower municipalities it was as if the 
state had boycotted what had been agreed. (Interviewee 4, 6.1) 
 
This interviewee expressed disappointment with the state level, because it did not support the 
development of management capabilities or the financing and distribution of basic medicines, both 
of which would be the state’s role and responsibility. Accountability is still a serious problem, 
which arguably may have its roots in the creation of SUS. As explained by Chapman Osterkatz 
(2011), when exploring the historical perspective of health decentralisation, subnational 
governments gained fiscal and policy autonomy without the presence of accountability mechanisms 
designed to ensure management capacity, quality of services or access. According to the author, 
some of the most extreme inequalities in the Brazilian health system are associated with the lack of 
accountability for subnational governments that do not fulfil their obligations. Concluding this 
section, I would say that accountability issues combined with the incipient SUS supervision 
contributed to perpetuate these inequalities. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed how federative arrangements regarding the health system have affected the 
decentralisation of the public provision of basic medicines. As discussed, the federative 
arrangement and the decentralisation process that at the same time allow and presume negotiations 
and partnerships, also presuppose autonomy, which adds considerable complexity to the process. 
This autonomy allied to party-political influence allowed the units of the federation, including 
municipalities, to shape health programmes to a certain extent, according to the local context. The 
guidelines are sometimes translated into different programmes in each Federative Unit, 
strengthening the already striking regional differences in Brazil. 
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The party-political influences lead to lack of continuity and cohesion in work teams. The states 
with fewer partisan influences showed better results in basic pharmaceutical assistance, which was 
associated by the interviewees with the continuity and commitment of the teams. The political 
culture of appointing team members according to election results hinders the continuity that is 
required to produce incremental gains in public health. This practice also reinforces the lack of 
commitment that entails, once again, the lack of accountability for pacts governing policy 
implementation. 
 
The lack of accountability of the entities involved is a recurrent theme when basic pharmaceutical 
assistance is discussed. The complaints are mainly about the state level. The discussion agenda at 
the negotiation forums (COSEMS, CIB, and CIT) is focused on transfers of funds due by the state 
level as part of the co-funding scheme. The subject is too complex and has important repercussions 
for the public provision of medicines and, as a consequence, has prevented other subjects from 
reaching the agenda. It is worth noting that complaints about the lack of accountability are directed 
at the state level of management. The interviewees have acknowledged the consistency of federal 
funding transfers. 
 
Another element that can be added to this set of arguments concerns the role of coordination and 
technical assistance that should be played by the state and federal levels. The municipal health 
secretariats claim, and the TCU report reinforces, that the state level does not play its role in Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance. The state level, with respect to pharmaceutical assistance, is focused on 
providing high-cost medicines.  
 
Two aspects of the performance of state level in basic pharmaceutical assistance are remarkable. 
First the political alignments of the state governments influenced the decentralisation process in the 
area. Second, noncompliance with the covenants, involving financing for the purchase of medicines 
and the functions of coordination and technical assistance for municipalities, determined the failure 
or delay in the supply of medicines to the population. 
 
Data from my interviews suggested that the state level plays an essential role in the management of 
basic pharmaceutical assistance. In the examples of success and failure provided by the 
interviewees, in both situations, the state level was pointed to as a central piece in the process. 
However, to date, there are more negative than positive examples, suggesting that the state level is 
more frequently not playing its role as agreed in the SUS forums. 
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After having explored the intergovernmental relationships involved in the management of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance, in the next chapter I will discuss changes in public provision of basic 
medicines after decentralisation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BASIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES AFTER 
DECENTRALISATION
97
 (FROM 2005 ONWARDS) 
6.1 Introduction 
Access to medicines is one of the major concerns of public health policymakers in Brazil as 
medicines are an important part of health treatment and advances in this field could benefit a large 
proportion of the population. Improvement in the provision of basic medicines, however, should be 
considered within the context of primary health care as a whole. The analysis of advances in the 
Brazilian Health System (SUS) provided by Paim et al. (2011) highlights that, despite the 
difficulties and barriers, SUS has improved access to primary health care over the last two decades. 
The substantial growth in the number of primary care facilities and the size of the health workforce 
that followed the creation of SUS in 1988 help to explain the improvements observed. According to 
the authors, access and use of health services increased significantly after 1988 when SUS was 
created. In 1981, only 8% of Brazil’s total population had used the health service in the previous 30 
days, whereas in 2008 the figure increased to 14% in the previous 15 days. Macinko and Lima-
Costa (2012) also support these findings about greater access to health services. The authors linked 
the increase in equity in health care use observed from 1998 to 2008 to the success of national 
health policies implemented over the period analysed. These advances probably had positive 
effects on the infant mortality rate,
98
 which dropped from 69, in 1970, to 14 per 1,000 live births in 
2012. 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the reform of the health system in Brazil in the 1990s was part of a 
broad agenda of economic adjustment recommended to Latin American countries by multilateral 
funding agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These 
recommendations for reforms were part of a World Bank document in 1987 which explicitly 
included decentralisation of services (World Bank, 1987:44). The prominence that decentralisation 
of the health system achieved in Brazil can be explained as a result of the convergence of interests 
among foreign funding institutions, the federal government, and the sanitarista movement. 
Regarding the context of pharmaceutical assistance decentralisation, in 1998 Brazil went through 
                                                          
97
 In this chapter the term decentralisation, unless otherwise specified, refers to the decentralisation of the 
management of basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
98
 The infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of children under one year of age in a year, expressed per 
1,000 live births. 
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another economic crisis that forced the country to take out a loan of $ 41 billion from the 
International Monetary Fund. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, following the neoliberal 
agenda, privatised many companies that year, and cut funds in the social area. Public spending on 
health was already dwindling, causing 21% reductions in the budget of health programmes between 
1995 and 1998 (Costa, 2002). In this context of this crisis, the economist and Senator Jose Serra
99
 
took over the Ministry of Health; his administration placed great emphasis on the pharmaceutical 
field. An important point on Serra’s agenda concerned the high prices of medicines, which 
prompted a major struggle with the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
On the one hand, in this economic crisis, decentralisation was considered a way of sharing by the 
federal government, with states and municipalities, the responsibilities and the consequent political 
burden caused by cuts in health funds. On the other hand the sanitarista movement and local 
authorities saw decentralisation as a way to achieve historical goals of empowering local 
authorities, and to fulfil the specific needs of the regions. With these considerations in mind, we 
can draw a parallel between the conditions, in the 1990’s, which resulted in health reform and 
consequent decentralisation, and the context of approval of the National Medicines Policy (NMP), 
which provided for the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
One of the most important guidelines stipulated in the NMP is the decentralisation of the 
management of the provision of basic medicines. In my research I asked how the public provision 
of basic medicines developed after decentralisation of the pharmaceutical assistance. However, it is 
important to remark that my research is limited to some aspects of the access to medicines and does 
not include the impacts of decentralisation, if any, on people’s health. For instance, it is difficult to 
isolate advances due to decentralisation from those obtained from the economic development of the 
country. Even more complicated, in the case of the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance, is 
to disentangle the results of what we could call two steps of decentralisation: the first step, the 
decentralisation of the health system (and the consequent decentralisation of  health care); and the 
second step, the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance. It is hardly possible to separate the 
achievements in terms of access due to the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance from those 
due to the development of primary care itself, which followed health decentralisation. Additionally, 
municipalities and state departments share the same health staff and physical structure to provide 
primary care and to manage the distribution of medicines. Another confounding factor, which 
could be associated with advances in access, is the increase in federal funding for primary care 
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 The increased exposure of the Senator and Ministry of Health is believed to have catapulted him to run for 
the subsequent presidential elections. 
 149 
 
after the first step of decentralisation. Those elements corroborate the idea that basic 
pharmaceutical assistance would face the same difficulties and share the same advances as those 
experienced by primary care.  
 
Bearing these considerations in mind, in this chapter I will discuss the strengths and flaws of the 
decentralised management of basic medicine provision, focusing on access. Answering questions 
on this subject, interviewees provided a rich view of advances and impediments that permeate the 
process. Initially, in this chapter, I will discuss the positive effects of decentralisation pointed out 
by interviewees and after that I will explore the issues that decentralisation could not change. I will 
approach interviewees’ perceptions, comparing them with the legal framework and the available 
data on access. 
 
In order to organise this discussion, this chapter is structured in five sections including this 
introduction. The second section discusses the structuring of basic pharmaceutical assistance after 
decentralisation. The third section analyses how access changed following the municipalisation of 
basic medicine management. The barriers and main failures that have prevented further 
development of basic pharmaceutical assistance in the decentralised context are the subject of the 
fourth section. Closing the chapter are the main conclusions. 
 
 
6.2 How was the structuring of Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance enhanced by 
decentralisation? 
The accounts of my interviewees suggested that changes provided by the creation of the National 
Medicines Policy (later complemented by the National Pharmaceutical Assistance Policy - 
NPAP
100
) have caused attention to turn to what municipalities should do in order to manage the 
provision of basic medicines. Health secretariats, from the creation of SUS onwards, but more 
intensely after the decentralisation of primary care, claimed that medicines distributed by the 
federal government did not meet the local needs in terms of diseases, doses and frequency of 
distribution. My interviewees suggested, as discussed in detail in Chapter Four, that this was a 
major motivation for them to ask for the decentralisation of the management of drug provision. The 
NMP has provided the legal support for these changes, but municipalities had to be prepared to 
respond to the new roles brought by the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
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 The context and actors involved in the creation of the NMP and NPAP are discussed in Chapter One, 
section 1.4. 
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Although my interviewees pointed out many flaws in activities related to the decentralisation of 
basic pharmaceutical assistance, the general perception was that decentralisation enabled the 
structuring of the area in states and municipalities. Interviewees also associate decentralisation with 
the organisation and strengthening of the pharmaceutical assistance department within the Ministry 
of Health. Their point of view was grounded in two elements which they portrayed as a 
consequence of the decentralisation of the sector: the organisation of pharmaceutical assistance 
activities, including the development of planning routines at municipal level; and the definition of 
roles and responsibilities of federal, state and municipal level regarding the provision of medicines. 
The combination of these elements, according to the interviewees, resulted in improvements in the 
structure of the newly created field of pharmaceutical assistance. I will discuss each of these 
elements in the subsequent sections. 
 
6.2.1 Organising the provision of medicines  
The organisation of pharmaceutical assistance is still a challenge to SUS managers (CONASS, 
2011). Organisation, in this case, is a broad term that includes aspects linked to each step of the 
administration of the pharmaceutical assistance cycle, from the planning to the dispensing of drugs. 
It means that organising goes from hiring and training human resources to the construction of 
facilities to store or dispense drugs, i.e. from the administrative structure to the infrastructure. The 
use of the term structuring, with the same meaning, was frequent in the interviewees’ narratives. 
 
My interviewees tended to portray the structuring of pharmaceutical assistance as a consequence of 
decentralisation. The reasoning underpinning this view was that the definitions of roles, 
responsibilities, and financing, as well as power distributed to manage and plan the provision, 
drove the organisation of the pharmaceutical assistance area at municipal and state level. The 
impetus for structuring and developing the provision of medicines came through decentralised 
management of pharmaceutical assistance resulting from the NMP, according to my interviewees. 
The organisation of the activities entailed making medicines available to patients and linking the 
management of pharmaceutical assistance to the treatments in primary care. These initiatives were 
driven by the decentralisation process, as illustrated by the next quote: 
I think the strongest aspect of decentralisation is the possibility [the one] of linking the 
municipal supply of medicines to the demands and to the strategies of treatment used in the 
primary care level. So, when the manager could make that decision, he [sic] became liable 
and at the same time the demands started, so the municipality had to be organised to 
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respond to this. So it has generated increased organisation in the municipality to connect 
what is done in primary care to the decision on which medicines to buy, the quantity 
needed (Interviewee 18; 7.1). 
 
From this quote we can see that the changes brought by decentralisation were associated with need 
(and opportunity) to organise and link the provision of medicines to the strategies of treatment used 
in primary care. This argument relating decentralisation with the structuring of pharmaceutical 
assistance at municipalities is disputed by some scholars, who argue that the main focus of the 
federal government has been the promotion of decentralisation in itself, and less importance has 
been put on developing the health system infrastructure (Arretche and Marques, 2007). In fact, with 
decentralisation, state and municipalities took over the responsibility of the management of basic 
medicines. However, in order to perform their duties accordingly they needed skills and 
organisation. Taking into account the interviews, it is clear that very little has changed in terms of 
infrastructure and human resources at the beginning of decentralisation. 
 
Decentralisation transferred responsibilities beyond the dispensing of drugs; however, 
municipalities did not receive financing to support the structuring of the area. Until 2007, funding 
was exclusively to buy medicines.
101
 From that year, the Ministry of Health changed the regulation, 
allowing for up to 15% of those resources to be used in the construction of facilities to dispense 
medication, or with other activities related to pharmaceutical assistance, as voiced by this 
interviewee: 
The vast majority of municipalities, at least in my state, made a plan for pharmaceutical 
assistance where they agreed on all these obligations. The pharmaceutical assistance plan 
also included a policy of rational use of medicines, minimal infrastructure of the 
pharmacy, storage (...) So following this plan for pharmaceutical assistance we built the 
structure because an ordinance of the Ministry of Health allows up to 15% resources [of 
the funds that were previously exclusive to buy medicines] to be invested in structuring 
pharmaceutical assistance (Interviewee 7; 2.3). 
 
This meant that although in 1998 there was a significant change in the scope of responsibilities of 
municipalities and states regarding pharmaceutical assistance, there was no provision of resources 
to implement these activities. Municipalities should buy and store basic medicines, but until 2007 
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 The municipalities received the IAFB- Incentivo a Assistencia Farmaceutica Básica or Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance Incentive. 
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they did not receive funds to build storage facilities and could not hire human resources to plan and 
execute the procurements. As such, for the population, the supply of medicines did not change soon 
after decentralisation was implemented. Thus, comparing what should be done according to the 
legal framework and what in fact municipalities and states received in terms of support and 
funding, it is not surprising that access to basic medicines remained unchanged in some regions of 
the country.
102
As I discussed in Chapter Four, the gap between what is provided by the SUS legal 
framework, and what in fact is implemented in terms of health delivery, is replicated in the case of 
pharmaceutical assistance. In this example, the NMP stipulated that municipalities would buy 
medicines according to local demands, but the funds transferred did not allow expenses to develop 
the structure necessary to put the new roles into practice.  
 
Data from my interviews suggested that not receiving funds to support the infrastructure and 
human resources contributed to maintaining regional differences. Regions that already had 
structured and organised primary care engaged and fulfilled their decentralised tasks. The less 
developed regions, in turn, started the structuring after receiving funds and support from the federal 
level, which only happened after 2007. Funding issues will be further discussed in section 6.3, 
when I will detail the barriers to the development of the field. 
 
Building upon the arguments of the structuring as a consequence of decentralisation are the 
accounts that decentralisation required the development of municipal planning practices to allow 
for the provision of medicines. In the next quote the interviewee links distribution of power and 
responsibilities to the need for municipalities to develop management capabilities associated with 
planning. An important aspect related to planning that appears throughout most of the accounts 
concerns bottom-up planning, as discussed in Chapter Four, section 4.6. Local initiatives are 
identified by interviewees as essential to allow the municipal managers to adapt their medicine 
purchases to the needs of the population residing in the area. The interviewees also linked the need 
for planning brought about by decentralisation with better performance. The following quote 
reveals how this obligation shaped the development of the field:  
For example, with decentralisation municipalities had to do planning. We can only buy 
with planning. We cannot guess the quantities of drugs we should buy. We need to estimate 
how many hypertensive [patients] there are in the municipality; how they're dispersed 
within the area of the municipality, to buy the right amount of drugs and distribute them 
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 CONASS, in 2011, produced a global analysis of SUS advances and barriers. Within this context, they 
argued that there is a causal link between the efficiency of pharmaceutical assistance and the organization 
and structure of the field. Despite these implications, they claimed that federal funding is essentially limited 
to the purchase of medicines (CONASS, 2011:19). 
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among the basic health units. This [need for] planning was introduced by decentralisation. 
We can only work with planning (...) I think the greatest result of decentralisation was the 
municipalities being forced to plan (Interviewee 10; 11.2). 
 
Besides planning, interviewees also highlighted the importance of having adequate medicines for 
the treatment of prevalent diseases in the area instead of receiving a standard set of medication as 
was provided by the Ministry of Health before decentralisation. 
 
Interviewees remarked that the insertion of basic pharmaceutical assistance management among the 
powers of the municipality has made medicines become part of the process of care performed by 
municipalities. Medication was not a foreign element anymore; it would be part of the process of 
care tailored according to the needs of patients in the region. In this next quote we can see the 
association of the decision-making power distributed by decentralisation with better care: 
I think the strong point is the possibility, in the municipality, of an increasingly close 
linkage between the supply of medicines and the demands (...) So I think what's best is the 
accountability for all stages of the process: planning, programming, determining how 
many hypertensive patients we have and how many [drugs] I have to buy ... (Interviewee 
18; 7.1). 
 
Also other aspects merit further attention in these extracts from interviews. Firstly, there is the 
aspect of ‘forced’ planning as a result of pharmaceutical assistance decentralisation. Nonetheless, 
primary care was decentralised previously to the decentralisation in the provision of basic 
medicines. Both activities require planning, but interviewees argued that it was the pharmaceutical 
assistance that ‘forced’ municipalities to plan. It sounds like planning just started after the second 
step of decentralisation. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that municipalities suffered from 
capability constraints that compromised the management of primary care when pharmaceutical 
assistance was decentralised. This in turn corroborates the accounts discussed in Chapter Four that 
regional differences in terms of management capability shaped the development of decentralisation, 
more precisely the views that municipalities in some regions were not equipped to manage the 
provision of basic medicines. This argument adds another nuance to the explanation about the long-
lasting period of implementation of the decentralisation of the provision of drugs also discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
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A second aspect that could be explored further is, that - as was discussed in Chapter Four - the 
freedom to choose which drugs should be purchased was received positively. Such a choice was 
placed as a counterpoint to the previous policy where a standard set of medication was distributed 
to all municipalities in the country.
103
 Overall, interviewees disapproved the distribution of the 
same set of medication for all municipalities. That was considered inadequate because the needs of 
each region are different and depend on the most prevalent diseases in the area. The exercise of this 
freedom of choice has also brought new responsibilities and the necessity of changing practices to 
face these tasks. As stated by interviewees, municipal planning regarding the acquisition of 
medicines was much more a necessity than an option. Despite the fact that ten out of 20 
interviewees expressed the importance of planning and scheduling the purchases of drugs, that 
routine was not implemented, as suggested by the report of the Brazilian Audit Tribunal (TCU) 
(TCU, 2011). In 2010, as discussed in Chapter Five, TCU inspected 30 municipalities distributed 
among ten states. It was shown that the schedule of purchases of medicines in the municipalities 
was inadequate. The inspection’s report has indicated that the amount of medicines purchased was 
based on historical consumption and average monthly consumption. Moreover, data of unmet 
demand was not registered, i.e. medicines that patients sought but did not find were not included in 
the programming purchases. Among other problems, the report showed that there was shortage of 
medicines in all basic health units visited. These data support interviewees’ accounts that the legal 
framework advanced but implementation remained incipient. 
 
In my view, this situation shows the broken link between policy and reality. When talking about 
pharmaceutical assistance, politicians and managers use what is provided in the legal framework 
and policy documents to portray the ideal situation for the provision of medicines and access. 
These documents are used as a signal that things are changing, but in several cases the signal is not 
translated into actions. The legal framework is also used to create a discourse that confuses what 
was already implemented in terms of pharmaceutical assistance and what is just part of the legal 
documents. Sometimes it was hard to understand if the interviewees were talking about what really 
happens or what should happen if the policy had been implemented. This perception of 
disconnection between discourse and reality, between the legal framework provided by the policy 
and the actions implemented, will be discussed again in section 6.4.1, within the pharmaceutical 
care fragmentation topic. This digression on the discourse adopted leads us to the next topic within 
the structuring process portrayed by interviewees: the new roles and responsibilities derived from 
decentralisation. 
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government distributed a standard set of 48 medicines to be used in primary care. This initiative was called 
the Basic Pharmacy Programme. 
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6.2.2 Definition of the roles and responsibilities in the provision of basic medicines 
The definition of roles provided by decentralisation required organisation from municipalities and 
states in order to provide the drugs involved in the primary care. The designation of roles revealed 
activities that should be performed by municipalities and states. Municipalities, for instance, 
became responsible for planning and executing activities involved with dispensing medicines. 
These included the elaboration of a Pharmaceutical Plan detailing what, how many and when to 
buy; and the corresponding administrative structure responsible for coordinating and implementing 
these pharmaceutical activities. 
 
The designation of roles within the provision of medicines is emphasised by interviewees as 
significant for the development of the field. As the interviews suggested, the idea behind those 
statements appears to be linked to the legal responsibilities of each level. Problems caused by court 
ruling demanding immediate supply of medicines and frequent failure of the state level in 
transferring the counterpart funding to basic medicines are examples that help to explain the 
importance of liability in the decentralised context.
104
 In fact, those court cases are part of a 
phenomenon referred as judicialisation, which is an important aspect within the pharmaceutical 
field, as explained in Chapter Five. Suing the state, the municipality or the federal government to 
obtain the drug prescribed was a procedure widespread at the end of the 1990s. Judicialisation has 
become very common in many regions of the country and has forced health secretariats to spend 
large sums to comply with court rulings. Moreover, these unexpected expenditures provided 
medicines to a reduced number of individuals, contributing to greater inequalities in access. There 
is no way to argue against or circumvent court rulings, and therefore secretariats had to provide the 
drugs or officials might even be arrested. Some of the interviewees provided narratives that suggest 
that the definition of each level’s roles was used as a way to improve the accountability of each 
government level and helped to limit the impacts of judicialisation, as illustrated by these two 
quotes: 
With the decentralisation [of basic pharmaceutical assistance] the municipal level became 
obligatorily responsible for providing the set of basic medicines. (...) This meant that we 
have at least a legal element, written, that [makes clear] the mandatory responsibility of 
each federal entity (Interviewee 14; 5.1). 
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 Failures of the state level in contributing with its counterparts to fund basic medicines and the 
consequences for access were discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
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What is positive [regarding the pharmaceutical assistance policy]? ... I think today it is the 
definition of roles. Municipalities have a role: the [supply of] medicine for primary care is 
their responsibility. This helped to organise [pharmaceutical] assistance. (…) Today it is 
very clear in Pharmaceutical Assistance what the responsibilities of each federal entity are 
(Interviewee 13; 7.1). 
 
In these accounts the legal assignment of responsibilities to each level that resulted in 
decentralisation is regarded as a positive aspect of the process. Policy documents and regulations 
that outlined what should be the role of each level of the federation in relation to the provision of 
basic medicines are regarded as elements that confer protection in case of lawsuits. This can be 
understood if we consider that in Brazil, federal, state and municipal levels are responsible for 
providing different classes of medicines. Medicines that are part of primary care have to be 
provided and distributed by municipalities. That said, in court cases demanding medicines 
municipal accountability is limited to the provision of just this class of medicines. It means that 
patients should not take the municipal level to court to obtain medicines unless those medicines are 
part of primary care.
105
 
 
As seen in this section, interviewees’ accounts suggested that decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance somewhat advanced the structuring of the field. It is reasonable to suppose that as a 
consequence of better organisation, access would also improve. The aspects related to the provision 
of medicines, and whether access developed with decentralisation, are explored in the next section. 
 
 
6.3 Changes in access to basic medicines that followed decentralisation 
Improvement in access to basic medicines was pointed out by 50% of interviewees as the main 
strength of the current basic pharmaceutical assistance policy. The other half pointed out positive 
aspects which were also related to access, like planning, improvement in financing and 
management qualification. In fact, improvement in access is the main purpose of the 
pharmaceutical assistance policy and all goals are interrelated and interdependent.  
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 For instance, drugs to treat multiple sclerosis are high-cost drugs, and the responsibility for providing 
them is shared between the state and federal levels. Therefore, patients demanding medicines to treat multiple 
sclerosis should sue the federal or state level. 
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Interviewees suggest that access has improved, particularly after decentralisation. According to 
interviewees, however, this advance was not sufficient to make medicines available to all people in 
need. The progress in access achieved is placed in perspective by this municipal health secretary, 
who drew attention to differences in medicines provided before and after decentralisation. Even if 
the current coverage did not attain the universal level advocated when SUS started, the advance 
obtained should be recognised, as explained in the following quote: 
The strongest [point of pharmaceutical assistance] is the access, which increased 
significantly throughout the national territory, including here in Sao Paulo state. If you 
think how it was before the pharmaceutical assistance of the SUS, right? We had medicines 
for tuberculosis, leprosy, childcare and a few more drugs for pre-natal. Today you have a 
policy of pharmaceutical assistance that few countries have, in the dimension that we have, 
despite the difficulties ... So, well ... As much as I have criticised [the failures that SUS 
has], the advance is incomparable (Interviewee 1; 37.1). 
 
From this quote, besides the changes brought by the pharmaceutical assistance policy, we can also 
see pride in the scope of the policy, which endorsed universal, free access to medicines for 
Brazilian citizens: “in the dimension that we have.” The changes introduced by decentralisation 
regarding the availability of basic medicines will be explored in the two subsections that follow. 
Firstly I will discuss the accounts related to the positive impacts on access attributed to 
decentralisation, and then the negative views. 
 
6.3.1 Regularity in provision of basic medicines 
Continuous availability of basic medicines, especially drugs to treat hypertension and diabetes, is a 
positive change reported by the interviewees on the basis of their experiences as secretaries of the 
state and municipal health departments, although it is not the case in all regions of the country. 
Interviewees pointed out regularity in the provision of medicines as part of the positive impact of 
decentralisation, as illustrated by the quote: 
I think the strong point [of the current policy] is that people can make their regular 
treatment and prevent complications of chronic diseases like diabetes and hypertension…. 
I think this is the strong point, being able to distribute medicines regularly, free of charge, 
to [treat] diseases that occur in the municipalities. Many people otherwise would not take 
the medication because they do not have money to buy it (Interviewee 10; 9.1) 
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The interviewee associated the current pharmaceutical policy with the availability of medicines to 
treat lower-income citizens. We can also see the association of decentralisation with availability of 
regular treatment and prevention of complications that could result from chronic diseases. It is 
reasonable to suppose that regular dispensing of drugs means that the steps of planning and 
purchase have been successfully worked through. Although the interviewee described regularity in 
provision, it is difficult to demonstrate the improvement in the access reported. There is hardly any 
national evidence of continuous availability of medicines in municipalities. National studies about 
access are scarce, and the existing studies employ different methodologies hampering 
comparability, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two. Interviewees have no evidence 
to corroborate the advances perceived in their work routine. In fact, lacks in monitoring and 
evaluation of the programmes implemented are significant limitations of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance, as pointed out by the interviewees, which will be discussed in section 6.4. 
 
Considering studies conducted between 1998 and 2009, regardless of the source of medication 
being private or public, and the methodological differences, the availability of essential 
medicines
106
 ranges from 55% to 96% (Bertoldi et al., 2009; Karnikowski et al., 2004). Even 
though some studies show reasonable figures in access to essential medicines, it is worth pointing 
out that the poorest households are those that commit proportionately more income to acquire these 
essential goods (Aurea et al., 2010). Aurea and colleagues also showed that poorer families, located 
in the lowest tenth of household income per capita, spend 12% of their monthly cash income on 
medicines. 
107
 In the end, the richest families belonging to 10% with the highest income committed 
only 1.7% of the monetary income. This shows great inequality in income commitment to 
acquiring medications among income strata. So, failure in public provision of medicines will affect 
the poorer families more importantly. Aurea et al. (2010) argue that SUS pharmaceutical assistance 
programmes are the main source of medicines in large portions of the population, especially those 
with lower incomes. The authors show that it is people with lower incomes who benefit the most 
from free distribution of medicines. 
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 It is worth elucidating the relationship between essential medicines and basic medicines or medicines that 
are part of the Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance policy. The National List of Essential Medicines (RENAME) 
consists of a list of drugs used for treatment of the most prevalent diseases in the country, which are selected 
considering their safety profile, efficacy, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. This list guides the supply, 
prescription and dispensing of medications at SUS services. RENAME constitutes the basic list of medicines 
funded by the Ministry of Health, so all medicines of Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance are essential 
medicines, but not all medicines of RENAME are supplied by municipalities. The list can be adapted by 
states, municipalities and the Federal District according to the population’s epidemiological profile.  
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 According to data from the Brazilian Household Budget Survey-POF, 2008-2009 conducted by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics –IBGE. 
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Although interviewees felt that overall the improvements and consistency in distribution was a 
positive development, some of my interviewees and the TCU report pointed in the opposite 
direction, as I will discuss in the next section. 
 
6.3.2 Shortages and a lack of regularity in the distribution of drugs 
The message from interviewees regarding regularity in provision was not consistent. On the one 
hand, interviewees suggested that medicine shortages are less frequent compared with the times of 
centralised procurement managed by the Ministry of Health. Moreover, access provided by SUS 
has reached broad coverage in some areas, such as in the state of Paraná. On the other hand, the 
majority of interviewees agreed that there is a shortage of drugs in virtually all regions of the 
country, although it is not possible to pinpoint with certainty where and why the failures continue 
to occur. The causes may vary from region to region and include failures in public bidding 
processes, planning (resulting in underestimated purchases), and poor administrative capacity, 
among others. The following extract from an interview with a municipal health secretary from the 
São Paulo metropolitan area illustrates that even in the more developed region of the country 
shortages still happen: 
So, the mayor and municipal health secretariats face shortages [of basic pharmacy 
medicine] indeed (Interviewee 1; 2.13). 
 
Another interviewee, speaking about patients from predominantly small rural municipalities, says 
that there were basically two reasons that explain the low availability of medicines in these 
locations. The drug prescribed was not part of the list of medicines distributed or the stock was 
depleted, as illustrated below:  
The doctor prescribes a drug, and even if it is part of the list of the basic pharmacy when 
the patient asks for it, it is not available. So the stock [of medicines] lasts fifteen days, 
many [patients] have this complaint. When they go looking for [the prescribed medicine] 
there is no medicine left and they are sent back [home and have to wait] until the next 
month. So the main complaint is that either the doctor prescribes a drug that is not part of 
the list or when they go to the pharmacy it is not available (Interviewee 20; 10.1). 
 
According to this interviewee there was a common complaint among patients that stocks only 
lasted for the first 15 days of the month, evidencing planning failures. The unmet needs on 
medicines are not recorded and therefore will not be part of the planning for the next purchase, 
 160 
 
perpetuating the vicious cycle. State and municipal level deficiency in planning is a clear failure, as 
pointed out in the TCU report mentioned earlier (TCU, 2011). 
 
In states where the basic pharmaceutical assistance is more organised and structured, such as in São 
Paulo and Minas Gerais, the flaws in the bidding process were held as responsible for temporary 
shortages. One interviewee from Minas Gerais attributes the main cause for temporary shortages of 
medicines for primary care to the failures in the bidding process. The alleged flaws in the bidding 
process might be due to several factors, among them: low administrative capacity, lack of adequate 
training of human resources, fraud, and lack of interest from the pharmaceutical industry in selling 
to the state public sector. This last factor has been used more often recently, while opposing the 
medicines consortium of Paraná against the community pharmacies participating in the Popular 
Pharmacy Programme.
108
 
 
In general, issues with the procurement process are frequently linked to management capability not 
only in the health sector. Moreover, public procurement of medicines is a complex and bureaucratic 
procedure that requires a highly skilled team. This in turn causes more difficulties to small 
municipalities that usually have small teams with a reduced number of officials that have the 
specialised skills required to manage a complex public procurement process. Therefore, even in 
more developed states of the federation, which have reached good levels of access to medicines, 
some barriers could not be removed and interruptions arose in the provision. 
 
After discussing the main features of the pharmaceutical assistance that emerged with 
decentralisation, the next section will present the main barriers that interviewees held responsible 
for hampering further advances in the field. 
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 This argument was raised twice during a public hearing to discuss the Popular Pharmacy Programme in 
the Chamber of Deputies in October 2012. Managers of the Paraná Health Consortium reported that from 
2011 to 2012, they had more difficulty acquiring some basic medicines for pharmacies, and that the prices 
have increased. It is speculated that this is due to the Popular Pharmacy Programme. It is believed that the 
pharmaceutical industry prefers to sell to pharmacies participating in the Programme because of the bigger 
amount purchased and better prices paid by the federal government for drugs distributed by the Programme. 
Available at: 
http://www.crfpa.org.br/sitesed/crfpa/?tipo=conteudos_site&tipo_conteudo=noticia&tipo_consulta=v&id=36
89622056340109 [last accessed 24/07/2013] 
The Popular Pharmacy programme will be discussed in depth in Chapter Seven. 
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6.4 Barriers to progress 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, according to the interviewees, decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance was an expected development of the decentralisation of health care. As 
the interviewees stated, they expected to have control over the management of provision of basic 
medicines after municipalisation of primary health, because of the importance of medications for 
therapy. However, the transfer of these additional responsibilities and powers to manage the 
provision of medicines was not easily translated into services. Decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance management put municipalities in charge of all steps involved in the distribution of basic 
medicines, but pharmaceutical assistance did not develop as foreseen in the NMP. My interviews 
suggest that the characteristics of decentralisation itself and SUS context hampered progress. State 
and municipal actors had difficulties with implementation, but more notably at municipal level, 
where management capabilities were often less developed. 
 
Overall, the message in all the interviews is ambivalent. The interviewees started discussing 
advances in pharmaceutical assistance and turned to problems and barriers. Usually each strong 
point was followed by an account of a negative aspect. This section brings together the aspects that 
interviewees considered the main weaknesses of basic pharmaceutical assistance policy. Moreover, 
the difficulties with planning and shortages already discussed, the main failures and barriers 
highlighted throughout the interviews, are related to policy fragmentation; lack of integration 
between the distribution of medicines and care; insufficient funding; low management capacity; 
and the absence of mechanisms and indicators for monitoring and evaluating the policies 
implemented. According to the interviews, these drawbacks prevented the pharmaceutical 
assistance from fulfilling the goals provided in the NMP. In order to better understand how this 
happened, the main barriers pointed out by interviewees are discussed below in four subsections.  
 
6.4.1 The fragmentation of Pharmaceutical Care  
Health service fragmentation is considered a serious problem in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(PAHO, 2010).
 109
 Even though the idea of comprehensive health services has been ubiquitous 
since SUS was created, care is still fragmented within the system. As this interviewee argued, the 
model of care adopted in SUS led to health care fragmentation and pharmaceutical assistance 
followed the same pattern: 
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 PAHO defines health service fragmentation as health facilities and services at different levels of care that 
are not coordinated among themselves or that do not provide care over time; health services that do not cover 
the entire range of promotion, prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care services; and 
services that do not meet people’s needs (PAHO 2011). 
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The issue of fragmentation of SUS policies is an inheritance [that persists from before SUS 
creation in 1988] that we have. It is the consequence of the way that, historically, health 
policies were implemented in Brazil. (...) I would say to you that fragmentation is not 
unique to pharmaceutical assistance. This fragmentation is [a result] of the management of 
care, of the model of care that we have that is still symptom-driven (Interviewee 1; 21.2). 
 
The interviewee ascribed the fragmentation of pharmaceutical assistance to the model of care 
centred on disease and acute care adopted by SUS. The interviewee referred to the traditional 
health care model designed to provide symptom-based responses to acute illnesses. Although SUS 
policy documents indicate changes toward a comprehensive model that integrates promotion, 
prevention and health care, the symptom driven model is still in practice in SUS according to the 
interviewee. 
 
This assessment is corroborated by scholars who argue that health systems in the Americas are 
characterised by high levels of fragmentation, and that the model of care is one of the leading 
causes of this phenomenon (Montenegro et al., 2011).
 
The fragmentation of SUS manifests itself in 
different ways, but mainly as weaknesses in links between the management system and health 
services, and as disconnection between the health services and support services for diagnosis and 
therapy. Fragmentation jeopardises the care offered, hindering users' access to services and causing 
loss of continuity in care (PAHO, 2010). Similarly to what occurs in primary care, basic 
pharmaceutical assistance policy and services are fragmented. This feature undermines care 
delivery, hindering access to medicines and services. Brazilian health secretaries also manifested 
their discontentment with the fragmentation of pharmaceutical assistance, and identified the model 
of care used in SUS, driven by disease, as the origin of the problem (CONASS, 2011). The system 
is considered fragmented because different sectors within the Ministry of Health are responsible for 
activities that interfere with the provision of medications. Some of the activities are overlapped, 
replicated and uncoordinated. This fragmentation has historical roots in the organisation of 
pharmaceutical services within the Ministry of Health.
110
 To illustrate this fragmentation I will use 
the example of medicines to treat diabetes and hypertension. 
 
The Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance (DPA) manages basic pharmaceutical assistance at 
the federal level. This sector coordinates the agreement process and funding, which results in the 
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 Until 1997 the Centre for Medicines (CEME – Central de Medicamentos) centralised all activities related 
to medicines. Deactivation of CEME caused its responsibilities to be reallocated to different departments 
within the Ministry of Health (Cosendey et al., 2000). 
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rules governing the process involved in public provision of medicines. Funds to purchase 
hypertensive and diabetes drugs are transferred by the Ministry of Health to state and municipal 
health funds. They, in turn, give their contribution (co-financing) and are responsible for the 
purchase and distribution of the drugs. But in the case of insulin, which is also part of diabetes 
treatment, the purchase is made directly by the federal level. Municipalities estimate the quantity of 
medicines necessary, using data from a database of patients with hypertension and diabetes called 
HIPERDIA (Hypertension and Diabetes Programme), which is coordinated by the National 
Coordination of Diabetes and Hypertension, which is not part of the DPA. Moreover, the purchase 
of supplies for diabetic patients, such as syringes, needles and blood glucose strips, is the 
responsibility of states and municipalities. Thus, SUS patients with diabetes receiving treatment 
cannot imagine the complex sequence of events that must happen before medicines can be 
dispensed as needed. There is a combination of centralised and decentralised efforts occurring in 
different areas of the Ministry of Health without unified coordination at the federal level. If within 
the Ministry of Health the actions are divided among different areas, patients will also have to 
search in more than one location for treatment. 
 
In another example, if a child is diagnosed with pneumonia in an emergency care unit, his/her 
parents will not get the medication from this health service to continue the treatment of pneumonia 
diagnosed. They will need to go to a basic health unit the next day to have an appointment with the 
doctor in order to receive the prescription. Only after going through this process will they qualify to 
receive the medicine although the child had just been diagnosed in a SUS facility, by SUS doctors. 
Likewise, when diabetic patients are attended in the emergency service they do not receive drugs to 
continue the treatment at home, but have to make an appointment with another doctor. 
 
Like health care, pharmaceutical assistance shares the same difficulties in terms of health service 
integration as other SUS services. Medical training is singled out as a significant barrier to the 
integration of services (Harris et al., 2007). Medical schools has been putting more emphasis on 
training specialties at the expense of medical generalists and this strategy is believed to drive 
professionals to build a private career. That in turn leads medical doctors to multi-employment in 
the private and public sectors, resulting in excessive workload (Feuerweker, 2001). These external 
obligations are considered to weaken doctors’ commitment to the municipal health service (Harris 
et al., 2007). The Family Health Programme illustrates the influence of doctors in integration of 
care. This programme is a community-based primary care service at the municipal level and, 
despite being a successful initiative, has patchy integration with specialist services (Harris and 
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Haines, 2010). The referral system to the specialist and the communication between generalist and 
specialist is still deficient, compromising the continuity of patients’ treatment.  
 
Fragmentation is not limited to aspects of management and provision of services. Actually, the way 
the transfers of federal funds are organised is argued to be the cause of the fragmentation in the first 
place (Santos, 2007). The financing strategy adopted for funding medicines has contributed to 
creating and maintaining fragmentation. Pharmaceutical assistance is divided into three categories 
called components (basic, specialised and strategic) and each has specific funding. Moneys are 
labelled for purchase of specific medications, and this makes specific programmes be developed for 
the distribution of certain drugs. In addition to the lack of integration of health services within SUS 
the provision of medicines is not integrated to health services as it should be. For instance, the 
Ministry of Health had various programmes that separately financed the purchase of diabetes and 
hypertension drugs. The provision of drugs for the treatment of diabetes and hypertension has been 
the subject of frequent government programmes given the significant number of patients in the 
population in all regions of the country. This subject of programmes has changed and now the 
money for primary care medicines is all gathered in one source. But sources remain separate in 
relation to the components of pharmaceutical assistance. The funds are earmarked for the purchase 
of a certain component, so they cannot be used to purchase other types of medicine, even if there 
are unused funds for one component. The following quote exemplifies how fragmented the 
provision of drugs was before decentralisation, when the federal level used to have multiple 
initiatives to provide the same class of drug: 
(…)Hypertension and diabetes medication were part of the list of drugs that municipalities 
had to purchase, they already were part of the pharmaceutical assistance [Ministerial] 
Orders, and the Ministry had until that moment [before the decentralisation] parallel 
programmes, such as HIPERDIA
111
  for example. Then, you had hypertension and diabetes 
drugs in HIPERDIA, in Women's Health, in the Health Penitentiary [programmes]... So, we 
had several offers for the same drug in separate programmes with separate funding, which 
usually did not reach all people [in need] (Interviewee 13; 4.1). 
 
The programmes were considered parallel initiatives because they worked independently without 
central coordination. To a certain extent, regarding primary care medicines, financing was unified 
but the supply of medicines for diabetes and hypertension remained scattered within different 
programmes. Despite having been dispensed by basic health units these drugs are currently 
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 HIPERDIA is a system of registration and monitoring of SUS patients with hypertension and diabetes. 
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included in the Popular Pharmacy Programme, at the national level, as I will show in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
6.4.2 Lack of integration between the distribution of medicines and care 
The lack of integration between care and provision of medicines is a concern evidenced in most of 
the interviews. Deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation of the system as well as weak 
management capability are cited among the barriers on care integration (Montenegro et al., 2011). 
State health secretaries argue that, in Brazil, medicines are still considered as something separate 
from the health service, discouraging the integration of pharmaceutical assistance into primary care 
(CONASS, 2011:25). Pharmaceutical assistance as planned in the NPPA is far from being 
achieved, as one municipal secretary from the metropolitan region of Sao Paulo says: 
The Ministry of Health is still quite fragmented. So the various areas within the Ministry 
did not talk to each other. So the creation of the National Policy on Pharmaceutical 
Assistance and this integration effort with the assistance areas, I think that is still ongoing 
in the Ministry of Health. It is a question that is not yet resolved. But I think it will take 10 
years to enter the political agenda in the same way as other important areas took 
(Interviewee 8; 4.1). 
 
Overall, my interviewees were emphatic in separating the advances in terms of availability of 
medicines and pharmaceutical assistance itself. They make it clear that access has improved, but 
that the care did not follow this advance. In the next extract the interviewee believes that, currently, 
only when patients are hospitalised do they get pharmaceutical assistance as it should be:  
And I'm really emphasizing the question of access, because for me one thing is access to 
medicine, another thing is effective pharmaceutical assistance. They are two separate 
things. So I think in relation to the access point there were some advances, but in terms of 
pharmaceutical care it is almost zero. Today the little pharmaceutical assistance that we 
have in SUS, in my view, takes place in hospitals where there are qualified and trained 
staff, and where there are defined policies and actions aiming to achieve qualified 
pharmaceutical attention. But today we have a situation where, occasionally, we get some 
progress on access to medicines, but in terms of pharmaceutical care as a whole, I think 
that, unfortunately, SUS has advanced on nearly nothing. I’m quite sure about this 
(Interviewee 17; 3.2). 
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As the interviewee stated, activities other than dispensing of drugs are not yet implemented in 
primary care. Activities to promote the rational use of medicines, like counselling on the 
appropriate use and potential risks of medications, importance of taking drugs as prescribed to 
enhance medication adherence, and quality assurance of drugs dispensed are not part of the 
pharmaceutical service routine. 
 
Pharmaceutical assistance is not included in the planning of the departments of health, and this 
makes it difficult for pharmaceutical assistance services to participate in health activities in states 
and municipalities, as highlighted by CONASS (2011). This can be evidenced, for example, in drug 
prescriptions. According to the NMP and NPAP, prescribed drugs should be part of the RENAME 
list, but doctors are not trained for this, and the observance of the prescription rules is not enforced. 
The fact is that many SUS doctors prescribe drugs that are not part of the municipal medicines list. 
Thus, patients treated by these doctors have two alternatives: pay for drugs out of their own pockets 
or take the municipality to court. This practice undermines the whole logic that governs basic 
pharmaceutical assistance. Although, in my opinion, prescription practice is an important aspect to 
understand the barriers pharmaceutical assistance has to overcome in order to be implemented, 
interviewees did not in general talk about it. A plausible explanation for this lack of interest in 
discussing this subject could be that many of these interviewees are medical doctors and are not 
comfortable discussing their peers’ behaviour.   
 
Policy fragmentation and the lack of integration between provision of drugs and care are connected 
topics and reinforce the negative effects mutually, and both were associated by my interviewees 
with loss of efficiency in pharmaceutical assistance. 
 
6.4.3 Funding 
In order to understand the interviewees’ claims about funding schemes, it is helpful to have an 
overview of the SUS funding and more particularly about medicines. Underfunding of health has 
been part of an intense debate among health secretaries since 2003 (CONASS, 2011). In 2000, an 
amendment to the Constitution, Constitutional Amendment 29 - EC-29, defined minimum limits 
for spending on health in the spheres of government and also established sanctions in case of 
noncompliance with the minimum limits. According to EC-29, the Union must spend on health the 
same amount of money committed in the previous year, adjusted by the variation of nominal GDP 
between the two previous years. States must spend on health 12% of the amount of taxes collected, 
and municipalities 15% of their own taxes.  
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Since 2000, state and municipal authorities have complained that the federal level, which is the 
largest tax collector, should spend more on health. In their views, a fixed minimum percentage of 
health expenses should be established, as was done with states and municipalities. The fact is, 
however, that the federal government spent 7.3% of the current gross revenue on health in 2011, 
whereas it spent 11.7% in 1995.
 112
 EC-29 was regulated in 2011 and CONASS, CONASEMS, 
CNS and the Health Conferences supported the proposal that the Union should spend a minimum 
of 10% of current gross revenue. The federal government, however, lobbied for its rejection in the 
Senate, arguing that this would mean an increase in annual expenditures of approximately R$ 30 
billion (around £10 billion) and that there were no resources available. Thus, the federal spending 
continues, to this day, to have no connection with the collection of taxes. Instead, it is bound to 
expenses incurred in the previous year. This means that the largest share of investments originates 
from the states and municipalities. In fact, the largest share of public spending on health, 53%, has 
its origins in the states and municipalities while the federal level, despite being the largest 
fundraiser, brings 47% (Carvalho, 2012).  
 
This federal underfunding has predictable consequences in the area of pharmaceutical assistance, 
and among the difficulties pointed out by state and municipal secretaries are the rising cost of drugs 
and their impact on the health budget. The following extract from an interview with a state 
secretary reveals the effects of health underfunding for the performance of pharmaceutical 
assistance: 
[The availability of medicines] just does not advance anymore because there is no 
[financial] resource to support it. It was a sector that was left behind in the past, but 
advanced a lot, especially in recent years. The list of medication was increased, the pacts 
were expanded, resources were expanded, but still not as fast as the cost, demands, and 
technology have advanced. I believe that if this [financial] resource grew as spending did 
we'd be [doing] better. But I have no doubt that we advanced (Interviewee 2; 14.1). 
 
The interviewee suggests that the provision of drugs has advanced but further developments have 
been restrained by insufficient funding in order to cope with rising costs due to increased demand 
and technological advancements. This underfunding of health, despite being a common complaint 
among virtually all SUS managers, whether they are interviewees in this study or managers who 
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 Current gross revenue is the money received from taxation, fees, fines, and any sales that are made. It is 
the gross income without credit and capital gains. 
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appear on TV or in the newspapers talking about health in Brazil, is a disputed view between my 
interviewees. 
 
The secretary of health of a municipality in the southern region of the country affirms that the 
amount of money available for basic pharmaceutical assistance is enough to supply the population 
with the necessary medicines since the process is well managed and there are no purchases of 
brand-name drugs. 
I can say that the resources available today are sufficient to meet basic pharmaceutical 
assistance, without major capital expenditures. (…) So we tried to make sure that 
medicines acquired have quality, [the medicines are] approved by ANVISA,
113
 comply with 
all legal requirements in public procurement processes ... But we work with certain types 
of analgesics, anti-hypertensive, etc. [We work] with several of them, we do not use only 
one [specific type of brand-name medicine]. But none of these are the latest releases of the 
market. No, they are not (Interviewee 7; 3.3). 
 
The example suggests that having administrative capacity to plan and bid to purchase generic 
medicines is critical in the use of available resources. Accounts from interviewees suggest that it is 
precisely this difference in administrative capacity which allowed certain regions to adjust to 
decentralised management of provision of medicine better than others. 
 
There is still one more element cited by a Ministry of Health official that corroborates the view that 
financing available today for pharmaceutical assistance is sufficient in certain regions. This 
interviewee mentioned a meeting of CIT (Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission) that reported 
that there were pharmaceutical assistance funds left and they should decide what to do with them: 
Resources are sufficient? Resources are insufficient? At the beginning of the past decade, 
we were certain that money was insufficient. Today, I've seen discussions in CIT that there 
is some money unused; I don’t know where. They had to decide what to do with this 
financial resource. So, funds are no longer insufficient in all Brazil, but also they are not 
more than sufficient all over Brazil (Interviewee 18; 8.2). 
 
As the moneys for pharmaceutical assistance are earmarked, health secretariats need permission to 
use the money left. A possible explanation for the unused funds could be, as the interviewee said, 
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 ANVISA is the Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency, the agency responsible for drug registration. 
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that the amount of money available to buy medicines is more than sufficient in certain regions. I 
did not find data to support this and many of my interviewees clearly signal the contrary. In fact, 
only two out of 20 interviewees disagree with the general view that funding is still an issue in 
pharmaceutical assistance. In general, interviewees suggested that money was not sufficient to buy 
adequate quantities of medicines. This position is corroborated by the TCU report that showed a 
shortage of basic medicines in all the 30 health units audited in 2010 (TCU, 2011). In my opinion, 
unused funds could be better explained by inadequate estimates of demand, as a result of poor 
administrative capacity, to conduct medicine bidding processes, along with lack of planning 
strategies. However, in order to determine the causes of these surpluses of funds more research is 
needed and it is not within the scope of the present work. 
 
Overall, twelve interviewees mentioned underfunding as a significant barrier and of them six 
claimed that the federal funding for structuring of pharmaceutical assistance has not yet reached the 
necessary level to provide municipalities with means to fulfil their responsibilities in the field. 
Different solutions, depending on state initiatives, were implemented in order solve the issues 
related to the lack of suitable infrastructure. An example of how the question has been addressed 
regionally comes from Minas Gerais. In 2008, the state health secretary supported a programme to 
construct a network of public pharmacies using a state financial incentive (Guerra Jr, 2012). The 
Farmácia de Minas programme includes the construction and structuring of 1248 SUS pharmacies 
distributed over the totality of all the 853 municipalities in the state.
 114
 The programme also 
provides a transfer of financial incentive for pharmaceutical procurement and the establishment of 
a process of continuing education for human resources. The results of this initiative are appreciated 
by municipal health secretaries, as shown in this quote:  
In Minas we decided, using state funds, to construct basic pharmacies. Today 60% of the 
municipalities in the state have their basic pharmacy built. It is a complete pharmacy, with 
all the facilities that are required. It has adequate storage area; and has a special room for 
pharmaceutical attention, which is no longer just a counter in a corridor. Minas has 
succeeded with this project so well that many municipalities using these pharmacies 
started delivering actual pharmaceutical assistance, not simply drug delivery (Interviewee 
6; 14.1). 
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 Farmácia de Minas means ‘Pharmacy of Minas’. The initiative is part of the State Plan for Structuring 
Pharmaceutical Assistance. Municipalities receive from the State Treasury an incentive for construction of 
the pharmacy and purchase of equipments. Moreover, a monthly amount is sent to the municipality to 
supplement the salary of the pharmacist responsible for the unit. According to the webpage of state health 
secretary of Minas Gerais, in May 2013, there were 503 units of the programme. Available at: 
http://www.saude.mg.gov.br/component/gmg/page/350-farmacias-inauguradas-sesmg [last accessed 
24/07/2013]  
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Besides this initiative, Bahia state also implemented a similar programme. In 2009, the state 
launched its own initiative and constructed pharmacies in municipalities with fewer than 30,000 
inhabitants. As in Minas Gerais the money to develop the infrastructure came from the state fund. 
 
These programmes, as interviewees suggested, were a sign of the need to improve the infrastructure 
of pharmaceutical assistance. Perhaps in response to pressures for specific funding, from 2010, the 
federal government allowed up to 15% of state and local counterparts to be applied in the 
structuring of pharmaceutical assistance in Primary Care (Ministerio da Saude, 2009a). These funds 
are regarded as an important step. However, in 2011, when I conducted the interviews, the results 
of the application for these funds had not yet been assessed by the interviewees. 
 
6.4.4 Regional disparities reflected in differences in pharmaceutical assistance development 
I discussed regional differences in the implementation of decentralisation in Chapter Four and now 
I will reflect on how these differences have influenced users’ access to drugs in different regions of 
Brazil. Interviews suggested that regional differences are associated with factors and circumstances 
that did not change with decentralisation. In other words, differences are associated with things that 
decentralisation has not been able to change. The issue of lack of technical support and training for 
municipalities is a clear example. The regional pattern of health development is replicated in terms 
of pharmaceutical assistance. So, the interviewees described different realities in terms of access 
depending on the region. Minas Gerais state, as described in the quote that follows, made 
significant progress and now is able to provide the population with basic medicines on a regular 
basis: 
So, the strong point is the improvement in access to the list of basic medicines. We have to 
think that within the basic list of Minas we have about 180 items, which in our view, meets 
the minimum requirements of 80% of the population. So, medicine is [sufficient] to meet 
the entire demand of the municipality. The main fault occurs in bidding, which causes 
shortages. But usually we're ensuring [access to] the basic medication list (Interviewee 6; 
8.2). 
 
As voiced by the interviewee, in Minas Gerais the provision of medicines for primary care was 
organised and the population has access to basic medicines. This means that the planning and 
choice about which medicines to buy and facilities for storage and dispensing were already 
achieved. The problem reported by the municipal health secretary is related to the procurement 
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process which under state level responsibility in Minas Gerais. The interviewee connected 
procurement flaws with the logistics failures in distribution to municipalities, which cause 
shortages of medicines. Logistic issues are part of Brazilian life. In this case, they are related to the 
private sector, which is in charge of the distribution of basic medicines bought by the state to 
supply the municipalities. The failure here is not seen, by the interviewee, as a limitation on the 
ability of the state to deal with the management of drug supply. 
 
Another aspect that corroborates the account of the interviewee on progress in pharmaceutical 
assistance in Minas Gerais relates to implementation of the Farmácia de Minas. However, the 
emergence of this programme also suggests, in my view, that provision of basic medicines is still 
under development and universal coverage has not been reached. Even developed regions such as 
Minas Gerais where the state level plays an active role in the coordination of pharmaceutical 
assistance can benefit from programmes such as Farmácia de Minas to increase the access to 
medicines. 
 
Consistency in the availability of medicine as experienced in Minas Gerais is not a reality in other 
regions of the country. In Amazonas state
115
 the purchase of medicines for primary care is a 
municipal duty. A precarious situation regarding availability of medicines is described by a 
municipal health secretary in the region: 
Municipalities have difficulties making purchases ... First because of the costs…Moreover, 
access to municipalities is complicated by the issue of transportation. Everything is by boat 
or by air. Where I live the municipality is not connected [to other parts of Amazonas state] 
by road. There are very few municipalities in the state that are connected by road, so the 
distribution of medicines is very complicated (Interviewee 16; 3.2.). 
 
In the Amazon region, small municipalities, on top of the usual issues of poor administrative 
capability, as discussed in Chapter Four, have infrastructure problems related to the supply chain of 
medicines. Environmental characteristics add complexity to daily activities, as the interviewee 
described. So it is reasonable to think that municipalities in the Amazon region have more 
difficulties managing the provision of basic medicines than in Minas Gerais, for example, and 
would require more support from state and federal levels. As my interviews suggested, as well as 
these unfavourable geographic characteristics, municipalities in Amazonas do not have support 
from the state administration with regard to the development of pharmaceutical assistance. Support 
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 Amazonas state covers 1,570,745.68 km²; it is bigger than the UK, Spain and France together. 
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and training are amongst the responsibilities assigned to the state level. How things really happen 
in that region is well illustrated in the next quote, where a municipal health secretary from the 
Amazon region described in which circumstances his/her legal obligations regarding provision of 
medicines were unveiled and how the lack of management training was remedied: 
When I arrived in the municipality - I am a nurse - I really had no experience. I had to 
learn [what I should be doing] when I received an audit from the CGU. 
116
 After that I 
searched for what they observed. That was when I really knew how pharmaceutical 
assistance should be. Then I started to worry because we have no management training. 
The Secretaries of Health are chosen more for political indication, although in my case it 
was not so. So that’s how I started learning and then I had an audit course where I learned 
what we must do (….) I think the state [level] should play its role along with the 
municipalities. We never, ever received such technical assistance or training to manage the 
provision (Interviewee 16; 9.2). 
 
In Amazonas, it is clear that neither the federal nor the state level fulfilled the role of coordinating 
or technically supporting municipalities, to allow for the development of the skills needed to 
choose the appropriate medicines and the adequate quantities and all activities involved in the 
procurement, distribution, storage and dispensing of medicines. Instead, in the example above, the 
municipal health secretary took an audit course to learn how pharmaceutical assistance in the 
municipality should be. The CGU, which is not part of the health system, trained the municipal 
manager when in current regulations, the Ministry of Health and the state level should provide 
management training for municipal officials.
117
 From this example, it is clear that differences in 
terms of management capacity at both state and municipal levels have significant impacts on the 
provision of medicines. 
 
This lack of support certainly impacts the access to medicines and to health services. Infant 
mortality, which among other factors reflects the characteristics of health systems, in Minas Gerais 
and Amazonas follow the pattern of pharmaceutical assistance described by interviewees. 
Amazonas shows worse infant mortality rates when compared to Minas Gerais.
 118
 The economic 
level of development of each region determines the corresponding health development level which, 
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 CGU - Office of the Comptroller General 
117
 This lack of coordination in state and federal levels is discussed in Chapter Five. The assessment of failure 
in coordination is reinforced by the TCU report on the evaluation of SUS basic pharmacy conducted in ten 
states in 2009. 
118
 Minas state’s infant mortality rate in 2010 was 16.2 per 1,000 live births; while Amazonas showed 20.6. 
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in turn, seems to be linked to the level of pharmaceutical assistance in the region. My interviews 
suggested that decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance was not able to change these regional 
disparities in terms of access to basic medicines. 
 
6.4.5 Low management capability 
The changes introduced by decentralisation precipitated the need for municipalities to develop 
management capability. For instance, according to the current policy, the decision on what and how 
many doses of medicines to buy is a municipal task even when the bidding and payment are done at 
the state level.
119
 The municipality has to decide which medications are appropriate and the 
schedule of purchases. The NMP stipulated that these decisions require the elaboration of a 
pharmaceutical assistance plan made by a specially appointed committee. However, according to 
the TCU report on SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance, 56% of the 30 municipalities visited do 
not have a pharmaceutical assistance plan and 70% do not have pharmaceutical committee (TCU, 
2011). The lack of qualified human resources is one of the justifications of the municipalities for 
these failures. 
 
Corroborating TCU’s findings are the interviewees’ accounts that associated the lack of a 
coordinated training of SUS manpower with the difficulties in implementing pharmaceutical 
policy. Interviewees stated that workers should have a SUS career, as occurs with other areas of 
public service, such as juridical careers. They advocated that the Ministry of Health should lead 
changes in the health education field in order to provide SUS with qualified human resources, and 
especially for pharmaceutical assistance. The following extract from an interview with a municipal 
health secretary is a good example of the responses obtained about this aspect of human resources: 
We have two problems; one is the formation of professionals for SUS. We do not have a 
policy of human resources training. We do not have a SUS career as exists in other sectors 
such as the judicial branches, and this causes great difficulty for public policy. Ideally we 
should have a SUS career but we do not have, it would be ideal to advance in the training 
of more professionals for SUS (Interviewee 2; 17.1). 
 
Administrative problems are aggravated by this lack of human resources training focused on SUS 
needs. The mismatch between the goals set by the policy framework and qualification of human 
                                                          
119
 Municipalities, as discussed in Chapter Five, could opt out of complete decentralisation leaving to the 
state level the task of acquiring basic medicines. How this option of decentralisation works is explained in 
detail in Chapter Five. 
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resources available is clear in the statement that follows. The interviewee, an official of the 
Ministry of Health, is sceptical when commenting on the managerial capacity of municipalities to 
perform pharmaceutical assistance as required by national policy: 
Management is still our weak point, I think. When we think of the cycle of pharmaceutical 
assistance, even if you consider that the proposed cycle is a bit out of date, plan 
programming, acquisition and distribution, they are still a major challenge to 
municipalities. [We need to] have people trained to operate this cycle. So when we talk 
about qualifying access, promoting rational use, etc ... we still cannot resolve [the issue of 
human resources training], and do not have people trained to operate the cycle in many 
municipalities (Interviewee 19; 7.2). 
 
The same official is even more explicit about the degree of unpreparedness of the people who have 
responsibility for managing pharmaceutical assistance, regarding two specific regions of the 
country: 
We did not yet manage to solve this issue of having people trained to operate the cycle [of 
pharmaceutical assistance] in the municipalities. (...)I am frequently in contact with the 
situation in the Northern and Northeastern regions of the country. There, people, in most 
cases, are unaware of the process [of management of basic pharmaceutical assistance]. It 
is still shocking for us (Interviewee 19; 7.1). 
 
This account reinforces my argument that reality is still far from pharmaceutical assistance as set 
out in the legal framework. Poor administrative capability is a common criticism of SUS and other 
services in Brazil, and in other developing countries (Ferreira, 2004). In Brazil, although 
deficiencies in management are frequently used to hide other failures, and are part of the arguments 
in favour of privatisation, they are significant obstacles for the implementation of the 
pharmaceutical assistance policy, as my interviews suggested. 
 
6.4.6 Absence of tools and indicators for monitoring the implemented policies, and the 
alternatives to estimate access 
Another major flaw that constitutes an obstacle to progress in access to medicines is the monitoring 
and evaluation of pharmaceutical assistance. Six out of 20 interviewees pointed out that the 
absence of national databases with records on monitoring, evaluation and indicators hindered 
assessment of the performance of basic pharmaceutical assistance and made improvement difficult. 
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Before discussing interviewees’ accounts I shall give an overview of the monitoring situation 
within SUS. 
 
In 2010, as mentioned before, TCU conducted an audit to analyse the implementation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance by the three levels of the federation, evaluating the efficiency in resource 
management by state and municipal entities and the controls carried out by the Ministry of Health 
(TCU, 2011). The TCU report made it clear that the Ministry of Health does not monitor or 
evaluate basic pharmaceutical assistance. The auditors are categorical in stating that the Ministry of 
Health has no indicators to assess the performance of pharmaceutical assistance programmes. In 
fact, the audits of the boards of control
120
 represent the most comprehensive source of information 
on basic pharmaceutical assistance available today. The Ministry of Health has been required to 
submit performance indicators to assess the basic pharmaceutical assistance on at least three 
separate occasions between the years 2008 and 2010. However, to date these indicators have not 
yet been implemented. Also according to the TCU, even if those indicators had been proposed they 
could not have been calculated because states and municipalities do not send the required data to 
the Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance (DAF). Until 2007, DAF had a database with 
compulsory input, called Sifab, whose main function was financial control, enabling the monitoring 
of the resources used in basic pharmaceutical assistance.
 121
 According to DAF, Sifab was 
abandoned because it was inadequate to the needs of the managers of the three spheres. Hence, in 
2009, the Ministry launched HORUS, designed to assist the management of pharmaceutical care, 
replacing Sifab.
122
 The HORUS database would also provide information to evaluate the 
performance of the programme, such as medications dispensed, population served, unmet demand, 
origin of the prescription, and resources applied, among others. However, HORUS does not have 
mandatory data-feeding, so municipalities can choose whether or not to send the information to the 
system. Moreover, many municipalities already have their own systems, so the implementation of 
HORUS and its integration with the existing systems was jeopardised and will require effort and 
significant time, as illustrated in the following quote: 
We took two and a half years to get 170 health units, and are still begging for health 
secretariats to use the system [HORUS] ... So it's quite different [from the private sector]. 
The public [sector] feedback is very time consuming (Interviewee 19; 11.2). 
 
                                                          
120
 The national boards of control are TCU and CGU- Office of the Comptroller General. SUS also has an 
internal board of control, DENASUS - National Department of Audits of SUS. 
121
 Sifab was the Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance Resource Incentive Monitoring System. 
122
 HORUS is software to manage pharmaceutical assistance designed by the Ministry of Health which 
allows the control and distribution of medicines covered by SUS. 
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This interviewee, who worked in the implementation of HORUS, reveals how negotiation to 
convince municipalities to join the system is laborious and time consuming. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, decentralisation provided an opportunity for local solutions to be found; however, as 
stated by this interviewee, autonomy also brings slowness and lack of standards as reported in the 
case of the databanks. Yet, as regards the lack of assessment of pharmaceutical policies, the 
Ministry of Health commissioned two national surveys whose preliminary results will be available 
in December 2013. One is to assess the basic pharmacy and the other to evaluate the Popular 
Pharmacy Programme. The following quote illustrates how poor the data available on access 
currently are:  
You asked me what I would say to the Minister about access to basic medicines provided 
by pharmaceutical assistance in SUS. I would have nothing to say. (...) About SUS I can’t 
say anything. I do not have any data from SUS. The system HIPERDIA, I do not have much 
to tell you because it is managed by the co-ordination of hypertension and diabetes. (...). 
Anyway, like all SUS information systems it has its difficulties of input, but ultimately these 
are the data we have about SUS. The data are not robust and that's why nobody speaks of 
them [the data] (Interviewee 19; 11.2). 
 
Deficiencies in monitoring pharmaceutical assistance, as clearly pictured by this official, place the 
Ministry of Health in a vulnerable position. There are no data to inform decisions on what should 
be tackled to implement effective provision. The federal level should be able to monitor if patients 
are receiving the medicines they need. But interviewees and TCU audit data suggest that despite 
being crucial for management, the implementation of a national system to record and monitor the 
performance of pharmaceutical assistance is a complex task. 
 
The WHO presents a series of indicators of structure, process and outcomes to assist the monitoring 
and evaluation of drug policies (WHO, 1999). A comprehensive study on the situation of 
pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil using the indicators proposed by the WHO was carried out in 
2004 (Marin Jaramillo et al., 2005).
 123
 Regarding access, 74% of the drugs were available free of 
charge at public facilities. These data match the situation of public provision of basic medicines 
before the effective decentralisation of the area in 2004. That was the access level that 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance policy was supposed to improve. So far there are no 
national studies that show improvement in coverage, although interviewees stated that access has 
improved. 
                                                          
123
 According to the WHO these studies to evaluate the implementation of national medicines policies should 
be repeated every two years, but have been conducted just once in Brazil. 
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Although the importance and advantages of recording and monitoring the performance of 
implemented policies are well known, this is a neglected area in the basic pharmaceutical 
assistance field. Trying to circumvent this deficiency in monitoring, municipal and state secretaries 
gave new uses to the phenomenon of judicialisation of medicine supply and media news about 
shortage of medicines. Judicialisation is a clear sign that drug provision is not adequate to demand. 
Bearing this in mind, health secretaries use the decrease in the number of court cases demanding 
medicines as a proxy indicator of advances in the availability of medicines. Following the same 
line of reasoning, mass media news about the shortage of medicines is also used as an indirect 
indicator of access to medicine. If no news about the shortage of medicines is broadcast they 
assume that availability is satisfactory.  
 
My interviewees suggested that deficiencies in the systematic evaluation of policies led managers 
to use their own mechanisms to estimate how the programme or policies implemented are 
performing, using available sources: media coverage of the lack of availability of medicines in SUS 
facilities, and number of lawsuits of citizens demanding drugs. These innovative indicators of 
performance, whose intended use is to infer the availability of medicines in SUS health services, 
are indirect and based on the absence of a specific event. The assessment consisted of scrutinising 
the news about scarcity of drugs, and the number of court cases demanding drugs. The next two 
quotes are examples of how the interviewees used media sources as a means to infer that access to 
medicines is satisfactory: 
Today, with the [Paraná] consortium
124
 [of medicines] we do not have any more newspaper 
headlines, complaints on the radio, as we had ten years ago. It was very usual [to hear] 
people complaining about shortage of medicines for diabetes, hypertension, antibiotics, all 
medicines that are included in the list of basic Pharmaceutical Assistance (Interviewee 3; 
1.3). 
 
This account illustrates how the absence of mass media news about failures in availability is 
interpreted as an indicator of good performance. Court cases brought by patients against the State 
in an attempt to obtain prescribed drugs are another proxy indicator of access. 
 
                                                          
124
 The Paraná Consortium of Drugs is a successful experience in management of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance discussed in Chapter Four, section 4.5. 
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In the Brazilian pharmaceutical assistance context, lawsuits are a result of failure in provision.
125
 
Thus, the absence of, or reduction in the number of lawsuits to obtain drugs was used by 
interviewees as an indicator of improved access in the region. The next quote illustrates how the 
number of cases was used to assess the results of decentralisation:  
In Santa Catarina [state] the responsibility [for managing the provision of basic medicines] 
was distributed to each municipality and the fulfilment of this responsibility is monitored. 
This has given us spectacular results in terms of access. The level of judicialisation in 
relation to basic medicines is very low in the state (Interviewee 7; 9.1). 
 
The interviewee affirmed that decentralisation has brought ‘spectacular results’ and the evidence 
used to sustain this view was the decrease in the number of court cases, which it is called ‘level of 
judicialisation’. In the course of judicialisation, in addition to spending sufficient financial 
resources in a few cases to provide medicines for the entire population of the municipality, 
secretaries also had to buy medicines urgently or they could be arrested. Within this context, the 
decrease in court cases has important consequences for the municipality and can help to understand 
why the phenomenon is used as evidence of the progress made in availability of medicines, as 
noted by the interviewees. 
 
It is noteworthy that the decrease in actions that require medications reported by the interviewee 
from Santa Catarina (quoted above), refers to basic medicines and does not include the high-cost 
medications. So what municipal managers are saying is that judicialisation decreased because the 
availability of basic medicines has improved. Nevertheless, at the state and federal levels the 
number of cases is still increasing, as evidenced by the figures provided by the analysis of the 
Office of the Attorney-General (Advocacia Geral da União, 2011). According to my interviewees, 
state secretariats’ efforts were focused on provision of high-cost medications and responses to this 
rising trend in court cases. This assertion is corroborated by the TCU report, which implies that the 
efforts to respond to judicialisation demands prevented the state level from satisfactorily 
performing their role of Pharmaceutical Assistance Coordinator. In my view, the context in which 
the state level is focused in providing high-cost medications, and dealing with lawsuits, can help to 
explain why they did not oppose implementation of the Popular Pharmacy Programme. This 
programme, as I will discuss, bypasses the state level and could be regarded as weakening state 
power. The argument about how this programme entered the policy agenda and prospered will be 
explored in Chapter Seven. 
                                                          
125
 In some cases, medicines demanded in the court cases are not licensed to be marketed in the country or 
they are experimental drugs. So, in these cases it is not failure in provision. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises the main strengths of decentralised pharmaceutical assistance policy and 
outlines the barriers to improving access to medicines in primary care, according to the informants. 
Interviewees’ accounts are contextualised within the policy framework and compared with 
available data about access. 
 
Interviewees, in general, related decentralisation with the structuring of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance in municipalities, which resulted in increased access to basic medicines. However, 
besides this perceived positive impact of decentralisation, the provision of basic medicines has not 
yet reached universal coverage. Significant weaknesses and important barriers, as exposed by 
interviewees in this research, are preventing further development of the pharmaceutical assistance 
field.  
 
Overall, this research has shown that interviewees associated decentralisation with a better level of 
access to basic medicines in certain regions of the country. Basic pharmaceutical assistance was 
organised in municipalities and states as a result of the decentralisation process, which distributed 
power and responsibilities. Decentralisation required the definition of roles and responsibilities for 
municipal, state and federal levels regarding the provision of medicines. To implement these new 
roles, municipalities had to create physical and administrative structures as well as planning 
activities related to the supply of medicines. These actions resulted, according to interviewees, in 
improvements in the availability of medicines.  
 
However, as in primary care, important regional differences in public provision of basic medicines 
are observed. In some states and municipalities, important advances have been achieved, while in 
other regions the accounts showed that the situation is still very precarious. Regions with better 
access to medicines are the same ones that have better primary care coverage, which is expected, 
since pharmaceutical assistance and primary care are interdependent. The contrasting examples of 
Minas Gerais and Amazonas suggest that support provided by the state level to municipalities plays 
an important role in determining whether better results in basic pharmaceutical assistance will be 
achieved.  
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In general, all interviewees reported an improvement in access to medicines, but a more detailed 
analysis showed that major failures still occur. The possibilities presented by decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance have not been translated into effective action, and the expected changes 
in terms of improvement in access to medicines have not materialised evenly across the country. 
Important barriers are delaying progress in the field. The problems are interrelated and 
consequently have mutual impacts. The main problems pointed out are: pharmaceutical care 
fragmentation; lack of integration between care and provision of medicines; insufficient financial 
resources; low management capability; and absence of tools and indicators to monitor programmes.  
 
There is general agreement on the need to implement indicators and a monitoring system to 
evaluate pharmaceutical assistance. Currently there are no data to confirm the perception of the 
interviewees that access has improved over the last decade. In the absence of mechanisms and tools 
for monitoring access, health secretaries use the number of lawsuits to estimate if drug supply is 
satisfactory. A decrease in the number of court cases is associated with better provision of 
medicines. They attributed a new meaning to the judicialisation phenomenon. 
 
As with the creation of SUS, the legal framework of pharmaceutical assistance is comprehensive 
and far-reaching, but it was not accompanied by the corresponding actions needed. In theory 
everything is provided, but in practice things are quite different. My findings indicate that the 
operational capacity of municipalities to manage basic pharmaceutical assistance is still inadequate 
to enable the universal coverage to basic medicines intended by SUS. There is still a large gap 
between the SUS legislation framework on pharmaceutical assistance and what is actually being 
delivered by states and municipalities. Achieving universal access to medicines will depend on the 
accomplishment of various steps, ranging from the manufacture of medicines to dispensing them to 
patients. 
 
Within the accounts of my interviewees it was sometimes difficult to differentiate between 
statements pertaining to decentralised services being actually delivered by the municipalities from 
those not implemented but that were mandatory. When they contrasted what they should (or would 
like to) do with what was really happening, there was no clear line in their accounts separating 
intention from action. I could not explore if they mixed future goals with services already delivered 
intentionally in their speech, or whether it was just complicated for them to explain how policy-
making happened. As Prainsack and Wahlberg  argue, for policy-makers “a lot rides on being 
perceived as formulating rational and coherent policies”. In my work, how some interviewees 
handled the issue of monitoring the access and demands for medicines is coherent with the authors’ 
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view of the effort of policy-makers. As I discussed, inconsistency in monitoring the access to 
medicines was pointed out as a significant failure in pharmaceutical assistance. In some accounts, 
however, my interviewees suggested that this was no longer a problem. They suggested that the 
software to support the national system of management created by the Ministry of Health, which 
included monitoring access, had solved the problem. Nevertheless, as I found out later, the 
implementation was limited to few localities. Thus, potentially, it could solve the problem if 
implemented, but this difference between intention and action was not clear in their accounts. What 
I could observe, is the unfortunate gap between what is provided in the legal framework and what 
has been delivered, a gap evidenced by the poor performance of basic pharmaceutical assistance as 
reported by the Court of Accounts of the Union (TCU). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE POPULAR PHARMACY PROGRAMME: AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF 
PROVIDING ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
7.1 Introduction 
In 2003 Brazil went through an important political transition with the election of the first Workers’ 
Party president. The left-wing candidate Lula was elected under the banner of fighting inequalities 
and poverty, opposing the neoliberal policies of former president Cardoso (Castro and Valladao De 
Carvalho, 2003). In his first term, however, to a certain extent Lula’s administration remained 
connected to the neoliberal agenda. The Brazilian economist Fagnani (2011) argues that social 
policies under Lula (2003-2005) took place against the backdrop of tension between the “Minimum 
State” and the “Welfare State” paradigms. The first term (2003-2006), according to Fagnani, was 
marked by coexistence within the core of the federal government, of sectors defending universal 
rights and those advocating the "Minimum State". Eventually, however, the neoliberal camp lost 
strength, as a consequence of the global financial crisis from 2008 onwards. 
 
This context of political transition helps in understanding why the Popular Pharmacy Programme 
(FP programme, hereafter), controlled by the Ministry of Health, was set up at the same time as 
decentralising the provision of medicines. In this initial period of Lula’s administration it seems 
that to accommodate opposite paradigms, there was an attempt to improve universal access 
(decentralising the basic pharmaceutical assistance), but also to increase the coverage by the co-
payment (with the FP programme). If we took this reasoning to the extreme, we could even identify 
a contradiction within the FP initiative: medicines are not totally free, but the prices charged are 
lower than those in private pharmacies because FP receives subsidies from the federal government. 
In sum, the programme is neither providing universal access in accordance to the “Welfare State” 
nor carries features of the typical “Minimum State”. Although municipalities were already 
responsible for distributing basic medicines to the population, the Federal government wanted to 
link the new administration with a programme to improve the availability of medicines. The FP 
programme, which is aligned with other social policies created by the federal government at the 
beginning of its term, has become a trademark of Lula’s government. 
 
The FP Programme, nevertheless, encapsulates the limits of recentralisation because subnational 
actors had no voice in the policy designing which was created by the federal government (Aurea et 
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al., 2010; Pinto, 2008). Moreover, although decentralised programmes to provide medicines under 
the auspices of the municipalities continued, within the FP programme the federal government took 
responsibility for the provision of essential drugs. The FP programme emerged within the context 
of decentralisation that has been in place as a pillar of SUS since the 1988 Constitution. The FP 
programme might thus be regarded as challenging the paradigm of decentralisation inherent in the 
Brazilian National Health Service (SUS) and indicates a new approach in the provision of 
medicines.  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the implementation of the FP Programme, how it relates to the larger 
framework of pharmaceutical assistance, its impact on the provision of basic medicines, and its 
effects on the decentralisation process. The chapter is organised in six sections. The first gives an 
overview of the central features of the programme, how it was created, and its rationale. The 
subsequent section discusses the effects of FP implementation and how the programme contributed 
to solving existing issues in the provision of medicines. The criticism levelled at the programme 
and the consequences of decentralised provision are explored in the following section. How the 
strategy adopted to implement the FP helped to avoid the debate about recentralisation is discussed 
in the section that follows. The chapter closes with the main conclusions. 
 
 
7.2 Why and how was the FP created? How does it work? 
The federal government’s justification for recentralising control over the distribution of basic 
medicines relies on two main factors. The first was the frequent shortage of medicines in SUS 
pharmacies, which undermined the reliability of the public supply of medicines. The second factor 
was related to socioeconomic factors. In Brazil, a significant portion of the metropolitan 
population
126
 had a private health plan but could not afford to buy medicines. This group was not 
among the primary users of SUS because their private health plans allowed them to use private 
clinics, hospitals and physicians. The Ministry of Health implemented the FP programme to 
improve access to and reduce costs of medicines for this group of non-SUS patients. 
 
One could ask how a centralised programme, designed and controlled by the federal government 
such as the FP, emerged to take a central role in the provision of medicines, a task that was among 
those of the decentralised system. The interview data that I collected indicate that it was the 
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 This group includes citizens with household budget ranging from 4 to 10 minimum wages. This group 
includes about 14% of Brazilian families (IBGE-Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2011) 
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President of the Republic himself who decided to create the programme. In fact, the political power 
of President Lula was decisive in setting up the FP. In tune with the President’s view, the Minister 
of Health and the officials involved with pharmaceutical assistance
127
 were also committed to 
implementing the programme. This commitment and influence were important if we consider the 
FP’s innovative strategy to improve the availability of medicines. The FP strategy is based on two 
controversial features: First, users’ co-payment, and second, centralised management. Before we 
discuss these features in more detail, let me give a more systematic overview of the programme. 
 
7.2.1 Features of the programme 
The FP programme was established in 2004 by the federal government to dispense medicine to 
treat prevalent diseases in the country (Ministerio da Saude, 2005b) Patients had to pay 10% of the 
costs out of pockets, and the government subsidised up to 90%. This is the only Brazilian health 
programme that involves users’ co-payment. The rationales presented by the Ministry of Health to 
introduce co-payment were the need to expand access to medicines considering that a significant 
portion of the population used private health services and bought medicines on the private market. 
The Ministry of Health’s justification, in the bill proposing the co-payment, was that it could 
reduce the impact of drug expenditures in the household budget and contribute to the expansion of 
the access to the treatments. The federal executive argued that these actions would benefit patients 
that otherwise would abandon treatments because they could not afford buying medicines. This 
adherence to the treatments due to subsidised drug prices provided by the FP, in turn, would result 
in less cost in health treatments and consequently saves on public resources.
128
 
 
The FP has a public and a private arm. The public arm was implemented in 2004, and has public 
pharmacy facilities (called ‘public owned’ pharmacies or simply ‘owned’) 129 set up and managed 
by Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ – Fundação Oswaldo Cruz) and the Ministry of Health130 
                                                          
127
 Pharmaceutical assistance is a broad term created in Brazil to designate health care activities involving 
medicines. According to Marin et al.(2003), the definition of pharmaceutical assistance involves 
comprehensive, multiprofessional and intersectoral activities connected to the management of services 
related to medicines in its various dimensions, with emphasis on the relationship with the patient, the 
community and health promotion. In this sense, the public delivery of medicines by SUS and its management 
is also part of pharmaceutical assistance. 
128
 These arguments are part of the justification of the bill 5235/2005, which introduced the co-payment, 
proposed by the Ministry of Health to the Congress. This document is available at: 
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=306211&filename=Tramitacao-
PL+5235/2005 [last accessed on 25/07/2013] 
129
 In this work I use ‘owned’ network and ‘owned’ pharmacies (meaning owned by the federal government) 
to designate those pharmacies built in municipalities exclusively for the FP programme. Those pharmacies 
are managed by FIOCRUZ. 
130
 FIOCRUZ- Oswaldo Cruz Foundation is a federal foundation that reports to the Ministry of Health. 
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in partnership with states and municipalities. The private arm, which began in 2006, incorporated 
accredited community (private) pharmacies. At present, FP has public and private arms working 
simultaneously. Alongside the implementation of the programme important changes were 
introduced. The positive results in terms of access and rapid expansion are among the factors that 
have driven those changes. In order to facilitate the understanding of the modifications introduced I 
will separate the process of the implementation of the FP into three stages, as explained below. 
 
7.2.2 The implementation stages 
The first stage commenced in 2004 with public pharmacies (the ‘owned’ network) managed by the 
Ministry of Health/FIOCRUZ. The primary goal of the FP was to make medicines available, at 
affordable prices, to private health plan users. These public pharmacies were installed in central 
areas of state capitals and municipalities with at least 100,000 inhabitants. These facilities were 
exclusively built or refurbished to comply with standards set by FIOCRUZ. Currently, 557 
pharmacies participate in the ‘owned’ network, which covers 441 municipalities around the 
country. The partnership with municipal health secretariats was restricted to the decision of where 
the pharmacy should be installed within the territory. The management of all other activities, such 
as the purchase of medicines, funding, logistics, distribution, and remuneration of staff, is 
centralised and controlled at the federal level. Unlike SUS basic pharmacies, these new units 
received exclusive federal financial support for their construction and furnishing. Additionally, 
each ‘owned’ FP facility is entitled to a monthly sum to pay staff and maintenance. These financial 
aspects mark important differences between the FP public arm and SUS basic pharmacies. In short, 
the federal government financed the construction and maintenance of a network of standardised 
pharmacies to be used exclusively by the centralised programme. 
 
The second stage began in 2006 when the programme was extended to the community pharmacies 
network. This expansion was called Aqui Tem Farmácia Popular (‘there is a popular pharmacy 
here’). At this stage existing community pharmacies entered into a contract with the Ministry of 
Health. Contract clauses are set down in the legislation and the maximum value paid for each drug 
is set by the federal government. This second stage of the programme was implemented rapidly, 
and participating community pharmacies grew from 2,955 in 2006 to 20,225 in 2011. At present, 
3,359 municipalities (out of 5,565) have community pharmacies that are part of the FP. These 
figures contrast with just 441 municipalities that have FP public (‘owned’) pharmacies. Since 2009, 
the Ministry of Health seems to have lost interest in the public arm of the programme, considering 
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that only 27 new ‘owned’ pharmacies have been introduced in three years, whereas accredited 
community pharmacies
131
 almost doubled in the same period, as shown in figure 7.1.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Growth in the number of pharmacies in the Popular Pharmacy Programme in Brazil in 
total  
Source: Produced by the author according to data available from Sala de situação Ministerio da Saúde 
(Situation Room of the Ministry of Health) available at http://189.28.128.178/sage/ 
 
Figure 7.1 compares the number of ‘owned’ and accredited pharmacies, from the beginning of the 
FP programme in 2004 until 2011. The figure shows that from 2006 to 2011 the percentage change 
observed in pharmacy facilities corresponds to 115% in the public arm (represented by the ‘owned’ 
pharmacies) against 584% observed in community pharmacies, which are the private arm of the 
programme. The growth of the private arm overtook the programme and now citizens usually 
associate the FP programme with the private sector. This means that the community pharmacies, 
i.e. the private sector, are the place where SUS and non-SUS patients go to receive medicines. 
 
Grounded in the accounts of my interviewees, in my opinion, the slow pace of implementation in 
stage one, evidenced by the low number of ‘owned’ pharmacies installed in the first and second 
year, motivated the partnership with the private sector that was to make the programme take off. In 
                                                          
131
 In my work I am using private pharmacies and community pharmacies as synonyms. In fact, in Brazil the 
term private pharmacy is more used. Accredited pharmacies or participating pharmacies refer to pharmacies 
that entered into a contract with the Ministry of Health. 
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fact, the resources devoted to the programme grew from about £8 million, in 2006, to £200 million 
in 2009 (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao, 2010)
132
.  
 
In 2011, the government implemented the third stage with the initiative Saude Não Tem Preço
133
. 
This stage started the distribution, free of charge, of drugs to treat diabetes and hypertension in 
‘owned’ and community pharmacies. In addition to these free medicines134, FP is still dispensing 
drugs in the co-payment scheme for the treatment of cholesterol, osteoporosis, Parkinson's disease, 
glaucoma, rhinitis and dyslipidemia, as well as providing contraceptives and geriatric diapers. 
Currently, the FP programme offers 25 items, of which 14 are distributed free of charge and the 
other nine being sold with a discount of up to 90%. 
 
7.2.3 The rapid expansion of the FP programme 
The partnership with the private sector was a turning point in the programme’s implementation. 
The capillarity of the community pharmacy network allowed non-SUS patients access to 
medicines, for whom the programme was originally designed, but also resulted in access for SUS 
patients. 
 
An important aspect that helps us to understand the accelerated development of the FP was the 
failure in the distribution of medicines by SUS pharmacies. The availability of basic medicines in 
SUS pharmacies did not meet the population’s needs. In other words, SUS has historically been 
unable to provide sufficient medicines. This lack of consistency caused a shortfall in access, which 
in turn gave the FP room to develop. In the quote that follows, a Ministry of Health official 
explains that SUS did not manage to distribute medicines consistently, whereas the FP did:  
Taking into consideration everything I already told you about Basic Pharmaceutical 
Assistance, and that SUS is still in a stage of consolidation, we have to admit that we could 
not organise our Farmácia Basica [SUS] to ensure the same level of access that the FP 
achieved (Interview 19; 8.2). 
 
                                                          
132
 Original figures in Brazilian Reais R$34724 million (2006) and R$562.42 million (2009), respectively. I 
used a £/R$ 4.18 and 2.83 conversion rate, respectively. Rates obtained at www.xe.com [accessed on 
18/04/2011] 
133
 ‘Health is Priceless’. The expression alludes to the introduction of free medicine provision. 
134
 Since 2012, FP has also distributed medicines to treat asthma, free of charge. 
 188 
 
To this interviewee, inefficiency in the public provision of medicines is a consequence of the 
incomplete implementation of SUS, which led to a lack of management capability. The interviewee 
compares the access offered by the Farmácia Básica
135
 and the FP and concludes that SUS did not 
make medicines available to patients in the necessary quantity or at the right time, whereas the FP 
did. However, it is worth noting that this opinion comes from a person who represents the federal 
level and therefore was likely to take the view that the federal-run FP solved the access problem 
that the decentralised SUS could not address successfully. 
 
Medicine to control diabetes and hypertension both play an essential role in the nation’s health and 
are a good example to illustrate the FP’s rapid expansion and importance. In 2011, when 
distribution free of charge started, from January to November, 6.973 million patients with diabetes 
and hypertension received their prescribed medicines from the FP (Pereira, 2011)In the next quote, 
the same interviewee continues to build up the justification for FP growth based on the inefficiency 
of the SUS in providing these drugs: 
SUS could not give us the answer [to the access problem] and ensure qualified access to 
medicines for hypertension and diabetes. If SUS had given the answer, the FP would not 
show this rapid expansion in the number of patients assisted in a few months (Interview 19; 
10.1). 
 
According to the interviewee, if SUS had distributed these drugs adequately, then the FP would not 
have grown as fast as it did. The rise in number of patients assisted by the FP is associated with the 
shortage experienced at the SUS. This account, however, should again be viewed with caution, 
considering that it comes from a Ministry of Health official, who would not be unbiased in 
justifying the need for the implementation of the FP. Moreover, another factor not considered by 
the interviewee, but one which influences this equation, is the high number of community 
pharmacies in the country. Certainly, the size of the network affects the number of patients reached. 
Hence, just the availability of drugs could not account for the rapid expansion of the programme. 
Accreditation of community pharmacies grew and spread throughout the country without any kind 
of federal guideline regarding geographical location until reaching about 20,000 pharmacies 
representing 24%
136
 of all private pharmacies in the country in 2010.  
 
                                                          
135
 Farmácia Básica, as discussed in previous chapters, is the SUS decentralised programme for provision of 
basic medicines. 
136
 According to the audit committee of the CFF, the Federal Chartered Board of Pharmacy, there were 
82,204 community pharmacies in 2010. 
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Another factor that helps to explain the development of the FP is related to the financial funds 
invested. The budget allocated to SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance compared to the FP 
programme budget shows that from 2011, when distribution of free diabetes and hypertension 
medicines started, FP has received resources comparable to those allocated to the entire SUS basic 
pharmaceutical assistance. In 2013, the budget was much higher for FP than for the whole of SUS’s 
basic pharmaceutical assistance, as shown in Figure 7.2 below. It is worth noting that FP distributes 
only 25 items to 3,353 out of 5,565 municipalities, while SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance 
programme is responsible for providing about 120 items to all municipalities in the country. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Budget allocated to SUS Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance compared to Popular Pharmacy 
Programme 
Source: author, according to data presented in the Farmácia Popular-Public Hearing at Câmara dos 
Deputados/Comissão de Seguridade Social e Família, Brasília in October, 2012 
 
The figure illustrates the trend described both by my interviewees and by Ministry of Health efforts 
and resources allocated. The FP was prioritised and received major investments, allowing its rapid 
expansion throughout the country. From 2011 to 2013, the SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance 
budget grew only 17% compared with an increase of 110% in the FP budget in the same period, 
evidencing federal government commitment to the programme. These figures strongly suggest that 
the centralised FP programme was the strategy chosen by the federal level to improve access to 
basic medicines. Moreover, judging by the large financial investment put in the programme it is 
reasonable to assume that the federal government was expecting positive results, and these did in 
fact occur soon afterwards. These positive results in terms of patients’ usage and medicines 
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delivered justify the increase in investments, which in turn helped to further boost FP 
implementation. 
 
In the section that follows I will explore the contribution of the FP programme to the solution of 
SUS’ problems in the provision of basic medicines. 
 
 
7.3 How did the FP approach persistent problems and barriers involving public 
pharmaceutical assistance?  
My analysis so far begs the question why this programme has been successfully implemented while 
public provision of medicines in SUS facilities still remains inadequate. I consider that the barriers 
to the advancement of SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance discussed in Chapter Six, section 6.4, 
are an important part of the explanation. Those barriers are related, mostly, to insufficient funds, 
low management capability, regional differences, and lack of planning and monitoring. The other 
component of this explanation is related to the federative arrangement, and the subnational 
autonomy
137
 which directly affects SUS management, as discussed in Chapter Five. Due to the 
autonomy given to states and municipalities by the Brazilian Constitution, the implementation of 
policies and programmes is preceded by negotiations and agreements between the three levels of 
the federation: union, states and municipalities. In the interviews, this process was described by 
Ministry of Health officials as being laborious and time consuming. In my view, these requirements 
of negotiation and agreement have helped encourage the federal authorities to search for an 
alternative to such a process. 
 
Another interesting question in this context is why the federal government decided to focus its 
efforts on the private arm of the programme, instead of the public arm. I found indications in the 
interviewees’ accounts that the federal level saw in its private partners an opportunity to achieve 
the distribution of basic drugs efficiently and at the same time to avoid the tiers of laborious 
negotiation with SUS. 
 
Some of the obstacles to the full development of SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance, mainly 
regarding access to essential medicines, are successfully overcome with the FP. The main barriers 
                                                          
137
 Autonomy of state and municipalities include a degree of administrative, financial and political power for 
the exercise of the local or regional government and administration. State’s legislative power is limited to 
regional issues whereas municipalities can only legislate on local issues. 
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pointed out by interviewees and corroborated by literature relate to insufficient financial resources, 
infrastructure, and human resources. Throughout the implementation of the FP the federal 
government has been working on each of these obstacles. The partnership with the private sector 
was the turning point in the implementation of the FP. The community pharmacies network 
contracted by the FP provided at a stroke the infrastructure, the human resources, and the 
management capabilities necessary. According to the Ministry of Health, to have built and 
furnished the 20,000 FP accredited pharmacies (which were already up and running) would have 
required investment of about R$ 1.8 billion (Ministério da Saúde, 2012). 
 
Another only partially solved problem was the lack of monitoring of indicators of access to 
medicine, an issue pointed out by interviewees as an obstacle to the development of pharmaceutical 
assistance. Due to the very nature of the commercial relations in the private sector and the contract 
signed with the Ministry of Health, FP facilities keep records of the number of patients assisted, 
and the medication and dose dispensed. They need to keep track of this information in order to 
receive payment for the service. Contrasting with SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance, FP is the 
only drug provision programme that keeps all these records. Currently, these records represent the 
only source of systematic data on access to essential medicines available in Brazil. 
 
Further to government savings due to the infrastructure brought in by the private partner, federal 
government officials also noted management benefits arising from the FP. To rebut criticism, these 
officials often mention some features, inherent to the private sector, which make the FP programme 
advantageous when compared to SUS pharmaceutical assistance. Community pharmacies have 
convenient opening times, an adequate number of trained employees, infrastructure and 
management capability; they keep a comprehensive stock of medicines, and use a wholesale 
service to fill prescriptions promptly. According to Ministry of Health officials, all these elements 
were incorporated into the federal programme without any additional cost. The capillarity of the 
private network that is spread in almost all regions of the country was another characteristic that 
brought important benefits to the programme. In the next quote a state health secretary talks about 
the advantages of the territorial coverage of the private pharmacy network. In this account the 
infrastructure provided by the private partner, the presence of a pharmacist in each facility, and the 
logistics of supply are all counted as advantageous when compared to SUS: 
The initiative reaches small and large municipalities, from capital cities to small 
municipalities and districts. The programme made the access easy and this is an 
improvement because, as I already said, [infra]structure is the problem. It is complicated 
for municipalities to have pharmacies in each of their healthcare facilities, and even more 
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complicated is to have a pharmacist in each of these pharmacies to dispense the drugs. The 
distribution of these drugs is much easier in the network of accredited pharmacies (…). 
The [community pharmacies] network already has all the structure of distribution and the 
logistics (Interview 2; 12.1). 
 
This account summarises the main features of community pharmacies that made FP advantageous 
when compared to SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance. Commercial networks are more efficient 
and are presented as a good way to improve access. The interviewee found in the private partner 
the solutions to persistent problems faced by SUS in attempts to improve the provision of 
medicines.  
 
Another likely explanation for this preference relates to the rapid response of private partners to 
federal government demands. In the quote that follows, this Ministry of Health official reviews 
characteristics of the private sector that make it advantageous compared to SUS. According to the 
interviewee, availability of medicines has been solved by the FP programme. The success of the 
initiative, however, unveiled a new challenge, as the respondent explains: 
The problem now is no longer the availability of drugs, the problem now is to provide 
qualified access and pharmaceutical assistance. We need to know if hypertensive patients 
and diabetics who are receiving medications in the FP are being monitored and having the 
necessary health care. The community pharmacy does not monitor treatment. In the case of 
the SUS basic pharmacy, only a few municipalities, who are more structured, offer this 
service. We'll have to make a decision here, and qualify such access in private pharmacies. 
And I think it's easier to qualify access in private pharmacies. Yes it is easier. If the 
government asks [the private sector] to accredit the pharmacy [to the FP programme] this 
pharmaceutical service must be done, so the private sector will do it. At SUS, we'll enter a 
series of negotiations and agreements which we could not solve in one, two or three 
months. This will take a lot longer than that (Interview 19; 8.4). 
 
The interest in and satisfaction with the private sector’s performance are apparent in the quote 
above. The interviewee remarks that as drug availability had already been solved the programme’s 
next step should be the improvement of pharmaceutical care.
138
 According to him, this step would 
also be easily achieved if the government invested in the private partner instead of in the SUS. 
                                                          
138
 According to Hepler and Strand (1990:539) the definition of pharmaceutical care is “the responsible 
provision of drug therapy for the purpose of achieving definite outcomes which improve a patient’s quality of 
life.” 
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Pharmaceutical care entails having a pharmacist to provide information and advice to help the 
patients to use medicines safely and efficiently. The justification for using a community network to 
improve pharmaceutical care instead of SUS is that in the public service there is the requirement of 
successive negotiations in various forums before the changes proposed can be implemented. Thus 
this process within the SUS is bound to take longer than in the private sector. Considering the 
potential political dividends from the FP and the restricted time within a presidential term, I would 
argue that the government took the faster alternative.  
 
In line with this reasoning, I would add that within SUS forums any new proposal has to be 
approved by consensus, and the subnational actors can propose modifications and amendments that 
could result in changes to the policy proposed. In contrast, the private partners have a contract and 
consequently they will do what the federal government asks them to do in order to be paid. In this 
way a standard policy that fits within the federal government’s agenda can be implemented 
throughout the country. 
 
In short, use of the existing infrastructure and its agile response to government’s demands provided 
by the private partners has been instrumental in shaping the programme. Both Ministry of Health 
officials and health secretaries praised the positive results of the programme in terms of availability 
of medicines. Remarkably, the health secretaries have barely reacted to the fact that a programme 
to distribute basic medicines controlled by the federal government is advancing and competing for 
SUS patients. I would have expected a more critical view, considering the top-down policy-making 
that is characteristic of the FP programme, and the limited participation of the health secretariats in 
the decision-making. In my view, based on my interviewees’ accounts, a likely explanation is that 
the municipal and state health regarded the FP as a solution to some of their problems. Secretariats 
are under constant pressure to deliver medicines and more than often do not have these drugs in 
stock. The FP brought concrete benefits to local government, which weakened opposition to the 
programme. 
 
From the private sector’s perspective, on top of the economic advantages related to the larger 
clientele brought to community pharmacies, the partnership with the federal government is also 
valued because it is similar to other well established models that provide medicines around the 
world. The president of ABRAFARMA, the Brazilian Association of Pharmacies Network, which 
represents 57,000 community (private) pharmacies, argues that the partnership with the federal 
government is the future of pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil (Longaresi, 2012) As he argues, “It 
is the way it works all around the world, sale of subsidised medicines, with refund from the 
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government.” In fact, FP distribution of drugs has similarities with other countries, such as NHS 
provision of medicines through community pharmacies in the UK. 
 
Having discussed the development of the FP programme and how it compares with SUS provision 
of medicines, in the next section I will consider what has changed for the users. 
 
 
7.4 Citizens’ uptake and the replacement of SUS pharmacies in the provision of basic 
medicines 
Since 2006, the FP programme has assisted 19 million people. The community pharmacies network 
performed 34 million dispensations in 2011 (Ministério da Saúde, 2012)Of the 17.5 million people 
served by the programme from 2011 to January 2013, 13.6 million received free medication for 
hypertension and diabetes
139
. During this period, the number of diabetic and hypertensive patients 
enrolled in the programme grew 457%: from 853,000 in January 2011 to 4.7 million in January 
2013. Considering the increasing number of patients whose medicines are dispensed via the FP, it 
is reasonable to infer that SUS patients are migrating to the FP. In fact, Santos-Pinto et al. (2011) 
showed that 46% of FP users came from SUS in 2009, arguing that the frequent shortage of 
medicines in SUS pharmacies explains this migration of SUS patients to the FP.  
 
In addition to historical failures in public provision of medicines, another three interrelated 
circumstances could help to understand this migration. Firstly, FP combines characteristics such as 
the location, convenient opening hours, and continuous availability of drugs that seem to attract and 
satisfy patients. The advantages of FP location compared to SUS facilities and the implications for 
users’ transport expenses are evidenced by the comments of a municipal health secretary, as 
follows: 
He [sic; the patient] searches [for medicines] in the Popular Pharmacy where they are 
highly subsidised and therefore more accessible. Often he would spend more money on 
transportation to get to a basic health care unit than he spends going to the Popular 
Pharmacy, which is strategically located (Interview 1; 3.3). 
 
                                                          
139
 The number of patients that had drugs dispensed by the FP and the proportion that had received drugs free 
of charge is provided in the Federal Government website. Available at: 
http://www.brasil.gov.br/noticias/arquivos/2013/02/15/gratuidade-de-medicamentos-beneficia-14-milhoes-
de-pessoas/print [last accessed in 25/07/2013] 
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The respondent has shown that the location of the FP facilities plays an important role in attracting 
patients. The FP is “strategically located” because there are pharmacies in places where many 
people circulate, often on their way to work every day, usually in the high street or near train, 
underground and bus stations, for example. Moreover, the comparison between SUS facilities and 
community pharmacies highlights the very divergent nature of the public and the private sector. 
The former is focused on (public) health whereas the latter is commercially driven. Commercial 
activity of the private network causes the operation to be adapted to the consumers’ needs, resulting 
in convenient opening hours, as illustrated in the next quote: 
Here the patient has two options: either he [sic] goes to SUS and receives the medication 
free of charge or if he is hypertensive or diabetic he can seek the popular pharmacy 
network and also get free access to these drugs. This helps because the popular pharmacy 
often works until 19h, and [its location] also [helps to] prevent extra transportation 
expenses. If you have a prescription you will have access to the medication at the Popular 
Pharmacy. I think it was a big advance and this initiative should advance even more 
(Interview 2, 6.3). 
 
According to the interviewee, the opening hours and location of private pharmacies were important 
in implementing the programme. This assessment is supported by Santos-Pinto et al. (2011), who 
noted the better location of the FP compared with the basic health units and the longer waiting time 
for obtaining medicines in SUS, which contrast with consistent availability of medicines in FP. 
These factors are likely to influence patients’ choice. 
 
The second aspect that helps to explain patients’ migration from SUS to the FP pharmacies is 
related to preferences and actions of the municipalities. Some municipal health secretaries seem to 
encourage SUS patients to use the FP facilities. These health secretaries see the FP as a reliable 
source of medicines and they prefer, and even advise, patients to seek medicines at the FP. As a 
consequence of the distribution of medicines by the FP, those municipalities started reducing the 
amount of medicines purchased so they rely on the FP when their stocks decrease or finish. This is 
well illustrated in the next quote by a municipal health secretary: 
So when the FP was implemented it took over acquisition and distribution of drugs that 
were part of our regular purchase. FP is a very successful experience, because it works 
continuously and medicine shortage is very rare. Indeed for me it was a relief because I 
reduced the purchase of these items in the municipality. Since FP is freely accessible to 
any citizen I do not need to have much stock [of medicines] in the warehouse. I don’t need 
to be concerned in acquiring drugs for hypertension and diabetes. That makes a big 
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difference for me because I do not need to take the resources of the municipal 
pharmaceutical assistance and use them in drugs that the FP distributes, I don’t have to do 
that. So it decreases my expenses (Interview 11; 7.2). 
 
In practice, this municipal health secretary has integrated the FP distribution of medicines into the 
municipal provision of medicines. In fact, the municipal health secretary in the extract above makes 
it clear that distribution of medicines by the FP was a relief for the municipality, which has come to 
rely on the programme to provide diabetes and hypertension medicines for SUS patients. Trust in 
the programme has led the municipality to decrease its stocks of drugs and to refer these patients to 
the FP pharmacies. By doing so, municipalities are, in practice, devolving control of the provision 
of medicines. It is important to highlight that although the FP changed the way medicines are 
accessed, the legal framework remains the same. This means that municipalities continue to receive 
financial funds and have responsibilities to provide basic medicines. However, it is reasonable to 
suppose that municipal provision of basic medicines will lose importance as a result of relying on 
the FP to provide medicines to the SUS patients and the consequent migration of these patients. In 
my view, the fact that municipal health secretaries are referring patients to FP has contributed to 
the increasing importance of the programme as well as dependence on the private sector. 
 
The third factor that helps to understand patients’ motivations for migration is related to the 
perception that the community pharmacies provide better quality and using them is not associated 
with being a low-income user. Lima (2009) studied the paths taken by patients seeking medicines 
in SUS facilities in Manaus. The patients interviewed by this researcher reported indifference from 
civil servants and long waiting times to receive information or to obtain the prescribed medicine. 
The journey is long, circuitous and humiliating, according to patients’ accounts. They feel 
humiliated because, although they are entitled to receive the drug, they are forced to long journeys 
in the search of these drugs, which are not available in SUS health services. Lima (2009) argues 
that interviewees associate their difficulties in obtaining medicines with the fact that they are poor. 
That work revealed the patients’ perception that only poor people use SUS and, because they 
cannot afford to pay for a health plan or the prescribed medicines, they have no other choice but to 
be submitted to this demeaning situation. Taking into account the users’ perception of SUS services 
mainly being used by low-income clients, it is reasonable to infer that FP community pharmacies 
will attract these SUS users, who would prefer not to be seen as poor or low-income patients. 
President Lula’s speech illustrates very well the perception that using SUS is linked to being poor, 
and also helps to understand why FP attracts SUS patients. In the first years of the FP programme 
President Lula stated: 
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[If a] man or woman goes to a pharmacy accredited to the Popular 
Pharmacy [programme] nobody will ask [them] how much they earn for 
salary; no one will ask their social origin. If it is a Popular Pharmacy, 
they will [simply] buy the medicine for hypertension and diabetes there.
140
 
 
In his speech President Lula associates the Popular Pharmacy with a place where both SUS and 
non-SUS patients go to buy or receive medicines without being differentiated according to their 
purchase power or social strata. Previous to FP programme, community pharmacies were 
associated with those that had money to pay for medicines out-of-pocket, whereas SUS pharmacies 
distributed medicines to those that could not afford buying them. FP community pharmacies deliver 
medication to high, middle and low-income people without class distinction. In FP community 
pharmacies patients are not identified as being a SUS patient (and, consequently, as being “poor”); 
all users receive the same attention. 
 
As discussed in this section, the high uptake by users, rapid expansion and migration of SUS 
patients to the FP have been fundamental for the success of the initiative. Moreover, as the 
implementation progressed the programme has changed its objectives. SUS patients, who were not 
even among the objectives during the first stage, have become a priority. From 2011 the Federal 
Government established that accreditation of new pharmacies to the FP would occur primarily in 
municipalities that had people who were living in poverty
141
 . Those municipalities were mapped 
by the last census in 2010. Therefore, the provision of free medicines throughout the FP is part of a 
major goal of reducing poverty in these areas. While in this section I discussed how the FP solved 
some important issues in the provision of medicines and how this has impacted the decentralised 
system, in the next section I will explore, in more detail, the how the federal government has 
responded to open criticism of it. 
 
 
7.5 Openly formulated criticism 
In the interviews I conducted, the FP was the subject that motivated respondents to talk the most. 
The programme is controversial; nevertheless, rather than there being two different camps whose 
                                                          
140
 This is a fragment of President Lula speech about the Popular Pharmacy programme that is available in 
Portuguese in a webpage of a Workers’ Party representative. I translated it into English. Available at: 
http://vaccarezza.com.br/lula-estimula-adesao-a-farmacia-popular/ [last accessed 22/08/2013].  
141
 This initiative is published in the Ministry of Health website. Available at : 
http://portal.saude.gov.br/portal/saude/visualizar_texto.cfm?idtxt=40501&janela=1 
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members mentioned exclusively the alleged benefits and problems of the programme respectively, 
most of my interviewees pointed out positive and negative aspects of the programme in their 
accounts. An exception was only an official at the Ministry of Health, who was entirely in favour 
of the programme. Most interviewees were on the fence: while recognising that access to medicines 
had improved as a result of the FP, they also indicated that the programme had led basic 
pharmaceutical assistance away from decentralisation. Since the publication of the National 
Medicines Policy in 1998, all initiatives were aimed at decentralising the management of provision 
of basic medicines, but with the FP, in practice, control returned to the federal government. In a 
relatively short period of time the programme achieved significant results in terms of patients 
assisted and medicines dispensed, and these results contributed to legitimising the initiative. The 
improvement in access undermined health secretaries’ opposition to the programme, even if there 
were criticisms of the programme. The high level of patient satisfaction with the FP adds even 
greater complexity to the situation. Even so, there are some points that were openly criticised by 
health secretaries, the co-payment scheme and the lack of integration between FP and SUS.  
 
7.5.1 Co-payment  
The main criticism at the launch of the programme in 2004 was targeted at the co-payment 
strategy, which was a ‘first’ in the history of medicine provision in Brazil. Universal health 
coverage, free of direct costs to users, is a fundamental SUS principle, which was undermined with 
the implementation of co-payment for medicines. The FP was viewed with reservations by the 
national boards CONASS, CONASEMS, CNS
142
 and, also, by scholars in the field of public health. 
Criticism was based on the premise of gratuity on medicines provided by SUS in contrast to the co-
payment applied by FP. The concern was that the co-payment of medicines could pave the way to 
other cost-sharing practices for services such as diagnostic tests, minor surgery and medical 
appointments. Those who opposed the programme advocated that co-payment should be prevented; 
otherwise the strategy would become common and would undermine the SUS pillars of 
universality and gratuity of access. The opposition, however, was weakened by the reasoning that 
the FP would benefit a significant portion of the population, as shown in the quote that follows: 
CONASEMS objected when the popular pharmacy was launched. Primarily, because we 
understand that there couldn’t be co-payment of any kind in SUS. However, after 
numerous meetings and resistances from municipal secretaries, we just gave up. Why? 
Because we saw that a big slice of the population could benefit and that the mayors were 
also interested in offering something to help the population that does not use SUS. They 
could have some kind of subsidy to purchase medicines (Interview 14; 9.1). 
                                                          
142
 The creation, role and composition of these boards are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. 
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CONASEMS, which brings together municipal health secretaries, was against users’ co-payment 
but withdrew their opposition because the population in the municipality could benefit from 
subsidised medicines. The interest shown by mayors in having subsidised medicines distributed to 
non-SUS patients also contributed to CONASEMS’ decision. Municipal and state health secretaries 
were both against users’ co-payment. Yet in 2004, when the FP was launched, CONASS sent an 
official letter to the Minister of Health (CONASS, 2004), expressing concern that the programme 
was unconstitutional because it introduced monetary contributions from the citizen in order to 
obtain medications that should be provided free of charge by SUS (Carvalho, 2004).  
 
It was only after seven years of using user co-payment exclusively, that the federal government 
changed the FP to include the distribution, free of charge, of diabetes and hypertension drugs. This 
change from co-payment to gratuity was considered a shift in the right direction as explained by 
this state health secretary in the next quote:  
It was a conflicting idea, contradictory within SUS, this proposal from President Lula to 
set up the popular pharmacy. Until today it is still arguable. The Popular Pharmacy, 
however, allowed the population to have access to drugs at a very low cost. (...)Initially 
there might be this contradiction with the co-payment in private pharmacies, but I think 
this contradiction no longer exists because within this programme the community 
pharmacies network today distributes, free of charge, medicines for diabetes and 
hypertension (Interview 5; 7.2). 
 
As explained by this interviewee, the FP has improved access, but the strategy chosen contradicted 
the SUS fundamental principle of being free of charge. The programme could not be entirely 
embraced, so free of charge distribution was adopted to solve this problem. This became apparent 
when this Ministry of Health official was asked why gratuity was introduced in the FP: 
We have to understand the FP, the two arms [public and private], as a complementary 
mechanism of SUS. (...) Diabetes and hypertension are free because these are the main 
chronic diseases responsible for the major causes of mortality. (...) So gratuity comes to 
complement SUS. It comes to strengthen access. Gratuity fulfils another strategic goal 
which is to “get the goat out of the room”143. The goat was the co-payment. It was the 
ministry [of health] implementing a programme that charged for medicines. (...) With the 
gratuity we no longer have “a goat in the room”. There were no more allegations that we 
                                                          
143
 It is a popular saying that means removing an obvious obstacle. 
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charge for drugs, that we were privatising SUS, or anything along those lines (Interview 
13; 10.2). 
 
The introduction of the gratuity was strategically executed to remove an obstacle to the acceptance 
of the programme. It could be argued that making the distribution of medicines free for treatment 
of just two diseases would not be sufficient to reverse the co-payment criticism, considering that 
many other medicines are still being charged for. Actually, the impact of this measure can be 
assessed by taking into consideration the percentage of diabetes and hypertension drugs among the 
total drugs dispensed. According to the Pharmaceutical Assistance Director, currently 76% 
144
of all 
medicines dispensed via the FP are free of charge, i.e. 76% are medicines to treat diabetes and 
hypertension. Taking these figures into consideration helps to understand why making just these 
two medicines free was enough to neutralise criticisms. In short, users’ co-payment was reduced to 
just a quarter of all medicines dispensed by the programme. 
 
7.5.2 Dispensation of medicines is not integrated within pharmaceutical assistance and 
health care 
An additional aspect of the FP pointed out by state and municipal health secretaries as challenging 
was the integration of the distribution of medicines within SUS primary health care services. As 
with the other aspects discussed previously, accounts of the FP were ambiguous. My interviewees 
agreed that the programme was effective in providing access but at the same time the FP 
undermined the development of comprehensive SUS pharmaceutical assistance. This is because the 
pharmacies participating in the programme do not have any kind of communication or interaction 
with the SUS. A basic requirement for pharmaceutical assistance is that the pharmacist and the 
physician or nurse should be able to communicate and share data and information about a patient’s 
health and treatment. As FP implementation advanced, more patients went to community 
pharmacies to get their medication. The main service provided by these private community 
pharmacies is dispensing drugs, as they are primarily commercial establishments that sell drugs and 
have no connection with the SUS. Moreover, even the dispensing service at community pharmacies 
may be considered inadequate because trained pharmacists are frequently absent from the premises 
(de Castro and Correr, 2007)Thus, lack of integration between drug distribution and pharmaceutical 
care has led to dissatisfaction with the FP among interviewees, although they could not ignore the 
advances in access. The following extract illustrates this contradiction between access and care: 
                                                          
144
 Data presented in Farmacia Popular-Public Hearing at Camara dos Deputados/Comissão de Seguridade 
Social e Família on 16th October 2012 
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Now, what was the assessment that we did on the occasion of the launch of the programme 
and I believe that somehow is still valid? We make a great effort to not see drugs as 
something separate from care. For us, for me as a health secretary, the medication has to 
be linked to care and to assistance. So, pharmaceutical assistance has to become part of a 
comprehensive policy. (...) So I reckon that the positive side of the FP is to facilitate 
access, but at the same time it is contradictory because of separate dispensing and care 
(Interview 8; 12.3). 
 
Although access has improved with the FP, other activities that should complement the 
dispensation of drugs were not part of the programme. State and municipal health secretaries 
expected that the broad range of activities related to pharmaceutical assistance might be partly 
addressed by including at least pharmaceutical and healthcare advice. As the following quote 
suggests, many patients in need of medicines were satisfied with the FP because it was the first 
time they had consistent access to medicines. However, they were unaware that pharmaceutical 
care is within the scope of SUS and therefore should be provided by FP pharmacies:  
So the government says that the population is very satisfied. Obviously they are very 
satisfied because they have always fought desperately to have access [to medicines]. What 
the population does not know is that they have the right to a qualified service of 
pharmaceutical attention beyond the access to medicines. The population does not know 
that (Interview 17; 7.2). 
 
The inadequacy of access before the implementation of the FP is raised as a problem in the quote 
above, as is criticism of the pharmaceutical service provided by popular pharmacies. The 
interviewee attributed patients' satisfaction with the FP to the availability of medicines compared 
with the previously experienced lack of access. The same interviewee went further and argued that 
the FP represents a step backwards in the process of integrating medication and overall health care. 
He explained that although patients are satisfied by the fact that they can receive the drug without 
payment, they are missing the guidance and pharmaceutical care that they should receive to help 
them use the medication better, as is illustrated in the next extract: 
The patient goes to a Popular Pharmacy, receives the medicine, does not pay a penny, and 
leaves highly satisfied. But it is likely that he [sic] takes the medication incorrectly, does 
not respect the recommendations on interaction with food, does not follow the schedule 
right, was not warned about the side effects that can arise, among other things. I think it is 
absurd what the government is doing. We are severe critics of this programme and we are 
 202 
 
trying to change that, but we know that once things start it is very difficult to change them 
(Interview 17; 7.3). 
 
The interviewee defended the conviction that the pharmacy should provide guidance on the best 
way to take the medicines to gain the best effect of the treatment or at least how to avoid incorrect 
use. 
 
In contrast to such strong criticism from this municipal agent, Ministry of Health officials argue 
that SUS is also not providing pharmaceutical care for patients. This is best illustrated by the 
following quote:  
Now of course, you have people who used to go to the Basic Health Unit to get their drugs, 
but now because they have a [FP] pharmacy around the corner they will change [from 
public to private]. Well, is this bad? If we had UBS
145
s with a different approach from 
those private pharmacies, this trade would be bad. If [at the UBS] we had guidelines for 
patients regarding medication and other supportive therapies for hypertensive patients we 
could criticise the FP. But actually in UBSs they do nothing different… They also only 
dispense medicines (Interview 18; 9.2). 
 
The Ministry of Health refuted the criticism by stating that the basic health units are not practicing 
pharmaceutical assistance in the broad sense either, i.e. SUS pharmacies are only dispensing 
medicines like the FP does. Here, to better assess the two sides of this discussion about the 
pharmaceutical care in SUS or FP pharmacies, it is important to recall some of the points discussed 
in Chapter Six related to the difficulties in implementing pharmaceutical assistance in 
municipalities. Health secretaries described many barriers to the development of pharmaceutical 
assistance after decentralisation. One of them was human resources: they pointed out that it was 
difficult to fulfil the requirement of having a pharmacist in each SUS pharmacy. It is plausible to 
infer that SUS pharmacies without pharmacists are only distributing medicines, and therefore in 
this case there is no integration between health care and medicines. But, behind the health 
secretaries’ criticism is the claim that the money invested in the FP should be given to states and 
municipalities to develop SUS pharmaceutical assistance. 
 
                                                          
145
 UBS- Unidade Básica de Saúde or Primary Care Unit 
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Another Ministry of Health official goes even further by stating that the issue of integrating care 
and distribution could be more easily solved in the private sector than in the SUS: "it is easier to 
qualify access in the private network" (Interview 19). This understanding that the private sector 
could solve this problem with greater agility is based on the satisfactory performance shown by 
private partners throughout the process of implementation of the FP. In my view, the rapid 
response usually associated with private partners is related to their economic interest in expanding 
their clientele
146
. Judging from the development of the programme, the financial resources invested 
and the political dividends that have been collected by the federal level, all lead me to believe that 
qualification of pharmaceutical care and integration with primary health care will be the next step 
to be pursued with the help of private partners. FP development has followed an incremental 
course: first co-payment in the public arm; then expansion to the private pharmacy network, and 
finally the distribution of medicines free of charge. These three stages dealt with the issue of 
availability of medicines. How distribution of medicines and SUS health care will work together is 
still undecided. It is still not clear how the federal government intends to achieve this solution. But, 
it is unquestionable that the FP programme has changed the landscape of basic pharmaceutical 
assistance and it is very likely that the programme will be part of the solution to the problem of 
integrating distribution and care.  
 
 
7.5.3 Top-down policy-making 
The policy-making route adopted in the FP was unusual considering the negotiation and agreement 
forums provided within the SUS. As remarked, the FP came about as part of the electoral platform 
of presidential elections. The programme design and implementation strategy have not gone 
through discussions and agreements with subnational actors. Interviewees expressed clearly that the 
creation of the programme was a decision stemming from the President of the Republic and that he 
pressed for its implementation. It was submitted and approved in SUS forums without having been 
discussed extensively. The strategy chosen to improve access did not take into account the 
decentralisation and SUS policy-making mechanisms nor did it include SUS in the implementation. 
CONASS, CONASEMS and CNS advocated that investments and efforts to improve access should 
be invested in SUS basic pharmaceutical programmes instead of in the FP. This is illustrated in the 
quote below: 
                                                          
146
 ABRAFARMA (Brazilian Association of Pharmacies and Drugstores Networks) celebrated the vigorous 
evolution of the pharmaceutical market in Brazil, which increased sales volume by 82% from 2008 to 2011 
(R$ 24 million in 2008 and R$ 43.9 billion in 2011). One of the factors that favoured their growth, according 
to ABRAFARMA, was the migration of SUS patients to FP accredited pharmacies. Source: 
www.abrafarma.com.br 
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So, in CONASEMS currently there is a significant discussion about this programme. This 
specific case of the FP, it was a programme that was a decision by the President of the 
Republic, President Lula, to ensure access to medicines at prices much lower than those 
charged by the market. We're not against that goal of the FP, but we always understood 
that this could have been done through SUS. Today that programme is consolidated 
throughout Brazil and eventually contributing to improve access to medicines in the 
municipalities that have the FP (Interview 8; 12.2). 
 
The goals and the efficiency in improving access to medicines are not in question, but the way to 
put them into practice is. There is consensus amongst subnational actors that the improvement in 
access should be made via SUS. This argument also encapsulates the notion of FP not being part of 
SUS. In the accounts I found other elements which, in my view, are related to this notion of 
separation. Presenting the programme as a presidential decision (not discussed with subnational 
actors, as other SUS programmes are), implemented by means of dedicated facilities (‘owned’ 
pharmacies) combined with private partners, has contributed to the image of a programme detached 
from SUS.  
 
Comparisons between FP and SUS facilities were a recurrent theme in my interviewees’ accounts, 
as well as the perception of different standards within the SUS. The respondent, in the following 
quote, refers to ‘owned’ FP pharmacies that have standards set at the federal level. As it is a 
centralised programme, the standards, guidelines and management are controlled by FIOCRUZ, the 
federal foundation that administers the public arm of the programme. In order to fulfil these 
standards, the municipality receives a certain amount of money to construct/refurbish the 
pharmacy. This process results in ‘high quality’ pharmacies, as portrayed by the interviewee, 
contrasting with the precarious conditions in SUS: 
Furthermore, the municipal health secretary has no control over the FP-owned pharmacy. 
Who controls everything, even the officials who are in fact employees of the municipality, 
is FIOCRUZ. (...)Why does everything have to be high quality for the FP, while I have 
difficulties in UBS. You should not have all the financial resources invested in FP if basic 
pharmacies in primary care service are precarious. It's like there's a disconnection, they 
created a programme that works separated from the primary health care as a whole 
(Interview 10; 7.3). 
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The difference in standards applied to SUS and the FP, and the independence of the federal 
foundation, pointed out by this municipal health secretary, supports the notion that the programme 
was designed to work outside SUS jurisdiction. In my view, this detachment, whether deliberately 
constructed or the result of circumstances, contributed to dismissing the possible reactions against 
federal interference in the autonomy of municipalities to manage the provision of basic medicines. 
I will develop this claim further in the next section. 
 
In this section we saw how the federal government has dealt with the criticism that was openly 
posed by state and municipal actors: co-payment, lack of integration with SUS, and top-down 
policy-making. In the next section I will discuss how the federal government avoided a debate 
about recentralisation, which could cause major opposition from municipal and state health 
secretaries, mayors and governors.  
 
 
7.6 How the debate about recentralisation was avoided 
At this point it is worth reflecting why the centralised nature of the FP programme was not opposed 
by municipal and state health secretariats considering that the programme has reduced their role 
within the provision of basic medicines. The improvement in access that followed FP 
implementation gave the federal government the justification to keep investing in the programme. 
The federal government has also managed to avoid major opposition to a centralised programme 
(FP) within a decentralised environment. My interviews suggest that the federal government used 
the right to health and medicines to shield the programme and to head off questions about 
recentralisation. With the same purpose, the government did not change the responsibilities of 
municipalities regarding basic medicines, and used separate financial resources to fund the FP. In 
order to explain this claim I will discuss these three aspects: the ‘right to health’ constitutional 
principle; the separate financial resources; and the unchanged legal framework regarding the 
responsibilities of subnational actors.  
 
Overall, in my study the FP is well rated by interviewees, who all agreed that the FP improved 
access to medicines. There is no dispute about FP achievements in terms of availability of 
medicines. Each interviewee, even those that had reservations regarding the way the programme 
was created and implemented, agrees on the benefits to access brought about by the FP. Although 
there was general agreement on the benefits of the programme, it is possible to distinguish two 
groups that have different views: the state and municipal health secretaries, and the Ministry of 
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Health officials. State and municipal secretaries were ambivalent because, while they perceived 
advances in access to medicines, they also argued that that improvement in access could have been 
achieved via SUS if it had received more money. Ministry of Health officials focused mainly on 
the advantages that the FP brought to the population. In general, those officials argued that the 
programme allowed citizens to obtain their medication in many facilities distributed around the 
country, where the medicines were always available; contrasting with the frequent drug shortage 
experienced in SUS pharmacies. Acknowledgment that these two groups of actors stand in different 
camps is important to understand the dynamics of the changes that took place when the FP was 
implemented.  
 
The ambivalent position of health secretaries helps to understand the expansion of the FP that took 
place simultaneously with the decentralisation of SUS. Their weak and inconsistent opposition, in 
my view, have allowed the FP programme to develop. In my research, the accounts have suggested 
that the perceived benefits of the FP helped to neutralise their opposition. In the next quote a 
former municipal health secretary and current Ministry of Health official expressed his reservations 
regarding the strategy of co-payment, which “violates certain principles”; he is referring to the 
right to universal and free of charge access to medicine. But he recognized that the FP facilitates 
citizens’ access to medicines, and admits that they are not interested in how access was achieved: 
So when you find a mechanism to reduce the difficulty of access ... Often, Brazilian citizens 
do not distinguish whether this mechanism violates certain principles. They actually want 
their rights to be guaranteed if their right is being guaranteed, that is what matters 
(Interview15; 10.2). 
 
Here it is important to note that this Ministry of Health official articulated a view that corresponds 
with the official view of the federal government. This respondent uses the fundamental ‘right to 
health’ principle stipulated in the Brazilian Constitution. In this case, the right to access to 
medicines justifies the implementation of the programme. The official suggests that to ensure the 
population’s right to medicines it does not matter if the FP is not in accordance with SUS precepts. 
This notion advocated by the federal level that the FP was helping to guarantee citizens’ rights to 
health made it difficult for state and municipal levels to position themselves against the initiative. 
 
Another important aspect to this discussion on the right to health is that the FP programme was 
portrayed as able extend the coverage of drug provision. Prior to the FP, provision was split into 
private or public spheres with separates rules, patients and prescriptions. SUS patients would 
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receive their medication in SUS units, while non-SUS patients (those that have health plans) should 
buy theirs in community pharmacies. The FP, in contrast, does not distinguish between SUS or 
private health plan patients: both can have their medicines dispensed from the same facilities. The 
next quote illustrates the importance of providing the medicines needed, whether patients come 
from private or public services: 
I believe that this initiative [FP] did not come to complement [the distribution of 
medicines], it came to universalise. I do not want to know where they [the patients] were 
diagnosed with hypertension or diabetes. The citizen can go to UBS
147
 or FP to have their 
medicine dispensed and use it (Interview 18; 9.3). 
 
The term “universalise”148 means that the FP dispenses medicines for patients coming from either 
SUS or private services (SUS pharmacies, on the contrary, only distribute medicines to patients 
holding a SUS prescription). Here, again the FP initiative is portrayed by a Ministry of Health 
official as a way of fulfilling rights enshrined in the 1988 Constitution. In short, the federal 
government implemented the free distribution of medicines (third stage FP) with the promise of 
“universal” access to medicines. The rapid expansion of the FP programme suggested that the 
decentralised provision was not able to fulfil the needs, although SUS only had to provide basic 
medicines for citizens within low-income strata. Combining those ideas of inefficiency and limited 
scope, the federal government presented the FP as the alternative to provide basic medicines for all 
citizens, as required by the constitution. This image, propagated by the federal level, allowed local 
health authorities to support the FP, even though the programme was not in line with the 
fundamental principle of free medicine from SUS. The idea was that the programme served the 
purpose of ensuring access to medicines, which is a right. Evoking this fundamental right, to health 
and medicines, and prioritising it, imbued the FP with enough importance to reduce the effect of 
any resistances that might appear. The speech of President Dilma Rousseff at the United Nations 
General Assembly, in 2011, evidenced the importance of the programme within the federal 
government and illustrates its link to the promotion of health rights for all: 
Brazil advocates access to medicines as part of the human right to health. We know it's a 
strategic element for social inclusion, for the pursuit of equity and the strengthening of 
public health systems. One of the first actions of my administration was to increase access 
to medicines for patients with hypertension and diabetes in the National Health System. We 
are providing free of charge drugs for these diseases, specifically diabetes and 
                                                          
147
 UBS-Unidade Básica de Saúde is the primary care unit. 
148
 This term was also used by the president of the republic, Dilma Rousseff, when she launched the third 
stage of the FP programme. 
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hypertension. The health programme, Health is Priceless distributes free of charge 
medication through partnerships with more than 20 000 public and private pharmacies.
149
 
 
As a result of the belief that access to medication was part of the human right to health, the 
Government had increased access to medication for patients with hypertension and diabetes. 
Although President Dilma’s speech does not emphasise the contribution of the public and the 
private arm, figure 7.1 showed that just 560 of about 20,000 pharmacies were ‘owned’.  
 
The second aspect that helps to explain the success of the government’s strategy is the financing 
arrangement designed for the FP. The programme was regarded as a “bonus” by health secretaries. 
This term was used by one of the interviewees, and I think it successfully reflects the perception of 
Secretaries of Health. The FP distributes medicines without any further costs to the municipality. 
The federal level sends dedicated resources to install and maintain the public arm, and pays for the 
medicines dispensed by the private arm of the programme. The funding strategy used by the federal 
government has allowed municipalities to benefit from the improvement in the provision of 
medicines without any financial drawback. As stated by a Ministry of Health official, municipal 
and state level actors placed no restriction on FP pharmacies, since there were no changes 
regarding the money allocated to finance basic pharmaceutical assistance within SUS. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Health made clear the distinction between the financial resources that fund basic 
medicines for SUS pharmaceutical assistance and those for the FP programme. Policy documents 
state that the funds to finance the FP should not be mixed with those monies allocated to purchase 
medicines in SUS. Federal funds transferred to States, the Federal District and Municipalities for 
co-funding basic medicines were not affected by the FP (Ministerio da Saude, 2005b).  
 
Indeed, the interviews suggested that the fact that the money for the FP does not come from the 
budget of basic pharmaceutical assistance is an important characteristic of the programme, and this 
has contributed to shaping the way the programme is perceived. Accounts of some interviewees 
suggest that the FP programme is considered an initiative unconnected to SUS. In the context of 
decentralisation, this perception of the FP as something detached from SUS may be regarded as 
serving the purposes of the Ministry of Health. This disconnection between the FP and SUS could 
help to fend off criticism and opposition that could be raised to the centralised character of the 
programme. Keeping FP and SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance in separate spheres has helped 
                                                          
149
 This quote is part of President Dilma Rousseff’s speech at the Sixty-sixth United Nations General 
Assembly, which opened a high level meeting on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable 
Diseases, in New York on September 29
th
, 2011. 
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the federal government to avoid comparative analysis that might highlight similarities between the 
goals of both initiatives and show up a contradiction in the strategies used. This comparison would 
evidence that the federal government, ignoring all pacts and regulations negotiated in SUS 
agreement forums regarding decentralisation, i.e. bypassing subnational levels, has created a 
centralised programme in partnership with the private sector.  
 
The third aspect, which in my view was important to the acceptance of the initiative, was its legal 
aspect. The federal level showed state and municipal level actors that legislation or regulation 
regarding basic pharmaceutical assistance would remain unchanged. The legal framework which 
governs pharmaceutical assistance was not amended or changed after the launch of the FP 
programme. Their roles and responsibilities remained the same, as did their autonomy to manage 
health services and the financial resources related to them. Therefore, if regulation and financing 
regarding the decentralised provision of medicines was not changed, they could not talk about 
recentralisation. In fact, in the interviews, none of the health secretaries has engaged in the 
discussion of recentralisation. This became apparent when the interviewees were asked for their 
opinion of the FP programme and its federal control. Even when probed they did not talked about 
recentralisation. In their view, SUS provision of basic medicines is still decentralised. This 
perspective adopted by state and municipal secretaries helps to understand why the centralised 
characteristic of the FP has not been on the agenda of SUS national forums. 
 
By not changing the responsibilities and financial resources of municipalities related to the 
provision of basic medicines and by implementing a parallel system of distribution of drugs the 
federal government was skilful in avoiding confrontation with subnational actors. Taking into 
consideration FP development, I would argue that the federal government strategically kept the FP 
and basic pharmaceutical assistance in two separate spheres. By so doing, it diverted the attention 
of subnational actors from the centralised character of the FP programme. To officially exclude 
states and municipalities from the management of the basic medicines could give rise to strong 
opposition and would be regarded, most certainly, as a loss of the power achieved by 
decentralisation. It is reasonable to assume that if the FP became part of SUS the distribution of 
funds would change. Municipalities would not receive the resources to buy the drugs distributed by 
FP. This would reduce the revenue of the municipality. Conversely, if FP were incorporated by 
SUS, the control of basic pharmaceutical assistance would be transferred to the federal level, i.e. it 
would be clear recentralisation. 
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As this chapter draws to a close I would like to remark that at present, the FP is fully consolidated. 
Due to its undeniable achievement in improving availability of drugs, I believe that going back is 
not an expected option either from the federal side or from the subnational actors. Despite their 
negative comments, health secretaries recognise the importance of the programme in providing 
access to basic medicines within primary care. 
 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I drew a picture of how state and municipal health secretariats regarded the changes 
in the management of medicine provision introduced by the FP programme. I discussed how 
recentralisation, represented by the FP programme, has impacted on provision of basic medicines. 
 
Three of the participants provided narratives that indicated the influence of the President of the 
Republic on the creation and expansion of the FP programme. The rationale for implementing this 
centralised programme was to provide drugs at subsidised prices to those patients with low-cost 
private health plans, i.e. non-SUS patients. Underlying the rationale for expanding the coverage is 
the notion that availability of medicines was insufficient in SUS pharmacies. In their accounts, 
participants reflected on the role of the FP programme in providing basic medicines. Although they 
have reservations about and criticisms of users’ co-payment introduced by the FP, they recognized 
the improvement in the availability of medicines provided by the programme. As a consequence of 
this better availability, SUS patients are migrating to the FP. According to participants, this 
migration is approved and even encouraged by some municipal health secretaries. As the FP 
develops and more patients use the programme and consequently fail to use SUS, this could cause 
the municipalities to stop buying those drugs that are distributed by FP. Consequently, this could 
lead to a weakening of public service and result in dependence of the private sector. 
 
The participants expressed dissatisfaction with the choice of the federal government regarding the 
partnership of the FP with the private sector. The programme has received major investments that 
allowed its rapid expansion throughout the country via the community pharmacies network. In their 
accounts, respondents advocate that those investments should go to SUS. 
 
Respondents have identified in the FP’s private partner the characteristics needed to solve the 
failures of SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance. In fact, with the implementation of the FP, the 
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federal government has managed to remove almost all obstacles and barriers to the development of 
SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance.  
 
Additionally, the interviews suggested that the federal government avoided direct confrontation 
with state and municipal health secretaries when it implemented and expanded the FP programme. 
The FP programme introduced new mechanisms and new actors to the process of public delivery of 
essential medicines, but the state and municipal levels were excluded from its design and 
implementation. This exclusion goes against the entire trajectory of decentralisation that had been 
built up over the years in pharmaceutical assistance and, overall, in the Brazilian public health 
system. Considering all the mechanisms and instances of agreement provided by the decentralised 
framework of pharmaceutical assistance, there was a potential for confrontations with the excluded 
actors. I argue that the federal government’s success in avoiding major opposition is due to three 
factors: the unchanged legal framework regarding the responsibilities of subnational actors; the 
separate financial resources used to fund the FP and SUS pharmaceutical assistance, and the ‘right 
to health’ principle evoked to justify the programme. 
 
To conclude this chapter I would say that FP deeply impacted the decentralised provision of basic 
medicines, mainly due to the inclusion of the private sector in the programme. The community 
pharmacies network allowed the programme to develop rapidly around the country. This strong 
presence of FP facilities and the consistent availability of medicines resulted in migration of SUS 
patients to the programme. In other words, these patients are no longer receiving drugs in SUS 
units. Now they receive those drugs from community pharmacies accredited in a centralised 
programme.  Reflecting how this situation could evolve, I would argue that the provision of basic 
medicines via the private arm of the FP programme would, eventually, replace provision in SUS 
facilities. My assessment is based on the increasing financial resources invested in the community 
pharmacies network and the political commitment devoted to the programme. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
In this thesis I explored how decentralisation has affected the public provision of basic medicines 
in Brazil in the views of health secretaries and Ministry of Health officials. Decentralisation is one 
of the SUS pillars and was implemented in 2005 with the aim of solving shortages in public 
provision of basic medicines. Simultaneously to the decentralisation move, however, the federal 
government invested heavily in a centralised programme to distribute basic medicines.  
 
My work was structured around four main questions. First, I investigated how the process of 
decentralisation developed and who the actors involved were. This led me to my second point of 
research which was the examination of power dynamics involved in the federative relationships 
related to the management of pharmaceutical assistance, and the role of federal entities in the 
improvement of access to medicines. The third aspect I explored was the situation of access to 
basic medicines after decentralisation through the lens of the actors involved in the design and 
implementation of the policies in the field. The last aspect I focused on was the emergence of a 
programme which aimed to improve public provision of basic medicines controlled by the federal 
government and delivered in partnership with the private sector.  
 
In this concluding chapter, in sections 8.2 to 8.5 I will review these four areas, summarising and 
contextualising my main findings to answer my research questions. The subsequent sections 
present the contributions and limitations of the study, suggestions for future research and my 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
8.2 Decentralisation and centralisation of public provision of basic medicines 
Exploring the question of how the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance took place, I 
started by investigating how the process was triggered and the motivating factors behind it. 
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Call for changes: main actors and motivations 
The narratives of my interviewees revealed that demands for decentralisation originated in 
municipal and state tiers. Municipal and state health secretaries represented in CONASEMS and 
CONASS, respectively, took a leading role in the process of decentralisation. This pattern is 
consistent with Falleti’s (2010:152) assessment of the key role of subnational actors in the 
decentralisation process in Brazil.  
 
Difficulties in providing basic medicines to SUS patients were pointed out by health secretaries as 
the primary reason for demanding decentralisation. The main problems reported by the secretaries 
in my interviews concerned the inadequacy of medicines (such as the type and quantities of 
supplied drugs) and logistic problems that resulted in constant failure or delay in delivering drugs 
to the municipalities. These two problems had a negative impact on access and were associated 
with a shortage in medicines. My interviewees suggested that the lack of suitable medicines to meet 
local needs resulted from the inability of the Ministry of Health to accommodate the 
epidemiological particularities of each region when planning which drugs should be purchased. In 
fact, before the decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance, the Ministry of Health 
distributed a standard set of medicines to all municipalities regardless of the particular needs of the 
region. 
 
In this scenario, demands for decentralisation were based on the expectation that redistributing 
responsibilities, decision-maker powers and resources would facilitate local problem-solving 
regarding the provision of medicines. The pursuit of decentralisation by health secretaries found 
support within the Ministry of Health due to the difficulties the latter had to operate the distribution 
of medicines throughout the country. Thus, the three tiers of government each had different reasons 
for supporting decentralisation changes. 
 
Another aspect that motivated health secretaries’ demands was linked to the prior decentralisation 
of health care, implemented after the health reform and creation of SUS in 1988. With that reform, 
municipalities were responsible for the management and delivery of health services. Therefore, 
they expected that the management of the supply of medicines used in primary care should also be 
their responsibility. According to the health secretaries I interviewed, decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance was the ‘natural’ way to follow. The secretaries pointed out the necessity 
of reorganising and integrating the provision of basic medicines into local SUS services. Unlike the 
decentralisation of health care which started in 1988, decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance 
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has no well defined point that marks its origin. In basic pharmaceutical assistance, according to my 
interviewees, the case for decentralisation was built gradually. The first significant step, as the 
narratives revealed, was to bring pharmaceutical assistance to the policy arena.  
 
National Medicines Policy provided opportunity for changes 
Based on my interview data it was not possible to establish exactly when calls for decentralisation 
of basic pharmaceutical assistance began. What could be established, however, was that in 1998, 
with the enactment of the National Medicines Policy (NMP), the distribution of responsibilities to 
subnational actors to manage the provision of basic medicines was officially stipulated. According 
to the accounts of my interviewees, from the moment that decentralisation was incorporated into 
the legal framework, the subject became part of SUS negotiating agenda. From this point onwards, 
shortage of medicines began to be discussed in SUS agreement forums (both at subnational and 
federal level, CIB and CIT, respectively). 
 
Implementation of decentralisation was a gradual and negotiated process 
The circumstances that allowed the provision of basic medicines to be decentralised resulted, at 
least partially, from the 1988 health reform. The new set-up that ended in municipalisation of 
health care empowered health secretaries and legitimated their demands for autonomy to manage 
the basic pharmaceutical assistance. Although since 1998 decentralisation was part of the NMP, 
narratives indicated that decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance entailed a long process of 
negotiations until 2005 when financial resources actually started to be transferred to municipalities. 
In the meantime, discrete and incremental changes were introduced. The series of negotiations on 
how to implement decentralisation resulted in agreements that did not substitute previous policies 
at once but gradually added new responsibilities to subnational levels. This policy-making pattern 
that I observed in my work was pointed out by Schmitter as typical of the policy process in Brazil. 
More than forty years ago, Schmitter (1971:256) argued that “[p]olicy in Brazil changes by 
accretion rather than by substitution”. 
 
Another factor that interfered in the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance was related to the 
expectations and understandings of decentralisation held by the actors involved. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, and well explored by Saltman et al. (2007:10), there is no common definition or 
understanding of decentralisation, and it could mean various things to different people. This also 
proved to be true in the case of decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance explored in my thesis. 
Decentralisation was understood differently by the Ministry of Health and by the health secretaries. 
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To the Ministry of Health officials, decentralisation meant distributing funds to municipalities and 
states for purchasing medicines. This transfer of financial resources by the federal level, can, in 
fact, be regarded as the last step in the process of decentralisation. In contrast to the willingness to 
change voiced by Ministry of Health officials, the distribution of funds only started from 2005 
onwards, as mentioned above. Falleti (2010:177) also highlighted the struggle for federal transfers 
in the decentralisation process in Brazil. Referring to the decentralisation of the health sector, she 
argued that “national authorities resisted the decentralization of funds”. Hence, while from the 
federal government’s point of view decentralisation meant transferring funds, in the case of state 
and municipal actors, decentralisation meant receiving (or assuming) the autonomy to decide which 
medicines to buy and participation in decisions concerning medicine policy in SUS forums of 
negotiation. The restricted scope of decentralisation in the views of the Ministry of Health 
contrasted with wider subnational demands, which included redistribution of responsibilities, 
decision-maker power and resources. Therefore, both centre and periphery held different 
understandings and expectations related to decentralisation, which might have influenced the 
process and timing of its implementation. 
 
Although decentralisation is one of the pillars of SUS, in my interview data it was possible to 
identify differences between the views of federal and subnational levels on the decision of whether 
to maintain centralised provision of basic medicines or to decentralise it. On the one hand, 
subnational actors considered that decentralising basic pharmaceutical assistance was the right 
decision and it represented a one-way process, i.e. there was no place for reversion on that choice. 
For state and municipal secretaries, basic pharmaceutical assistance should be managed by the 
municipal level regardless of the results and the federal level should provide support to make 
possible improvements in municipal management. On the other hand, for the Ministry of Health, 
centralisation or decentralisation was an interchangeable approach depending on the results 
obtained with regards to costs and economies of scale. 
 
Regional differences shaped the implementation  
Regarding the question of how decentralisation took place, accounts of my interviewees suggested 
that regional differences are important to understand patterns of decentralisation development. 
Such disparities motivated but also limited the implementation of the decentralised approach in 
some regions. In other places, however, innovative solutions in the provision of medicines emerged 
as a result of decentralisation.  
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As discussed above, epidemiological differences between different regions in the country also 
motivated decentralisation. The fact that the medicines supplied were often unsuitable for local 
epidemiological conditions was a problem experienced by many municipalities. According to the 
accounts of my interviewees, this issue was widespread and seemed to favour decentralisation 
being included in the agenda at SUS negotiation forums, receiving much support from subnational 
actors. Nevertheless, when decentralisation actually started to be implemented, it caused many 
problems in less developed regions. These places faced more difficulties in managing 
pharmaceutical assistance because they lacked human resources and physical infrastructure, and 
had poor administrative capacity. Accounts of my interviewees suggested that, in small 
municipalities, despite some advances in the availability of medicines over the years, these barriers 
of unpreparedness are still preventing further improvement in access to medicines. As my 
interviewees suggested, although municipalities asked for autonomy to choose which medicines to 
buy, at the beginning they continued to buy the same list of medicines they had claimed inadequate 
when sent by the federal level. 
 
In the negotiations to establish the implementation, options on how to conduct decentralisation 
were agreed between the three tiers. There were two types or stages of decentralisation, depending 
on where responsibilities and power were concentrated: municipal (or complete decentralisation), 
and state (or partial decentralisation). In the latter option, municipalities could opt to leave the 
responsibility for managing pharmaceutical assistance in the hands of the state, but would retain the 
prerogative to determine the types and quantities of medications the state should acquire and 
distribute. As discussed in Chapter Four, this option seems to have emerged from the previous 
experience with decentralisation of health services,
150
 and it preserved the power of the 
municipalities to choose the medicines they needed. At the same time, partial decentralisation does 
not burden them with bureaucratic tasks, such as public bidding, which would require highly 
qualified human resources that are often not available in small municipalities. The state level would 
act as a 'buffer' to absorb more complex tasks by balancing the deficiencies of municipalities. This 
arrangement, however, was not sufficient to resolve regional differences. On the contrary, the 
possibility of partially decentralising pharmaceutical assistance, an alternative that could be seen as 
a solution to the diversity of situations in Brazilian municipalities, ended up contributing to 
increase regional disparities. States that already had the best structures in terms of health services 
were also those most committed to the process of decentralisation, leading to better support for 
municipalities within their jurisdiction, as was the case with Paraná, Minas Gerais and São Paulo, 
although the latter to a lesser extent. 
                                                          
150
 As discussed in Chapter One, decentralisation processes of health care used gradual levels of complexity 
in terms of service delivery in an accreditation process to enable municipalities to join decentralisation.  
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The option for partial decentralisation was not available to all, though. The accounts of my 
interviewees showed that certain municipalities had no such choice (even though partial 
decentralisation would be the most appropriate option for small municipalities). In these places, 
local authorities had to take responsibility for the full cycle of basic pharmaceutical assistance 
because the state level did not join a partial decentralisation scheme. There might be more than one 
explanation for the fact that some states did not engage in making partial decentralisation possible. 
Considering that this lack of support to municipalities was present usually in less developed 
regions, I would argue that it had resulted from unpreparedness at the state level. In less developed 
regions, states suffer, to varying degrees, from the same problems faced by their municipalities, in 
terms of structure and administrative capability. Thus, in these cases, neither states nor 
municipalities were prepared to take responsibility for the provision of basic medicines. 
 
At this point, it is important to take a closer look at the implications of this lack of preparedness for 
decentralised duties in the perpetuation of regional disparities. Corroborating what has already been 
described in other studies, data from my interviews suggested that the decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil has not helped to reduce disparities between regions. This 
finding is consistent with Bankauskaite and Saltman’s (2007:16) observations regarding 
decentralisation in European countries. Decentralisation caused interruptions to the Ministry of 
Health’s distribution of basic medicines, which made less developed regions responsible for tasks 
for which they were unprepared. One Ministry of Health official I interviewed considered that, in 
some cases, decentralisation was practically ‘forced’ upon certain municipalities because although 
some of them were not ready to take on the decentralised tasks, the option of having basic 
medicines distributed by the federal government was no longer available. In those situations where 
partial decentralisation was not available, the double burden of having neither state support nor 
structural conditions to perform the decentralised duties contributed to the worsening of the 
situation of these municipalities. The perception of my interviewees was that, in poor regions, 
instead of reducing disparities, decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance has contributed to the 
deterioration in access to medicines and thus contributed to increased inequality. This perception is 
corroborated by the view expressed by the Brazilian political scientist Marta Arretche (2012:11). 
Referring to modern democratic states, she remarks that, in general, regional differences in the 
provision of services could be regarded as a consequence of the authority being devolved to 
subnational governments to decide on their own policies. According to her, this can lead to 
inequalities in the provision of services to citizens living in different localities in the same country. 
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In contrast, municipalities located in states with more structured health services, in general, had the 
option of having partially decentralised pharmaceutical assistance. In these places, the usual 
problems of small and medium municipalities related to lack of administrative capacity, human 
resources and physical structure were absorbed by the state level, and decentralisation was 
perceived by interviewees as beneficial to access. In these states, the power and resources 
distributed by decentralisation were used to deploy innovative solutions in the management of 
pharmaceutical assistance. Paraná, for example, created the Paraná Consortium of Medicines to 
manage pharmaceutical assistance. This initiative was pointed out by members of CONASS, 
CONASEMS and by Ministry of Health officials as the most successful example of good 
pharmaceutical assistance. Moreover, the initiative was perceived as an example to be followed. 
This case led me to a reflection on the peculiarities of the implementation of decentralisation across 
the country and their influence on the availability of medicines at the local level. 
 
In the successful initiative in Paraná, decentralisation was partial, i.e. it stopped at state level. This 
means that the state receives federal and municipal contributions for pharmaceutical assistance 
funding, and was responsible for planning, purchasing and distributing basic medicines. The state 
in this case played a key role in the emergence of this solution which resulted in improving access 
to medicines. The coordination of the state and the existence of adequate administrative structure 
were critical to the success of the initiative. The difficulties and limitations of small municipalities 
were, in this case, outweighed with the help of the state level. 
 
These variations in the results achieved with decentralisation, which I identified as being directly 
associated with the degree of development of the region, indicates that there is no single approach 
that could solve issues of access to basic medicines. In fact, as Vrangbaek (2007) argues, 
decentralisation often results in differences in services and quality across decentralised units 
depending on local capacity which could reduce equity and fairness. I discussed examples showing 
contrasting results of decentralisation which, I argue, are linked to regional differences in terms of 
administrative capacity and the role performed by the state level. The discussion of whether there is 
an appropriate degree or level of decentralisation is another aspect where there is no consensus 
within the literature on decentralisation. The regional disparities and their influence on access that I 
found in my work confirm the conclusion that there is no universal solution or model to be 
followed. My findings are consistent with Vrangbaek’s (2007) suggestion that the challenge in 
decentralisation and centralisation processes in health services is to find an optimal mix of central 
and decentralised management.  
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8.3 Federative relationships in a decentralised setting 
The process of decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance involved federative relationships and 
negotiations in SUS forums of agreement, namely CIB and CIT. My question was how these 
federative relationships affected the decentralisation of public provision of basic medicines. It is 
worth noting that decentralisation was not compulsory since federated entities have administrative, 
political and financial autonomy
151
 within their jurisdiction. Therefore, states and municipalities 
had to be persuaded by the federal level to join the process, which was similar to what had occurred 
in the decentralisation of health care more broadly. 
 
Roles and responsibilities: coordination, interdependence and autonomy 
The definition of roles and responsibilities of each level of government in the management of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance took years to clarify and put into practice (even though the pattern of 
responsibilities of each tier overlaps the ones of primary care services). As a result of the long 
process of agreement, coordination and technical assistance became federal and state duties, 
whereas municipalities were in charge of service delivery. Basic pharmaceutical assistance, like 
primary care, is co-funded by federal, state and municipal level. In this regard, the process of 
negotiations resulted in an agreement which stipulated the percentage of funds that each federal 
entity had to contribute, and the roles and responsibilities of each level.  
 
In those situations where decentralisation was complete, federal and state contributions should be 
transferred to the municipality for the purchasing of medicines. In partial decentralisation, it is the 
state level which should receive federal and counterpart contributions for purchasing basic 
medicines. Thus, the success or failure of decentralised initiatives depended on the fulfilment of 
pacts between federal entities. As I will discuss next, my research revealed that non-compliance 
with the pacts negatively influenced the decentralised provision of medicines, and the enforcement 
of compliance was hindered by the federative arrangement. 
 
Disruption of pacts: failures and lack of accountability 
States failing to transfer funds was the main issue in the accounts of municipal secretaries with 
regards to federative relationships and pharmaceutical assistance. These disruptions affected the 
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 The financial autonomy is limited, but municipalities and states have a certain degree of autonomy to rise 
and expend funds. These rules are provided in the Constitution. 
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provision of medicines by municipalities regardless of whether they opted for partial or complete 
decentralisation.  
 
In cases where decentralisation was complete, when the state failed in sending its financial 
contribution, municipalities had the federal share to purchase the medicines. In partial 
decentralisation the drawback in the case of a state failure was even greater. Those municipalities 
did not receive the drugs that should be distributed by the state, and could not afford to acquire 
them. All funds to purchase basic medicines, in this case, were in the state’s hands. Those failures 
were portrayed as difficult to solve, though. As I discussed in Chapter Five, there is no effective 
mechanism to enforce compliance with the agreements signed. The penalty stipulated for non-
compliance is the interruption of federal funds transfers to health. The punishment, however, if 
enforced, would further undermine the whole municipal health system, not only the provision of 
basic medicines.
152
 In fact, as far as my research showed, this measure was never used. 
Nonetheless, if there is no penalty these situations can persist for long periods, compromising the 
availability of basic medicines in the municipalities affected. According to my findings, even in 
São Paulo state, which is probably the most developed state in the country, there was a situation of 
failures in the co-funding of the basic pharmaceutical assistance which persisted for at least two 
years, in 2010 and 2011. I would argue that the federative arrangement (particularly the 
interdependence in the co-funding) and autonomy granted in the Constitution, contribute to 
perpetuating the problem of accountability; there is no applicable countermeasure that could be 
taken for this situation. 
 
These issues of accountability, transfer of funds, and non-compliance with agreements, as my 
interviewees suggested, continuously occupied the agenda of SUS negotiation forums. According 
to the perception of one Ministry of Health official who participated in CIB meetings in various 
regions of the country for almost two years, this preponderance of matters relating to financial 
resources prevented other subjects from being discussed in these forums.
153
 Thus, municipalities 
are prevented from advancing in the discussion and negotiation of other issues related to 
pharmaceutical assistance, which, consequently, will not reach CIT’s agenda. 
                                                          
152
 Health is co-funded by the three government tiers; interruption in federal transfer of funds would 
compromise the delivery of health services in the municipalities. 
153
 There are steps to be followed until a theme or subject reaches the CIT’s agenda, which is the last step in 
the negotiations between the federal entities that are part of SUS. As discussed in Chapter One, the first step 
in general entails the discussion of this issue in the municipality and then, if deemed important, this is 
brought to the agenda of the CIB, which is the ultimate forum within the state. The CIB brings together 
representatives of the state health secretariat and the municipalities within the area. 
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Ideology and party political influences  
In my work, partisan political influence was another aspect of federative relationship that had 
repercussions on the course taken, and on the results achieved by the decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance. My interviewees associated the high turnover of officials in the 
executive branch with limited progress in the implementation of the decentralised pharmaceutical 
assistance.
 154
  
 
According to accounts from my interviewees, the lack of continuity in work teams was one of the 
consequences of partisan political influence. Interviewees reasoned that in the states where partisan 
political influence in the choice of leaders was less frequent, health work teams remained for longer 
in the health secretariat. Permanence of staff was associated with incremental and steady 
development of the pharmaceutical assistance, which in turn was translated into improvements in 
access to medicines. The states of Ceará and Paraná were the two examples used by my 
interviewees to explain their perception that the stability in the work teams was linked to good 
performance of pharmaceutical assistance. In these cases, the work teams were identified as more 
committed to the pacts in force because their leaders participated in the negotiation of these 
instruments. In the words of one of my interviewees, for those leaders, ‘the health of the population 
is above partisan interests’. My findings concerning political partisan influence in Ceará and Paraná 
contradict Arretche’s (2000) analysis of the decentralisation of health care in these states. 
According to Arretche (2000:73), in these two states successive governors of the same political 
party were responsible for continuity experienced in the policies of health, which in turn resulted in 
better outcomes. Whereas Arretche associated continuity in health policies with no changes (or 
continuity) in the governor’s political party, my interviewees suggested that continuity in policies 
was associated with less political partisan influence, which resulted in low turnover in work teams. 
 
The partisan political alignment of state or municipal leaders with the federal and state level, 
respectively, was also mentioned as a factor that influenced federative relationships concerning 
pharmaceutical assistance. Where federal and subnational authorities were from the same political 
party, policies were usually followed as agreed, while where they were from opposing parties, local 
authorities used their self-rule power to oppose to national policies. One example of this 
confrontational approach was provided by one of my interviewees from Sao Paulo: “[b]ecause here 
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 In Brazil, as a rule of thumb, after elections the executive branch has a significant staff turnover. There is 
a strong partisan influence in the appointment of state and municipal secretaries and other prominent 
positions in the structure of the health secretariats. 
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in São Paulo it was always like this: if the federal government wants this, then the state does not do 
that”. 
 
Thus, two negative aspects in the development of pharmaceutical assistance were associated with 
the political party influences: high turnover, which was associated with failure to comply with the 
covenants that govern decentralisation, and a confrontational approach, resulting in lack of 
standardisation of services throughout the country. Although my research has investigated only the 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance, I would suggest that the findings apply to the general 
decentralisation of health in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is plausible to argue that the negative 
influence of the high staff turnover in the health secretariat will not be restricted just to 
pharmaceutical assistance, which is part of the health system. 
 
The data I gathered lead me to identify three conditions, all related to the state level, which are 
associated with successful initiatives. The first of these conditions is the pre-existing infrastructure 
and administrative capability within the state. Secondly, there is stability in work teams (as a result 
of lesser political partisan influence on the appointment of the most important positions in the 
hierarchy of the secretariat of health). Lastly, there is the engagement of the state health secretariat 
in the implementation of the decentralisation. The role of the health secretariat is related to the 
fulfilment of all responsibilities provided in the statutory framework (mainly technical assistance, 
and coordination), compliance with the pacts and also acting as a 'buffer' absorbing and 
counterbalancing the deficiencies of the smaller municipalities. State level administration was 
pointed out as a central piece in the process in situations where the implementation of 
decentralisation was successful and brought improvements in access to medicines, but also in those 
examples of failure. Within the accounts of my interviews, however, there are more negative than 
positive examples, suggesting that the state level is more frequently not playing its expected role 
according to the legal framework and agreements signed.  
 
The identification of these three conditions helped me understanding how the responsibilities and 
powers distributed by decentralisation could result in improvements in access to medicines which I 
highlight as an important finding of my research. At the same time, the accounts of my 
interviewees suggested that in states where these three conditions were not found, in many cases, 
public provision of basic medicines worsened when decentralisation was implemented, especially 
at the beginning of the process. 
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While this section has highlighted how the state level figures as a major player for the success (and 
the failure) of decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance, in the next section I will explore my 
main findings with relation to the access to medicines after decentralisation. 
 
 
8.4 Basic pharmaceutical assistance and access to medicines after decentralisation 
As discussed above, decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance was motivated by problems with 
access to basic medicines, but did public provision of basic medicines improve with 
decentralisation?  
 
Pharmaceutical assistance structuring 
When asked, all my interviewees considered that basic pharmaceutical assistance improved as a 
result of decentralisation. The responsibilities, powers and financial funds transferred were seen by 
my interviewees as instrumental to the development of the municipal structure devoted to 
pharmaceutical assistance. To implement the new roles and responsibilities related to the supply of 
medicines, municipalities needed to develop new administrative capabilities to take on planning, 
purchasing, storage and dispensing of basic medicines. This improvement in the structure of 
municipalities dedicated to pharmaceutical assistance resulted, in a certain extent, in better public 
provision of medicines. 
 
Changes in access that followed decentralisation 
Improvement in access was pointed out as the main strength of the decentralised pharmaceutical 
assistance. Based on their experience as health secretaries, my interviewees suggested that 
regularity in provision of basic medicines was an important change that followed decentralisation. 
In particular, drugs to treat hypertension and diabetes were made available consistently, although it 
was not the case in all regions of the country.  
 
Despite this perception of improvement in basic pharmaceutical assistance, there are no consistent 
and reliable systems for monitoring and recording indicators of access to medicines in SUS. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, studies evaluating access to medicines in Brazil are not 
comprehensive enough. They only provide a snapshot of the situation rather than a full picture of 
the situation of public availability of medicines around the country. The lack of indicators and 
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monitoring system were pointed out, mainly by the Ministry of Health officials I interviewed, as an 
important barrier to the development of basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
 
Narratives about improvements in regularity and availability of medicines were not consistent. If 
on the one hand they suggested that shortage was less frequent and access reached broad coverage, 
on the other hand interviewees agreed that shortages remain in virtually all regions of the country. 
My interviewees acknowledged that the public provision of medicines fell short of the universal 
coverage recommended by SUS. This view expressed by my interviewees was corroborated by the 
Brazilian Auditing Tribunal, which reported poor performance of basic pharmaceutical assistance 
around the country in 2010, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
An unmistakable sign that the availability of medicines remains insufficient to meet the demands of 
SUS patients is judicialisation. As discussed in Chapter Six, this phenomenon refers to the use of 
lawsuits against the government (federal, state or municipal level) to obtain prescription drugs not 
available in SUS pharmacies. While judicialisation started with patients demanding medicines to 
treat AIDS and cancer, lately it has become more widespread and included even basic medicines. 
This phenomenon of using the court to seek the fulfilment of the right to medicines provided in the 
SUS legal framework has reached major proportions in the last ten years. Remarkably, data from 
my interviews suggested that judicialisation, or rather, a decrease in legal cases requiring 
medication, was used by health secretaries as a proxy indicator of improvement in access to 
medicines. 
 
Barriers to the progress 
If SUS provision of medicines did not improve as expected after decentralisation, what were the 
barriers to further progress on access as perceived by my interviewees? A broad range of structural 
issues already discussed were pointed out, such as regional differences, low management capability 
(both municipal and state level), insufficient financial resources and absence of tools and indicators 
for monitoring. Other factors, however, are related to the design and organisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance policy within the SUS structure, namely, the fragmentation of pharmaceutical assistance 
and lack of integration between dispensation of medicines and health care. 
 
Considering the decentralised setting and the federative arrangement, what all barriers have in 
common is that any strategy to solve the problems identified here will necessarily require 
negotiations in all SUS forums of agreement prior to implementation. As extensively discussed in 
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Chapter Five, the agreement process entailed is laborious and time consuming. Moreover, 
considering the autonomy and self-rule power of states and municipalities, implementation will not 
necessarily be standardised throughout all regions. This scenario led me to conclude that these 
barriers and difficulties with decentralisation discouraged federal government from strengthening 
decentralisation and drove it to launch a centralised strategy to deliver basic medicines. In this 
regard, while SUS subnational actors struggled in implementing decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance, the federal government created, in 2004, an ambitious programme to 
improve access to basic medicines. The Popular Pharmacy (FP) programme bypassed the main 
obstacles associated with the federative arrangement. In the next section I will discuss my main 
findings related to this controversial programme. 
 
 
8.5 Popular pharmacy programme: an alternative way of providing access to medicines 
Taking into consideration the elements I discussed in the previous sections related to access to 
medicines and the decentralised strategy to manage basic pharmaceutical assistance, it is evident 
that availability of basic medicines was not sufficient to meet the demands even with the 
implementation of the NMP. This failure to make basic medicines consistently available for SUS 
patients helps us to understand, at least in part, how the Popular Pharmacy programme emerged 
and developed within the decentralised setting. In my interviews, the initiative aroused strong 
views that showed a clear separation between Ministry of Health officials, who all defend the 
programme, and my other interviewees, who criticised it. 
 
Especially in Chapter Seven of my thesis, I explored how the Popular Pharmacy programme was 
created and implemented without significant participation of states and municipalities, and how it 
impacted on the decentralised setting of basic pharmaceutical assistance. For this discussion it is 
important to review some key characteristics of this programme. The implementation of the 
initiative went through three stages. When launched in 2004, it was managed and delivered by the 
Ministry of Health in public facilities and exclusively employed users’ co-payment. In the second 
stage the programme was expanded using the community pharmacies network. In the third stage 
drugs to treat diabetes, hypertension and asthma started to be distributed free of charge. It is worth 
noting that, initially, the Ministry of Health rationale for implementing the FP programme was to 
provide basic medicines at subsidised prices to Brazilian citizens who, despite having private health 
plans, could not afford to pay for out-of-pocket medicines because of their low family budget. 
Thus, at the beginning, the FP was targeted at non-SUS patients.  
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In my interviews, the feature of user co-payment, applied for the first time in the public health 
system, proved to be very controversial. On the one hand, this feature differentiated the FP 
programme from other initiatives of public provision of medicines and, in some way, as the 
accounts of my interviewees suggested, contributed to the perception of disconnection between the 
FP programme and SUS, to which I will turn shortly. On the other hand, co-payment was one 
aspect of the initiative that caused much criticism from municipal and state health secretaries, the 
National Health Council (the higher instance of SUS), and academia because co-payment was seen 
as going against the principle of free access to healthcare (which includes medicines), as enshrined 
in the Brazilian Constitution.  
 
The second stage also generated controversy. In 2006, the federal government expanded the FP 
programme to incorporate accredited community pharmacies. Underlying this expansion was the 
undeniable issue of insufficient availability of medicines in SUS pharmacies, as already discussed 
in Chapter Six. The Ministry of Health’s choice to use private partners to improve the coverage of 
the programme was much criticised because financial resources were being invested in the private 
sector instead of improving the public sector.  
 
Criticism of users’ co-payment was somehow neutralised in the implementation of the third stage 
of the FP when diabetes and hypertension drugs started to be distributed free. As highlighted in 
Chapter Seven, according to a Ministry of Health official, these drugs represented 76% of all drugs 
distributed by the service, and, therefore, a significant proportion of users started to receive free 
drugs. 
 
Even if the co-payment issue was at least partially solved, the partnership between the federal 
government and the private sector still causes dissatisfaction. As previously mentioned, state and 
municipal health secretaries advocated that investments used in the FP should go to SUS, not to the 
private sector. As a result of that federal priority, the programme has received major financial 
investments that allowed its rapid expansion throughout the country by using the capillarity of the 
community pharmacies network. 
 
Although subnational actors disagreed with many points related to the FP programme and had 
reservations about its implementation strategy, they agreed that the FP improved the availability of 
medicines. In fact, narratives revealed that as a consequence of better availability of medicines, 
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consistency in distribution, and the high numbers of community pharmacies, SUS patients are 
migrating to the FP. This migration was approved and even encouraged by some municipal health 
secretaries. At first sight this position may seem puzzling, but the accounts of my interviewees 
suggested that the FP is seen by health secretaries as a means to relieve the pressure for provision 
of basic medicines. My interviewees also suggested that health secretaries do not see the FP as 
interference in the decentralised system managed by the municipality by the Ministry of Health, or 
think of it as recentralisation.  
 
Debate about recentralisation was avoided 
Another puzzling question about this programme, which I tried to answer in my research, was how 
a centralised programme entered the decentralised SUS setting without resulting in major 
confrontations with subnational actors. My research demonstrated that understanding how the FP 
programme was created is important in answering this question. Three of my interviewees provided 
narratives on the influence of the President of the Republic on the creation and expansion of the 
programme. FP was created during President Lula’s rule, and six years later was part of the 
electoral platform of the following candidate, President Dilma. 
 
The programme, which is clearly identified as a federal initiative,
155
 had significant results in the 
availability of medicines contrasting with the historical shortage faced by municipal public 
pharmacies. In fact, positive results obtained with the programme, and its potential impact on 
voters’ preference, made even the opposition presidential candidate José Serra156 to include the FP 
programme, created by his political adversary, in his electoral platform. Corroborating with this 
evaluation of the political importance of the FP is the fact that after President Dilma’s election, one 
of her first announcements was the distribution, free of charge, of diabetes and hypertension drugs 
by the FP programme. The strong commitment of the federal government to the implementation of 
the initiative, the political power and financial resources given to it are, without doubt, important 
elements in explaining the role this programme currently plays in the provision of basic medicines. 
 
Another element that contributes to the understanding of the commitment to this programme is 
related to the private sector partnership and its contributions to the improvement in access to 
medicines. My interviews with Ministry of Health officials suggested that the federal government 
                                                          
155
 It is compulsory the exhibition of a standard banner in the community pharmacies accredited in the FP 
programme, which should contain the logos of the Ministry of Health and federal government. Moreover, 
television adverts also portrays FP as a federal government initiative.  
156
 José Serra was defeated by Dilma Roussef in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. 
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found in the private sector the solution to overcome the barriers for the development of the basic 
pharmaceutical assistance. Private sector assets, such as the widespread network of pharmacies, 
human resources, administrative capability, and consistent availability of medicines ready to be 
dispensed, were employed to solve historical failures experienced in SUS pharmaceutical 
assistance services. Moreover, another characteristic of the private partnership relates to funding. 
Community pharmacies receive payment for the drugs distributed directly from the federal 
government. Unlike in SUS, where the decentralised model entails co-funding by the three tiers, in 
this case, there was no counterpart contribution or negotiations in agreement forums. As 
highlighted in Chapter Six, in the view of one Ministry of Health official, partnership with the 
private sector avoided lengthy negotiations and dependence on the fulfilment of agreements. 
Moreover, as no counterpart contributions were involved, it simplified the overall process. 
 
In sum, the FP programme introduced a new strong actor (the private sector) and new mechanisms 
(co-payment and private facilities) to the process of public provision of basic medicines. The 
initiative was implemented without effective participation of state and municipal health secretaries 
in the design and implementation. Remarkably, both the exclusion of these actors, and the whole 
approach taken by the federal government run contrary to the decentralisation strategies that have 
been built up over the years in pharmaceutical assistance. As I discussed in Chapter Five, my 
interviewees pointed out the importance of the forums of agreement and the processes of 
negotiation introduced by decentralisation. Therefore it is plausible to ask why the excluded 
subnational actors did not confront the Ministry of Health decision to launch a programme in 
partnership with the private sector to distribute the same drugs that SUS should distribute. Based on 
my interviews, I argue that the federal government succeeded in avoiding major opposition by 
using at least three strategies. Firstly, the federal level did not change the legal framework 
regarding the responsibilities of subnational actors. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the 
Ministry of Health used separate financial resources to fund the FP and SUS pharmaceutical 
assistance.
157
 And lastly, the federal level evoked the ‘right to health’ (and medicines) 
constitutional principle to justify the programme. No pro-decentralisation discourse could 
contradict this argument. 
 
 
 
                                                          
157
 As discussed in Chapter Seven, the federal government states that it does not decrease the transfer of 
federal funds for SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance. In 2013, however, the federal government allocated 
R$2 billion to the FP, while R$1.23 billion were allocated to SUS basic pharmaceutical assistance. 
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8.6 Contributions to existing scholarship  
This thesis has three main contributions to scholarship, particularly in the fields of decentralisation, 
fiscal federalism, and policy research. My research offers new insights in the study of 
decentralisation policies by raising awareness of how, seemingly paradoxically, decentralisation 
can enable (re)centralisation. My work also shows that political gains (such as electoral gains) can 
motivate national government to double fund the provision of health services, opposing the 
expected transferring of responsibility for expending to subnational actors. The work also 
evidenced that the limitations and difficulties inherent to federative relationships involved in the 
implementation of a decentralised policy can be used to justify partnerships with the private sector, 
and (re)centralisation. 
 
8.6.1 Contribution to decentralisation research 
One way in which this thesis has contributed to advance decentralisation research is through its 
focus on exploring the interplay between centralised and decentralised modes of implementation. 
By offering an explanation on how federal government can divert attention from centralisation, my 
thesis adds to the Exworthy et al.’s (2010:8) work who found that policy attention on 
decentralisation can mask the opposite, namely that centralisation is taking place.  
 
In the case of Brazil, decentralisation in itself and the complexity of intergovernmental 
relationships involved were important elements that facilitated the implementation of the FP 
programme, a centralised initiative to provide medicines. As a result, the federal government has 
implemented, in parallel, a centralised programme to perform the same activities that were being 
devolved to states and municipalities, thereby taking advantage of the weaknesses and difficulties 
experienced by subnational actors in the decentralisation process. Another circumstance that, in the 
Brazilian case, contributed to the masking of (re)centralisation was the unquestionable commitment 
of SUS and its leaders to decentralisation. In the views of subnational actors (as indicated by my 
interviewees) decentralisation was unchangeable for having been enshrined in the constitution.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter seven, unlike in Europe (especially in Nordic countries), that has had a 
tradition of decentralised governance, and in the 2000s had important health functions 
recentralised, in Brazil (re)centralisation and decentralisation of basic pharmaceutical assistance 
occurred concomitantly. The awareness of differences in approach to policy implementation are of 
interest to those studying health reforms and offers an opportunity to compare the strategies to 
recentralise the provision of medicines conducted in Brazil and the recentralisation of health 
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services recently implemented in Europe. Those differences could contribute to the on-going 
debate on recentralisation of health care in European countries. 
 
8.6.2 Contribution to studies on fiscal federalism 
My findings challenge the understanding reached by scholars of decentralization in the tradition of 
the theory of fiscal federalism, who state that the federal government seeks, first and foremost, to 
get rid of the responsibility for spending. Considering this tradition, in a decentralised environment, 
Garman et al. (2001) argue that we would expect federal government to be more inclined to 
transfer responsibilities than the resources to meet them.  
 
In the case of pharmaceutical services in Brazil, as discussed in Chapter seven, the federal 
government doubled the funding for the provision of basic medicines after decentralisation. At the 
same time that the federal level kept the transfer of funds to municipalities to co-finance the 
decentralised provision of basic medicines, they funded the FP programme. In this circumstance, 
the political gains provided by a centralised programme led to the subversion of the economic logic 
advocated by the theory of fiscal federalism. Thus, it is plausible to infer that, in the name of 
political gains, national governments can decide not to transfer expenditure responsibilities to local 
governments, and scholars should examine this aspect when studying decentralisation policies. 
 
8.6.3 Contribution to policy research 
My thesis contributes to advance policy research by exploring intergovernmental relationships 
related to pharmaceutical assistance, offering a new view on the implementation of a contested 
policy. My work shows that the federal government used the ‘limitations' or 'difficulties' inherent to 
the Brazilian federal arrangement (as for example, the autonomy of states and municipalities and 
the lengthy negotiations preceding the implementation of policies) to justify the implementation of 
a centralised initiative, the FP programme, producing significant political gains.  
 
As discussed in Chapter seven, with regards to the provision of medicines, states and municipal 
levels are interdependent and the distribution of medicines is based on intertwined actions 
performed by both tiers. The strategy used by the federal government to introduce the FP took 
advantage of this interdependence between states and municipalities. Besides the inherent 
contradictions with the principles of decentralisation of the SUS, the federal government managed 
to construct the FP to be acceptable and even attractive to both levels.  
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The circumstances that allowed decentralisation and centralisation to happen concomitantly is also 
important to explain the success of the federal government in implementing the FP. The difficulties 
experienced by state and municipal secretaries in the course of implementation of the 
decentralisation dominated the agenda of discussion on SUS, diverting the attention from FP and, 
in a certain extent; FP had time to be consolidate and to improve availability of medicines. The 
satisfactory performance of FP resulted in a positive feedback and, at the same time, the 
programme has gained increasing importance in the scenario of public provision of medicines. The 
federal government transformed a “quicksand” policy – the provision of drugs within a complex 
federative arrangement – into an initiative planted in a fertile and firm ground for the proliferation 
of political dividends. This success was possible because the federal level managed to avoid major 
confrontation with subnational actors (see Chapter seven) in the conduction of FP’s 
implementation. My findings indicate that policy scholars should be aware that national 
governments’ ingenious approaches to enable policy implementation may even contradict the legal 
framework if this results in political gains. 
 
 
8.7 Limitations of the study  
My study has a number of limitations. Amongst these were the constraints on time and funds that 
prevented me from conducting more interviews.
158
 I conducted the interviews in Brazil over a short 
period of time, so it was difficult to arrange all interviews in that time-span, and in two cases I 
could not wait for interviews which had been cancelled to be rescheduled before I had to leave the 
country to return to the UK. Although I planned to interview most of the participants in Brasilia, 
where the important SUS forums and most Ministry of Health officials are based, there were some 
potential informants from other regions of the country that I could not interview because I did not 
have the funds or time to travel to their locations. Another aspect of having a short time-span to 
conduct the interviews relates to the impossibility of transcribing the interviews immediately, as I 
intended in the first place. In order to minimise the inconvenience of missing some of the thoughts 
and impressions I tape-recorded my perceptions or any other information immediately after each 
interview when possible. 
 
                                                          
158
 I was living in the UK but travelled to Brazil to conduct the interviews in 2011, during the second year of 
my PhD. This was an expensive trip and I could not afford to return for more interviews. Moreover, I had a 
leave period of three years from my employer to complete my PhD. 
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Personal bias is an important methodological limitation inherent to elite interviews, and to 
minimise its effects on my analysis I used multiple sources and checked some interviewees’ claims 
in policy documents when possible. It was especially useful in those cases where it was difficult for 
me to distinguish in interviewees’ accounts what was actually implemented from what remained as 
a plan or policy goal. The chronology of certain steps of the decentralisation process was not clear 
in certain accounts, so I cross-checked these with other sources. As noted by Berry (2002:680), 
“[i]nterviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective 
and to tell us the truth.” In my work it was important to be aware of this inevitable lack of 
objectivity in my participants.  
 
Although I managed to include the three tiers of the government quite successfully – I interviewed 
health secretaries from different regions of the country and key informants in the Ministry of 
Health – this research would also have profited from the views of users or patients. Through such 
interviews I would explore the perspectives of representatives of patients’ associations, for example 
diabetes and hypertension associations from each region of the country. In my work I focused on 
the views of those SUS actors involved in policy-making and implementation. Patients’ perceptions 
and experiences would certainly provide fresher and different insights about access to basic 
medicines in Brazil. Although this approach could bring new perspectives, and compensate for 
some of the limitations of my study, I consider this an opportunity for further research, which I will 
develop in the next section. 
 
 
8.8 Suggestions for future research 
The investigation of what agreement of pharmaceutical assistance policy in CIT means for each of 
the three levels of the federation is another point of great interest which I would like to investigate. 
As we are reminded by Walt (1994:73), power relations are at the core of every health policy 
process. The role of the government bodies involved in policy-making and policy-decisions, and 
the power shared in federative states, are also important elements in this equation. In my work I 
investigated, to some extent, the interplay between the tiers of government regarding the 
negotiations to decentralise and implement pharmaceutical assistance policy. In fact, the process of 
agreement was very much valued, and frequently highlighted by my interviewees, but it was not 
possible to further explore what this meant to each of the actors involved. Therefore, to explore 
what is actually agreed in SUS forums and how this process occurs would be of value in advancing 
the debate about power relations in health policy-making. In such future research, in addition to 
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interviews, I would systematically use observation of CIT and CIB meetings, the proceedings of 
CONASS and CONASEMS meetings, and the minutes generated in these meetings.  
 
With regards to the FP programme, the investigation of the impact of this initiative in states and 
municipalities where SUS pharmaceutical assistance was successful would be very useful to 
conclude if the FP is competing with SUS for patients, or if the FP is only filling in the deficiencies 
in medicine provision that SUS was unable to solve. With respect to this particular field, a case 
study with the Paraná Consortium of Medicines and the role of the FP programme in that state 
would certainly offer a new perspective for decentralisation studies in Brazil. 
 
 
8.9 Concluding remarks 
As these discussions have indicated, the decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil and 
its impact on access is a complex subject. My interviewees’ assessments and experiences of how 
the process was conducted and its outcomes are ambivalent and sometimes contradictory. Overall, 
decentralisation was seen as an important step to improve the organisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance and the access to basic medicines. The expected improvement in access, however, was 
not achieved evenly around the country. Decentralisation in itself was not sufficient for improving 
access (or service standards) in less developed regions. Moreover, decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance was associated with increased inequalities, contributing to deepening the 
existing regional differences in health delivery. SUS forums of agreement are seen as very 
important in the policy process for subnational actors, whereas their proceedings are seen as 
laborious and time-consuming by Ministry of Health officials. Regarding the agreements between 
the three tiers of government to manage pharmaceutical assistance, the lack of compliance with the 
pacts by the state level was pointed out as one of the main barriers to improving access to 
medicines. In this context of struggle to improve access, the implementation of the FP programme 
controlled by the federal government (and delivered by community pharmacies) aroused 
contradictory assessments. The programme has achieved high coverage and consistent availability 
of basic medicines in a short time-span. Municipal health secretaries criticised federal investment 
in the programme, but they acknowledge that FP decreases the demand for drugs in SUS, relieving 
the burden on the municipality. Although it is centrally controlled, the federal government 
managed to avoid major opposition from subnational actors to this centralised programme by 
portraying it as an initiative that does not interfere in the decentralised setting of pharmaceutical 
assistance. 
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My findings suggest that there is no clear indication of whether decentralisation or centralisation is 
the best alternative for improving access to basic medicines in Brazil. Both approaches worked 
well in some contexts but failed in others. I believe that the theme and findings of my research will 
be useful for other scholars and policy-makers interested in decentralisation. With this thesis I offer 
a panorama of the policies, relationships and issues involved in Brazilian pharmaceutical assistance 
for provision of basic medicines, which researchers could draw on for further investigations. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1  
 
TIMELINE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK RELATED TO BASIC 
PHARMACEUTICAL ASSISTANCE IN BRAZIL  
 
1971 Creation of the Central of Medicines (CEME – Central de Medicamentos) 
1987 The CEME launches the Basic Pharmacy an initiative to distribute to municipalities 48 
drugs within RENAME list to meet the needs of 3,000 inhabitants for a period of six months. 
1997 CEME was extinct. 
Health Ministry establishes Basic Pharmacy Programme (PFB) based on similar assumptions to 
those of CEME basic pharmacy (i.e. drug sets to serve about 3,000 inhabitants in cities with up to 
21,000 inhabitants). Medicines, acquired by Ministry of Health, were sent to distribution poles 
located in each region of the country. Subsequently, the PFB was reformulated, excluding the states 
from participating, as opposed to the emerging process of decentralisation/organisation in progress 
in various units of the federation regarding pharmaceutical assistance. 
1998 Launching of National Medicines Policy (NMP). Main changes are related to 
decentralisation of pharmaceutical assistance management, promotion of rational drug use, 
effectiveness of distribution in the public sector, and initiatives to reduce the prices of medicines 
including out-of-pocket. 
1999 Ministry of Health Order 176 established specific financial incentives for Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance – IAFB,159 as well as criteria and requirements for qualification of 
                                                          
159
 IAFB-Incentive to Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance was a special source of funding established by the 
Ministry of Health in 1999. The funds to finance the purchase of medicines are: 50% from the federal 
government, 25% from states, and 25% from municipalities. The total value proposed by Ministry of Health 
approved by the Tripartite Intergovernmental Commission (CIT) was R$ 2.00 (approximately 70p) per 
inhabitant/year (federal contribution: R$ 1.00 per inhabitant/year and state and municipal level contribution 
of at least R$ 0.50 per capita/year each). 
Federal funds are transferred by the National Health Fund to the respective state and local health funds, in 
monthly instalments in proportion to the number of inhabitants of the municipalities.  
As a condition to access the IAFB states have to develop the State Plan of Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance 
to be updated and approved annually by the Bipartite Intergovernmental Commission (CIB). This Plan 
should include: i) a list of basic medicines for Pharmaceutical Care to be purchased with this resource, ii) the 
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municipalities and responsibilities agreed between the three management levels of SUS. The IAFB 
unlike the Basic Pharmacy Programme (PFB – Programa Farmácia Básica), included all the 
municipalities independent of the number of inhabitants. The ordinance also provided for the 
participation of state and municipal managers in the financing and management processes. This 
was considered the first step towards effective decentralisation of the pharmaceutical assistance in 
Primary Care. 
2001 Initiatives for centralised acquisition of basic medicines. Despite the process of 
decentralisation the Ministry of Health started to acquire and distribute a set of drugs designed to 
support strategies and activities of basic care, including the Family Health Programme (PSF). Some 
of the drugs contained in the set overlapped those financed by the IAFB as for example the diabetes 
and hypertension drugs. Moreover, Ministry of Health officials dealt directly with PSF teams of 
municipal health secretaries excluding the participation of the state level in this initiative. 
2002 Medicines to treat diabetes and hypertension were purchased by the Ministry of Health and 
distributed directly to municipalities. 
2003- First year of Lula’s presidency. This year was marked by changes in the structure of the 
Ministry of Health departments. It was also the beginning of negotiations between CONASS 
(National Council of State Health Secretaries) and the Ministry of Health about Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance decentralisation policies. 
2004 - In May 2004, National Health Council (CNS) approved the National Policy for 
Pharmaceutical Assistance (PNAF). Decentralization of basic pharmaceutical assistance was set up 
as the strategic priority of this policy.  
2004 - In June, the Ministry of Health launched the Popular Pharmacy Programme, to improve the 
availability of essential medicines. The programme introduced the users’ co-payment. Users pay 
10% of the costs out-of-pocket, and the government subsidises up to 90%. The programme was 
coordinated and executed by the Ministry of Health and the (public) Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
(FIOCRUZ) through public pharmacies (SUS-‘owned’ pharmacies) dedicated to the programme. 
2005 - In July, the Ministry of Health regulated the Basic Pharmaceutical Assistance, increased the 
minimum value of IAFB, and started the transfer of funds to municipalities and states for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
adhesion mechanisms and a degree of accountability of the municipalities; iii) the covenant of resource 
management, with the establishment of values for state and local contributions, and iv) the systematic 
programming, monitoring and evaluation of its implementation in the state.  
The Ministry of Health set the minimum list of drugs to be acquired by Incentive Basic Pharmaceutical 
Assistance. 
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purchasing of some basic drugs. The purchase of medicines for diabetes and hypertension remained 
centralised under the Ministry of Health. 
2005- Negotiations between the Ministry of Health, states and municipalities regarding the Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance led to the definition of two groups of medicines related to primary care: 
-Strategic (set of drugs whose responsibility for acquisition and/or financing was of the Ministry of 
Health): hypertension and diabetes, including insulin, asthma and rhinitis, women's health, 
nutrition, and tobacco control. 
-Decentralised (funded by the IAFB with contributions from the Ministry of Health, states and 
municipalities): According to CIB and CIT agreements in, purchasing would be states or 
municipalities’ responsibility. 
2006 – A ministerial ordinance established that the decentralisation of financial resources for the 
acquisition of medicines to treat diabetes and hypertension depended on agreements in CIT and 
later in CIB forums.  
2006- Pacto pela Saude- ‘Pact for Health’ was approved by the CIT in January 2006. The pact is 
an agreement in which managers at every level of government were committed to complying with 
health objectives and responsibilities. The Pact aimed to establish joint responsibility in SUS more 
clearly, in which all managers were considered to be invested with full responsibilities, replacing 
the former accreditation process with a new system where they should observe the Statement of 
Commitment and Management (TCG). The TCG has goals and objectives of the Pact for Health, 
duties and responsibilities of each manager and corresponding monitoring indicators. Another 
important element introduced by the Pact concerned the financial resources that changed from 
monthly payments linked to the service delivered, to ‘block funding’ corresponding to a certain 
amount of money to finance the services required to reach the targets agreed in the TCG. Financial 
incentives for the development of management and planning capabilities were also provided under 
this new scheme of funding. 
2006- The Popular Pharmacy Programme was extended to the community pharmacies network. 
This expansion was called Aqui Tem Farmácia Popular (‘There is a Popular Pharmacy Here’). At 
this stage existing community pharmacies entered into a contract with the Ministry of Health. This 
second stage of the programme was implemented rapidly, and participating community 
pharmacies grew from 2,955 in 2006 to 20,225 in 2011.  
2011 - The third stage of the Popular Pharmacy programme was implemented with the initiative 
Saude Não Tem Preço (‘Health is Priceless’). This stage started the distribution, free of charge, of 
drugs to treat diabetes and hypertension in ‘owned’ and community pharmacies. In addition to 
 263 
 
these free medicines, FP is still dispensing drugs in the co-payment scheme for the treatment of 
cholesterol, osteoporosis, Parkinson's disease, glaucoma, rhinitis and dyslipidemia, as well as 
providing contraceptives and geriatric diapers. Currently, the FP programme offers 25 items, of 
which 14 are distributed free of charge and the other nine being sold with a discount of up to 90%.  
2012- The distribution, free of charge, of medicines to treat asthma was introduced by the Popular 
Pharmacy programme. 
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Appendix 2- Description of studies measuring medicines access in Brazil (1998 to 2009). 
Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
National Studies 
Cosendey 
2000 
National; Multi-
centre study in 5 
states 
(AC,AM,GO,PE 
and RJ) to evaluate 
the implementation 
of Farmácia Basica 
programme 
1999 
Multiple case study Public Health Units in 12 
municipalities in 5 states; 75 
informants involved in the 
management of the programme (5 
from national level, 4 regional 
and 66 at the municipal level; 
116 health service patients 
Standard set 
of 40 essential 
medicines 
distributed by 
the PFB1 
Public 
Health 
Units 
General 
availability 
of the FBP 
drugs 
according to 
WHO 
definition  
 
52.81%  - 83.46% 
The goal 
according to 
WHO is 95% 
Karnikowis
k 2004 
National; 11  
Metropolitan areas 
distributed in the 5 
geographical 
regions of Brazil 
2002 
Cross-sectional  in 
primary care health 
units; instrument 
developed by  the 
authors 
Public Health service patients;  
50 Public Health Units  
61 drugs 
distributed 
over 13 of  the 
19 
pharmacologi
cal groups 
comprise on 
the 
RENAME2 
Public 
Health 
Units 
 55.4%   
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Carvalho 
2005 
National 
2003 
Medicine utilization. 
Cross-sectional study 
based on survey 
designed by the  WHO 
to evaluate health 
systems performance of 
the member countries 
(adapted to Brazil) 
Population based study: 
5000 adults, 18 years or older, 5 
thousand households, 250 census 
tracts, 188 cities, 25 estates 
11 groups of 
medicines 
Househ
old 
survey 
   87% had 
succeeded in 
obtaining all 
medication 
prescribed. 
Within the 
13% of 
patients that 
failed in 
obtaining their 
medication, 
55% of them 
alleged lack of 
money.  
 
Emmerick 
2009 
OPAS 2005 
Multi-centre study 
in 5 states 
(ES,GO,PA,RS,SE) 
2004 
Descriptive cross 
sectional study based on 
survey designed by 
WHO about medicines 
access/use (adapted for 
Brazil) 
Households, of all ages, acute 
illness in the last two weeks, in 
916 houses, five states, two cities 
in each state 
RENAME 
and set of 
standard drugs 
distributed by  
PFB 
Househ
old 
survey 
 73%  65.7% 
Average time 
of supply 
shortage of 
medicines in 
SUS facilities 
was 84.1 days. 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Pinto 2010 National; 30 cities  
2007 
Methodology developed 
by the WHO in 
partnership with the 
Health Action 
International,  to 
compare medicines 
prices and a availability 
FP – Popular Pharmacy 
Programme in public (‘owned’) 
and community pharmacies 
 
Four selected 
drugs for 
hypertension 
and diabetes 
treatment  
 
Public 
and 
commun
ity 
pharmac
ies in 
the 
Popular 
Pharmac
y 
Program
me 
 Diabetes  
23.3% 
Hypertension 
86.7% 
Diabetes  
100% 
Hypertensio
n 100% 
 
Paniz 2008 Regional 
41 cities in South 
and Northeast 
Brazil 
2005 
Cross-sectional study, 
instrument developed 
by the researchers   
The sample included 4,060 adults 
(30 to 64years old) and 4,003 
elderly (65+) living in areas 
covered by primary health care 
clinics. 
Medicines to 
treat diabetes, 
hypertension 
and mental 
health 
conditions 
Househ
old 
survey  
Adults 
81.2% 
Elderly 87% 
Measured as 
access to all 
medicine 
needed last 
month 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Northern Region Studies 
Emmerick 
2009 
OPAS 2005 
Multi-centre study 
in 5 states 
(ES,GO,PA,RS,SE) 
2004 
 
Descriptive cross 
sectional study based on 
survey designed by 
WHO for households 
survey about medicines 
access/use (adapted for 
Brazil) 
Households, of all ages, acute 
illness in the last two weeks, in 
916 houses, five states, two cities 
each state 
Medicines for 
acute 
conditions 
Househ
old 
survey 
 65.7%  69.5% 
Cosendey 
2000 
National; Multi-
centre study in 5 
states (AC, AM, 
GO, PE and RJ) to 
evaluate the 
implementation of 
Programa 
Farmácia Básica 
(PFB)1 
1999 
Multiple case study Public Health Units in 12 
municipalities among the 5 states;  
116 health service patients 
Set of 40 
essential 
medicines 
distributed by 
the PFB 
Public 
Health 
Units 
   AC 63.37% 
AM 82.73% 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Northeastern Region Studies 
Cosendey 
2000 
National; Multi-
centre study in 5 
states (AC, AM, 
GO, PE and RJ) to 
evaluate the 
implementation of 
Programa 
Farmácia Básica 
1999 
Multiple case study Public Health Units in 12 
municipalities among the 5 states;  
116 health service patients 
Set of 40 
essential 
medicines 
distributed by 
the PFB 
Public 
Basic 
Health 
Units 
(UBS) 
 GO 78% 
(% of 
medicines 
available in 
the UBS) 
 PE 95.68 
GO 100% 
RJ 83.9% 
 
 
Emmerick 
2009 
OPAS 2005 
Multi-centre study 
in 5 states (ES, GO, 
PA, RS and SE) 
2004 
PA state 
Descriptive cross 
sectional study based on 
survey designed by 
WHO to evaluate 
medicines access/use 
(adapted for Brazil) 
Households, of all ages, acute 
illness in the last two weeks, in 
916 houses, five states, two cities 
each state 
For acute 
conditions 
Househ
old 
survey 
SE 75.5%   SE 54.9% 
GO 74% 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Midwestern Region Studies 
Cunha 2002 Municipal; 
Campo Grande-
MS 
1999 
Cross sectional study 
based on medicine 
indicators designed by 
WHO 
12 Public Health Units ;  713 
patients interviewed 
40 essential 
drugs  
Public 
Health 
Units 
87.2%   80.7% 
Naves 2005 Regional; Distrito 
Federal 
2001 
Cross sectional study 
based on medicine 
indicators  designed by 
WHO 
15 Public Health Units;  40 essential 
drugs  
Public 
Health 
Units 
83.2%   61.2% 
Siqueira 2009 Regional; Distrito 
Federal 
2006 
Cross sectional study 
based on medicine 
indicators  designed by 
WHO adapted by the 
researchers 
Board of Pharmaceutical 
Assistance of Distrito Federal; 2 
pharmaceutical supply centres;  
66 pharmacies or dispensaries; 
1330 users interviewed (20 per 
pharmacy) 
50 index 
drugs 
according to 
WHO 
guidelines 
Public 
Health 
Units 
 79.9%  63% 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Southwestern Region Studies 
Santos 2004 Municipal; Ribeirão 
Preto-SP 
1998 
Cross sectional study 
based on medicine 
indicators  designed by 
WHO 
10 Public Health Units All medicines 
the UBS was 
suppose to 
dispense 
according to 
REMUME4 
Public 
Health 
Units 
   60.3% 
Chaves 
2005 
Municipal, RJ 
2002 
 
Case study based on 
medicine indicators  
designed by WHO, 
adapted to Brazil 
01 Public Health Unit All medicines 
the UBS was 
suppose to 
dispense 
according to 
REMUME 
Public 
Health 
Units 
   65.3% 
Guerra 2004 Regional, MG 
2000 to 2001 
Survey 69 Health Units 21 index 
essential 
drugs within 
the PFB 
Public 
and 
Private 
Health 
Units 
and 
pharmac
ies 
81.2% in 
private 
pharmacies 
46.9%   
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Southern Region Studies 
Marcondes 
2002 
Municipal, Ponta 
Grossa, Parana State 
2001 
Descriptive study based 
on medicine indicators  
designed by WHO, 
adapted to Brazil 
20 Public Health Units All medicines 
the Unit was 
suppose to 
dispense 
according to 
REMUME 
Public 
Health 
Units 
   73% 
Bertoldi et 
al.2009 
Municipal, Pelotas, 
Rio Grande do Sul 
State 
2003 
Cross sectional study, 
survey, instrument 
developed by the 
researchers 
900 households, 2988 individuals 
of all ages, living in an area 
covered by assisted by the Saúde 
da Família3 programme 
All medicines 
the 
programme 
was suppose 
to dispense 
according to 
REMUME 
Househ
old 
survey 
96.4% 51% 41.5%  
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Mendis 
2007 
Multi-centre, 3 low– 
middle income 
countries (Brazil, 
only in 
Rio Grande do Sul 
state; Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka) and 
3low-income 
countries 
(Bangladesh, 
Malawi and Nepal) 
 2005 
Cross-sectional study, 
survey on medicine 
indicators adapted from 
WHO–Health Action 
International manual 
20 Public Health Units and 20 
private outlets (Brazil) 
32 medicines 
used to treat 
cardiovascular 
disease,  
diabetes, 
chronic 
respiratory 
disease, 
glaucoma and 
to provide 
palliative 
cancer care 
Public 
and 
Private 
Health 
Units 
and 
pharmac
ies 
 30%   
Dal Pizzol 
2010 
8 municipalities in 3 
states : Rio Grande 
do Sul, Santa 
Catarina e Mato 
Grosso do Sul 
2006-2008 
Multi-centre, 
longitudinal study, 24 
patients per month in 
each Health Unit 
participated on a 
survey, instrument 
developed by the 
researchers 
 
8 Public Health Units All medicines 
prescribed in 
the Health 
Units 
investigated 
Public 
Health 
Units 
 76.1% of  all 
medicines 
prescribed 
88.1% if only 
essential 
medicines 
prescribed 
were 
considered 
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Reference Scope/year of data 
collection 
Study Design Studied sample Evaluated 
Medicine 
Study 
focus 
% general 
availability  
% public 
availability 
(SUS 
facilities) 
% out-of-
pocket 
availability 
% prescribed 
drugs 
dispensed 
Bertoldi 
2010 
6 cities ( the capital 
plus 5 others) within 
the Rio Grande do 
Sul State 
2008-2009 
Cross-sectional study, 
survey on medicine 
indicators WHO 
methodology  
56 public and private pharmacies 50 medicines : 
29 were part 
of the 
WHO/HAI 
global and 
regional core 
lists, whereas 
the remainder 
list, were 
selected from 
the national 
(RENAME) 
and municipal 
(REMUME) 
lists of 
essential 
medicines 
Public 
and 
Private 
Health 
Units 
and 
pharmac
ies 
 69% 
90%  in 
Popular 
Pharmacy 
Programme 
  
 
1 PFB- Basic Pharmacy Programme 
2 RENAME- National Essential Medicines List 
3 ‘Health of the family’ programme 
4 REMUME - Municipal List of Essential Medicines 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
Topics/questions  
Set A- Municipal Health Secretaries members of the CONASEMS 
1. What do you understand by the terms “decentralisation” and “recentralisation” in 
the context of basic pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil? 
2. Do you have any thoughts on the extent of pharmaceutical assistance 
decentralisation in recent years? What has changed? 
3. In your view, why was pharmaceutical assistance decentralised? 
4. Who, in your view, had supported or advocated decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance? 
5. Was there anyone against decentralising pharmaceutical assistance?  
6. Who do you think has benefited the most from decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance? 
7. According to your experience, what is the strength of the pharmaceutical assistance 
policy, especially regarding essential drugs? And the main weakness? 
8. What is the main issue/barrier regarding the access to essential drugs? 
9. Tell me about municipality autonomy to manage pharmaceutical assistance of 
essential drugs. How about state autonomy? 
10.  How about the access to diabetes type 2 and hypertension drugs: what has changed 
with the decentralisation? 
11. Tell me about the influence/impact of the Popular Pharmacy Programme on the 
dynamics of delivery of diabetes type 2 and hypertension drugs by municipalities. 
No changes, synergism, competition with the private sector, or what else. 
12. Tell me about the municipalities’ participation on the policy-making process of the 
Popular Pharmacy Programme? 
13. What is the main issue regarding the access to essential drugs experienced by 
municipalities? 
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14. Tell me about the role of the states regarding essential drugs. Someone could play 
the same role or substitute actions of this government tier? Is the role of the state 
essential for municipalities? How about the federal level? Could its role be possibly 
transferred to other level? 
15. Do you have an example of municipal initiative or demand that resulted in changes 
in policies? And how about demands that did not succeed.  
16. In your opinion, what is the main achievement of decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance? Which positive results in this area could you assign as a 
result or consequence of decentralisation? 
17. The government has been emphasizing in the media and conferences, about the 
savings that is obtained with the purchase of medicines because of economies of 
scale achieved by centralised purchasing. This practice was evident during the 
Cardoso government with the Ministry Jose Serra and has been repeated since then. 
What CONASEMS thinks about it? Is the subject discussed by health secretaries? 
How does it affect the municipal/state autonomy to manage basic pharmaceutical 
assistance? 
18. In your opinion, what could explain the lack of integration between pharmaceutical 
assistance and the changes that were occurring in health care, especially in relation 
to decentralisation since the implementation of SUS? 
19. The government, in 2005, at the same time that regulated the decentralisation of 
resources to purchase medicines for the treatment of diabetes 2 and hypertension 
has expanded the Popular Pharmacy programme to include the community network 
on the distribution of these drugs. In your opinion, what was the justification for 
adopting policies that could be regarded as contradictory, i.e., centralised and 
decentralised programmes to distribute the same drugs? 
 
Characteristics of respondents 
Age: 
Gender: 
Job title: 
Length of time in job: 
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Job specific qualification: 
Set B- State Health Secretaries members of CONASS 
1. What do you understand by the terms “decentralisation” and “recentralisation” in 
the context of basic pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil? 
2. Do you have any thoughts on the extent of pharmaceutical assistance 
decentralisation in recent years? What has changed? 
3. In your view, why was pharmaceutical assistance decentralised? 
4. Who, in your view, had supported or advocated decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance? 
5. Was there anyone against decentralising pharmaceutical assistance?  
6. Who do you think has benefited the most from decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance? 
7. According to your experience, what is the strength of the pharmaceutical assistance 
policy, especially regarding essential drugs? And the main weakness? 
8. Tell me about the State autonomy to manage the pharmaceutical assistance of 
essential drugs. How about municipal autonomy? 
9. How about the access to diabetes type 2 and hypertension drugs: what has changed 
with the decentralisation? 
10. Tell me about the influence/impact of the Popular Pharmacy programme on the 
dynamics of pharmaceutical assistance in municipalities (especially the delivery of 
diabetes type 2 and hypertension drugs). Where there no changes, synergism, 
competition with the private sector, or what else did occur? 
11. Tell me about the states’ participation on the policy-making process of the Popular 
Pharmacy programme? 
12. What is the main issue regarding the access to essential drugs experienced by the 
states? 
13. Tell me about the role of the states regarding essential drugs. Someone could play 
the same role or substitute actions of this government tier? Is the role of the state 
essential for municipalities? How about the federal level? Could the federal role be 
possibly transferred to the states? 
14. Do you have examples of state initiatives or solutions that resulted in changes in 
pharmaceutical assistance policy? And how about demands that did not succeed? 
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15. In your opinion, what is the main achievement of decentralisation of 
pharmaceutical assistance? Which positive results in this area could you think are a 
result (or consequence) of decentralisation? 
16. The government has been emphasizing in the media and conferences, about the 
savings that is obtained with the purchase of medicines because of the economy of 
scale achieved with centralised purchasing. This practice was evident during the 
Cardoso government with the Ministry Jose Serra and has been repeated since then. 
What CONASS think about it? Is the subject discussed by health secretaries? How 
does it affect the state autonomy? 
17. In your opinion, what could explain the lack of integration between pharmaceutical 
assistance and the changes that were occurring in health care, especially in relation 
to decentralisation since the implementation of SUS? 
18. The government, in 2005, at the same time that transferred funds to state and 
municipalities to purchase basic medicines (especially those to treat diabetes 2 and 
hypertension) the federal government has expanded the Popular Pharmacy 
programme to include the private network on the distribution of these drugs. In 
your opinion, what was the justification for adopting policies that could be regarded 
as contradictory, i.e., centralised and decentralised programmes to distribute the 
same drugs? 
19. The CONASS advocates the need for overcoming the fragmentation of 
pharmaceutical assistance. How would this be achieved? Who supports this idea? 
Who opposes? 
 
Characteristics of respondents 
Age: 
Gender: 
Job title: 
Length of time in job: 
Job specific qualification: 
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Set C-Ministry of Health Officials 
1. What do you understand by the terms “decentralisation” and “recentralisation” in 
the context of basic pharmaceutical assistance in Brazil? 
2. Do you have any thoughts on the extent of pharmaceutical assistance 
decentralisation in recent years? What has changed? 
3. In your view, why was pharmaceutical assistance decentralised? 
4. Who, in your view, had supported or advocated decentralisation of basic 
pharmaceutical assistance? 
5. Was there anyone against decentralising pharmaceutical assistance?  
6. Who do you think has benefited the most from decentralisation of pharmaceutical 
assistance? 
7. According to your experience, what is the strength of the pharmaceutical assistance 
policy, especially regarding essential drugs? And the main weakness? 
8. What is the main issue/barrier regarding access to essential drugs? 
9. Tell me about municipalities’ autonomy to manage pharmaceutical assistance of 
essential drugs. How about state autonomy? 
10. The management of essential drugs, especially diabetes type 2 and hypertension is 
made by both, decentralised and centralised programmes. What was the rationale 
for having different strategies for the same drugs?  
11. In your opinion, what could explain the lack of integration between pharmaceutical 
assistance and the changes that were occurring in health care, especially in relation 
to decentralisation since the implementation of SUS? 
12. Tell me about the different programmes and how they affect the pharmaceutical 
assistance. What is the justification for keeping distinct programmes and separate 
sources of funding for the supply of the same drugs, as for example diabetes and 
hypertension? 
13. Much has been said that pharmaceutical assistance is still focused on the 
purchasing and distributing medicines. Who or what is it to blame for [the poor 
outcomes]? 
14. The Popular Pharmacy programme was, firstly, focused on those patients that did 
not use SUS, but that did not have sufficient income to afford to buy the prescribed 
medicines. What has changed [in the programme] and why? 
 
 279 
 
Characteristics of respondents 
Age: 
Gender: 
Job title: 
Length of time in job: 
Job specific qualification: 
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APPENDIX 4 
ACRONYMS 
 
AFB Assistencia Farmacêutica Básica – Basic Pharmaceutical 
Assistance 
CEME Central de Medicamentos – Central of Medicines  
CGU Controladoria Geral da República - Office of the Comptroller 
General 
CNS Conselho Nacional de Saúde - National Health Council 
CIB Comissão Intergestores Bipartite - Bipartite Intergovernmental 
Commission 
CIT Comissão Intergestores Tripartite - Tripartite Intergovernmental 
Commission 
CONASEMS Conselho Nacional de Secretários Municipais de Saúde - National 
Council of Municipal Health Secretaries 
CONASS Conselho Nacional de Secretários Estaduais de Saúde - National 
Council of State Health Secretaries 
COSEMS Conselho de Secretarios Municipais de Saude – Council of 
Municipal Health Secretaries 
DENASUS Departamento Nacional de Auditorias do SUS – National 
Department of Audits of SUS 
FIOCRUZ Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Oswaldo Cruz Foundation 
FPB Farmácia Popular do Brasil - Brazilian Popular Pharmacy 
Programme 
FURP Fundação para o Remédio Popular – Foundation for the Popular 
Medicines 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
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HIPERDIA Programa Hipertensão e Diabetes - Hypertension and Diabetes 
Programme 
IAFB  Incentivo à Assistência Farmacêutica Básica – Basic 
Pharmaceutical Assistance Incentive 
IBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics  
INAMPS  Instituto Nacional de Assistencia e Previdencia Social - National 
Institute of Medical Assistance and Social Care 
IPEA Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - Institute of Applied 
Economic Research  
NMP National Medicines Policy 
NOB Normas Operacionais Basicas - Basic Operating Standards  
NPPA National Policy on Pharmaceutical Assistance – Política Nacional 
de Assistência Farmacêutica 
OSS Organizações Sociais de Saúde - Social Organization of Health 
PAB Piso da Atenção Básica -.Primary Care Quota 
PACS Programa de Agentes Comunitários de Saúde - Community Health 
Agents Programme  
PFB  Programa Farmácia Básica - Basic Pharmacy Program 
PNAD Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio - National Household 
Survey 
POF Pesquisa de Orcamento Familiar - Brazilian Household Budget 
Survey 
PSF Programa Saúde da Família - Family Health Programme 
RENAME Relação Nacional de Medicamentos Essenciais - National Essential 
Medicines List 
REMUME Relação Municipal de Medicamentos Essenciais -Municipal List of 
Essential Medicines 
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SESAB Secretaria de Saúde do Estado da Bahia – Bahia Health State 
Secretary 
SUS Sistema Único de Saúde - Unified Health System 
TCU Tribunal de Contas da Uniao – Court of Accounts of the Union  
UBS Unidade Básica de Saúde – Basic Health Unit 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
WHO   World Health Organization  
